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English Summary
This dissertation is an attempt at reconciling the existing (and until recently predominant) private
law concept of ownership and the property rights espoused by the new constitutional order. The
attempts at land reform in South Africa and Germany are used as specifie examples of the
manner in which the whole property law order in both these legal systems is developed through
legislative and judicial initiative, on the basis of the constitutional provisions concerning
property protection and regulation. The purpose of the investigation is to determine to what
extent constitutional development of the private law of property will result in a property law
order serving the socio-economic and political goals of economic growth and self-fulfilment and
empowerment of the individual. Focus is placed on the influence of the constitutional protection
and regulation of property as a mechanism for developing the private law of ownership in
Germany and South Africa.
In the first part of the exposition, the choice of legal comparison as course of inquiry is
substantiated, and the terminological difficulties connected with an investigation into the
development of the private law of property by the constitutional protection and regulation of
property are discussed. Attention is given to the use of the terms "ownership" and "property" in
the private law and in the constitutional context. The term "tenure" is also discussed in the
context of land reform in South Africa. Further, the usc of terms such as "public interest",
"common weal" and "public purposes" is discussed. The use of these terms are particularly
complicated by the fact that each of them are often used in more than one sense, and that the use
of these di fferent terms overlap to varying extents.
The second part of the exposition contains information on the background of the constitutional
property orders as they arc found in Germany and South Africa.
The drafting histories of the South African and German constitutional property clauses
indicate that in both these legal systems, the constitutional property clauses have hybrid
ideological foundations. Both contain a compromise between, on the one hand, classical
liberalism (which affords the holders of rights a high degree of individual freedom and
autonomy) and, on the other hand, social democracy (which allow stronger regulatory measures,
also upon private properly).
Further, some of the structural aspects connected to constitutional protection and
regulation of property in Germany and South Africa are discussed. The positively phrased
property guarantee in art 14 GG is compared with the negatively phrased "guarantee" of s 25 Fe,
whereby the transitional property guarantee in s 28 JC is also considered. Further, the basic
structure and stages of an inquiry into the constitutional property clause are discussed, with
reference to differences between the German and South African methods. These differences are
not of such a nature that it excludes further comparison. Ilowever, it is necessary to keep the
differences in the judicial system in mind when conducting a comparison of the present nature.
Therefore, a brief overview of the judicial systems of Germany and South Africa is provided,
with specific reference to the manner in which the courts resolved certain property questions.
The principles underlying the constitutional orders of Germany and South Africa are also
discussed with specific reference to their significance for the treatment of property issues. In
particular, the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and the social wei fare state
(Sozialstaat) for the solution of problems connected to property is discussed. It is indicated that
the legitimacy of the legal order in general and property law in particular, depends on the degree
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of success in the implementation of these values. Further, it is indicated that the implementation
of these values also determines the importance of private property and/or regulation thereof in a
specific legal system.
In the third part of the exposition, the relevance of the constitutional protection and regulation
for the private law of ownership is discussed.
The expansion of the concept of property by the application of a "purely" constitutional
definition thereof raises the question as to the continued relevance of the private law concept of
ownership. This issue is discussed with reference to the protection of property in terms of the
constitution in comparison with the scope of property in private law. It is indicated that the
"exclusively constitutional" concept of property is by no means based only on Constitutional
law. The role of the private law concept of ownership in a constitutional order is then elucidated.
The discussion then turns to an analysis of the limitations on property endorsed by the
constitutional order. Two main kinds of limitation are possible: (i) limitation of property through
vertical operation of the constitution (ie a broad category of legislative and administrative
deprivation (regulation), and a more specialised category, namely expropriations), and (ii)
limitation through horizontal operation of the constitution (ie through the inroads allowed on
property rights by the protection of other rights in the Bill of Rights). It is indicated that the
application of the public interest / public purposes requirements are sometimes intended to
protect individual interest above those of society in general. In other cases, the public interest /
public purposes requirement is aimed at securing the interests of the society at large. Further, it is
indicated that the purpose of constitutional "interference" in the area of private property law is to
correct imbalances in the relations among private persons which are regarded by the law as
"equals," even if they are not equal for all practical purposes.
The fourth part of the exposition concentrates on the land reform programmes in Germany (after
the reunification of 1990) and South Africa (since 1991) in order to analyse the attempts by the
legislature and judiciary to give effect to the improved property order as anticipated by
constitutional development of property. In both Germany and South Africa political changes
made land reform programmes essential:
In South Africa the land reform programme was introduced to reverse the injustices
created by colonialism and apartheid. A tripartite programme is employed for this purpose. The
new kinds of land rights created through this system of land reform are indicated. The manner in
which this body of law is treated by the courts is also analysed with reference to its relevance for
the development of Property Law in general.
In Germany a property and land reform programme became necessary with the
reunification. On the one hand, the socialist property order in the former GDR had to be replaced
by the property order already existing in the FGR, and on the other hand the individual claims
for restitution of the land and enterprises taken by the GDR state or its Soviet predecessor had to
be balanced against the claims that present occupiers of such land have to it. The influence of
legislation and litigation connected to these issues on the development of Property Law is
discussed.
The final part of the exposition is a summary of the conclusions drawn during the course of the
analysis.
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Afrikaanse Opsomming
In 'n poging om in hierdie uiteensetting die bestaande (en tot onlangs nog oorheersende)
privaatregtelike begrip "eiendom" te versoen met die breër eiendomsbegrip wat deur die nuwe
grondwetlike bestel gepropageer word, word die grondhervormingsprogramme in Suid Afrika en
Duitsland gebruik as voorbeelde van die wyse waarop die bestaande Eiendomsreg in beide
regsisteme deur die wetgewer en die howe ontwikkel word. Die doel van die ondersoek is om
vas te stel tot watter mate die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg sal
bydra tot die totstandkoming van 'n eiendomsregtelike regsorde waarin die sosio-ekonomiese en
politieke doelwitte van ekonomiese groei en die vrye ontwikkeling en bemagtiging van die
individu gedien word. Die klem word geplaas op die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van
eiendom as 'n meganisme waardeur die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg in Duitsland en Suid-
Afrika ontwikkel kan word.
Die eerste deel van die uiteensetting begrond die keuse van regsvergelying as metode van analise
en bespreek die terminologiese probleme wat in 'n ondersoek na die grondwetlike ontwikkeling
van die privaatregtelike eiendomsreg kan opduik. Aandag word gegee aan die gebruik van
begrippe wat verband hou met eiendom en publieke belang in sowel die privaatreg as in die
grondwetlike konteks. Die gebruik van verskillende terme, veral in Engels, kan problematies
wees, en daarom word dit breedvoeriger bespreek.
In die tweede deel van die uiteensetting word die agtergrond waarteen die grondwetlike bestelle
van Duitsland en Suid-Afrika funksioneer, bespreek:
Eers word die formulering van die eiendomsklousules in Suid-Afrika en Duitsland vanuit
'n historiese perspektief ondersoek. In beide regsisteme is die grondwetlike eiendomsklousules
op 'n kompromis tussen verskillende ideologieë gebaseer. Enersyds op klassieke liberalisme, in
terme waarvan eienaars en ander reghebbendes 'n hoë mate van individuele vryheid en
outonomie toegeken word; andersyds op sosiaal-demokratiese denke, in terme waarvan strenger
regulerende maatreëls (ook op privaat eiendom) geduld moet word.
Dan word sommige van die strukturele aspekte verbonde aan die grondwetlike
beskerming en regulering van eiendom in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek. Die positief
geformuleerde eiendomswaarborg in art 14 GG word vergelyk met die negatiewe formulering in
art 25 FG en die positiewe waarborg in art 28 lG. Verder word die basiese struktuur en fases van
'n grondwetlike ondersoek in die beskerming en regulering van eiendom bespreek, met spesifieke
verwysing na die verskille in die Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse benaderings. Hierdie verskille is nie
van so 'n aard dat dit regsvergelyking kortwiek nie. Nogtans is dit noodsaaklik dat die
benaderingsverskille in ag geneem word vir 'n meer diepgaande vergelyking. Daarom word 'n
vlugtige oorsig oor die rol van die howe in die hantering van eiendomsvraagstukke in
grondwetlike konteks verskaf.
Verder word die beginsels onderliggend aan die grondwetlike bestelle in Duitsland en
Suid-Afrika bespreek met spesifieke verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die beskerming en
regulering van eiendom. Daar word veral klem gelê op die regstaat- en sosiaalstaatbeginsels. Die
legitimi teit van die regsorde in die algemeen, en meer spesifiek die Eiendomsreg, hang af van die
mate van sukses waarmee hierdie beginsels in die gemeenskap geïmplementeer word. Daar word
verder aangedui dat die toepassing van hierdie beginsels die mate van individuele vryheid in die
uitoefening van eiendomsreg en/of die graad van regulering van eiendomsreg in 'n bepaalde
regstelsel bepaal.
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Die derde deel van die uiteensetting konsentreer op die betekenis van die grondwetlike
beskerming en regulering van eiendom vir die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg.
Die uitgebreide eiendomsbegrip wat in die grondwetlike konteks aangewend word, gee
aanleiding tot die vraag na die sin van 'n voortgesette enger eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg.
Hierdie kwessie word bespreek met verwysing na die beskerming van eiendom in terme van die
grondwet, en word vergelyk met die omvang van die eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Daar
word aangedui dat die sogenaamde uitsluitlik grondwetlike eiendomsbegrip geensins eksklusief
aan die Grondwetlike Reg is nie. Die rol van die privaatregtelike eiendomsbegrip in 'n
grondwetlike bestel word vervolgens uiteengesit.
Verder word die beperkings op eiendom in die grondwetlike konteks geanaliseer. In
beginsel is twee soorte beperkings regverdigbaar: (i) Beperking van eiendomsreg deur die
vertikale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die breër kategorie wetgewende en
administratiewe ontnemings (regulerings) van eiendomsreg en deur 'n enger en meer spesifieke
kategorie, naamlik onteiening; en (ii) beperking van eiendomsreg deur horisontale aanwending
van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die inbreuk op eiendomsregte wat toegelaat word as gevolg van
die uitwerking van die beskerming van ander regte in die Handves vir Menseregte. Daar word
aangedui dat die vereiste van publieke belang in twee teenoorstaande opsigte gebruik word:
Enersyds om die individuele belang bo dié van die gemeenskap te stel, en andersyds om die
gemeenskap se belange as sulks te beskerm. Daar word ook aangedui dat grondwetlike
"inmenging" met privaatregtelike eiendomsreg daarop gemik is om ongebalanseerdhede in die
regsverhoudings tussen persone wat deur die reg as "gelykes" bejeën word en in effek nie gelyk
is nie, uit te skakel.
In die vierde deel van die uiteensetting word die grondhervormingsprogramrne in Duitsland
(sedert hervereniging in 1990) en Suid-Afrika (sedert 1991) bespreek. Die klem val op die
pogings van die wetgewer en howe om die verbeterde eiendomsbestel, soos wat dit in die
grondwet in die vooruitsig gestel word, te konkretiseer. In beide regstelsels het politieke
veranderinge 'n grondhervormingsprogram onontbeerlik gemaak:
Die grondhervormingsprogram in Suid-Afrika het ten doelom die ongeregtighede in die
grondbesitstelsel wat ontstaan het as gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid uit te skakel. Vir dié
doel berus die grondhervormingsprogram op drie verwante, maar uiteenlopende, beginsels. Die
nuwe vorme van grondregte wat uit hierdie sisteem ontstaan, word aangedui, en die wyse waarop
hierdie deel van die reg deur die howe hanteer word, word bespreek met verwysing na die
betekenis daarvan vir die ontwikkeling van die Eiendomsreg.
In Duitsland is die noodwendigheid van 'n grondhervormingsprogram aan die
hervereniging van die DDR en die BRD gekoppel. Die sosialisties-georienteerde eiendomsbestel
wat in die "oostelike" deel van Duitsland aanwending gevind het, moes vervang word deur die
bestel wat reeds in die "westelike" deel van die "nuwe" staat in werking was. Verder moet die
grondeise van persone wat grond of besigheidseiendom verloor het gedurende die sosialistiese
regeringstyd en die voorafgaande Sowjetiese besetting, opgeweeg word teen die aansprake wat
huidige besitters op sulke grond het. Die invloed van wetgewing en regspraak hieroor op die
Eiendomsreg word geanaliseer.
Die laaste deel van die uiteensetting bevat 'n samevatting van die gevolgtrekkings wat deur die
loop van die analise gemaak is.
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enough lo go around, not enough cars, shoes, cigarettes. Too many people,
too few things. What there is must go into circulation, so that everyone can
have a chance to be happy for a day. That is the theory; hold to the theory
and to the comforts of theory.
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[1] Introduction
1. An introduction to the basic problems
Before a new constitutional era dawned on South Africa, the general notions accepted as
portraying legal reality best were that private law regulated the acquisition, protection and
transfer of private property and that public law regulated the liberty and equality of citizens. The
inclusion of the property clauses in the chapters on fundamental rights of the Interim
Constitution' and Final Constitution' challenged tbis point of departure.' More specifically, tbe
reference to public purpose and the public interest as justification for expropriation of property
and land reform in the Final Constitution" raised questions about the acceptability of the existing
scheme of law pertaining to landownership.
In a post-colonial, post-apartheid era, South African COIIIIIIOIl laws finds itself at the crossroads
as new legal developments endeavour to follow and/or shape the changes in society." From the
perspective of private law, the imminent question is what impact the constitutional provisions
I S 28 (Interim) Constitution Act 200 of 1993.
2 S 25 (Final) Constitution, 1996.
l The words Interim or Transitional usually denote the Constitution Act 200 of 1993, which was always intended as
a temporary measure to be replaced within two years, whereas with the Filial Constitution is usually meant
Act 108 of 1996, which is intended to be of lasting application, even if amended from time to time and therefore not
"final" in the absolute sense of the word. Cf Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux
New Land Law (1998) ch I, 4 n 2. With reference to the erroneous numbering of the Final Constitution as "Act 108
of 1996", see Van Wyk 1997 TI/RIIR 378 - 379, where it is explained that the Final Constitution, not being a
parliamentary statute, should not have been regarded as part of the body of statutory law accepted by parliament
annually and numbered accordingly. The Interim Constitution was numbered as "act 200 of 1993" because it was
technically and formally adopted by rhe three-cameral parliament, as opposed to a constitutional assembly
speci fically appointed for this purpose. The Final Constitution has been adopted on II October 1996 (after initial
rejection of the constitutional text by the Constitutional Court) by the constitutional assembly, which existed
independently from parliament. (For a discussion of the certification of the constitution by the Constitutional Court,
see Malherbe 1997 TSAR 356 - 370.) The constitutional assembly also had one spesific assignment: the adoption of
the Final Constitution in the manner prescribed by the Interim Constitution. This indicates that reference to the Final
Constitution should not support the erroneous numbering thereof. Consequently, further reference to the Final
Constitution in this work will ignore the numbering and will simply be indicated with the abbreviation "FC" after a
specific section. For the sake of consistency, reference to the Interim Constitution will be indicated with the
abbreviation "IC" after a specific section.
4 S 25 FC; cfin particular s 25(4) FC.
S The usc or the terms common law and civil law is problematic in the South African context. The term COli/III Oil law
usually refers to the legal systems in England. Wales and Ireland, which have traditionally been perceived as
"nourishing in splendid isolation from those on the European continent." With the term civil law reference is made
to the legal systems on the European continent, which are, to a larger or lesser extent, influenced by the reception of
Roman law in these systems. South Africa has a so-called mixed legal system, as a result of its peculiar colonial
history, where at first the Dutch province of Holland and later the British Empire enjoyed a particularly influential
position with regard to governmental structure and legal regime. A mixed jurisdiction lies at the intersection, so to
speak, or civil law and common law. (Apart from South Africa, also Scotland, Quebec, Louisiana, Sri Lanka,
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Zimbabwe arc categorised as mixed jurisdictions.ï Therefore, the
South African COII/IlIOII law differs in content somewhat from its English counterpart. Zimmermann & Visser
"Introduction" in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 2 - 3; Beekhuis, Lawson, Knapp in Lawson
(chief cd) VI (2) tECL 2-247 - 2-252.
(, Van der Walt 1998 THRHR 401.
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pertaining to property have on the existing law of property. Prior to the advent of transformation,
the land law - in its material form constituting numerous politically inspired statutes 7 - was
simply the most visible embodiment of apartheid and racial discrimination' Many opponents of
apartheid wanted to get rid not only of the race laws, but also of the existing land law as such,"
and vociferously claimed its replacement by a new system of land rights reflecting the ideals of
justice and equality under a new constitutional order. No wonder that the South African private
law of property had suffered a legitimacy crisis.'?
Those who did not want to throw out the Roman-Dutch law baby with the dirty apartheid water,
argued that the "pure" common law (that is to say the uncodified Roman-Dutch law) was already
an embodiment of the required principles of justice and equality. I I Stripped from the stigma it
gathered through legislative alterations, the common law could, according to this argument,
serve a post-apartheid society well. The problem with this approach is that a continued reliance
on the Roman-Dutch law could impede the development of a "properly constitutional"
fundamental rights practice and the promotion of land reform.12 Concepts like reconciliation,
reconstruction and development, as well as the notion of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental
rights, will cause the South African society to continually scrutinise the legitimacy of the
existing common law order.l '
7 .
Eg Blacks' Land Act 27 of 1913; Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936; and the Group Areas
Acts (41 of 1950, 77 of 1957 and 36 of 1966). All these acts were repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based Land
Measures Act 108 of 1991.
8 Van der Walt "Future" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 22.
9 Some authors believed that nationalisation of property would be the adequate solution. Cf Marcus 1990 SAJHR
178 - 194; also Skweyiya 1990 SAJHR 195 - 214. However, the debate about transformation of the property law
order in South Africa took place more or less simultaneously with the fall of socialism in Eastern Europe. This made
it difficult for most scholars to take calls for nationalisation of property in an old-fashioned socialist manner
seriously. Van der Walt "Future" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 29; cf in particular Robertson 1992
SAJHR 215 - 227.
10 South African land law as a source for the bitterness and scepticism had several facets: The unfair distribution of
land under "grand apartheid" (ie the spatial separation of the different races under the policy of "separate
development") resulted, first, in overcrowding, overgrazing and overcultivation of agricultural land. This caused
serious environmental damage and generated controlled urbanisation with the purpose of providing mines and
industries with cheap labour. In the second place it reduced the activities of all "black" farmers to subsistence
farming (due to acute shortage of land, financing and agricultural markets, as well as the inability to procure
agricultural land in "white" areas because of prohibitory legislation). Furthermore, as the indigenous land law was
also used by the apartheid government as an instrument to subordinate blacks, the general disregard for the
traditional (civilian) property law also spilled over to this legal sphere. Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 17.
Finally the statutorily implemented forced removal and resettlement of millions of people in areas according to
population group contributed to the growing mistrust in and despise of the existing property law system by the
majority of the population. The "colossal social experiment" of separate development (as it was described by the
Appellate Division of the South African Supreme Court in Minister of the Interior v Loekhat 1961 2 SA 587 (A)
602D) resulted in, first, transport problems for especially people from "non-white" groups, usually situated outside
urban areas and, second, in criminal prosecutions for residential occupation outside the specially demarcated areas.
Van der Walt 1995_TSAR 515 - 517; Letsoalo Land Reform in South Africa (1987) 3 - 7; 32 - 35.
II Van der Walt "Future" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 22 (but contrast Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR
171). Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 13, in spite of his criticism of the "colonialist" system of private
property promoted by the legal system, shows that "this system of property has been sufficiently indigenised to
provide it with 'legitimacy' in the new Africa."
12 Van derWalt 1998 THRHR418.
13 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 171.
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Even if it is assumed that an equitable solution to the problems created by apartheid land law can
only be found in constitutional law, the basic dilemma does not disappear. A compromise still
needs to be worked out between property as an instrument for giving effect to individual freedom
and property as an instrument for effecting social equality. If the private law of property would
continue to exist unaltered, the unequal distribution of property would remain unchanged and the
political and economic inequality present in the South African system would persist. However,
private ownership and the security of title coupled with it under private law cannot simply be
disregarded for the sake of socio-economic transformation. After an, security of title is an
important component of stable socio-economic relations.
This dissertation is an attempt at reconciling the existing (and until recently predominant) private
law concept of ownership and the property rights espoused by the new constitutional order
against the background of the land reform programme, in particular the attempts at restitution
and redistribution of land in South Africa. The focal point of the exposition will be the influence
of the constitutional protection and regulation of property on the private law of ownership, An
investigation that affords primary importance to the system of fundamental rights, and which
takes governmental policy programmes into account, could provide new insights into the
continued relevance or altered significance of the common law concept of landownership in
South Africa. It might also be useful in determining the basis of rights created in terms of the
new political dispensation, specifically with regard to access to land, and restitution and
redistribution of land. Thus, the legal development of the private law of property could be
sustained by a paradigm that takes the dictates of the constitution into account.
Such an investigation is also interesting from another perspective. The institution of ownership is
meaningful only in relation to the nature of the specific society in which it operates. As such, the
scope and content of property rights will always be dependent on the needs of a specific society
at a specific point in time, This mostly means that property rights cannot exist in isolation.
Moreover, property rights are almost never really absolute in nature. Both in private and
constitutional law the scope of these rights is restricted, albeit on different levels. From a private
law perspective, property rights are restricted on a "horizontal" level by the rights and interests of
third parties. From a constitutional perspective, the scope of a person's property rights is
determined by considering limitations in tbe public interest; that is, on a vertical level vis-a-vis
the state authority. The interaction of private law and public law limitations of property rights
has received little scholarly attention thus far and deserves to be discussed.
2.1. Motivation
At first glance, it seems inevitable that new legal developments initiated by the introduction of
an entrenched bill of rights might be incompatible with the property rights enforceable in terms
of the South African common law. It is not easy to find viable solutions to undo those injustices
that occurred during the apartheid era as a result of forced removals and expropriations for the
sake of implementing the policy of racial segregation.
4
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It is, however, important to make an attempt at satisfying the expectations in this regard, and at
finding solutions to the socio-political and legal problems that have arisen because of the
injustices of the past. An effort of reconciling the notion of fundamental rights (which goes hand
in hand with a modern, constitutional state), land reform (which is an imperative of the South
African constitutional property clause") and common law (which is the uncodified South
African private law rooted in the Roman-Dutch tradition and influenced in some respects by the
English common law and the German Pandectists)," is important for the establishment of a
legitimate new constitutional order. In such a process, at least some of the injustices of the past
could be undone.
2.2. Legal comparison
The extent to which public interest determines how an individual owner is protected in the
enjoyment of rights and entitlements pertaining to his or her ownership, is not an issue peculiar
to the South African context. Germany was, for instance, confronted with similar problems after
the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic."
The German and South African priorities pertaining to the formulation of a dynamic concept of
ownership are, however, linked to the unique historical developments in the respective legal
systems. Nevertheless, the process of reformulation and alteration of ownership theory in both
systems correspond with each other, in spite of the fact that circumstances that have given rise to
these developments in both systems were markedly different.
In South Africa, the transformation of the existing property law must take place as a result of
constitutional reform, and has the objective of ensuring security of land tenure, restitution of
dispossessed property and equitable access to land." By contrast, the German civil law concept
of ownership underwent a gradual adaptation through the decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) and the
Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). The "social responsibility" embodied
in the notion of ownership has been a factor considered by the German judiciary practically from
the moment the Basic Law came into force.'! More recently, during the process of reunification,
this "social function" of ownership also influenced the drafting of legislation aimed at
reconciling the property systems of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic."
Lessons from German law in the regulation and protection of property, the restitution of property
expropriated in the eastern part of Germany during the time of Soviet occupation and German
Democratic rule, and in the treatment of such cases by the courts could be a fruitful basis for
14 Cfs 25(4) - (9) FC.
15 Carey-Miller "Revision of Priorities in South African Land Law" in Barry (ed) Proceedings of the Conference on
Land Tenure (1998) 50; Online at http://www.gtz.de/orbodenicapetownicape09.htm [27.05.2000].
16 Cf 358 et seq infra.
17 S 25(4) - (9) FC.
18 Eg BVerfGE 1,264 (Schornsteinfeger), handed down in 1952.
19 Cf 363 et seq infra.
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legal comparison. In this manner, legal-comparative research may contribute to finding solutions
to the problems related to the regulation and protection of property and to land reform,
redistribution and restitution under the South African constitutional order. Through legal
comparison, a property model that serves the socio-economic and political goals of individual
development, societal empowerment and economic growth could be developed. In this
exposition, the insights to be gained from the constitutional protection and regulation of property
rights by the German legislature and judiciary, and their relevance for the development of a
South African property theory which could be employed as an instrument of refonn,2o will take
central stage.
2.3. Delimitation
A focus on the constitutional development of the concept of ownership can, at best, provide only
a partial explanation of the intricate system of social, political and historical relations
underpinning the legal concept of ownership. For a better understanding of the structure of the
legal institution of ownership in both Germany and South Africa, it would be necessary to
conduct an in-depth socio-political and historical analysis of the development of this concept in
both legal systems. Unfortunately this would go beyond the scope of the current exposition. The
primary focus of the thesis is to place into context, from a constitutional perspective, the
protection of property rights, expropriation of property and land reform. The discussion of
different theories on property" and of the Roman concept of ownership,22 which lies at the root
of the civilian concept of ownership as it is known in both Germany and South Africa, will be
confined to the rudimentary.
20 Cf Munzer A Theory a/Property (1990) 469.
21 A useful overview over the different theories on property relevant for the South African context can be found in
the trilogy of articles by Van der Walt (1995 TSAR 15 - 42; 322 - 345,493 - 526).
22 Among the authoritative sources on the historical development of ownership are: Kaser Eigenrum (1943); Diosdi
Ownership ill Ancient and Pre-Classical Romall Law (1970); Schultz Classical Roman Law (1951) 334 - 380 Cf
also Daube "Fashions and Idiosyncracies in the Exposition of the Roman Law of Property" in Cohen & Simon (ed)
Collected Studies in Roman Law Il (1991) 1325 - 1339. Van der Walt Houerskap Doctoral Dissertation (1985)
provides an extensive analysis of the historical development of ownership in relation to the concept of holdership
from ancient Roman Law, Germanic Law, Medieval Canon Law through the developments in Germany, the
Netherlands and France of the sixteenth century and thereafter, and the reception of the Roman Law in Holland and
its application in South Africa. Hëft OJlentlichrechrliche Eigentumsbeschriinkungen Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation (1952) analyses the public law limitations on ownership in Roman Law by using the example of
building laws and regulations. This is particularly interesting for the question as to the meaning of common good or
public weal in Roman Law pertaining to property. Not only does it provide insight into the 1110resgoverning Roman
society pertaining lo the individual freedom and autonomy of the "owners," bul also, and more importantly, it
indicates that the restrictions on ownership for the sake of the common good existing in the various eras were
generally quite extensive (72). The restrictions by public building law being least extensive in the classical era of
Roman Law, the conclusion is made that the development of limitations to ownership within private law itself made
public law restrictions less important (73). On the restriction of the ownership concept, cf also Birks 1985 Acta
Juridica 1 - 37. For the South African context, cf Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 - 35, 306 - 325; Visser 1985 Acta
Juridica 39 - 52; Van der Merwe 1998 TSAR I - 19; Van der Walt 1998 THRHR 400 - 422; Van der Walt 1986
THRJIR 305 - 321; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 - 589. For an overview of the development of ownership in
German law, cfOlzen 1984 JuS 328 - 335.
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3. Practical significance of research
The aim of this thesis is to determine the extent to which existing rights should yield to the new
political policies in property reform legislation and the basis of new rights created by property
reform legislation. In this regard it will be of specific interest to examine the extent to which
individual property interests could be limited or expanded by the ability of a democratically
legitimised legislature to interfere with private property interests in the general interest of the
public. The extent to which a social responsibility is incorporated into the institution of
ownership could also be clarified.
This might, however, create the impression that this research would be simply theoretical and of
little importance to the practice of property law in South Africa. On the contrary, a consistent
interpretation of the constitutional property clause is practically impossible if the fundamental
dogmatic principles on which it is based are unclear or confusing. The purpose of this exposition
is to evaluate the current developments in property law in order to determine whether they could
serve the socio-economic and political goals of development of individual self-esteem, societal
empowerment and economic growth.
Moreover, jurisdictions with longer histories of constitutional property protection than that of
South Africa have demonstrated that the harmonisation of individual property rights and the
public interest is one of the main issues in judicial evaluation of the state's interference in social
or economic matters.P The results of the legal-comparative analysis will be specifically targeted
at providing guidelines to the South African judiciary (that has to interpret the constitutional and
ordinary legislative directives pertaining to property law reform) and the administration (that has
to apply these directives).
4. Inquiry outline
In the following chapters, the existing private law of ownership in both Germany and South
Africa will be contrasted with the status of property under the constitutions of these countries. A
detailed analysis of the various stages of inquiry into property issues under these constitutions
will indicate how the present concepts of ownership in Germany and South Africa have been or
will be influenced under a system of constitutional supremacy. Particular attention will be given
to the extent to which the existing institution of ownership has been adjusted - in the public
interest - by the social function of ownership embodied in the constitutional guarantee of
property rights.
The restitution processes, both in Germany and in South Africa, will then be discussed as
examples of property law reform. As such, the possibility of a new category of adjustments to
the private law concept of ownership, apart from the already existing private law limitations, will
be considered. However, before embarking on this inquiry, the advantages and disadvantages of
23 Von Brunneck Die Eigentumsgarantie des Grundgesetzes (1984) 15.
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the chosen analytical method, and the terminological difficulties that could be encountered in the
course of the analysis will be assessed.
8
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1. Possible terminological difficulties
Terms such as property, ownership and public interest are not unknown. In fact, they are widely
used, not only in the technical language of various legal disciplines, but also in ordinary
language. These concepts also differ to various degrees from one society to the other. As Birks
remarksr'"
"The acquisition and enjoyment of wealth is a social phenomenon, which means at the simplest that it
goes on, not in isolation, but in a context in which a plurality of people with competing interests, have
to live in physical proximity. The very language of ownership implies the presence of others, albeit
others who are to be excluded. It is observable that at different times and places different
arrangements are made for locating the selfish drive for wealth and material security in the context of
society as a whole."
This statement explains why concepts like property and public interest is so extraordinarily
difficult to define. The following paragraphs will indicate the problems that could be
experienced with these terms in legal-comparative research.
2. Ownership and property
Ownership and property are the central concepts in an investigation of the constitutional
moulding of structures from private law. The meanings of these terms depend on their functions
in both private and constitutional law. Without embarking on a detailed analysis of either of
these terms, the following introductory statements will attempt to clarify the use of these terms in
the rest of this work.
2.1. Ideological concept
Inboth Germany and South Africa, ownership is an important legal-sociological institution. On the
one hand it recognises the private relationships between individuals in a given community in a
unique way. On the other hand it also recognises the relations between persons and state institutions
regarding the control over specific patrimonial objects. In both the German and South African legal
systems, the essential function of the institution of ownership is to preserve and propagate the
interests of individuals, albeit on different levels. Therefore ownership will continue to shape the
structure of society as long as the individual remains the most important basic constructive element
of society.v' Together with agreement, the institution of ownership forms the basis of the modem
world economy, and together with labour, property is the constitutive element of modem
patrimonial law"
24 Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 23.
25 Bixio "Property Ownership and Social Concern" in Ferrari (ed) Laws and Rights (1991) 969.
26 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 169 - 170.
.,
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The perception of ownership, nevertheless, differs from one society to the other, depending on the
political, juridical and economic systems of the various communities, Even within a single
community, proprietary relations are transitory in nature: They are not ready-made, fixed or
predetermined.t' Almost like languages, proprietary relations are changeable and are indeed
changed as soon as they can no longer meet the needs and interests of the members of the
community." Since political theories incorporate ownership in their dogmatic structures, the legal-
technical aspects of the ownership concept are furthermore almost invariably ideologically tainted"
The fact that the concept of ownership and property is inextricably linked to the social and
political ideologies underlying a specific legal system, renders a universal definition practically
impossible, A definition of ownership and property would, therefore, depend on the specific area
of investigation, as well as on the prevailing socio-political convictions in the legal systems
under scrutiny, In the legal context, attempts at defining the institution of ownership are further
complicated by the use of more than one term for the description of more-or-less similar
concepts, or the use of a single term for two or more different concepts.
2,2. Legal concept
Different factors make a juridical definition of property and ownership difficult. On the one
hand, the inconsistent use of terms denoting proprietary relations in legal English could cause
unnecessary hair-splitting, For example, in the First Protocol to the European Convention on
Human Rights30 mention is made of possessions in the first paragraph of the English text,"
whereas the word property" is used in the second paragraph, The German version of the
document treats both these terms as Eigenturn. These differences have, for instance, resulted in
two decisions of the European Court of Justice to the effect that, although different terms are
used, one and the same meaning is inrended.f
27 Cf Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 161; Pienaar 1986 TSAR 303 - 306; Van der Walt
1988 De Jure 17 - 18; Domanski 1989 THRHR 433 - 443; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction (1996) 55; Gutto
Property and Land Reform (1995) Il;
28 Beekhuis, Lawson, Knapp in Lawson (chief ed) VI (2) IECL 2-273 - 2-284 provide a valuable overview of the
"grammar" of property law in the different societies, They remark that the differences between property law in
various jurisdictions, even within a specific ideological class, can perhaps best be explained in a general way by
saying that the various grammars of property law have, like linguistic grammar, been worked out in order to
describe and regularise the habitual ways of dealing with problems which predominated in different societies and at
different periods,
29 Van Maanen 1993 Recht & Kritiek 74,
30 Art I, First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject 10 the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law, '" The preceding
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties," Emphasis added,
31 The French equivalent is biens,
J2 Propriété in the French text.
13 Frowein & Peukert Europiiische MellschenrechtskollllentiOIl-Kommentar (1996) 766 mn 3, Handyside decision
EuGRZ 1977,38 par 62; March decision ELlGRZ 1979,454 par 63,
10
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
{2j Terminology
On the other hand, the different terms used in English are sometimes used to denote different
concepts. In German, like in Afrikaans, one word is generally used with reference to both
ownership and property in the private law sense. Eigentum in German and eiendom in Afrikaans
refer to both the right of ownership as well as the object of such a right. Then again, the English
term property is employed differently in public law and in private law. This makes the English
terminology of property law rather confusing.
2.2.1. Private law terminology
Van der Walt and Pienaar34 have indicated that the term property in its "ordinary sense" refers to
a wide variety of assets that make up a person's estate or belongings and which serve as objects
of the rights that such a person exercises in respect thereof. In legal English, however, the word
property is a complex term, the exact meaning of which can only be defined in the context in
which it is used. Kleyn and Boraine35 explain that, even when it is reduced to its most elementary
components, property has two different meanings. It will always signify two distinct legal
concepts: (i) property as the right of ownership in a thing and (ii) property as the thing to which
this right relates.
(i) Property as the right of ownership implies a relation of a specific person to a specific
object of patrimonial interest. It furthermore implies a relation between a specific person (the
holder of the right to ownership) and third parties. The latter can be prohibited from infringing
the entitlements of the former to the object." Further, ownership can usually be distinguished in
certain respects from other kinds of rights: It is the only real right that the person can have with
regard to his or her own object. 37 The term real right refers to the right of a person to a specific
kind of object of patrimonial interest, the res.38 Res is generally accepted to refer to perceptible
and tangible (corporeal) assets only. Various kinds of real rights over res exist, but ownership is
usually perceived to be the most extensive of these rights. Other real rights are iura in re
alienai" because they pertain to the res of somebody other than the holder of the right. Thus,
ownership is described as that real right which provides the subject with potentially the most
complete and comprehensive control over an object. In contrast, other real rights are merely
34 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction (1996) 17. They continue by explaining (at 18) that a person's assets consist
partly of tangible, perceptible parts and partly of non-tangible or non-perceptible parts like creditor's rights in terms
of a contract, copyright in respect of a book etc.
35 Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 1. To prevent confusion, the first legal concept to
which Kleyn and Boraine refer, that is to say "the right of ownership in a thing," will be described in this work as
ownership and the second legal concept, or rather lithe thing to which this right relates," as property in its narrow
sense, or by means of the Latin term, res. Within the constitutional context, the term property will be used, but here
in its broader sense, that is to say including all patrimonial interests qualifying for protection under the constitutions.
36 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 17; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 61 - 63.
37 Ie ius in re sua (in re propria).
38 Ie thing.
39 Ie rights that persons or legal subjects hold with regard to the res of other legal subjects. Van der Merwe
Sakereg 69; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 17.
Il
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limited to a few specific entitlements regarding an object of another." However, this explanation
is rather superficial and prone to criticism. This will be indicated in the course of this thesis.
(ii) The term property as object of a right" was, in the private law context," limited - for
scientific purposes - to denote corporeal res only.43 In fact, preference is given to the terms
things or res when denoting the object of the right in private law, as an inconsiderate use of this
term creates confusion between references to a person's patrimony or assets in general and
references to perceptible and tangible assets only. The word properly is even regarded by some
as a "foreign" term as far as private property law is concerned." This explains why some authors
refrain from referring to this part of the law as "property law," and prefer the term "the law of
things. ,,45 The word saak in Afrikaans and the term die Sactie in German both describe the object
of the owner's right and correlate with the use of the term property in its narrow private law
sense (meaning: thing / res). Traditionally it was defined very broadly in Roman law." Roman-
Duteh law47 and South African law.48 However, limiting property to corporeal res was
apparently the only way in which real rights could be distinguished from other subjective
rights." This induces Van der Merwe'" to declare that, in the law of property, the object of a real
right is not as important as the absolute effect of il. This enabled a definition of real rights as
those rights that provide the legal subject with direct physical control over a legal object.
Nevertheless, several examples from legal practice indicate that incorporeal objects to real rights
do indeed exist." Moreover, in the constitutional context this definition becomes problematic.
40 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 17; Van der Merwe Sakereg 171. Cf 119 Cl seq infra.
41 When used in the sense of "things" (res) as in the second context described by Kleyn and Boraine (ie "the object
10 which the right of ownership relates").
42 le with reference to res / thing.
4) Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 63.
44 Van del' Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 53 n 84.
-IS Cf Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 5 - 7; critical explanation in Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg &
Schoeman (1992) 2.
46 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 20. Although the Roman lex IS do not contain a comprehensive definition of res, il
is indicated in the lnstitutiones of Gaius I 8 that things (ic res) included everything that the private law look
cognisance of other than persons and actions. This includes corporeals as well as incorporeals. Van der Merwe
LAWSA XXVI! par lol.
47 Grotius' Illleidinge 2 I 3 described property (Zake,,) as objects which are external lo and useful in any way lo
mankind. Van der Keessel Praelectiones ad Grotius 2 I 3 adds that objects that are useful and valuable to mankind,
except persons and actions, arc regarded as things. Veet's definition is even more broadly phrased and includes
"omne id de quo ius dicitur" - "everything of which the law lakes cognisance." Elementa JIlris 2 I I. Cf Van der
Merwe I.A WSA XXVII par 14 and the accompanying notes for a more detailed discussion.
4K These definitions tend to equate the notion of property (I'c.\') with that of legal object. cr Maasdorp's Instill/tes
vol 2 I "The term property (res) is applied in law to everything with respect lo which one person may be entitled to a
right and another person to a duty." Van der Merwe LAWSA XXVII par 14 n Il. Lee uses Voot's definition in his
Romall Dutch Law 120; but warns that il is "unprofitable to labour 10 define what is scarcely definable." Van der
Merwe Sakereg (1989) 21 n 9.
I~ Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 21, 22. Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) II argued
that, if the definition of res would not be limited to corporeal things only, "it would mean that a right can also be the
object of a right which is regarded as illogical, inconsistent and jurisprudentially impossible."
50 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 23.
SI A usufruct, for instance, can be created and registered in connection with registered mineral rights. Van der
Merwe LA WSA XXV!! par 14 n 21. Likewise, a registered long-term lease, a registered persona I servitude or
continued
12
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(2) Terminology
2.2.2. Terminology of the constitution
In the constitutional context the English terminology is possibly not as problematic as the
Afrikaans or German terms. Van der Walt52 indicates that property clauses are usually
interpreted liberally and generously in most jurisdictions where constitutional protection of
property is found. The term Eigentum is, for instance, used in the German constitutional context,
although it is quite clear that the constitutional definition of Eigentum has very little to do with
the narrow definition in the Civil Code.
The terms eiendom and regte in eiendom are used to refer to proprietary relations in the
Afrikaans versions of the Final Constitution and Interim Constitution respectively. The use of
eiendom in the constitutional context can be confusing, because it can refer either to the object of
property rights or to the right of ownership, as it is known in private law. In fact, the Afrikaans
word eiendomsreg would be technically more appropriate if reference is made to the right of
ownership. By contrast, because English prefers use of the terms thing and res in the private law
context, the word property is a "foreign" term as far as private property law is concerned. This
makes it much easier to accept that property in the constitutional context is a wider concept than
the private law ownership or things."
The term property in the constitutional context usually designates a broader concept than that of
thing (res) in private law. 54It includes not only ownership as it is known in private law, but also
several other patrimonial and incorporeal rights, regarded as "lesser" rights in private law, and
which sometimes do not even qualify as real rights. That does not mean, however, that all rights
and interests with even the slightest patrimonial character qualify as property in the
constitutional sense. The most difficult questions regarding the constitutional concept of property
still concern the protection of intangible property in the form of rights and interests not
necessarily recognised or treated as property in the narrow private law sense. Although property
rights with regard to the human body, cultural property and religious property have attracted
some attention in recent years;55 intangible and commercial property, as well as the so-called
new property" still remain the most controversial.
(i) Most forms of intangible property and commercial property could qualify for
constitutional protection. The best examples are the various forms of intellectual property (that is
to say, copyright, patents and trademarks); and even some "rights" based on commercial
registered mineral rights can form the object of a real security right (Pignus / Hypotheea). S 65(1), 60, 68(2), 69(4),
71(5) and (6) and s 80 of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 22.
52 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 21.
53 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 53 n 84. In South Africa, the word ownership is usually
employed in the private law context and property, rights in property or property rights in the constitutional context,
in order to show that the constitutional definition of property has a broader scope than the private law definition of
ownership.
54 The South African constitutions and the German Basic Law themselves do not provide definitions of
constitutional property, but usually certain requirements have to be complied with before interests not protected by
the private law of property can qualify for constitutional protection. Cf 139 et seq and 156 et seq infra.
55 Cf eg Harris (ed) Property Problems from Genes to Pension Funds (1997).
56 Van der WaIt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 22 - 23.
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documents (like shares). The constitutional protection of monetary debts and rights created by
legislation (like permits, licences and quotas) is, however, more difficult.
(ii) With the development of the welfare state, access to "state largesse" in the form of
benefits, jobs, pensions, housing subsidies, contracts, licenses, and so on, broadened the scope of
individual security connected to property. 57 The increasing economic importance of tbese
"assets" envisages a notion of property that is - as far as due process issues are concerned 58 - not
limited to corporeal res only. Although they could be covered by the application of existing
principles of contract and administrative law, it is difficult to categorise these "rights" in a
constitutional sense. Jf the definition of property under constitutional law would mirror that of
private law, these "rights" would not be protected as part of an individual's patrimony, and would
not qualify for protection under a constitutional property guarantee. Normally, the constitution
docs not protect these "rights" or "assets" separately either. If the law was to keep abreast with
social development, constitutional protection had to be extended to these types of new property
by including them within the ambit of the constitutional property concept."
2.2.3. Terminology of reform
The traditional restriction of the property concept to corporeals might be render it impossible to
explain the nature of rights created by reform legislation, especially where they are relevant
outside the constitutional context. Similarly, the existing model of full ownership as a right
elevated above all others, might make it difficult to reconcile the reform policy, portrayed and
supported by the constitutions, with the present notion of property in private law.
In the context of the land reform programme in South Africa, reference is sometimes made to the
term land fel/ure. This concept includes landownership, but has a wider scope. The new Soutb
A frica has inherited a diversi ficd land tenure system with land control forms varying from race
group to race group and region to region depending on the applicable legislation at a specific
point in time.6o Over the past few years, it has become clear that social and economic
development in the sphere of land rights depend essentially on security of tenure, rather than on
ownership. Private law has shown that the latter can be completely stripped or all its inherent
entitlements, including the right to use land and the power to control that use, without being
57 These interests are to a certain extent protected in Germany. Cf 164 et seq infra.
S8 In the USA, Reich 1964 Yale U 733 - 787 first propagated the idea of "largess of government" as a new form of
property. Cf 734 - 739 for a description of this concept and 739 - 756 for an analysis of the underlying legal
structure. This Idea found strong support, not only in the USA, where Reich's article has become one of the most
frequently cited law review contributions (cf Shapiro 1985 California Law Review 1549), but also in South Africa:
eg Van der Walt "Property Rights" in Van Wyk, Dugard, et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism (1996) 457 - 458,
463,465 - 466, 480, 490 - 493 (criticism); Davis, Cheadle, & Haysom Fundamental Rights (1997) 241; Chaskalson
& Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridgc, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 31,4. The courts in
the USA have, however, accepted the notion of "new properly" for purposes of due process, and not for purposes of
takings. Cf lhe discussion of the US case law (Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254 (1970) and Flemming v Nes/or 363 US
603 (1960» in Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 442 - 443.
59 Chaskalson 1993 SAJIIR 404.
so Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (cds) Reform (1997) 364.
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transformed in the process. However, increasing intervention by the state in several areas related
to property demonstrate that unlimited or absolute private ownership does not exist and that all
ownership is subject to the state's dual power of regulation and expropriation. The most telling
examples are found in the regulation of land use and the creation of new statutory rights to
facilitate sectional title ownership, group and cluster housing, as well as property time-sharing.
Further examples can be found in the role of the state in the declaration and management of
nature reserves and in planning law.
Land tenure implies legally secure access to land and security of its use. Quite often this term is
associated with agricultural or rural development. Sometimes it is also used to refer to both
urban and rural security of tenure.?' All rights of tenure, whatever the scope of individual, group
or societal rights might be, are subject to the inherent powers of the state. This includes the
power to regulate all patrimonial interests (police power / deprivation / legislative interference)
and the power to expropriate such interests (eminent domain). The power to regulate includes,
for instance, power of taxation, environmental and planning regulation, and compulsory
requirements for title to land. In the South African context, the Development Facilitation Act62
and the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act63 contain such state regulatory measures.
2.2.4. Polarisation of the private law property and constitutional property
The manner in which property in terms of the constitution is distinguished from private law
property is characteristic of the new property order under the constitution. The definition of the
South African property concept in terms of the civilian tradition64 raises the question of whether
the constitutional property concept should be restricted in the same way as the private property
concept. Although the German legal system is also oriented towards civil law, the Federal
Constitutional Court has established a "typically" constitutional interpretation of the term
Eigentum, which differs from the traditional civil law meaning of this word, with regard to both
the objects and the meaning of property rights."
Property therefore means something different from ownership. The constitutional property
concept is much wider than private law ownership." The introduction of a wider property
concept in terms of the constitution would obviously bring about some changes to the property
law order. The consequent polarisation of private law and constitutional law with regard to the
concepts of ownership and property raises questions about the inherent characteristics of
property and the acceptability of the existing structure of property law.
An important issue is whether aspects or parts of the right of ownership can be judged
independently when deciding whether property has been expropriated. Although this issue is
61 Cfthe use of this term in Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 26 et seq.
6267 of 1995.
63 70 of 1970.
64 Ie Roman-Germanic law.
65 Cf 156 infra.
66 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 350.
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older than the new constitutional order in South Africa, it acquires renewed interest because of
the widened definition of property under the constitution. Some authors argue that property is
made up of different characteristic Irights"67 which could be conceptually severed." In this
manner, different ownership entitlements could be withdrawn or removed separately. This
conceptual severance (also called the bundle of rights theory) could int1uence the fact of
expropriation and the amount of compensation. This approach is, in fact, rejected by most
scholars in Germany as well as in South Africa. lncorporating elements of such an approach into
the theoretical structure of the constitutional concept of property should be avoided.
Certain aspects of both private law property and property in its constitutional sense could be
relevant in an investigation of the extent to which existing rights should yield to the new political
policies portrayed in, and the theoretical basis of rights created by reform legislation, For
purposes of the constitutional interpretation of the property clause it might, for instance, be
necessary to distinguish between rights in property and rights in things.69 The latter concept is
narrower, since it refers to the concept as it is understood in private law. The former includes
both real and personal rights in property. This could underscore the extended concept of property
in the constitutional context.
3. Public interest, common weal and public purposes
The concept of public interest is well known in almost all branches of the law and in almost all
jurisdictions, but the formulation of a definition is still problematic. Especially in the case of
property law - in both a private and public sense - the meaning of the term public interest is
perhaps even more difficult to define than the concepts property and ownership themselves.
Attempts at formulating an acceptable definition of public interest in the context of property law
are complicated by the fact that this term is used in more than one sense. Moreover, other similar
terms (like public use, public weal, public purposesi'" are used to denote concepts which either
overlap to varying extents with or have a specific relation to the term public interest,
In principle, the law allows (or should allow) every individual to realise and propagate his or her
full potential, within the limits set by the rights and freedoms of other individuals and the public
order. These interests of individuals are protected in private law. When the interests of
individuals as a group ("individuals as ali'') are threatened, they are protected by public means.
This protection through public means introduces a public element to the protection of the
individual's private interests, without depriving the individual of the remedies available for
protection of interests in private law." From this, it follows that public interest is a general
notion used to justi fy choices of policy. It is a collecti ve term used to refer to all those factors
67 Different "sticks" within a bundle. "Rights" in this sense is used as a general term, not necessarily as a legal term
with a speei fie content.
68 In Sand/oil Town Council v Elf 89 Sandown Extension 2 (Pty) Ltd 1988 3 SA 122 (A) the Appellate division also
seems to adopt an approach based on this theory. Cf 128 infra,
69 Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 193,
70 Cf Eisenberg 1995 SAJHR 208 - 209,
71 Du Plessis 1987 THRH R 291 - 293.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
[2J Terminology
(like economic considerations, state security, as well as administrative and legal interests) which
could influence the wellbeing of the community. The state can rely on these factors to justify
infringements upon individual rights.
To simply say, however, that terms like public weal, public purposes or public interest are
employed in property law to indicate the circumstances under which the state could infringe
private rights, would be an inapt generalisation. The following paragraphs explain how these
terms can be distinguished and will be employed in the rest of this thesis. An attempt is also
made to indicate the kind of problems that might arise in connection with the use of the various
terms. Before analysing the use of terms like public interest in the constitutional property clauses
in particular, it might be useful to consider how these terms are generally applied in
constitutional law.
3.1. Public interest and common weal in the constitutional context
In discussing the concept of "sociality" as it is found in existentialist theory, Blaauw72 draws
attention to an important difference between public interest and public weal (or common good).
She points out that in public law the state (or a state organ) forms one party to a legal
relationship, with either a natural or a juristic person (whether singly or in plurality) constituting
the other party. The public at large is only indirectly involved and only in so far as public interest
(salus publica) is a legal norm applicable in resolving disputes." By contrast, common good is a
term connected with the philosophy of Rousseau, who determined that the general will (volonté
générale) of the community is imbued with normative qualities reflecting the content of the
common good.74 The common good includes the fundamental values of freedom, justice,
security, peace and prosperity. This concept is "translated" into "reality" by constitutional
mechanisms like fundamental rights, the notion of the Rechtsstaat or constitutional state, the
notion of the social welfare state and democracy.f Still, common good is a vague and
problematic term, and renders itself prone to abuse by authoritarian rulers or interest groups."
From Blaauw's analysis it becomes clear that the public interest can, in a sense, reflect the
common good. This would be the case if it is accepted that the public interest denotes 77 "a
regulative legal principle in terms of which legal interests are integrated on the basis of the
recognition of its structural variety and equal value," and that the juridical interests of the public
in general should be severed from the interests of the state itself.78 As such a regulating principle,
the common good is a valuable element of the constitutional order and, insofar as it is reflected
72 Blaauw Group Rights Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (1988) 179 - 185.
73 180.
74 The common good as a result of the general will of the community is not necessarily the sum of individual wills or
interests of specific groups. It can also happen that under specific circumstances the will of a minority in the
community reflects the common good. Blaauw Group Rights Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (1988) 180 - 182.
75 Blaauw Group Rights Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (1988) 185.
76 184.
77 Translation of the definition in Pretorius Openbare Belang Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (1986) 304 by
Blaauw Group Rights Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (1988) 183.
78 Pretorius Openbare Belang Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation (1986) 212 - 213.
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by the public interest, important for an analysis of the property concept under the constitution.
However, an approach in which public interest is equated with common good, is unacceptable.
This would only serve to camouflage the interests of the state itself."
The consequences of an abuse of the common good notion can best be illustrated by the
treatment of property in Germany under National Socialism, This experience made Germans
sceptical about a concept that is determined in an autocratic way and in reality constitutes
nothing but a subterfuge for arbitrary action, which destroys individual freedom.
Scepticism among South African lawyers about the value of a principle like the common good
for interpretation of the property clause, should also not seem strange in the light of the
continuous abuse of executive power under the old regime in South Africa, Some authors have
already touched upon the difficulties experienced with terms like public interest and public
weal,8oThe abuse of such terms is perhaps most prevalent in the context of expropriation of land,
The addition of the term public purposes to the equation increases the confusion,
3,2. Public interest, public purposes and the property clauses
Section 25(2)(a) FC provides that property may be expropriated "for a public purpose or in the
public inlerest,,,81 whereas section 28(3) IC stipulated that "[an expropriation] shall be
admissible for public purposes only,,,82 The text of the Final Constitution apparently adopted
both the concepts of public purposes and public interest in an effort to el iminate the problem of a
limited interpretation" stemming from judicial precedent on the matter.84 This, however, created
nothing but further confusion,85
In the South African context, the terms public purposes and public interest are used only with
regard to expropriation, and not with regard to deprivations of property, The reason for this is not
apparent. Because of the problems with the lise of concepts like public interest, public weal and
public purposes in South Africa, comparative legal analysis could in particular on this point have
been valuable in suggesting solutions. Instead, problems of translation curtail the value of legal
comparison on this point.
In article 14 GG, public interest is employed not only with regard to expropriation, but also to
refer to the social obligation inherent in property, The official translation of article 14 GG treats
both the terms Wohle der Allgemeinheit and Interessen del' Allgemeinheit as meaning public
79 Blaauw Group Rights Unpubl ished Doctoral Dissertation (1988) 182,
so Eisenberg 1995 SIIJHR 221; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 135 - 139; Chaskalson & Lewis
"Property" in Chaskalson, Kcntridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 31, 17 - 18; Murphy 1995
SAPR/PI. 124 - 128; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 136 - 138; Oudlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender,
Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,48 - 54; Reich 1964 Yale U 771 - 783,
81 Emphasis added,
K2 Emphasis added,
83 Van der Mcrwe & Pienaar "Land reform in South Africa" in Jackson and Wilde (cds) The Reform Of Property
Law (1997) 358,
g4 Cf 233 cl seq infa.
KS Van der Walt Constitutional Properly Clause (1997) 135,
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interest. Article 14 II GG requires that property should "serve the public interest" (Wahle der
AllgemeinheitïÏ" Further, article 14 III GG determines that an expropriation shall only be
permissible "in the public interest" (Wahle der Allgemeinheitï'' and that the amount of
compensation to be paid for expropriation shall "reflect a fair balance between the public interest
(Interessen der Allgemeinheit) and the interests of those affected. ,,88
However, the fact that several authors'" prefer to translate only Interessen der Allgemeinheit with
public interest, and Wahle der Allgemeinheit with public weal, again gives rise to the problem of
delimiting these concepts. Still, Bohmer J indicated in a minority judgement of the Federal
Constitutional Court'" that the purpose of the term Wahle der Allgemeinheit in article 14 II GG is
quite distinct from that of the same term in article 14 III GG. In the former it protects the public
at large by restricting individual rights, and in the latter it protects the individual by restricting
the power of the state to expropriate property.
The definitions of public interest and public weal developed in the German context could most
probably not be applied without further ado to the South African situation. Nevertheless, it
would be useful to consider some of the results emanating from the interaction between public
interest and property in the German system and which are related to the treatment of the property
clause in general. It is submitted that some of these solutions could be adopted in the South
African context.
However, one must still determine to what extent public interest correlates with the notion of
public purposes in connection with the South African constitutional property clauses. This is best
attempted within the context of the constitutional requirements for expropriation, as the
application of the concepts public interest and public purposes in this field causes many
difficulties.
3.2.1. Public interest, public purposes and expropriation
In section 25(2)(a) FC both the terms public purpose and public interest are used with reference
to the requirements for expropriation of property. Section 28(3) IC only referred to public
purposes. This difference in wording shows that the meanings of the terms public interest and
public purpose are neither exact, nor clear. This issue is made more problematic by the fact that
the term public purposes have been used in South African law in a broad as well as in a narrow
sense." In discussing public purposes as a requirement for expropriation under the South
African constitution, it will be indicated" that the existing case law on the interpretation of the
86 Art 14 II GG: (I) Eigenturn verpflichtet. (1) Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich dem Wahle der Allgemeinheit dienen.
87 Art 14 III GG: (I) Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wahle der Allgemeinheit zuliissig.
88 Art 14 III GG: (3) Die Entschiidigung ist unter gerechter Abwiigung der Interessen der Allgemeinheit und der
Beteiligten zu bestimmen.
89 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 250; Finer, Bogdanor & Rudden Comparing
Constitutions (1995) 134. Currie Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) 349.
90 BVerfGE 56, 249 (Diirkheimer Gondelbahn) 273 - 276.
91 Cf 229 et seq infra.
92 Cf 228 et seq infra.
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term public purposes is inadequate in the constitutional context, inter alia because of the
different ways in which the term is applied.
The addition of the term public interest in section 25(2)(a) FC lays emphasis on the fact that the
courts have limited power to set aside expropriations on the basis of the purpose behind such
expropriations. To ensure that the objectives of land reform, redistribution and restitution are
also incorporated into an interpretation of the terms public purposes and public interest, section
25(4) FC incorporates an additional mechanism to ensure that these terms are not
"misinterpreted" by the courts. It determines that public interest includes the nation's
commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's
natural resources.
3.2.2. Public interest, public purposes and land reform
In other jurisdictions - particularly in those where land reform programmes were introduced -
terms like public interest and public purposes have been debated extensively.Ï'' One could,
therefore, legitimately expect that this topic will be discussed in South Africa in years to come.
However, even the express reference in section 25(4) FC that pub/ic interest includes the
commitment to land reform is not of much help in determining what types of actions would be
permissible because of being in the public interest or for public purposes and what not.
The "deprivations provision" in section 25(1) FC does not refer to the public interest or to public
purposes at all. Consequently, section 25(4)(a) Fe cannot be read as referring to deprivations of
property. This gives rise to the question of whether it will be possible to attack the validity of a
deprivation of property that was imposed for purposes of land reform, or whether section
25(4)(a) FC will cover the situation." The courts can, of course, read a public purposes
requirement into section 25( I) FC, especially if the view is accepted that expropriations also
have to satisfy the provisions of section 36( I) FC, which is wide enough to be regarded as an
extended public purposes limitation provision. However, the current situation gives rise to the
question of whether deprivations of property for purposes of land reform would be valid
regardless of the question whether they are imposed for public purposes. This question will be
discussed at a later stage.
4. The relationship between property and public interest
All branches of the law are, at the least, concerned with property, the individual as a member ofa
specific community and the state." The omnipresence of property in the law, philosophy and
society renders a clear-cut definition of its scope practically impossible. Property takes a central
place in the study of constitutional and human rights law, public and private international law,
'J3 In Eisenberg 1995 SA./HR 216 - 218 the example of India is discussed, as well as the treatment of this concept in
the USA (209 - 216).
94 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 137.
~5 Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) xv.
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law of delict, criminal law, contract, commercial law, tax law planning and environmental law,
mining law, family law, and so on. An exhaustive list cannot be supplied. The relevance of
property does not lie only in ascertaining the theoretical and philosophical basis of judicial
decisions and statutory provisions. Even more important is the need to understand the dynamics
of social processes that underlie the relationship between the law, the state, societal organisation
and governance."
For the present inquiry, therefore, it is submitted that a concept of property or ownership can
only be transitory in nature. Itwill be indicated that the regulation and protection of property as a
fundamental right under a constitution illustrates that the definition of ownership varies
according to context in which it is used. In this regard, it is possible that the public interest will
determine the manner in which ownership is understood in a concrete case. This interaction
between public interest and the concept of property or ownership will be elucidated in the course
of this exposition, by analysing the way in which property is regulated in Germany and South
Africa. For this purpose it will, however, be necessary first to determine the comparability of
these two legal systems.
96 XV.
21
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1. Legal comparison as method of analysis
[3] Legal comparison and the course of inquiry
In an attempt to find a working compromise between protecting the values of liberty and equality
in the context of the South African property clause, German law could be a valuable source of
comparison for the South African courts. The treatment of the values of individual freedom and
social justice through application of constitutional principles and the provisions of article 14 GG
of the German Basic Law have resulted in a clear-cut framework within which the interests of
the individual property owner can be weighed against those of the community at large. Thus,
German law provides a good example of how the fundamental values of individual freedom and
social justice interact in the development of a unique constitutional concept of property. This
framework could be important in the South African context. Under the new constitutional order,
the legal system will be confronted with the question as to which of these values should enjoy
precedence in situations where both are at stake and compete with each other. The analytical
method of legal comparison could render valuable service in this regard.
However, the German property model has developed over a period of more than 50 years, and
has adapted to the unique political and social circumstances of post-war Germany, whereas the
new South African property order is still in its childhood. This might raise the question as to
exactly how valuable insights gained from the German legal system could be in the South
African context. After all, the best-intended law reform programmes can still be rendered
nugatory by social reality, and reform based on the wrong premises could be a waste of time and
money. The viability of a comparison of German and South African property law is analysed in
the following paragraphs.
2. Comparative analysis as constitutional directive
On the basis of constitutional guidelines for interpretation." the judiciary passes judgements and
the legislature is given direction in enacting legislation mandating future legal development. The
interpretation of the constitutional property guarantee will determine the extent to which existing
rights should yield to the new political policies portrayed in legislation aimed at reforming the
South African socio-political and legal systems and the theoretical basis of newly created rights
in a new political dispensation. The fundamental requirement for constitutional interpretation
under the new South African constitution is that98
"[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - (a) must promote the values that
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity. equality and freedom; (b) must
consider international law and (c) may consider foreign law."
97 S 39 FC.
98 S 39( I) Fe. The Interim Constitution contained in s 35( I) a provision similar to that of s 39( I) FC that a court
may "have regard to comparable foreign case law."
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The Basic Law forms the basis of Germany's democratic and social federal state and is backed
up by the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.99 It has, moreover, been used as a
modelloo in the drafting process of the Interim and Final South African Constitutions. It seems
logical that the drafters of the Final Constitution would expect the text to be interpreted by
having regard to - among others - those jurisdictions that have provided such important
guidelines in formulating the South African constitutional text.
In South Africa, fundamental rights jurisprudence has only recently, after the enactment of the
first justiciable bill of rights in the Interim Constitution, lOlgained significance. The enactment of
the Final Constitution, which also contains a chapter on fundamental rights,102 has permanently
ingrained this sphere of law in the South African legal system. Given the fact that South African
fundamental rights jurisprudence is still young and susceptible to influence, the German
jurisprudence flowing from the Basic Law can undoubtedly play an important role in developing
further constitutional theory in South Africa.l03
The courts have, moreover, already shown their inclination to make use of comparative law for
solving legal problems. In the short time span between 1994 and 2000, the Constitutional Court
has frequently considered foreign and international law in its decisions.l'" South African
constitutional jurisprudence is even developing an international reputation for the exemplary
application of legal comparative methodology. lOSThis creates the expectation that the insights
gained in other jurisdictions concerning most constitutional issues will also in future be applied
to reach solutions in the South African context. Until now, however, the courts have had very
little opportunity to formulate a theoretical framework within which legislative and
administrative actions pertaining to property could take place. Instead, this has been done by
academics.l'" Section 39( 1) FC paves the way for the reception of foreign law in the
99 De Waal 1995 SAHJR 1.
100 Cf De Waal 1995 SAHJR 1 - 29 for a summary of the German influences in the South African Interim
Constitution. Also Van der Walt 1993 SAPRlPL 300 - 306 for a specific application to the Interim property clause.
For similarities with the German Basic Law in the Final Constitution, cf ia Grupp Siidafrikas neue
Verfassung (1999); Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 32 - 35, 47 - 50, 76 - 78, 137 - 139; Van
derWalt 1997 SAPRlPL 284, 301 - 302, 319 - 320.
101 Ch 3 IC.
102 Ch 2 FC.
103 De Waal1995 SAHJR 1 - 3; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 336; Murphy 1994 SAJHR 388, 392.
104 It is interesting to note that s 39(1)(c) FC does not give the court an injunction to consider foreign law, as is the
case with international law in s 39( 1)(b) FC. In spite of fears that foreign case law might not be a safe guide to the
interpretation of the bill of rights, many of the Constitutional Court's decisions contain extensive comparative
analyses of constitutional law. Cf eg S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) par 36 - 37; Sanderson v Attorney-
General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC) par 26; and judgement of Ackermann J in Fose v Minister of Safety and
Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).
105 CfGrote Rechtskreisen und ihre Bedeutung fiir die Rechtsvergleichung Unpublished Paper (1999) 17.
106 The following commentary works by South African authors are helpful. Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in
Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1, 1 - 75; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause
(1997); Davis, Cheadle, & Haysom Fundamental Rights (1997) 237 - 255; Devenish Commentary (1998) 68 - 72;
Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 275 - 330; Van der Walt "Property Rights" in Van Wyk, Dugard, et al (eds) Rights and
Constitutionalism (1996) 455 - 501; Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds)
Constitutional Law (1996) eh 31, 1 - 21; Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 107 - 130; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 - 139;
Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 - 203.
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constitutional context of South Africa. The German law pertaining to the constitutional
protection and regulation of property - where scholarly work and judicial analysis of this topic
complement each other - could be valuable for developing South African law in this regard.
3. Possibilities for legal comparison
Several South African scholars have aireadyl07 recognised that German law is particularly
suitable for providing insights into the new direction of South African property law. The need for
comparative research, with regard to the South African constitutional property guarantee in
particular and with human rights law in South Africa in general, is directly related to the need for
a theoretic structure for interpretation.
Van der Waltl08 points out that there is ample reason for research: Comparison of the structure
and terminology of clauses a bill of rights should be undertaken not only on a smaller scale (by
analysing specific provisions), but also on a larger scale (by analysing a number of provisions at
a time and comparing them to case law). Since the introduction of the Final Constitution, some
commentaries on the Constitution itself,109 the bill of rights, 110as well as the property clause in
particularlll have seen the light. Yet, literature on the constitutional property guarantee in the
Final Constitution still needs to address several unanswered questions. As such, the possibilities
for comparative research are by no means exhausted.
Questions related to the extent to which existing rights should yield to the new political policy
behind reform legislation and the theoretical basis of new rights created by the reform legislation
stemming from the constitution have only been touched upon in some of these contributions.
Reference to the limitation of property rights in the public interest in these contributions are
usually limited to attempts to define tbe concept "public purpose" or "public benefit," and here
opinions differ widely as to exactly what the content of these terms is. On the contrary, the issue
of the limitations on ownership in the public interest is to a larger extent - albeit mostly only
indirectly - addressed in the ever-growing arsenal of literature on land reform, land restitution
and access to land.
107 Van der Walt 1995 SAPRIPL 336; Van Maanen 1993 Recht & Kritiek 74 - 95; Van der Walt 1993 Recht &
Kritiek 263 - 297; Kleyn 1996 SAPR/PL 402 - 445.
IO~ Van der Walt 1998 SAJIIR 586.
109 Dcvenish Commentary (1998); Chaskalson, Kentridgc, Klaaren ct al (cds) Constitutional Law (1996); Grupp
Siidafrikas neue Verfassung (1999).
110 Davis, Cheadle, & Haysom Fundamental Rights (1997); De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999).
III Van der Wah Constitutional Properly Clause (1997); Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender,
Latsky & Roux New La lid Law (revised 1998) and lo a lesser extent Gurto Property and Land Reform (1995). Cf
also Du Plessis & Olivier 1997 (I) 5 /-IRCI.JSA II - 15; Van der Walt 1997 SIIPRIPL 275 - 330; Van der Walt 1998
SAHli? 560 - 586. Most of the existing literature on constitutional property law entail analyses and interpretations of
thc interim property clause. Cf Van der Walt 1995 SA PR/PL 298 - 345; Kroeze 1994 SA PR/PL 323 - 331; Murphy
1995 SAPR/Pt 107 - 130; Murphy 1994 SAJHR 385 - 398; Van der Wall 1993 Recht & Kritiek 263 - 297;
Chaskalson 1995 SAJ/-IR 222 - 240; Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge el al (eds)
COl/still/tiona! Law (1996) eh 3 I, I - 21; Van der Walt 1994 THR!IR 181 - 203; Chaskalson 1994 SAJI-IR 131 - 139;
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 31.)8- 411.
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4. Similarities in the German and South African property orders
One of the most valuable elements of legal-comparative study is that the universality of the laws
of different legal systems is recognised, even if the values of the different communities, on
which their legal orders are based, differ considerably.i" In the German and South African
property orders there are several comparable elements.
4.1. Bases of the legal systems and their material law
South Africa has a mixed legal systeml13 that contains both characteristic common law'!" and
civil lawl15 features. Legislation and precedent are the primary sources of law. Beyond these
sources, one finds the South African common law, which has, depending on the specific area of
inquiry, been influenced to an equal measure by both English and Roman-Dutch law. Thus,
comparison with a great variety of other legal families 116 and specific legal systems 117 is
possible.
Especially with regard to the Roman-Dutch roots of the South African legal system, the German
legal system - being an important legal system on the European continent and thus also strongly
oriented towards civil lawl18 - makes it eminently suitable as a comparative model for the South
African context. This is particularly so in the field of property law, which has, in contrast to
other fields of private law (like the law concerning unjustified enrichment and the law of delict)
remained an unassailable stronghold of civilian jurisprudence.i'" On occasion it has even been
remarked that South African property law preserves and modernises the jus commune of Europe
which lies behind the codification of civil law.120 This also indicates that elements in the South
African legal system could serve as comparative agents in the co-ordination, harmonisation and
unification of private law within the framework of the European Community.
4.2. Corresponding legal problems
Comparative analysis has until now been employed to explain the mechanical as well as the
substantive (normative) effect of the two South African constitutions on the concept of
ownership. For instance, the Canadian two-stage approach was used as basis for the inquiry into
issues related to constitutional property law in South Africa.121 Comparative analyses of the
structure of the constitutional property inquiry have been undertaken by scholars like Kleyn,
Van der Walt, and Chaskalson, and many contributions on the meaning of the constitutional
112 Venter, Van der Walt, Van der Walt Regsnavorsing (1990) 207 - 208.
113 Zimmermann & Visser "Introduction" in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross (1996) 9 - 12.
114 Like the roles of judges and oflaw reports.
115 Like the role of legal writers.
116 Ie the Anglo-American legal family, the civilian legal systems, and the family of mixed legal systems.
117 Ie England, the United States, Germany, France, Scotland, Namibia, etc.
118 Murphy 1994 SAJHR 386.
119 Zimmermann & Visser "Introduction" in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) Southern Cross (1996) 24 - 28.
120 Beekhuis, Lawson, Knapp in Lawson (chiefed) VI (2) IECL 2-252.
121 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 28 and Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 277.
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guarantees viewed against the insights gained from other jurisdictions have also seen the light.122
There is no reason why comparative analysis cannot be useful for developing the existing
property order and especially the theory of land law in South Africa.
The treatment of social limitations on ownership in other jurisdictions could stimulate innovative
ideas about legal reform when tbe South African experience is placed side to side to tbat of a
legal system where similar problems had to be resolved in the past. The ricb collection of
German jurisprudence and scbolarly work on the institution of ownership could be extremely
beneficial in solving practical and dogmatic problems in balancing the interests of individuals
with those of the society at large.
Apart from a similarly civil law oriented history, South African legal reasoning also harks back
to the abstract and deductive reasoning processes that are characteristic of European civil law
systems. This applies not only to constitutional law, but also in otber areas of the law.123 In
addition, the traditional division between public and private law in South Africa is also shared by
the German systern.!"
In Germany the separate treatment of property in the constitutional context resulted in the
parallel existence of both a private law and a public law concept of properly. In this scheme,
private law property is generally more restricted than the constitutional property concept, and
pertains only to corporeal things.125 Further, constitutional property provisions do not
fundamentally influence ownership in private law, except for correcting possible imbalances
resulting from an application of private law principles.l'" This approach enables the courts to
122 Eg Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997); Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 275 - 330; Van der Walt
1998 SAJHR 560 - 586; Van der Walt 1995 SAPRlPL 298 - 345; Kroeze 1994 SAPRlPL 323 - 331; Murphy 1995
SAPRlPL 107 - 130; Murphy 1994 SAJHR 385 - 398; Van der Walt 1993 Recht & Kritiek 263 - 297; Chaskalson
1995 SAJHR 222 - 240; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 - 203; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 - 139; Chaskalson
1993 SAJHR 388 - 411; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999).
123 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 181 avers that the South African law of property, although conceptually based on the
civil law tradition, has not yet been developed far enough or in sufficient theoretical detail to reveal the full
implications of the civil law method. This might be attributed to the fact that, in spite of a general marked reaction
against uncritical anglicisation in South Africa, the legal method of the courts is more comparable to the English
than to the Continental European pattern. (Bcekhuis, Lawson, Knapp in Lawson (chief ed) VI (2) fECL 2-252.) Van
der Walt, however, ascribes this underdevelopment of the civil law method in property law, as compared to other
spheres of law like delict and contract, to the fact that the values underlying the civil law method have been worked
out in those areas where the protection and enforcement of private law rights were more problematic. This indicates
strength of logic and pervasiveness of the civil law method in property law particularly. As such, comparison with a
civil law oriented legal system is recommendable, because of the need to clarify exactly the scope of the private
owner's rights, particularly in a new constitutional order. Van der Walt's further statement (at 190) that the influence
of the Constitution on the development of the civil law tradition should be ascertained, serves as further justification
for a study of the German legal system as an example of a civil-law oriented system that has survived constitutional
supremacy. Cf Murphy 1994 SAJHR 386.
124 Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 336 - 337.
125 As traditionally described in the Burgertiches Gesetzbuch par 90 ct seq.
126 Eg in case of an imminent danger to the common good, or in times of social change, the constitutional provisions
will be used to correct the output of private law principles.
26
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
[3} Legal comparison and the course of inquiry
interpret the meaning of property so as to give more weight either to social justice or to
individual freedom, depending on the demands of society at a given moment.127 In effect, this
approach always revolves around a consideration of the boundaries of private and public law, the
results of which would be applicable to a similar South African inquiry.
Van der Walt,128however, maintains that the situation in South Africa differs considerably from
that of Germany in that the division is stricter in the latter jurisdiction. He bases his caution for
comparison on three considerations: (i) The existence of a formal civil code in Germany (as
opposed to the uncodified common law system of South Africa) exacerbates the strict divide
between public and private law and therefore hinders comparative analysis. (ii) The South
African Interim Constitution seems more open to an interpretation that overrides the traditional
private-public divide (through horizontal application / seepage). (iii) Finally, academics and the
courts are both inclined to follow the purposive approach to interpretation in order to allow the
values and reconstructive effects of the constitutions to pervade the whole legal system and to
give the constitutional property guarantees broader relevance.
These arguments convincingly caution against an uncalculated comparative approach, but they
do not preclude an investigation into German law. The German division between private and
public law needs to be considered as one possible solution, or perhaps evef merely as an
incentive for developing an own approach towards resolving the issues arising from
constitutional protection of property in South Africa. This would prevent a one-sided
comparative perspective which could result in a transplant of wholesale dogmatic and practical
solutions to South African property law from the (by some South African scholars so highly
acclaimedj'j" Anglo-American legal family. Even if the South African constitution foresees a
more direct application of the constitutional values in the private law sphere, the indirect
application of constitutional values to private law in Germany could still provide valuable
insights.13o
127Murphy 1994SAJHR 388.
1281995 SAPRJPL 337.
129Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 remarks that the case law of English speaking jurisdictions will exercise a dominant
influence over the development of South African constitutional law because "most South African lawyers share my
limitations [ie the 'inability to read any international languages other than English']". This argument cannot be
supported. The abstract and deductive reasoning processes characteristic of the Romanic legal families of the
European continent have frequently been used in South African constitutional law and private law for comparison.
CfMurphy 1994 SAJHR 386. Moreover, De Waal1995 SAHJR 1 - 2 nlpoints out that South African legal scholars
are "particularly well situated to benefit from the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence
because so many have made use of scholarships to become familiar with the German language and legal system."
He mentions the DAAD and BMW scholarships, as well as financial support from the Alexander von Humboldt
Foundation and the Max Planck Institutes in Germany. It is however, further acknowledged that traditionally mainly
the Afrikaans-oriented universities have maintained relations with the law faculties on the European continent, while
English-speaking public-law scholars tended to tum rather to the universities of the United States, Canada and
Australia. The consequent gap that has developed between Afrikaans- and English-orientated constitutional
literature can only be closed with renewed (and continued) interest by both groups of scholars in the possibilities
offered by both the continental and the Anglo-American systems. Other African legal systems are also valuable
sources of legal comparison.
130Cf 260 et seq infra.
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Part One: Research Question. Terminology and Methodology
The principles of German constitutional interpretation correspond largely with those endorsed in
the South African Interim and Final Constitutions.l'" The constitutional and social history of tbe
Federal Republic of Germany furthermore supports a notion of property that envisages, on tbe
one hand, wider boundaries of public control and, on the other hand, continued individual
security in accordance with the values of liberty and personhood.':" This has enabled the courts
to accord more importance to either social justice or individual freedom, depending on tbe
demands of society at a specific time. J33
The German treatment of the dichotomy between social justice and individual freedom in cases
where property rights arc limited for the public benefit must inevitably lead to a better
understanding of the South African situation. It is in line with the prevailing property theory in
South Africa, which holds that, to be functional, ownership should not only be characterised by
the existence of rights and entitlements accruing to the individual owners, but also by inherent
duties, limitations and responsibilities toward society.':" Accordingly, a comparison of South
African problems surrounding the property concept with the notion of property as developed
under the Weimar Constitution and through article 14 GG seems meaningful.
5. Differences between the German and South African
systems of property law
Despite the several convincing reasons for choosing the German legal system as a comparative
source for South African property law, there are also some fundamental differences between the
German and South African legal systems. This could prove problematic for such a comparative
analysis,135 as is illustrated in the ruling of Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic
OffencesP" In this decision, it was remarked that legal-comparative analysis should be done
with circumspection. The di fferent contexts within which other constitutions were drafted, the
different social structures and milieu existing in other countries as compared with those in South
Africa, and the different historical backgrounds against which the various constitutions came into
being can all be factors dictating against legal comparison. One must be wary of the danger of
unnecessarily importing doctrines associated with those constitutions into an inappropriate South
African setting.
131 Cf 86 Cl seq infra.
132 De WeI Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 133.
IJ) Murphy 1994 SIf./IIR 388.
134 Cowen New Patterns of Landownership Unpublished (1984); Pienaar Nuwe Sakeregtelike Ontwikkelings
Inaugural address (1997); Van der Wall 1990 De [ure I - 45; Van der Walt 1995 SAJ/·IR 169 - 206; Van Maanen
1993 Recht & Kritiek 74 - 95; Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 - 266; Van der Walt 1988 De Jl/re 16 - 35; 306 - 325;
Van der Walt "Property Rights" in Van Wyk, Dugard, et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism (1996); Kroeze
"Between Conceptualism and Constitutionalism" Unpublished Paper (1997).
IJS De Waal 1995 SAl/JR 2.
136 19952 SA 148 (C) 160F-H.
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5.1. Drafting circumstances
The German constitution, which was adopted after the Second World War, inevitably has a
different focus than the South African constitution, which was drafted practically at the end of
the twentieth century. Both these documents arose from very unique sets of historical
circumstances. As such, both these constitutions tend to place primary focus on values that were
important at the time when they came into operation. This will influence the importance attached
to the values of individual freedom and social justice in interpreting and applying the
constitutional property clause. The initial German constitutional jurisprudence, for instance,
granted primary importance to human dignity, whereas both the South African constitutions are
strongly oriented towards the value of equality.137 Particularly in the area of property law,
German constitutional case law over the past fifty years indicate that the values underlying the
Basic Law have been moulded and shaped extensively by prevailing social circumstances.
The different social structures of South Africa and Germany are, in themselves, grounds for the
comparison of constitutional property theory and practice in these jurisdictions. In Germany, for
instance, redistribution of land became important after the reunification of the former Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic at the beginning of the nineties.t"
By that time, it could draw on a rich collection of constitutional jurisprudence on property that
has been developed and refined during the preceding forty years. In South Africa, on the other
hand, the redistribution of land has been an issue even before negotiations on the incorporation
of a property guarantee in the Interim and Final Constitutions have been initiated. Therefore,
land redistribution itself will play an integral part in the development of property law in South
Africa.
The social and constitutional history of South Africa will naturally differ from that of Germany.
Nevertheless similar issues inevitably arise to some extent, albeit then in differing contexts. A
comparison of the German and South African constitutional property issues could help overcome
or adjust some of the hurdles still to be crossed, in spite of the different historical contexts at
stake. In this regard, the qualification of Tebbutt J to the cautionary approach towards legal
comparison propagated in the Park-Ross case139 is significant. Certain fundamental principles
and considerations emanating from foreign constitutions which are used as sources of legal
comparison in South Africa, can indeed be applied in the South African context as readily as in
the interpretation of the foreign constitutions from which those principles originate;
notwithstanding the dangers of legal comparison.
137 Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 7, however, indicates that cognisance has been taken in (the working draft of) the Final
Constitution of the consequences in establishing a value of equality unbridled by the demand to realise human
dignity. This is the reason why human dignity is afforded a more central place in the Final Constitution (s l(a) FC)
than in the Interim Constitution. Du Plessis explains: "Equality transcends mathematical equations: it needs 'flesh
and blood' to breathe a spirit conducive to the promotion of what is peculiarly human. This is best achieved through
its symbiotic unison with human dignity." On the relation between equality and dignity, cf also Ackermann
"Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity" Unpublished Paper (2000).
138 Cf 355 et seq infra.
139 Park-Ross v Director: Officefor Serious Economic Offences 19952 SA 148 (C) 160H-I.
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5.2. Wording of South African and German property clauses
The South African Interim Constitution contained a positive property guarantee.l'" whereas the
property guarantee in the Final Constitution is negatively formulated."" In comparison, the
property guarantee in article 14 GG has developed into a somewhat more advanced form of
protection: The institution of property is guaranteed positively, in contrast to the negative
guarantee of individual property rights against state interference."? This is sometimes referred to
as the institutional and individual guarantees of property in Germany. The guarantee of property
as an institution denotes that the very existence of private property in a specific economic and
ideological model of state organisation is protected. South African scholars have published
several (often contrasting) opinions with regard to whether or not the South African property
clauses do protect the institution of property, and if so, to what extcnt.!"
But even if direct application of German theory to the South African context would in this regard
be limited, it is undeniably truc that comparative law, particularly comparative case law, plays an
important role in the development of jurisprudence. Moreover, a clearly discernible line of
reasoning about the nature, interpretation and effects of a constitutional property clause is
evident in case law from a large number of jurisdictions.l'" The differences in phrasing or
structure also illustrate that approaches to the function and interpretation of property clauses can
be more generally applied, even in jurisdictions where the property clauses do not expressly
resemble each other.
6. Course of inquiry
In an attempt to reconcile the existing private law of ownership and the property order propagated
by the new constitution against the background of land reform, restitution and redistribution in
South Africa, the main focus of the inquiry will be the treatment of property in constitutional law.
The interaction between the values of individual freedom and social equality in each stage of the
constitutional inquiry will be analysed, in order to trace the development of the existing property
law under a constitution guaranteeing property and simultaneously limiting it in the interest of the
public at large.
Once the treatment of property under the constitution has been analysed, specific attention will be
given to adjustments - in the interest of the general public - to the existing property law orders of
Germany and South Africa effected by land reform and restitution legislation. These legislative
adjustments are the best available examples of the transformation of property law in legal systems
characterised by constitutional supremacy. If these legislative adjustments are to be analysed
thoroughly, one will have to start with an overview of the principles and values endorsed by the
140 S 28( I) IC: "Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, ... , lo dispose of such
rights."
141 Section 25{I) FC: "No one may be deprived of properly ...".
142 Van del' Walt 1995 SAPIUPL 302. Cfalso 57 et seq infra.
14) cr60 ct seq infra and 136 et seq infra.
144 Van der Walt 1998 SAJHR 584.
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constitutional orders in Germany and South Africa. The drafting histories of, and the principles on
which the constitutions of the respective jurisdictions are based will accordingly be discussed in the
following chapter. Attention will also be given to certain structural aspects.
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1. Relevance of an historical inquiry
[4] The drafting histories of the South African
and German constitutional property clauses
In order to understand the structure and purpose of the property guarantees in the German Basic
Law and the South African Constitutions, it will be necessary to recall the drafting history of the
constitutional documents in which the respective provisions appear. It is also necessary to
consider the relevance of constitutional property guarantees for the legal systems in which they
operate. In this chapter, the historical backgrounds of section 28 IC and section 25 FC
respectively, and of article 14 GG, will be discussed. The general relevance of these property
guarantees for the respective property orders in which they operate will then be elucidated.
2.1. Historical background of article 14 GG
2. Germany: development of property protection under a constitution
The German history of constitutionally protected property, covering a period of more than a
century, is somewhat more extensive than that of South AFrica. Through an overview of tbe
historical highlights of constitutional protection of property, the relevance of the German
property clause in the transformation of the ownership concepts will become clear.
Article 14 GG forms part of the German bill of rights (Grundrechtskatalog). It provides: 145
(1) (Ii Das Eigennon IIl1d das Erbrecht werden gewáhrleistet. (IJ Inhalt lind Schranken werden durch
die Gesetse bestimmt. (2) II) Eigentum verpflichtet, (2) Sein Gebrauch .1'01/ zugleich dent Wohle der
Allgemeiuheit dienen. (3) (I) Eiue Enteignung ist nur zum Wahle del' Allgemeiuheit zulássig. (2) Sie darf
nur dwell Gesets oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes ella/gen. das An und AlismajJ der Entschëdigung
regelt. {JJ Die Entschiidigung ist unter gerechter Abwágung der lnteressen der Allgemeinheit und der
Bereiligten :11 bestimmen. (ol) Wegen der Haire der Entschiidigung steht im Streitfalle der Reehisweg
\'01' den ordenttichen Gerichten offen.
Article 14 GG is characterised by an inherent tension between the liberal view that individual
property rights are justified by natural law, and an acknowledgement that property rights are
IJS Art 14 GG consists of three clauses, each containing more than one provision. These provisions are not officially
numbered separately, as is the case in South African legislation. Ilowever, these provisions have to be clearly
identified for purposes of analysis. In this text, reference is made to the various clauses by means of capital Roman
numbers (the first clause is therefore indicated with the numeral I; the second with II, and the third with lIl).
Reference to a specific sentence within a clause is then made by means of a consecutive Arabic number, ie
art 14 I I GG or art 14 III 2 GG. The official English translation of this text reads: (I) (I) Property and the right of
inheritance shall be guaranteed. I2lThcir substance and limits shall be determined by law. (II) (I) Property entails
obligations. (2) Its usc should also serve the public interest. (III) (I) Expropriation shall only be permissible in the
public interest. (2) It may only be ordered by or pursuant to a law which determines the nature and extent of
compensation. 0> Compensation sbull reflect a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected. (4) In case of dispute regarding the amount or compensation recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.
Press and lnforniation Office of the Federal Government, Foreign Affairs Division 1994 (Numbering of the
individual sentences added).
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created and restricted by the social context.t'" This tension, which at present forms the backbone
of the courts' interpretation" of article 14 GG, was also present in the property clauses
preceding article 14 GG. The following paragraphs contain a brief overview of the creation of a
constitutional property order in Germany.
2.1.1. First attempts at constitutional protection of property
The various states in the German Federation received constitutions between 1818 and 1848.
However, constitutional development took place predominantly at state level and the monarchic
principlel48 lay at its root. The constitutions within the federation of German states guaranteed
certain rights, but they were regarded as the rights of the subject, not as human rights. These
rights were furthermore confined to the citizens of the particular state in question.l'"
The aims of the middle-class revolution, which began in 1848, were to unite Germany in a new
empire and to compel the government to acknowledge fundamental rights. However, the
revolution failed and the attempts at unification were unsuccessful. The
Paulskirchenverfassung'i" that was drawn up during this time never entered into force.
Nevertheless, it played a significant role in later developments of a fundamental rights
consciousness in Germany.!" Paragraph 164 of this constitution contained a property
guarantee.F"
"Das Eigentum ist unverletzlich. Eine Enteignung kann nur aus Riicksichten des gemeinen Besten, nur
auf Grund eines Gesetzes und gegen gerechte Entschiidigung vorgenommen werden. "
This clause was not meant to be a fundamental right in the true sense of the word, but rather a
mechanism of control over bureaucratic encroachments on ownership.V'' Nevertheless, it already
reflects the dichotomy between a liberal-naturalist justification of private ownership and the
146 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 122; Finer, Bogdanor & Rudden Comparing
Constitutions (1995) 37 - 38.
147 In Germany, various courts have jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the property clause. The Federal Supreme
Court / Federal Court of Justice in Civil Matters (Bundesgerichtshoj) has jurisdiction with regard to the
compensation that has to be paid for expropriations, whereas the Federal Administrative Court
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) has jurisdiction concerning the validity of administrative decisions and actions
pertaining to expropriation. The Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has jurisdiction with
regard to the question whether legislation, actions of the state or court decisions are in accordance with the Basic
Law. This shared jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the property clause opened the system to different
interpretations of the property clause and various aspects thereof (for instance the question of when an expropriation
or regulation of property could be justifiable), which initially also created confusion in the ranks of property and
constitutional lawyers in Germany. Cf 78 infra.
148 Ie the sovereignty of the prince, not of the people, was protected.
149 Robbers Introduction (1998) 39.
150 This constitution was named after the venue where the constitutional assembly of the Parliament held their
meetings in Frankfurt am Main between 18 May 1848 and 30 May 1849. It is also referred to as the Frankfurter
Reichsverfassung. Brockhaus 19th ed VII 519 - 520.
151 Robbers Introduction (1998) 39.
152 Translation: "Property is inviolable. Expropriation can take place only against a consideration of the public weal,
and only in accordance with law and against just compensation."
153 RittstiegEigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 241.
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social function of property that has in the meantime become a characteristic of all subsequent
constitutional property guarantees in Germany.l"
The German Empire established by Bismarck replaced the German Federation in 1870/71. lts
constitution still did not contain express provisions on fundamental rights. However, significant
aspects of fundamental rights were incorporated in ordinary statutory law and the different states
had constitutions incorporating property guarantees. The lack of an express property guarantee in
the Federation's constitution furthermore did not hinder lawyers from elevating the civil concept
of ownership - through interpretation based on natural law ideas - onto a constitutional level.155
2.1.2. Property protection in the Weimar Republic and under national-socialism
It was, however, only forty years later, after Germany's defeat in the First World War,l56 the fall
of the monarchy and the introduction of the Weimar Republic, that the sovereignty of the people
and numerous guaranteed fundamental rights were perceived to be characteristic features of the
state.157 The tradition of constitutional property protection started by the constitution of the
Paulskirche was continuedl58 ill article 153 of the Weimar Constitution:159
"Das Eigentum wird VOII der Verfassung gewëhrleistet. Sein Inhalt und seine Schranken ergeben sich
aus den Gese/zen. Eine Enteignung komi nur zum Wahle der Allgemeinheit und auf gesetzlicher
Grundlage vorgenommen werden. Sie erfolgt gegen angemessene Entschiidigung, soweit nicht ein
Reichsgeset: etwas anderes bestimmt .... Eigenturn verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich Diens/
sein fiir das Gemeine Beste. "
Rittstiegl60 points out that this article was initially developed as a tool against direct political
interference with the existing order in property law.161 However, the post-war crisis and the
challenges set by the extraordinary inflation rate of the twenties and thirties also brought about
extensive jurisprudence on the meaning of public weal (Wohle del' Allgemeinheit) and the
acceptability of infringements on individual property interests for the well-being of the general
econorny.l'" The jurisprudence of the courts on the property clause in the Weimar Constitution
also played a signi fieant role in expanding the concept of property. This can be noticed
especially in the area of land utilisation (in particular where the protection of historical
IS4 Kimminich Eigenuun Enteignung Entschtidigung (1976) mn 7; Eschenbach Der Verfassungsrechtliche Schulz
des Eigentunis (1996) 33. Cf also the Prussian Constitution of 1850, as analysed in Von Brtinneck
Eigentunisgarantie (1984) 21 - 26.
ISS Rirtstieg Eigenrum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 250.
1561914 _ 1918.
IS7 Robbers Introduction (1998) 40.
ISS Eschenbach Schut: des Eigen/Wils (1996) 33.
159 Translation "Property is guaranteed by the constitution. Its substance and limits are revealed by law.
Expropriation can take place only in the public weal and upon a legislative basis. Expropriation is successful against
appropriate compensation, unless imperial legislation determines otherwise .... Property entails obligations. lts use
should serve the public interest."
160 Rittsticg Eigen/tim als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 256 - 262.
161 Cf Von Briinneck Eigentunisgarantie (1984) 32 - 34.
162 Riustieg Eigenrum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 262 - 265; Von Brilnneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 36
mentions infringements ia in the spheres of agriculture, monopolies and restraints of trade, as well as lease and
interest rates.
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monuments is concerned). A further example is the treatment of established or exercised
commercial activity in terms of constitutional protection of property.163
Although the decisions of the German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) mostly lacked a clear
theoretical construction and were contradictory and unpredictable in practice.l'" they introduced
the practice of judicial examination of legislation according to its material compatibility with the
constitution.l'f Furthermore, the academic discourse over the interpretation of article 153 of the
Weimar Constitution would also prove to be of importance for similar debates over article 14
GG.166
Fundamental rights were not entrenched in the Weimar Constitution, and could therefore be
altered or erased by a simple majority.l'" The National-Socialists, who seized power in Germany
after 1930, exploited this weakness. The Great Depression and the lack of co-operation between
the democratic parties in the Weimar Republic, which caused a system of weak coalitions and
fragmentation of party representation, all contributed to the empowerment of the National-
Socialists.l'" The era of National Socialism was characterised by a disregard of legal principles
and abuse of constitutional structures with binding force in Germany at the time.169
The property guarantee was annulled in 1933 through a decree of the German president, as a
measure of protection against averred communistic acts threatening the security of the state.170
The courts at first interpreted this legislation as being merely temporary. By contrast, some
scholars pointed out that the alterations made to the constitution were not compatible with the
idea of fundamental rights and that the annulment of the property guarantee, among other
provisions, could not be regarded as being of a passing nature.171 The consequences of the
annulment of the property guarantee soon became clear: The state authorities in the Third Reich
were enabled to execute several expropriations on racial or political grounds without being
exposed to judicial disapproval. The assets of political parties like the KPD and SPD and their
supporting organisations, the assets of German emigrants who have lost their citizenship through
the Gesetz fiber den Widerruf von Einbiirgerungen und die Aberkennung der deutschen
Staatsangehorigkeit'V as well as cinematic material or works of art which were unacceptable
163 Cf Eschenbach Schutz des Eigentums (1996) 34 - 37 for a discussion of the Federal Court's efforts to expand the
constitutional property concept. Also Rittstieg Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 266 - 269; Von Bri.inneck
Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 37 - 38.
164 Von Bri.inneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 39.
165 Rittstieg Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 269.
166 The various methods of interpretation that were considered are described and evaluated by Eschenbach Schutz
des Eigentums (1996) 45 - 75. It is shown that the difficulties with art 153 of the Weimar Constitution were not
linked with the understanding of art 153 as such, but rather with the different approaches to constitutional
interpretation in general. Thus the discussion revolved around the questions whether the will of the historical
legislature, or rather the objective will of the law should enjoy precedence, and what the value of teleological and
comparative interpretation methods would be.
167 Foster German Legal System (1996) 26.
168 Robbers Introduction (1998) 40; Foster German Legal System (1996) 25, 26.
169 Foster German Legal System (1996) 27; Robbers Introduction (1998) 40.
170 "Verordnung des Reichspriisidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat" 28 February 1933, RGBI I 83.
171 Rittstieg Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 273.
172 14 July 1933, RGBI 1480.
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(entartete Kunst) in the eyes of the National-Socialists were confiscated. The destruction of
Jewish property passed unsanctioned after 1933, as the civil-law property order were practically
not applicable to Jews after this date. If judicial investigations were applied for, they simply did
not take place. The police also simply turned a blind eye at atrocities connected to the
persecution of Jews. As the Jewish persecution intensified, so did the systematic removal of
Jewish assets from their owners. Especially means of production were taken from their true
owners and transferred to companies or individual pursuing the arial ideal.173
Still, the administrative and legislative practise of the National-Socialist government afforded
property a kind of "quasi-fundamental-right" guarantee. Political institutions assumed the power
to determine the contents and limits of property and the obligation to protect it.174 The
expropriation procedure and requirements also remained unchanged during this time - except in
political cases like those mentioned above.175 However, the National-Socialist aims pursued after
1933 often caused far-reaching interferences with the institution of ownership and other
complementary institutions. For instance, the executive and legislative authorities, which
continued "guaranteeing" property after annulment of the constitutional provision, could not
really solve the problem of whether or not compensation was payable for legislative interference
in institutions related to property (namely means of production, industries, elc).176 This resulted
in an inconsistent and confusing system of compensation policies.
2.1.3. Circumstances influencing the drafting of article 14GG
The experience with National-Socialism has to this day been the strongest influence on tbe law
of the Federal Republic of Germany.v" The Basic Law, that came into force in 1949, is
thoroughly pervaded by the determination to prevent anything similar to national-socialism from
happening again. Consequently the Basic Law contains extensive provisions on fundamental
rights,178 which were also - in reaction against the loss of freedoms and the repression of
individual rights - more strongly oriented towards individual freedom than the fundamental
rights of the Weimar constitution. Article 14 GG is, in fact, one or the few rundamental rights
provisions which contains references to fundamental duties, and not only to fundamental
rights.179
The designation "Basic Law" (Grundgesetz) is an expression of the expectation (at the time of its
promulgation) that the division of Germany effected by the Allied forces after the Second World
War was only a temporary measure and that a permanent constitution for the whole country
I7J Von Brunncck 1979 Kritische Justi: 153; 155 - 157.
114 Von Brtinneck Eigentunisgarantie (1984) 51.
115 Fraenkel Der Doppelstaat (1974) 107 - 108.
116 Von 8riinneck Eigenmmsgarantie (1984) 61 - 71.
117 Robbers introduction (1998) 41 explains that the internal self-understanding of Germany is intimately connected
to this experience: "[Germany's] political debates, their high points and weaknesses cannot be understood without
bearing this background in mind."
118 Fosler German Legal System (1996) 28.
179 Kimrninich Eigentum Enteignung Entschádigung (1976) mn 8.
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could soon be created.P" However, after the commencement of the Cold War, German
unification seemed to be out of the question. Nevertheless the view that reform could only take
place once Germany has been reunited impeded the process of reform. The system of property
endorsed by the Basic Law thus remained capitalist-oriented, contrary to the ideal of
Neuordnung der Eigentumsverfassung supported by most political groups in Germany between
1945 and 1949.181
This ideal entailed a reformulation of the property guarantee to portray a democratic-socialist
order.182 Itwould also signify a break with the national-socialist past in which the property order
were exploited to serve the aims of the Third Reich's govemmentP'' However, the Western
Allied powers were not in favour of such a reform.l'" America in particular argued strongly that
only a unified German legislature could decide whether or not the structure of the German
property order should be changed.185 Simultaneously the Western Allied powers promoted an
economy based on private ownership of the means of production.l'"
By 1949, with the drafting of article 14 GG, the political parties already espoused different views
on the content of the Neuordnung der Eigentumsverfassung. The SPD still favoured
socialisation, but the CDU under Adenauer opted rather for a liberal and social market economy
(sozialen Marktwirtschaftït'" These different approaches would also eventually influence the
wording of the new constitutional property guarantee.P''
This difference of approach is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the scope of protection
to be afforded to property by a constitutional guarantee. The SPD-representatives disagreed with
the FDP and CDU-representatives about the extent to which property interests had to be covered
by the constitutional property guarantee in order to aid the development of individual wealth.189
Further problems were caused by the disagreement about the extent of the social function of
property. Another issue that had to be resolved was whether an individual's abuse of his or her
property could be constitutionally protected. This was related to the question of whether the use
of property should always be in the public interest. In the context of expropriation and
compensation, the most contentious issues were the determination of the amount of
compensation and the situations under which compensation would be payable.i'"
180 Robbers Introduction (1998) 41.
181 Von Brunneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 82 - 83 shows that the SPD, CDU as well as the KPD were in favour of
a break with the property order of the past and of socialisation. Only the liberal FDPILPDIDVP alliance was not in
favour of alterations to the existing property order.
182 Finer, Bogdanor & Rudden Comparing Constitutions (1995) 37 - 38.
183 Rittstieg Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 275.
184 Von Briinneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 85.
185 In Rittstieg Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 278 it is indicated that Britain - where the Labour Party
was governing at the time - was more in favour of socialisation than America, but that the American influence in
Germany, even in the British occupation zone, was stronger.
186 Eg the currency reform (20 June 1948) and the Marshall plan.
187 Rittstieg Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 279.
188 Finer, Bogdanor & Rudden Comparing Constitutions (1995) 37 - 38.
189 Von Doemming, Fusslein & Matz 1951 Jahrbuch des ëffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart (NF) 146.
190 Von Doemming, Fusslein & Matz 1951 Jahrbuch des ëffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 149 - 154.
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Eventually the wording of the first two paragraphs was altered to look more like that of article
153 of the Weimar Constirution.l'" After a series of alterations, it was also decided not to make
any mention of whether or not owners abusing their property should be protected. The decision
as to which property interests would be protected was left to the legislature.l'" These elements
clearly illustrate that article 14 GG is characterised by compromises between liberal and socialist
ideologies.193 The drafting process resulted in a constitutional property guarantee, which -
although formulated in general terms - still reflects the dichotomy between liberal private
ownership and the social obligation inherent in property. The task of finding a working balance
between the interests of the individual and the society would in the following years under the
Basic Law fall on all levels of government: first and foremost the judiciary, but also to a large
extent the legislature and even the administration.
2.1.4. Constitutional property protection in a reunified Germany
German unification was eventually achieved on 3 October 1990, after the conclusion of the Two-
plus-four treaty between Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States of America on
the one hand and the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the
other hand. The property law order underpinned by article 14 GG lost its temporary nature and
was accepted by the people of the Federal Republic. It was also adopted by the "new" German
Lander after reuni fication.!" The unification treaty set out the terms upon which unification
would take place. It contained several provisions on property. Because of this agreement, a
whole new range of problems needed to be addressed. But legal solutions to the newly arisen
problems were hampered by the different ideologies underlying the divided German society.195
Property law and the transformation of the German Democratic Republic's economy have been
particularly problematic in the negotiations preceding the reunification!" and in the period of
transition following upon the reunification.l'" Concepts like property, expropriation,
socialisation and compensation were in the theory and practice of the former German
Democratic Republic afforded meanings differing quite extensively from those of similar terms
used in the Federal Republic of Germany. This gave rise to the question whether the "East-
Gerrnan'' and "West-German" property orders could ever be compatible.
It soon became clear that the property order of the German Democratic Republic would not
survive the reunification. It was in principle oriented against private property. The flexibility that
191 Together with the creation of a constitutional court which would control the Federal legislature, it was expected
that the judicial obstruction from the early Weimar period would not be repeated. Rittstieg Eigentutu als
Verfassungsproblem (1975) 285; Von Doernming, Fusslein & Matz 1951 Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts der
Gegenwart 147.
192 Von Doemming. Fusslein & Matz 1951 Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 148 - 149.
193 Rirtstieg Eigenturn als Verfassungsproblem (1975) 280.
19'1 Foster German Legal System (1996) 29; Robbers Introduetian (1998) 41.
195 Robbers introduction (1998) 41.
196 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injus/ices (1996) 79.
197 Wendt" Art. 14" in Sachs (ed) Kali/men/ar (1996) mn 187.
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the property guarantee in article 14 GO acquired through 40 years of jurisprudence was also
much better geared for protecting existing property relations in the East of Germany than the
property order of the German Democratic Republic itself.198 This state of affairs nevertheless
gave rise to more intricate problems regarding the restitution of property rights lost as a result of
the division of Germany after the Second World War and the Soviet rule in the East. The issues
relating to the existing property order that were discussed, were the following:
(i) Considerable attention was given to the issue whether property expropriated before
1945, and in the period of Soviet occupation between 1945 and 1949 could be restored.l'"
(ii) A related issue was the determination of the value of confiscated property and attempts
at reaching an agreement on the manner in which the interests of persons entitled to
compensation could be given effect.2oo
(iii) Further, the differences in social and economic standards in the different parts of
Germany still give rise to heated political discussions and challenge the legal and social
structures of the reunited Federal Republic.i'"
2.2. Relevance of article 14 GG for the German property order
The Basic Law quickly became a "centre of identification for the German people,,,202and a token
of the free, democratic society within which it functions. Within the constitutional system, the
protection of property rights is a guiding ethical principle recognised by the Basic Law and of
special importance for the system of social relations under the rule of law. 203Article 14 GG has,
mainly through the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, obtained a relatively clear
basic structure. Nevertheless, the application of the principles incorporated in this section still
creates confusion, even for German lawyers, practitioners and students.204
In general, it can be said that property is protected in the hands of its owners, and that not only
property itself, but also to some extent the value of property, is guaranteed. The function of the
property guarantee is to permit the holder of a protected property interest to act freely with the
property and to control his or her own economic destiny. From an economic perspective, one can
say that the guarantee of ownership in article 14 I GG has a microeconomic and a
macroeconomic function. The basic right of ownership which is guaranteed in article 14 I GG,
results in an economy governed by private-sector autonomy, "actual,,20S competition and
198 Kimminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefi der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 69 - 72.
199 Wendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (ed) Kommentar (1996) mn 187 - 192.
200 Badura "Eigentum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 46; Jeffress 1991 Yale LJ 544 - 548.
201 BVerfGE 91294 (Fortgeltung der Mietepreisbindung); Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 23.
202 Robbers Introduction (1998) 41.
203 BVerfGE 14,263277: "Das Eigentum ist ebenso wie die Freiheit ein elementares Grundrecht; das Bekenntnis zu
ihm ist eine Wertentscheidung des Grundgesetzes von besonderer Bedeutung fiir den sozialen Rechtsstaat."
204 CfVon Heinegg & Haltern "Keine Angst vor Art. 14 GG!" 1993 JuS 121 - 122.
205 In other words not competition determined by regulative policy or theory.
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decentralised self-regulation.i'" On the other hand, the guarantee of ownership also has the
microeconomic function of providing the individual with the freedom to engage in economic
activity. Two fundamental characteristics of the German notion of ownership can be deduced
from this description of the constitutional property guarantee. First, it indicates that Germany
prefers an economic system that recognises individual initiative and responsibility of the
entrepreneur in the market economy as essential elements. Second, as a necessary corollary,
ownership is guaranteed as an elementary basic right intimately associated with personal
freedom. The guarantee of ownership is not merely a guarantee of the value of property, but also
a guarantee that the legal entity of ownership will be protected.
3. South Africa: negotiating a constitutional property clause
The negotiation processes, which preceded the promulgation of both the Interim Constitution and
the Final Constitution in South Africa, are well known and well documcnted.i'" The
contentiousness of the right to property as a fundamental right worthy of constitutional
protection has enjoyed the attention of many authors: lawyers, politicians and journalists alike.
The following paragraphs briefly summarise the history of the inclusion of a property guarantee
in the South African constitutions.
3.1. Historical background to the property clauses
The primary object of the bill of rights in tbe Interim Constitution of South Africa was to find the
means and methods of transforming an unjust and deeply divided society.208 The adoption of this
bill of rights was the consequence of political negotiationi'" - in the context of a dialectic interplay
between the two opposing, yet complementary human rights traditions of libertarianism and
liberationism/egalitarionism'P - al the beginning of the nineties. The protection of human rights
as such was proven to be a "site of struggle for political power,,211 in South Africa. Particularly
the property clause was contentious right from the outset.212 In analysing the historical
206 Ossenbiihl " Economic Rights" in Kirchhof & Kommers (cds) Germany and its Basic Law (1993) 269.
207 Cf Bennun & Newill (cds): Negotiating Jl/slice (1995); Chaskalson 1995 SAJHR 222 - 240; Friedman &
Atkinson (eds) Small Miracle (1994); De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) etc.
208 Murphy 1994 SAJHR 391, 394.
209 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
ch 31, I. Du Plessis & Olivier 1997 (I) 5 HRCUSA II; Chaskalson 1995 SAJ/IR 229 - 238; Du Plessis "Drafting
the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 89 - 91.
210 Du Plessis 1994 SAPR/PL 2 - 3 and Du Plessis "Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in De Villiers (ed)
Birth of a Constitution (1994) 91 - 92 originally referred to the term "liberationism" to refer to the ideas of
"empowerment of the marginalised (majority) by the 'higher hand' of state authority" espoused by certain political
groups in South Africa. In a later article, these ideas are referred to as "egalitarianism". Cf Du Plessis 2000 Scriptura
34 - 39.
211 Du Plessis 1994 SAPRIPL I.
212 Du Plessis & Olivier 1997 (I) 5 IIRCLJSA II; Du Plessis "Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in De
Villiers (cd) Birth of a Constitution (1994) 97; Atkinson "Insuring the future? The Bill of Rights" in Friedman &
Atkinson (eds) Small Miracle (1994) 134; Du Plessis 1994 SAPRIPL 17; Gutto Property and Land Reform
(1995) 55.
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background of the South African constitutional property clauses, these differing ideological
influences must be kept in mind.
Libertarianism draws on the ideology of classical liberalism, and is closely related to the idea of
restricted government.P'' It tends to rate individual liberty as the core value for purposes of
constitutional drafting and interpretation. As such, the value of equality could easily play a
subordinate role in libertarian thinking. In South Africa, it was the "white liberals," who
expressed their opposition to the authoritarian government and its apartheid regime before 1990
in human rights terms, who have initially supported the libertarian tradition. After the fall of
apartheid, the ranks of the libertarians were expanded and diversified through the joining of
"newcomers" on the human rights scene. Ironically, the "old" South African National Party
govemmenti'" was probably the most significant newcomer to fervently support the libertarian
approach to human rights in ensuing negotiations.
Liberationism/egalitarianism, by contrast, is predominantly underpinned by ideologies ranging
from social democracy to democratic socialism.i" Thus, it takes a more decisive egalitarian
stance than its libertarian counterpart, but cannot really be described as being by nature
"socialist" or "collectivist" in the true sense of the word. Liberationists are, however, usually
more prepared to bear with state intervention for the sake of an equal distribution of means
among the members of society. As early as 1943, the ANC has adopted a liberationist approach
to human rights in South Africa.216 Strong liberationist elements have also been incorporated into
the ANC's proposals'!" presented for negotiations.
Libertarianism and liberationism/egalitarianism can to some extent be complementary. They
share a fundamental commitment to a quintessence of time-honoured liberal-democratic values,
albeit with a marked difference in emphasis. Among these values are218
"an unquestioning deference to human life and human dignity, to freedom and security of the person,
to freedom of conscience, religion, belief and expression (including freedom of the media), to
participatory political institutions and to due process oflaw in its various forms."
213 Du Plessis 1994 SAPRlPL 2 - 3 and Du Plessis "Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in De Villiers (ed)
Birth ofa Constitution (1994) 91 - 92.
214 Their "Proposals on a Charter of Fundamental Rights" (2 February 1993) is framed in the libertarian tradition.
See also the art 15 of the proposal of the South African Law Commission, Working Paper 25, Project 58, Group and
Human Rights (1989). This document is printed as Appendix B, vol 21, 1989 Columbia Human Rights Law
Review 241 - 248.
215 Du Plessis 1994 SAPRlPL 2 - 3 and Du Plessis "Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in De Villiers (ed)
Birth ofa Constitution (1994) 91 - 92.
216 This is apparent from their 1943-document "African Claims in Africa" and the 1955 "Freedom Charter." These
documents can be found online at http://www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/keydocs.htrnl [2000.03.12].
217 "Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" (online at
http://www.anc.org.zalancdocs/history/readyto.html [13.02.2000] and "A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa." (Cf
Appendix A, vol 21, 1989 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 235 - 239 which formed the basis of the latter
document.)
218 Du Plessis 1994 SAPRlPL 2 - 3; Du Plessis "Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in De Villiers (ed)
Birth of a Constitution (1994) 91 - 92.
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However, in spite of the values shared by the libertarian and liberationist/egalitarianist traditions, it
is especially in the field of socio-economic rights, like those "new" land rights created by section
25(5) to (8) FC,219 where the different traditions might be difficult to reconcile.
Liberationism/egalitarianism is much more oriented towards the treatment of the bill of rights as
a vehicle for socio-economic upliftment of the marginalised masses than libertarianism. The
debate about whether or not (and the extent to which) socio-economic rights in general should be
entrenched in a bill of rights, thus also had a profound influence on the discussion about the
inclusion of a property clause in a justiciable bill of rights.22o The differences between
libertarianism and liberationisrn/egalitarianism therefore become particularly apparent in the
debate about the inclusion of a property clause in the constitution, and the overview of the
compromises that were eventually struck.
3.1.1. The inclusion of a property guarantee in the constitution
During the negotiations, the different approaches regarding the inclusion of a property guarantee
in the constitution's chapter on fundamental rights were in essence based upon the divisions in
the South African society and the fundamental-rights ideologies underpinning these divisions.'?'
This would eventually also determine the wording and structure of the property clauses, section
28 IC and section 25 FC.
An important and "typically South African" characteristic of the libertarian and
liberationist/egalitarian approaches should be mentioned at this stage: Normally, libertarians
would - due to their roots in classical liberalism - contend for a minimalist approach towards
protection of fundamental rights. They would, for instance assume a "hands-off' attitude with
regard to the relation of state authority to individual autonomy. By contrast,
liberationists/egalitarianists would - due to social-democratic ideological roots - usually prefer
stronger regulatory measures. Further, liberationists normally favour a bill of rights providing
mechanisms with which to effect claims premised on second and third generation rights. In
South Africa, however, the political positioning of the negotiating parties caused
liberationists/egalitarianists to adopt an a-typical minimalist approach, and libertarians to adopt
an a-typical "optirnalist" stanee.222 This peculiarity had a noteworthy influence on the drafting of
section 28 IC in particular, but also on section 25 FC. It is also bound to influence the decisions
of the courts in future. Whereas the National Party/Government's negotiators favoured the
219 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" ill Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,69. For
a discussion on the enforceability and implementation of the right to property as a socio-economic right in the South
African context, cf De Wet Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 129 - 135; Caiger
"Protection of Property" in Bennun & Newitt (eds) Negotiating Justice (1995) 132 - 137.
220 Caiger "Protection of Property" in Bennun & Newin (eds) Negotiating Justice (1995) 132; Budlender 1992
SAJHR 303.
221 Chaskalson 1995 SAJHR 222 - 240 and Atkinson "Insuring the Future? " in Friedman & Atkinson (eds) Small
Miracle (1994) 134 - 140 provide telling illustrations of the drafting IC's property clause and the ongoing conflict
between the ANC and the NP as supporters ofdifTerent human rights traditions and as representatives of conflicting
interest-groups in the South African society.
222 Du Plessis 1994 SAPRJPL 2 - 3.
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inclusion of a property guarantee right from the start of negotiations, the ANC's negotiators
initially attempted to exclude the right from the interim charter.223
The ANC and their supporters believed that a property guarantee would hamper land restitution
projects. They were of the opinion that the constitutional protection of property would legitimise
the consequences of generations of apartheid and dispossession+" Therefore, their proposed bill
of rights for the negotiation process did not provide for the protection of property as such. The
Canadian225 and Indian226 situations, where the constitutional drafters for various reasons
refrained from incorporating a property guarantee in the respective Bills of Rights, were used to
223 This declares the stronger influence of the NP in determining the initial wording of the property clause.
Chaskalson 1995 SAJHR 222 - 240; Atkinson "Insuring the future? The Bill of Rights" in Friedman & Atkinson
(eds) Small Miracle (1994) 134 - 140.
224 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1, 3;
Caiger "Protection of Property " in Bennun & Newitt (eds) Negotiating Justice (1995) 113 - 114; Atkinson "Insuring
the Future? " in Friedman & Atkinson (eds) Small Miracle (1994) 135; Van der Walt "The Fragmentation of Land
Rights" 1992 SAJHR 450.
225 In Canada it was decided to exclude property rights from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (adopted in 1982),
after the topic has been debated extensively. Originally the Canadian Constitution of 1960 contained a non-
justiciable Bill of Rights, as part of an ordinary statue, which could be revoked by parliament and which did not
provide the court with the power to review statutes. This remains in force and contains specific protection for
property rights, by providing guarantees for the right to the enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived of
property except by due process of law. It applies to federal parliament, and seems to be restricted to the property of
individual persons. Several provincial bills of rights provide explicit protection of property rights. The guarantee of
property was apparently excluded from the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by reason of (i) the
uncertainty of the range of rights that would be included in the category of property protected by a constitutional
property clause; (ii) previous experience with the earlier non-entrenched constitutional provisions regarding
property; (iii) the conviction that vital aspects of life, liberty and personal security that are often associated with and
protected by the property clause are sufficiently covered by the articles dealing with personal rights; (iv) opposition
from provincial governments fearing that the inclusion of a property clause might hamper the solution of specific
provincial problems; and (v) the controversy of the question whether property is in fact so fundamental a right that it
should rank with other rights that are guaranteed in the charter. Owners, however, are at least protected by a number
of common law rules and by procedural provisions which guarantee due process of law. Nevertheless, payment of
compensation is not guaranteed, but the relevant statues usually provide for payment of adequate compensation. Cf
Bauman 1992 SAJHR 345 - 355; Van der Walt 1993 Recht & Kritiek 275 - 277; Budlender "Constitutional
Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,3. Gutto Property and Land Reform
(1995) 31 refers to the Canadian approach to securing property rights and land rights as one of "constitutional
abeyance," explaining that this approach of a deliberate omission from constitutional protection is a political
strategy not to explicitly incorporate that which is unlikely to receive general consensus, however, with the
knowledge that such a lacuna would not be fatal to the overall balance of the political and social order in the
interests of society. Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 86 - 87 shows that, even without an
express property guarantee, the Canadian treatment of property protection is important for comparative purposes,
because of the importance attached to the interpretation of the general limitation clause in the Canadian Charter.
226 The history of constitutional property protection in India is dominated by the constitutional conflict that raged
between the legislature and the courts for almost thirty years. Judges asserted property rights to upset schemes of
social reform. Land reforms, nationalisation, motor transport, slum clearances and government take-overs of
mismanaged vital industries were struck down in the name of private property. The property clauses contained in the
list of fundamental rights (art 19(1)(t) read with 19(5); as well as art 31), were eventually the most litigated
provisions in the Indian Constitution. After a series of constitutional amendments, the inability of the courts and
legislature to find common ground on the issue of constitutional property protection resulted in the removal of the
property guarantee from the bill of rights in 1978. The Indian experience is relevant for South Africa because of the
similar problems of widespread poverty and the aftermath of colonialism that will have to be faced in a democratic
order. Murphy 1993 JJS 38 - 39; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 389 - 395; Van der Walt 1993 Recht & Kritiek 277 - 278;
Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 33, Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 192 et seq.
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justify arguments in favour of the exclusion of property rights from a catalogue of fundamental
rights in South Africa.227
Instead of showing outright support for property protection, the ANC's proposal set out general
principles seemingly imbued with a "communal spirit," affording property a more customary
character. According to their proposal, property was to be regarded as something people use and
cannot own to the exclusion of others_228 Their reservations concerning the inclusion of a
property guarantee in the new constitution focussed on the unpredictability of consequences
flowing from such an inclusion. This could be problematic for the exercise of the government's
regulatory functions229 and legislation aimed at achieving social stability and at addressing the
disparities of wealth in the South African society.23o
On the other hand, the National Party/Government and their supporters from the outset favoured
a property guarantee elevating the rights of owners to such a level that the state's power to levy
taxes would be subject to the sovereignty of property. Their initially proposed property guarantee
would have had the effect that all taxes on property with a confiscatory effect would be invalid.
Expropriation against compensation would have been the only interference with property for
which the state would have had authorisation. They based their view on the proposition that the
individual can first and foremost achieve his or her full potential by acquiring property through
hard work, thri ft and responsibitity.i" They pointed out that the protection of property is
fundamental to democracy itself and that such guarantees are present in most modern
constitutions.V' They also indicated that the function of a clause constitutionally entrenching the
right to property would be to ban the fears of owners and right holders regarding property
confiscation.v''' It was also argued that a property clause would be an effective way of mediating
the conflict between free economic activity and the imperatives of social policy.234
3.1.2. Compromises incorporated in section 28 IC and section 25 FC
The negotiators eventually agreed that a property clause which both protects existing property
rights and recognises property rights which had been taken away by apartheid, should be
included in the bill of rights. They could not, however, reach agreement on the way in which,
and standards according to which compensation would have to be determined in the event of
m A discussion on the treatment of the right not to be deprived of property in these jurisdictions, which both are
connected to the Commonwealth, can be found in Allen 1993/llt & Comp LQ 523 - 552.
22M Caiger "Protection of Property" in Bennun & Newill (eds) Negotiating Justice (1995) 130 - 138.
229 Budlcnder "Constitutional Protection" in Budlcnder, Latsky & Roux Nell' Land Law (revised 1998) ch I, 3;
Atkinson "Insuring the Future? " in Friedman & Atkinson (eds) Small Miracle (1994) 136 - 139.
230 Murphy 1993 JJS 38; Chaskalson 1995 SAJlfR 223.
231 Chaskalson 1995 SAJIIR 224; Du Plessis 1994 SAPR/PL 3.
mOudIender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh I, 3.
m le the withdrawal of property from its owners by the state or public authorities without remuneration. Du Plessis
& Olivier 1997 (I) 5 /IRCLJSA II; Chaskalson 1995 SAJ/-IR 224.
m Cf the application of the principles in Munzer Theory (1990) to the South African context in Lewis 1992
SAJ/IR 419 - 430. Cf also the account of the Democratic Party's lobby at the Multi-Party Negotiating Process in
Atkinson "Insuring the future?" in Friedman & Atkinson (eds) Small Miracle (1994) 136, 137.
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expropriation. Neither could they agree on a constitutional strategy to provide for the restoration
of rights in land to persons who had been dispossessed of such rights as a result of racially
discriminatory policies.r"
It was eventually decided to include a positive property guarantee, section 28 IC, in the chapter
on Fundamental Rights of the Interim Constitution. The mandate for land reform and restitution
would be framed in sections 121,236122237and 123238IC,239outside the chapter on fundamental
rights. Ordinary legislation (more particularly the Restitution of Land Rights Act240)would then
235 Du Plessis 1994 SAPR/PL 17; Caiger "Protection of Property" in Bennun & Newitt (eds) Negotiating
Justice (1995) 115 - 116; Du Plessis & Olivier 1997 (I) 5 HRCUSA 11; Chaskalson 1995 SAJHR 229 - 238;
Atkinson "Insuring the Future?" in Friedman & Atkinson (eds) Small Miracle (1994) 136 - 140.
236 S 121 FC (Claims): "(1) An Act of Parliament shall provide for matters relating to the restitution ofland rights, as
envisaged in this section and in sections 122 and 123. (2) A person or a community shall be entitled to claim
restitution of a right in land from the state if - (a) such person or community was dispossessed of such right at any
time after a date to be fixed by the Act referred to in subsection (1); and (b) such dispossession was effected under
or for the purpose of furthering the object of a law which would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial
discrimination contained in section 8(2), had that section been in operation at the time of such dispossession. (3) The
date fixed by virtue of subsection (2)(a) shall not be a date earlier than 19 June 1913. (4)(a) The Provisions of this
section shall not apply to any rights in land expropriated under the Expropriation Act, 1975 (Act No. 63 of 1975), or
any other law incorporating by reference in that Act, or the provisions of that Act with regard to compensation, if
just and equitable compensation as contemplated in section 123(4) was paid in respect of such expropriation. (b) In
this section "Expropriation Act, 1975" shall include any expropriation law repealed by that Act."
237 S 122 FC (Commission): "(1) The Act contemplated in section 121(1) shall establish a Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights, which shall be competent to - (a) investigate the merits of any claims; (b) mediate and
settle disputes arising from such claims; (c) draw up reports on unsettled claims for submission as evidence to a
court of law and to present any other relevant evidence to the court; and (d) exercise and perform any such other
powers and functions as may be provided for in the said Act. (2) The procedures to be followed for dealing with
claims in terms of this section shall be as prescribed by or under the said Act."
238 S 123 FC (Court orders): "(1) Where a claim contemplated in section 121(2) is lodged with a court of law and the
land in question is - (a) in the possession of the state and the state certifies that the restoration of the right in question
is feasible, the court may, subject to subsection (4), order the state to restore the relevant right to the claimant;
or (b) in the possession of a private owner and the state certifies that the acquisition of such land by the state is
feasible, the court may, subject to subsection (4), order the state to purchase or expropriate such land and restore the
relevant right to the claimant. (2) The court shall not issue an order under subsection (1)(b) unless it is just and
equitable to do so, taking into account all relevant factors, including the history of the dispossession, the hardship
caused, the use to which the property is being put, the history of its acquisition by the owner, the interests of the
owner and others affected by any expropriation, and the interests of the dispossessed: Provided that any
expropriation under subsection (I)(b) shall be subject to the payment of compensation calculated in the manner
provided for in section 28(3). (3) If the state certifies that any restoration in terms of subsection (1)(a) or any
acquisition in terms of subsection (1)(b) is not feasible, or if the claimant instead of the restoration of the right
prefers alternative relief, the court may, subject to subsection (4), order the state, in lieu of the restoration of the said
right - (a) to grant the claimant an appropriate right in available alternative state-owned land designated by the state
to the satisfaction of the court, provided that the state certifies that it is feasible to designate alternative state-owned
land; (b) to pay the claimant compensation; or (c) to grant the claimant any alternative relief. (4)(a)The
compensation referred to in subsection (3) shall be determined by the court as being just and equitable, taking into
account the circumstances which prevailed at the time of the dispossession and all such other factors as may be
prescribed by the Act referred to in section 121(1), including any compensation that was paid upon such
dispossession. (b) If the court grants the claimant the relief contemplated in subsection (1) or (3), it shall take into
account, and where appropriate, make an order with regard to, any compensation that was paid to the claimant upon
the dispossession of the right in question.
239 Text online at http://www.constitution.org.za/1993cons.htm [28.02.2000].
24022 of 1994.
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be passed to give effect to tbe provisions of these sections."! Thus, section 28 IC, while
entrenching the right to acquire, hold and dispose of rights in property, also provided for the
protection of existing rights in property and for expropriation against payment of compensation.
A strong libertarian influence is thus demonstrated. The section provides as follows:
28 (Property)
(I) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the
nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights.
(2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in accordance with a
law.
(3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such
expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the payment of
agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such
period as may be determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking into account all relevant
factors, including, in the case of the determination of compensation, the use to which the property is
being put, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those
affected and the interests of those affected.
The constitutional property clause in the Interim Constitution played an important role in the
overall importance of the new constitutional order established after 1994.242 The compromise
embodied in the Interim Constitution was followed by another intense debate in the drafting of
the Final Constitution. It was agreed relatively early in the second drafting process that the
protection of existing property rights should not render land reform impossible.i'" Divergent
opinions were, however, held on what constituted effective land reform, and which measures
would render il impossible. The decision to keep the constitutional property guarantee intact
remained controversial until the very last moments of the drafting process. It was one of the last
issues resolved by the constitutional assembly.i'" The property clause in the Final Constitution
was eventually phrased more widely so as to include the objectives of access to land, provision
of legally secure land tenure, land restitution and land reform in subsections (5) to (8). It
provided:
25 (Properly)
(I) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application - (a) for a public purpose
or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and
W Note that s 121 - 123 IC and the Restitution of Land Rights Act do not, and were not intended to, deal with land
redistribution. Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kcntridge, Klaaren et al (cds) Constitutional Law
(1996) eh 31, 2. Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998)
eh I, 4 points out that of all the wrongs, injuries and suffering caused by apartheid and racial discrimination, it is
only the dispossession of land rights that the legislature is specifically directed to rectify in the Interim Constitution.
(The consequences of other human rights abuses are treated in the Postscript to the Constitution, dealing with
National Unity and Reconciliation, As a result of those provisions and the Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, victims of serious human rights abuses do not have an enforceable right to
compensation if amnesty is granted in respect of those abuses, even if they constituted illegal conduct.)
242 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 324.
243 Budlendcr "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Lewd Law (revised 1998) ch 1,4.
24'1 Budlcnder "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) ch I, 5; Du
Plessis & Olivier 1997 (I) 5 nRCUSA II.
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manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a
court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable,
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, including - (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of
the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct
state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property;
and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.
(4) For the purposes of this section - (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and (b)
property is not limited to land.
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination,
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of
section 36( 1).
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).
3.1.3. Certification of section 25 FC
The next hurdle to be crossed was the certification of the Final Constitution by the Constitutional
Court.245 The negotiators responsible for drafting the Interim Constitution agreed on thirty-four
broad constitutional principles, included in schedule 4 to the Interim Constitution, with which the
Final Constitution had to comply. The Constitutional Court had the task of certifying that the text
of the Final Constitution complied with all of these principles before the Final Constitution could
come into operation.
In the Certification case, the court inter alia had to decide whether section 25 FC complied with
the constitutional principles in schedule 4 IC. With regard to the certification of the property
clause, the second constitutional principle played an important role. It determined:
Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which
shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which
shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained in
Chapter 3 of the [Interim] Constitution
Several arguments were presented to the Constitutional Court to indicate that the property clause
in the Final Constitution did not comply with the second constitutional principle. The first
objection raised against section 25 FC was that the wording adopted by the constitutional
assembly did not comply with the requirement of being one of the "universally accepted
245 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 CCT 23/96 online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.html[06.08.l999] par 70 - 75.
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fundamental rights" and that section 25 FC did not protect the right to "acquire, hold and dispose
of property" as was the case with section 28 IC.246 This argument was dismissed by the court in
the light of the many and varied existing versions of property guarantees in other constitutions
and human-rights documents. The court thus concluded that there is no universally accepted
formulation of the right to property and tbat, although section 25 FC was framed negatively,
protection of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property was implicit in the new text. It
was also remarked that a negative formulation of the property guarantee was apparently widely
accepted as appropriate, and that the lack of an express protection for the right to hold and
acquire property did not indicate non-compliance with the second constitutional principle.247
A further objection against section 25 FC concerned the expropriation provisions. In particular, it
was argued that expropriation could also be effected for purposes of land, water or related reform
and not only where the use to which the expropriated land would be put would be in the interests
of a broad section of the public. lt was furtber argued that compensation should be determined on
the basis of market value, and not by having regard to the factors listed in section 25(3) Fe. On
the first issue, the court found that the aims of expropriation envisaged were not inconsistent
with universally accepted approaches to expropriation. With regard to the determination of
compensation, the court acknowledged that it was not usual for a constitutional document itself
to mention specific criteria upon which compensation could be determined. It found, however,
that the approach taken in section 25 Fe did not conflict with the universally accepted view that
compensation had to be "fair," "adequate," "full," "equitable and appropriate," or "juSt.,,248
Section 25 Fe was not referred to the Constitutional Assembly for amendment. The court thus in
principle approved of the compromise reached in the drafting of section 25 Fe. In the four years
since the enactment of section 25 Fe, the government (that is to say the Department of Land
Affairs) has published extensive policy declarations on the property reforms undertaken and
intended.250 Yet, the debate on whether the libertarian or the liberationist tradition25I of human
rights ideology should be pre ferred continues in the sphere of constitutional interpretation.
A last objection against section 25 Fe was that mineral rights and intellectual property were not
expressly afforded protection. The court rejected this argument by indicating that neither of these
was regarded as "universally accepted" fundamental rights.249
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2~6 Par 71.
247 Par 72.
24R Par 73.
249 Par 74 - 75. Mostly, intellectual property or mineral rights arc protected by a constitutional guarantee, not
because they constitute inherent fundamental rights, but rather because they are regarded as properly within the
wider constirutional meaning of the term.
250 Department of Land Affairs While Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) online at
hllp://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/whitc_papersllandwp.htl11l [16.12.1998J.
251 Sec n 210 supra.
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3.2. Relevance of the constitutional property clauses
for the South African property order
The South African provisions on the constitutional protection of property reflect, apart from their
hybrid ideological foundations.if also a collision between South Africa's unfortunate history of
ownership and property rights, on the one hand, and the present disparities of wealth in the society,
on the other. This complicates the court's function of balancing the protection of private property
rights against the need for regulation and expropriation of property rights for the sake of the
common good. The days are over in which the court could remark thaes3
"Whether all this [ie the social transformation envisaged by Parliament in enacting the Group Areas
Act] will ultimately prove to be for the common weal of all the inhabitants, is not for the court to
decide."
The courts have, on the one hand, to abstract a set of values according to which property law - in
particular law pertaining to ownership of land - should function under the constitution. On the other
hand, they have to monitor compliance with these values. Neither of the constitutional texts
provides ample guidance for the fulfilment of these tasks.
The meaning and effect of the interim property clause was, for instance, problematic from the
outset. Some scholars regarded section 28(1) IC as a statement of substantive individual property
rights.2s4 Others regarded it as a guarantee of the institution of private property, rather than
individual property rights.2ss A third group regarded the right to property as a socio-economic
right,2S6while some scholars deemed it to be a mere statement of eligibility to hold and deal with
rights in property.2S7The divergent interpretations of the function of section 28 IC could possibly
be ascribed to the different views on the importance of the human rights ideologies underpinning
the compromise reached in the drafting of the property clause.
The dichotomous nature of the values underlying the ownership concept in the new constitutional
order still persists in the formulation of section 25 FC. The human rights tradition that enjoys
precedence through the interpretation of the constitutional text will therefore also in terms of section
25 FC necessarily influence the manner in which existing property rights, and the restitution of land
rights, are treated. This will, in turn, have implications for the understanding of the private law
concept of ownership, which is inevitably influenced by the underlying political and social
ideologies in the South African society.f"
252 Cf 46 supra.
253 Holmes J in Minister of the Interior v Loekhat and Others 1961 2 SA 587 602E-F commenting on the
discriminating effect that the Group Areas Act 77 of 1957 would have through substantial partial and unequal
treatment of the different race groups, the disrupting effect and substantial inequalities that would arise out of this
act clearly having been envisaged by Parliament.
254 Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 107 - 130.
255 Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 - 203.
256 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Raux New Land Law (1998) eh 1, 13 - 14 for a
critical approach; Cf also in general Budlender 1992 SAJHR 295 - 304.
257 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Raux New Land Law (1998) eh 1, 14 - 15.
258 Cf 10 supra.
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The courts in future will have to determine how problems regarding, inter alia, the interaction
between general and internal limitations of the constitutional property guarantee,259 the social
function of property/60 the formulation of the constitutional property concept.i" and the
interaction between the property clause and the equality clause of the constitution262 will be
theoretically disposed of. No generally accepted theoretical framework exists at present.
Nevertheless, the actual transformation of property law and landownership is not curtailed by the
lack of such a theoretical framework. In the face of severe political pressure, in anticipation of a
new socio-political dispensation and in spite of serious financial difficulties, most of the property
practices under apartheid land law have been altered since 1990.
Compliance with the urgent need for reconstruction and reparation (which is explicitly demanded in
the constitutional property clauses) will inevitably disturb existing property relations_263 It is
submitted that the judiciary, legislature and administration should try to avoid piecemeal
transformation. A set of principles should rather be abstracted from the constitutions themselves,
according to which land restitution and redistribution can be effected by fully acknowledging the
constitutional spirit of reconciliation, unity and compromise.
In view of the above, it should be clear that not only the property clause of the Final
Constitution, but also that of the Interim Constitution is relevant in a formulation of the
theoretical structure underlying the constitutional property guarantee. This flows from the fact
that sections 71, 73 and schedule 4 IC, provided that the new constitution had to comply with
certain principles laid down by the Interim Constitution.i'" Section 28 IC will continue to be the
legal yardstick when determining the constitutional validity of all property law. Statutes
pertaining to property law passed before the coming into force of the Final Constitution also
have to be measured against section 28 IC.265 This is illustrated by the decision in Ferreira v
Levin NO, Vryenhoek v Powe1l266 where it had to be determined whether a law inconsistent with
the Interim Constitution was automatically invalid through the operation of law, or whether such
a law would have to be declared invalid by a Court. The court argued that, after the coming into
force of the Interim Constitution, laws were either objectively valid or invalid267 - depending on
whether or not they were consistent with the Constitution - even if a dispute concerning
inconsistency would only be decided268 years afterwards. Therefore, as Budlender indicates,269
259 Cf 187 et seq infra.
260 Cf 139 et seq infra.
2M Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh I, 13 - 14; Cf also
Ackermann "Equality and the South African Constirution: The Role of Dignity" Unpublished Paper (2000) and the
examples menticned there.
262 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh I, 14 - 15.
2(,) Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridgc, Klaaren el al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31, 21.
26-1 A constitutional assembly had to be established in terms of these provisions, and the new constitution had to be
passed within two years from the dale of the first sitting of the national assembly in terms of the Interim
Constitution.
265 4 February 1997.
266 1996 1SA 984 (cq, online at http://www.law.wits.ac.zaljudgcments/ferrcira.html[09.06.1999] par 27 - 28.
267 And therefore of no force and effect in terms of s 4( I) IC.
26R In terms of s 98(5) IC.
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even if they are completely consistent with the Final Constitution, statutes enacted before its
promulgation might be inconsistent with the Interim Constitution. In such a case the Court would
be obliged to declare them invalid,27o and may then make any order which is just and
equitable.f" in order to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. Such orders may
include limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity or suspending the
declaration of invalidity for a period and subject to conditions.272
4. Constitutionalism and socio-economic needs
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the historic-ideological foundations of
the German and South African constitutional property clauses. The historical background can be
of valuable interpretative assistance, since it provides information on the nature of a particular
property clause and the intention of the drafters thereof.
,
In both Germany and South Africa, the wording of the constitutional property guarantees was not
a matter of chance, but an issue thoroughly debated and negotiated. In both legal systems the
products of these negotiations were structured in a manner so as to serve the aims of the drafters
of the property guarantees. In both cases, the unique historical circumstances of the respective
countries contributed to the process of drafting the constitutional property guarantees. Both in
Germany and in South Africa, the foundations of constitutional property protection comprise a
compromise between the values of individual freedom and autonomy, on the one hand, and the
common good, on the other. The interplay between individual autonomy and the common weal
in the compromise between libertarianism and liberationismlegalitarianism forms the basis of
section 25 FC and section 28 IC in South Africa. The courts' function of abstracting a set of
values from the constitutional property guarantee, according to which property law should
function, and of monitoring compliance with these values, is therefore not easy. A similar
deduction can be made from the German example.
Apart from the general constitutional principles+" and the guidelines in the interpretation
clause,274 South African courts have very little material with which to work. In contrast to the
269 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) ch 1,6.
270 In terms ofs I72(I)(a) FC.
271 In terms ofs 172(I)(b) FC.
272 S I72(1)(b)(i) and (ii) FC.
273 The values on which the constitution is founded are expounded in the Preamble to the constitution. It refers. inter
alia, to "heal[ing] the divisions of the past," establishing a society "based on democratic values, social justice and
fundamental human rights;" and basing government "on the will of the people" and protecting "every citizen ...
equally ... by law;" improving "the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person;" and building
"a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations."
274 S 39 FC (Interpretation of Bill of Rights): (I) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law. (2) When interpreting any
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. (3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other
rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that
they are consistent with the Bill.
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German courts, which could, to some extent, rely on the decisions of their predecessors in the
Weimar republic, no existing South African case law can provide sufficient guidance in matters
pertaining to the constitutional protection of property. Still, major socio-economic issues have to
be tackled in South Africa through the chosen method of constitutionalism. Constitutional
adjudication in terms of the property clause, the equality clause, or the contentions of property
owners that their lives and liberty have been violated by some economic, social or political
regulation, require judicial harmonisation of collective and individual interests_275
This could be done by relying on legal-comparative analyses of constitutional property protection in
other jurisdictions. Here, thc German example could be helpful for finding solutions to the South
African problems. In the following chapters, it will be indicated to what extent the constitutional
values of the German legal system correspond or could be applicable to the South African context.
First, however, the property guarantees of Germany and South A frica will be juxtaposed in order
to analyse their structural aspects and to identify the apparent similarities and obvious
di fferences between them.
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1. External aspects of the constitutional property clauses
The external aspects of a particular property guarantee will inevitably influence the interpretation
thereof. These external aspects not only determine the essential features of constitutional
property protection in a given jurisdiction, but can also affect the comparative value of specific
property guarantees. It will, thus, be necessary to take a closer look at the wording of the
constitutional provisions protecting property in Germany and South Africa.
Article 14 GG consists of three clauses, each containing more than one provisionr "
(1) (I)Das Eigentum und das Erbrecht werden gewëhrleistet. (2) lnhalt und Schranken werden durch
die Gesetze bestimmt.
(2) (I) Eigentum verpflichtet. (2) Sein Gebrauch soli zugleich dem Wahle der Allgemeinheit dienen.
(3) (I) Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wahle der Allgemeinheit zulássig. (2) Sie darf nur durch Gesetz
ader auf Grund eines Gesetzes erfolgen, das Art und Ausmaj3 der Entschiidigung regelt. (3) Die
Entschiidigunff ist unter gerechter Abwágung der Interessen der Allgemeinheit und der Beteiligten zu
bestimmen. (4 Wegen der Hëhe der Entschëdigung steht im Streitfalle der Rechtsweg var den
ordentlichen Gerichten offen.
The provisions within the respective clauses are not officially numbered separately, as is the
South African legislation. For purposes of the present analysis, reference is made to the various
clauses by means of capital Roman numbers (the first clause is indicated with the numeral I; the
second with II, and the third with III). Reference to a specific sentence within a clause is then
made by means of a consecutive Arabic number. So, for instance, article 14 I 1 GG contains the
guarantee of property, whereas article 14 I 2 GG acknowledges the ability of the legislature to
regulate property. Article 14 II mentions the social obligation inherent to property. Article 14 III
determines the requirements with which expropriation must comply.
Section 28 IC of South Africa also consisted of three clauses. Section 28(1) contained the
property guarantee, section 28(2) stated the circumstances under which property could be
regulated (or "deprived"), and section 28(3), almost like article 14 III GG, determined the
requirements to be adhered to in the case of expropriation:
Section 28 (Property):
(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the
nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights.
276 The official English translation of this text reads: (I) (I) Property and the right of inheritance shall be
guaranteed. (2) Their substance and limits shall be determined by law. (II) (I) Property entails obligations. (2) lts use
should also serve the public interest. (III) (I) Expropriation shall only be permissible in the public interest. (2) It may
only be ordered by or pursuant to a law which determines the nature and extent of compensation. (3) Compensation
shall reflect a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. (4) In case of dispute
regarding the amount of compensation recourse may be had to the ordinary courts. Press and Information Office of
the Federal Government, Foreign Affairs Division 1994 (Numbering of the individual sentences added).
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(2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in accordance with a
law.
(3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such
expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the payment of
agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such
period as may be determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking into account all relevant
factors, including, in the case of the determination of compensation, the use to which the property is
being put, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those
affected and the interests of those affected.
Section 25 FC of South Africa constitutes a considerable deviation from the property clause in
section 28 IC. Apart from the fact that the property "guarantee" in section 25( l) FC is phrased
negatively, and as sueh perhaps constitutes no real "guarantee" at all, the provisions on the
determination of compensation in the case of expropriation are also more detailed. Section 25(4)
FC contains a definitions clause and sections 25(5) to (8) FC regulate the state's duty to effect
land reform, equitable access of land, security of land tenure and redistribution of property:
Section 25 (Property):
(I) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application - (a) for a public purpose
or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and
manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a
court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable,
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, including - (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of
the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct
state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property;
and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.
(4) For the purposes of this section - (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and (b)
property is not limited to land.
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.
(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to
achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination,
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of
section 36( I).
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).
At first glance, the obvious question that arises from a comparison of the wording of the German
and South African constitutional property clauses, is to what extent the formulation of the
property guarantee in either a "positive" or "negative" manner influences the interpretation
thereof. This question will be addressed in the following paragraphs. Thereafter, the approach
followed regarding the object of protection in positively anel negatively formulated clauses, and
its bearing on the procedure to be followed in an inquiry into the constitutional protection of
property as a fundamental right, will be examined.
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2. "Positive" and "negative" guarantees
The most obvious external characteristic of a property clause lies in the type of property
protection it guarantees. The property clause can be formulated either positively or negatively,
but neither the positive nor the negative formulation can be described as being the universally
recognised version.i" Most property clauses include at least a negative guarantee of property,
which authorises the limitation of property rights subject to certain explicit requirements.V''
Thus, property can be appropriately protected even in the absence of a clause expressly
guaranteeing the existence of the right to property.t" Even so, positive property guarantees are
found in the constitutions of several jurisdictions. In the following paragraphs the German and
South African constitutional property clauses are discussed as different types of property
guarantees.
2.1. The German property guarantee
Article 14 I 1 GG is an example of a positive formulation of the property guarantee, since it
guarantees the existence of the right to property. However, a positive guarantee does not
necessarily establish a right to claim delivery of property from the state.280Neither does it
guarantee the ability of individuals to acquire property on their own.281 This might cause
confusion, in particular since article 14 I 2 GG already contains an additional ("negative")
property guarantee, which provides all the protection that can be claimed in terms of a property
clause. It creates the impression that the "positive" guarantee is superfluous, as there is, in effect,
no fundamental difference between a positive or negative formulation of the property clause.
The "positive" guarantee of article 14 I 1GG, nevertheless, plays an important role in German
constitutional property theory. Within the context of basic rights (Grundrechte), German
constitutional theory distinguishes between fundamental rights and institutional guarantees,282
thereby giving the basic rights several layers of importance. On the one hand, the basic rights are
subjektive Rechte, in the sense of fundamental rights accruing to individuals.283 On the other
hand, they are Elemente objektiver Ordnung, which means that the basic rights also prescribe the
fundamental values of the existing social and legal order.284As regard constitutional protection
of property in Germany, this two-tiered relevance of basic rights is exemplified particularly well
277 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 eeT 23/96, online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.html [26.09.1999] par 72.
278 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) Il.
279 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 eeT 23/96, online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.htrnl [26.09.1999] par 72.
280 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 414.
281 Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights. Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 82.
282 A further distinction is made in German constitutional theory between Institutsgarantien and Institutionellen
Garantien. Kimminich Eigentum Enteignung Entschiidigung (1976) mn 92 explains that the former are guarantees
of essentially private law institutions, whereas the latter refer to guarantees in the public life, eg the institution of
civil service with tenure (Berufsbeamtentum) or municipal autonomy (kommunale Selbstverwaltung). Art 14 I 1 GG
is an example of the former, as it sets out to protect private property as a legal institution.
283 Hesse Grundziige (1993) mn 279, 283 - 289.
284 mn 279, 290 - 299.
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by the existence of both "positive" and "negative" elements within the property guarantee.
Indeed, the distinction made in German constitutional theory between fundamental rights and
institutional guarantees results in a double property guarantee:28S On the one hand, individual
propertl86 rights arc guaranteed by means of the negative wording (Bestandsgarantier.r' On the
other hand, property as an institution is guaranteed by the positive wording (Inslilulsgaranlie).288
The institutional guarantee of article 14 I 1 GG ensures that private property is recognised in an
objective sense as a basic component of the social order.289 It secures the essential elements in
the property concept, like its existence, availability and usefulness for individuals; and ensures
that legislation does not erode or abolish any of these elements.29o The institutional guarantee
thus protects a core of norms that ensures the existence of private property in the broader legal
order.29I In this sense, property is an autonomous legal institution, or, alternatively formulated,
an objective constitutional value that the state is obliged to preserve and foster affirmatively.i"
The legislature is directed neither to abolish the institution .of ownership, nor to water it down to
such an extent that it cannot be characterised as ownership any longer. Such legislation would
remove the realm of freedom guaranteed by article 14 GG,293 lead to the destruction of larger
areas of private law and would therefore be in conflict with the prohibition of excesses
.. 294(Ubermafiverbot).
However, the institutional property guarantee does not mean that the legislature is prevented
from interfering with the system of private property. The institutional guarantee does not oblige
the state to provide individuals with property,29S but rather ensures that harmful concentrations of
28S The structure of article 14 GG is, however, even more complex than one would think at first glance: Article 14 I
I GG in effect guarantees two legal institutions, namely private propeny and inheritance. Simultaneously, two
fundamental rights have also been established, namely the right to acquire and own property and the right to
establish a will. Cf Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact oj International Law
(1987) 81. A discussion of the right to establish a will and the guarantee of inheritance falls outside the scope of this
work. In the analysis of article 14 GG in later parts of this exposition, focus will be placed only on the right to own
property and the guarantee of private property.
28(, The term used in art 14 GG is correctly translated as properly and not as ownership only. Therefore it includes a
variety of proprietary interests. Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 413,418.
287 Badura "Eigenrum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 32.
2K8Kleyn 1996SAPRlPL4l3.
289 Badura "Eigentum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 33.
290 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 129; Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch
VI (1989) mn 12; BVerfGE 26,215222; BVerfGE 52, 1 31.
291 Kimminich Eigentum Enteignung Entschëdigung (1976) 92.
292 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence oj Germany (1997) 253 explains that the content of the positive duty of
the state in this regard has not yet been fully defined. It may. for instance, require environmental protection
legislation preserving the value of property where the productive use would depend on clean water and unspoiled
forests. For instance, Kunig 1983 Adel LR 326 - 327 remarked that it would be conceivable that the institution of
Anliegergebrauch - the right of owners or other right holders (eg lessees) to use the street adjacent to the land under
discussion - could lead to a reactivation of an 14 GG against measures which endanger the environment; and that art
14 GG could also be invoked by businesses (for instance the tourist trade) in applying for nature preservation and
environmental protection as an important clement of property protection.
29) BVerfGE 58, 300 (NafJauskiesllIIg) 339; BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnungj 389.
294 Kleyn 1996SAPRlPL415.
29S Leisner "Eigcntum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 6; Badura "Eigentum" in Benda, Maihofer &
Vogel (eds) ilandbuch (1994) mn 26; BVerfGE 80,124 137.
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private property can be prevented by legitimate state action. It also places a duty on the
legislature to create proper structures in areas where no or only weak proprietary protection
exists.296Therefore an intrusion of public law into traditionally private law spheres is justified in
order to protect and defend aspects of property vital to the well-being of the general public in
maintaining the institution of ownership. This does not adversely affect the institutional
guarantee.i'"
German constitutional law further also emphasises the subjective character of the right to
property. Property is associated with liberty and personhood; it provides space for the exercise of
autonomy and development of self-esteem.i'" The Federal Constitutional Court299 further
confirmed that article 14 I 1 GG guarantees private property, not only as legal institution, but
also in concrete form in the hands of a specific owner. Logically, individuals cannot be holders
of property rights if the institution of property does not exist. The specific purpose of the
Bestandsgarantie is, however, to entitle individuals to be holders of property rights, and to
protect them against undue state interference.i'" The court explained that the right to property is
an elementary fundamental right closely related to the guarantee of individual freedom.30l For
the holders of property rights, the article 14 GG guaranteed freedom in the patrimonial sphere. It
enables holders of property rights to live independently and to freely take responsibility for their
own lives. Therefore private property is said to be an "expression and prerequisite of personal
freedom.,,302Accordingly, property not only serves to optimise the product of one's economic
efforts, but also forms the basis of a liberal society.i'" In this way, the patrimonial and economic
private autonomy of individuals is endorsed. Individuals can control, use and alienate the various
objects of their property rights.304
In conclusion, the German double property guarantee indicates that, although personal freedom
and private property are two separate ethical values, they have reciprocal relations, particularly
in modem, industrialised societies.i" The Federal Civil Court held306 that the individual,
296 Badura "Eigenturn" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 26; Kleyn 1996 SAPR/PL 415.
297 BVerfGE 58, 300 (NaBauskiesung) 339; Cf also Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 259.
298 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 252.
299 BVerfGE 24,367 (Deichordnung) 389.
300 Badura "Eigenturn" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) 32.
301 The principle of personal freedom is protected in art 2 of the German Basic Law and guarantees the development
of the individual's personality. Further, it plays an important role in the interpretation and application of article 14
GG. It reads: ''Jeder hat das Recht auf die freie Entfaltung seiner Personlichkeit, soweit er nicht die Recht andere
verletzt und nicht gegen die verfassungsmëfsige Ordnung oder das Sittengesetz verstojlt. " Translation: "Everybody
has the right to self-fulfilment in so far as they do not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional
order or morality."
302 Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 81;
Kimminich "Eigenturn und Freiheit" in Abelein & Kimminich (eds) Festschrift fUr Hermann Raschhofer (1977)
105; Meier-Hayoz "Vom Wesen des Eigentums" in Keller (ed) Festgabe Karl Oflinger (1969) 171; Meyer-Abich
Der Schutzzweck der Eigentumsgarantie (1980) 58 et seq.
303 Weber "Das Eigenturn und seine Garantie in der Krise" in Pawlowski & Wieacker (eds) Festschrift fia' Karl
Michaelis (1972) 328; Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International
Law (1987) 81.
304 Kleyn 1996 SAPR/PL 414.
305 Personal freedom is protected and guaranteed in art 2 GG. It is, however, in relation to art 14 GG, the general
legal rule whenever both apply. Therefore art 14 GG will take precedence, as it specifically protects freedom in the
continued
59
Stellenb sch University http://scholar.su .ac.za
2.2. The South African property guarantees
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integrated into the community of the State, needs a strictly safeguarded sphere of property in
order to be able to live as a person among equals. This means that the state should enable the
individual to be free and responsible for him- or herself, and not merely an object of an
overwhelming state power. The court's approach supports the view that the right to private
property is a crucial component of the values of freedom and human dignity.
The institutional/individual guarantee theory of German constitutional law has not been adopted
or developed in other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the debate has considerably influenced the
discussion on constitutional property protection in South Africa.307 The German theory has been
referred to several times in the context of the changed structure of the interim and final property
clauses, where a noticeably mixed positive/negative guarantee was substituted by one purely
negative in formulation,
2.2.l. Section 28 IC
Although section 28( I) IC contains a positive property guarantee, it is unlikely that this section
intended to provide individuals with positive claims against the state to provide them with
property. The wording of section 28( 1) IC rather grants a guarantee to all individuals to become
holders of property.
The positive formulation of the property guarantee,308 together with the fact that tbe general
limitation clause309 required that the essential content of all fundamental rights had to be
reserved, persuaded most authors3lo to accept that the institution of property was guaranteed in
the Interim Constitution. However, diverging opinions existed on the question of in which
sections - if at all - individual property was guaranteed in the Interim Constitution. According to
Van der Walt,311 and Chaskalson and Lewis3l2 the individual property guarantee was to be found
sphere of al legal titles representing financial assets. (Cf BVerfGE 19, 206 225: Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hal
zwar en tschieden, daft die besonderen Grundrechtsnormen fiir ihren Bereich die Anwendung des Art. 2 Abs.I GG
ausschliefien ... Dies gilt abel' nur, soweit eine Verletzung des Art. 2 Abs. I GG und einer besonderen
Grundrechtsnorm unter deinselben sachllehen Gesichtspunkt in Betracht kommt, nicht aber, wenn Art. 2 Abs. I GG
unter einem, Gesicluspunkt verletzt ist, der nicht in dell Bereich der besonderen Grundrechtsnorm fallt," Cf also
BVerfGE 6 32 37.) If a violation of such titles is combined with an impairment of the free development of one's
personality, an 2 GG may be invoked to prevent further impairments, As activities in a modem, industrialised
country often concern financial assets, it often happens that the priority position an 14 GG takes, bars recurrence to
the protection of freedom by an 2 GG. Therefore art 14 GG must also in some circumstances provide protection for
personal freedom. This can only be done when property is also guaranteed in the hands of the individual.
306 BGIiZ 6, 276.
307 Van der Walt Constitutional Properly Clauses (1999) 12.
308 S 28( 1).
309 S 33( 1)(b): "( I) The righls entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that
such limitation - ... (b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, ... " The effect of this is that
ri§/zts ill property may not be abolished as institutions of the legal system to which individuals can have access.
31 Kleyn 1996 SIIPRJPl. 418; Van del' Walt 1995 SAPRIPL 302, 30g; Murphy 1995 SAPRIPL 112; Chaskalson &
Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (cds) Constitutional Low (1996) eh 31,8,
311 Van der Walt 1995 SAPRlPL 302 - 303; 308.
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in the negative guarantees of section 28(2) and (3) IC. Then again, Murphl13 accepted that the
positive guarantee in section 28(1) FC empowered all individuals with the right to acquire, hold
and dispose of rights in property. This viewpoint has been criticised by Chaskalson and Lewis,314
because it supported an interpretation through which all existing rights in property and therefore
also privileges extended during the apartheid era would be protected. Kleyn's315reply to this line
of argument was, however, that existing rights would even be protected under the negative
guarantees of sections 28(2) and (3) IC. Privilege based on apartheid would, therefore, not be
entrenched only by reliance on section 28(1) IC as individual guarantee. He furthermore
indicated that section 28(1) IC would not necessarily entrench privilege based on apartheid at all,
as such a guarantee could not imrnunise private property against the operation of section 28(2)
and (3) IC or against sections 121 to 123 IC.
2.2.2. Section 25 Fe
In terms of section 25 FC, individuals are still not provided with positive claims for the provision
of property against the state. The wording of section 25 FC also still raises the issue of whether
or not individual property and the institution of property are protected. Nevertheless, the
structure of the South African property clause has in many respects undergone a metamorphosis
since 1994.
Contrary to section 28(1) IC, section 25(1) FC is formulated negatively. Moreover, section 25(1)
FC can be deemed a so-called specific negative guarantee. In this section, the provision for
limitation of rights is negatively phrased within a sentence prohibiting deprivations. This specific
negative guarantee, which includes references to the conditions for limitations on property, has
to be seen as a clause directly restricting the scope of the right that is protected. By contrast, a
general negative guarantee could still have been regarded as an indirect guarantee of property.i"
This could result in some complications during a process of interpretation.'!" The choice of a
negative formulation could give rise to the argument that section 25 FC in reality protects
something "less than property.v''" namely the right not to be deprived of property and the right
not to be expropriated except as provided for in the property clause itself.
312 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31, 7 - 8.
313 CfMurphy 1992 SAJHR 362 - 388; Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 107 - 130.
314 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31,8.
315 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 417.
316 After explaining (297) that the difference between specific and general negative guarantees lies in the fact that in
the former case, both the guarantee as well as the limitations provision are phrased negatively within one sentence,
whereas the latter would be characterised by two separate phrases, Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 301 - 302 points out
that this difference is probably merely a question of linguistic preference by the drafters of the constitution, instead
of a conscious attempt to protection something less than property.
317 The right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour (s 13 FC); the right to citizenship (s 20 FC)
and the right to participate in cultural, religious and linguistic communities (s 31 FC) are phrased negatively and do
not involve the same complications as s 25 FC.
318 Cfthe explanation of this argument in Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 295 - 313.
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Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court indicated a preference for an interpretation of
section 25 FC that upholds the idea of an individual property guarantee, even if this terminology
is not used explicitly. According to the First Certification Case,319a negative formulation such
as employed in section 25 FC appears to be widely accepted as an appropriate formulation of the
right to property. The assumption tbat the full content of property - and not something "less than
property" - is protected by section 25 FC, is therefore well founded. Moreover, the court
remarked that the right to hold property is implicit in section 25 FC. The court therefore could
not support the argument that section 25 FC failed to meet the requirements of constitutional
principle 11 in schedule 4 IC simply because of its negative formulation and because it lacks
express recognition of the right to acquire and dispose of property. This also indicates that tbe
COUlt supports the protection of an individual right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.
The negative formulation of the property guarantee in section 25(1) FC also makes it more
difficult to assume that the institution of property is guaranteed, as was the case under section
28( 1) IC. Van der Walt320 is of the opinion that the positive clement of the property clause in
section 28( I) IC was omitted from the final property clause speci fically to avoid the debate about
an institutional guarantee. However, Kleyn's321 submission that such a guarantee still exists and
the reasons he advances for this, are convincing.322 He argues that the commitment to land
reform, access to resources, restitution of land and the security of tenure all point to the creation
of a mixed economy in which newly-empowered "deprived" section of the South A frican society
can benefit from an institutional guarantee. He points out that these issues reflect the duty upon
the state to safeguard the institution of property. Accordingly, it would be senseless to protect
property in a bill of rights if the institution of property as a fundamental right in the objective
sense is not protected.
The idea that the constitutional property clause protects the institution of property as sucb can to
a certain extent also be inferred from the decision in the First Certification Case.323 The
Constitutional Court accepted that there is no fundamental di fference between a positive or
negative formulation of the property clause, and concluded that even a negative property clause
would be an appropriate way of providing (implicit) protection for the right to hold property.
This indifference of the court towards the type of formulation used could point to an implicit
adoption of the institutional guarantee of property. The court could, however, also have found
that the institution of property is protected on the basis of the general limitation clause of the
Final Constitution. Section 36 FC provides justification for the protection of property as an
institution, even though the essential content provision in the limitation clause of the Interim
Constituticrr'<' has been omitted in the final text. The proportionality requirement is implicie25
JI9 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 ccr 23/96, online al
hllp://www.collsliI1iIion.org.za/cerl.html[26.09.1999] par 72.
320 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRIPL 303.
321 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 418.
122 Cf, however, Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 303 n 45.
32J Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of SOIllIl A/rica 1996 CCT 23/96, online at
hltp://W\VW.COllSlillilioll.org.zaleerl.hlml [26.09.1999] par 70 - 75.
32-1 S 33(1)(b).
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in section 36 FC. It is specifically foreseen that the constitutionality of a particular infringement
on property depends on the existence of certain formal elements. A law of general application
can restrict the fundamental right only to the extent prescribed in the constitution.i'"
Furthermore, the constitutionality of a particular infringement also depends on whether the
restriction complies with the three requirements (namely suitability, necessity and
moderation327)328 of the proportionality test itself. The restriction should, in other words, be
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society and the same purpose should not
have been achievable by less restrictive means. Upon this analysis, it can be submitted that an
abolition of private property would infringe human dignity, equality and freedom beyond
reasonableness and justifiability. It would at the same time be excessive. It would, therefore, be
in conflict with the constitutional requirement of proportionality.
2.3. Legal-comparative evaluation
In South Africa, a clear distinction is not always made between individual and institutional
guarantees when the question as to the scope of protection in terms of the property clause is
discussed. Therefore, the situation in South Africa might differ from that of Germany with
regard to the protection of individual property or property as an institution. This theoretical
distinction is more apparent in scholarly work than in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court.
However, it could have an important influence on the manner in which an inquiry into the
provisions of a particular constitutional property clause is conducted. In the course of this
exposition, this influence will be pointed out.
The idea that - in spite of the negatively phrased constitutional property clause - at least some
private property in a free (or mixed) market economy is guaranteed, might be valuable in the
South African context. Van der Wale29 has, in this regard, pointed out that the circumstances, in
which individuals are empowered to acquire, hold and dispose of rights in property, form the
bases of the market system. It is submitted that the mixed market economic policy of the present
government could benefit from an approach by which private property is protected to that extent
in which it can serve the individual's initiatives to attain self-fulfilment, and the initiatives of the
state to bring about social upliftment and development. This matter will be discussed in more
detail in the next chapter.r'" At this point it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the basic
structure of an inquiry into the constitutional property clause, and the manner in which the
approach to such an inquiry is influenced by the view taken on the matters concerning the object
of property protection and the nature of such protection.
325 Cf94 supra; Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 209 et seq; 31 - 32; cf contra De Waal1995 SAHJR 7.
326 S 36(1) FC.
327 I d' .e not isproportionate.
328 Cf 89 supra.
329 Van der Walt 1995 SAPRlPL 303.
330 Cf 112 et seq infra.
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Part TIVo:Background to the Constitutional Protection of Property ill Germany and South Africa
3. Basic structure of an inquiry into the constitutional property clause
In order to undertake an analysis of the constitutional protection and regulation of property in
Germany and South Africa, it is necessary to understand the general structures of human rigbts
litigation and the role of the different courts in these systems. These issues will be dealt with in
the following paragraphs.
In general, litigation pertaining to human rights occurs in a number of distinct stages in which
procedural and material issues, as well as the remedies available are considered. Initially a court
must decide whether a particular kind of legal relationship is subject to a fundamental rights
review. This means that certain procedural issues such as the locus standi of the applicant, the
justiciability of the issue, the jurisdiction of the court and the application of the bill of rights to
the subject-mailer of the litigation must be investigated.i" The subsequent stages concern the
substance of the case. If the chapter on fundamental rights applies to the given legal relationship,
tbe court must decide whether the applicant's constitutional right has been infringed. If the court
finds that the applicant has a right falling within the ambit of constitutional protection, and that
tbis right has been infringed, it must decide whether the limitation placed upon the right is
justifiable.332 Finally, if the court finds that a violation of a right is not a justifiable limitation, it
will have to consider the proper remedy to deal with the unconstitutional infringement of a
fundamental right.333
The three-tiered investigation is in principle applicable in Germany, as well as in South Africa.
Nevertheless some differences exist, in particular with regard to the procedures followed by the
courts in these legal systems. The procedural differences are due mainly to the fact that the
inquisitorial court system and the adversarial court system arc preferred in Germany and in
South Africa respectively, and the consequent influence on the power of the court to investigate
or consider certain issues.334 Where these issues have an influence on the comparison undertaken
in this exposition, they will be discussed in more detail.
One important point of distinction between human rights litigation in South Africa from that of
Germany is the presence of a general limitation clause335 in the South African bill of rights and
the lack of something similar in the German Basic Law. This issue is apparently also influenced
BI These issues arc discussed in De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 20 - 21; 26 - 121; Chaskalson,
Kentridgc, Klaaren "Introduction" in Chaskalson, Kentridge et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 1.
m De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 21 - 22 describe the substantive questions generally relating to
constitutional litigation as follows: "The court must assess the merits of this allegation. This assessment primarily
involves the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution in general and the Bill of Rights in particular." It
must first be determined whether a particular interest of the applicant is protected under the bill of rights. Then it
must be determined whether the law or the conduct challenged impairs that interest. 1f the court has thus determined
that a law or the conduct of the respondent impairs a fundamental right, it must be considered whether the
infringement is nevertheless a justi fiable limitation of the right under discussion.
m De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 21 depicts this as the third stage of human rights litigation.
3J4CfKotz 1987 TSAR35-43.
335 S 36 FC.
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by the formulation of the constitutional propety clause in either negative, positive or mixed
(positive and negative) terms.336In the discussion about the limitation of rights at a later stage,337
it will be indicated that certain principles of rights limitation in Germany are applicable to all the
basic rights. The function of these provisions differs from that of the South African section 36
Fe. Nevertheless, the German approach to the object of protection and the nature of limitation of
the right hold interesting possibilities for the South African context, as will be pointed out in the
course of this exposition+"
It is not within the scope of the present exposition to provide a detailed discussion of the
procedural stage of constitutional litigation. Hence, in commenting on the application of the
property guarantees, focus will be placed mainly on the substantive issues at hand, and to a lesser
extent on the remedies available. At the outset, however, a few explanatory comments on the
application of the principles of human rights litigation in general to the specific inquiry into
constitutional protection of property are necessary. The following paragraphs contain a brief
discussion of the possible claims that could arise from a constitutional property guarantee, and
the manner in which the courts could deal with these issues.
3.2. Substantive issues relating to the property clause
At this point, a few remarks about the substantive issues in the inquiry based on the
constitutional property guarantee will have to suffice. In the following paragraphs, the views on
the objeet of protection in terms of the constitutional property clause and the claims arising from
such protection will be briefly discussed. The influence of these views on the inquiries into the
constitutional validity of property regulation will then be indicated.
3.2.1. Claims arising from the constitutional property clause
A constitutional property clause could give rise to a variety of possible claims. The
categorisation of possible claims depends largely on the approach taken regarding the object of
protection and the influence of the limitation provisions on the constitutional property clause.339
For the moment, these differences in opinion will be set aside in an attempt to cover this issue
from more than one angle. Thus, the most important categories of possible claims for present
purposes are (i) claims to have property, (ii) claims of eligibility to hold property, (iii) claims to
immunity against uncompensated expropriation of private property, and (iv) claims to insulation
336 Cf Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 275 - 330 for an overview of the different approaches emanating from the
understanding attached to the nature of the object of protection and limitation of the right of constitutional property.
337 Cf 179 infra.
338 Cf 267 et seq infra.
339 Eg De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (2000) 381 discuss some of the possible claims that could emanate
from the constitutional protection of property. Their view is based on the idea that the term "property" refers to "the
set of legal rules governing the relationship between individuals and physical property" (at 383). This idea they
explain (at 384) as that "property ... encompasses at least some of the component rights making up what is termed
the 'bundle of rights' that constitute ownership" which they refer to (at 383) as "the closest to the traditional
conception of property in South African law." The problems with such an approach is pointed out at 128 et seq infra.
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against slate interference with private property. The extent to which these claims exist in the
South African and German context will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
3.2.1.1. Tbe claim to have property
Tbe claim to have property would be premised on tbe argument that all people bave a moral right
to have at least enough property to enable them to survive or to lead a dignified existence. If they
do not have this minimum, it should be provided to them (usually by the state). It will be
indicated in the course of this exposition that such a claim is not acknowledged by section
25 FC, nor by article 14 GG.340
If a claim to the eligibility to hold property were acknowledged, it would create a constitutional
right not to be excluded from a class of property holders. In other words, the claim to eligibility
points to the right to acquire and hold property rights. However, the claim of eligibility to hold
property does not entitle a person to become a holder of property simply on the basis of the
constitutional provisions. It merely would protect tbe position of existing holders of property. In
German terminology, this would point to the opinion that the constitutional right to property is
not a Teithaberecht, but rather a Freiheitsrechl.34I
Because of its formulation partly as a "positive" guarantee,342 article 14 I 1 GG (like section
28( I) IC) could be regarded as an embodiment of the claim of eligibility to hold property.i" It is
often argued that section 25( I) FC does not provide any basis for a claim of eligibility to hold
property, because it is phrased negatively.i'" The choice of a negative formulation could give
rise to the argument that section 25 FC in reality protects something "less than property,,,345
namely the right not to be deprived of property and the right not to be expropriated except as
provided for in the property clause itself. Exponents of this argument draw strongly on the fact
that mosr'" of the other provisions in chapter 2 of the Final Constitution are phrased positively,
while section 25( I) FC is phrased negatively. Additionally, the negative formulation of section
25( 1) FC as opposed section 28( I) IC indicates a conscious decision against incorporation of
claims for eligibility to hold property under the constitutional property clause. Furthermore,
section 25(1) FC comprises a single provision, which combines the prohibition against
unconstitutional deprivations with the requirements for constitutional deprivations of property.347
)40 Cf57,60and61 supra.
341 Cf 167 infra.
342 For a discussion of the positive and negative formulations of property clauses, cf 57 supra.
34) Cf De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (2000) 381.
344394 n 40.
34S Cf the explanation of this argument in Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 295 - 313.
346 Apart from s 25( I) Fe, the following sections in eh 2 FC arc also framed negatively: s 13 FC (slavery, servitude
and forced labour), s 20 FC (citizenship), and s 31 FC (linguistic communities).
347 Section 25( 1) Fe has, in other words, deliberately not been phrased: "Nobody may be deprived of property
except as provided for by the Constitution. Deprivations of property are only allowed in terms of law of general
continued
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These factors all seemingly point to an intention of the drafters of the constitution that the
eligibility to hold property was not envisaged as a possible claim falling under section 25(1) Fe,
and that the intention was, in fact, to guarantee a right that was something less than property.t"
The most important effect of such an argument is that it can be employed to support the idea that
section 36(1) Fe only in exceptional circumstances applies to an inquiry into the constitutional
validity of a regulation of property.ï"
However, a few considerations dictate against such an approach.f''' The constitutional court has
accepted in the First Certification Case,351 that the positive or negative phraseology of the
property clause will make no fundamental difference to the appropriateness in terms of universal
recognition of the clause. The court even went further and accepted that the right to hold
property (or rather, the claim for eligibility to hold property) is implicit in the negatively
formulated section 25( 1) Fe. This argument is in line with the tendency to interpret specific
provisions of the constitution in the light of the constitutional text in its entirety.352 Moreover,
from a comparative point of view, there is no indication in any other jurisdiction making use of
negatively formulated property clauses that something "less than property" is envisaged for
protection. It seems to be accepted (or at least not strange or unusual) that a property clause,
unlike most other fundamental right guarantees, launches into the limitation provision and
qualifications without any introduction of founding statement of the right that is to be protected.
Even the fact that section 25(1) Fe is a so-called specific negative guarantee353 does not flout the
overwhelming indications from comparative law that the formulation of the property clause does
not really influence the content of its guarantee. In fact, from a comparative view there seems to
be no dramatic difference between a ("general") negatively phrased guarantee with limitations
spread over two or more sentences, and a ("specific") negatively phrased clause that condenses
guarantee and limitations into one sentence. As has been indicated above,354 the avoidance of a
positive formulation or statement in a property clause supposedly displays the desire not to get
caught in the complexities of theories about institutional guarantees, as is the case with article 14
GG, which contains some positive elements. However, this cannot be justification for the view
that a negatively formulated property clause does not envisage the eligibility to hold property. It
merely indicates that the debate about the existence of an institutional guarantee of property is
more suitable in a jurisdiction with codified private law than in the uncodified South African
system. Besides, from the other negatively formulated provisions in the South African bill of
application. No law may provide for arbitrary deprivations of property." Instead, the combined negative phraseology
of s 25( 1) FC includes the limitation provisions that apply in the givien case.
348 I am grateful to Prof Frank Michelman for pointing this out to me. Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 294 - 298 has
also articulated these arguments very clearly.
349 CfVan der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 298, 291 - 293. Cfalso 187 infra.
350 CfVan der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 299 - 312.
351 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 CCT 23/96, online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.html [26.09.1999] par 72.
352 Cf 83 infra.
353 Cf 61 supra. In a "general" negative guarantee, the conditions for limitation are stated in a separate phrase or
sentence, whereas a "specific" negative guarantee combines the guarantee of the right with the conditions for
limitation in a single sentence. CfVan der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 297 - 298, 301.
354 Cf 61 supra.
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rights no indication of an intention to protect something less than the right mentioned in each355
can be deduced.
3.2.1.3. Insulation of private property from state interference
for exponents of the idea that section 25( I) fe does not provide for claims of eligibility to hold
property, it might seem strange that an argument in favour of claims of eligibility to hold
property is immediately followed with a statement that the property clause can also cater for
claims of insulation of private property from state interference. Superficially, this would exactly
be the substitute argument offered by supporters of the "less than property" argument.356
However, the submission above is that simply that, should the question arise for adjudication, the
courts need not shy away from upholding a claim of eligibility to hold property merely on the
basis of the negative formulation of the property clause. Even in its present negative form,
section 25( I) Fe protects and guarantees property in the constitutional context.
As is indicated by the example of article 14 I GG read with article 14 11GG, this docs not mean
that property rights are entrenched in absolute fashion. In fact, they are subject to many
immanent restrictions embodied in legislation, private law (codified or uncodi fled) and the
constitutional provisions themselves. For the purposes of constitutional interpretation and
application of the property clause, it should submittedly be accepted that a constitutional
property clause can simulteneously protect and guarantee property, and limit its protection not
only generally, but also in specific ways from case to case.357 Thus, claims of eligibility to hold
property could, to some extent be regarded as going hand in hand with claims of insulation
against state interference with private property. In some instances, these claims could even
fulfill the same function.
For purposes of clarity, however, it should be mentioned that support of claims of insulation
against state interference could be a separate purpose of a constitutional property clause. Section
25( I) fe should be a clear example of this point. It might be more difficult to abstract the same
kind of example from article 14 GG at face value. However, in the course of this exposition it
will be indicated358 to what extent article 14 GG, like section 25(1) Fe does, in fact, provide
insulation against state interference. In order to understand this function of the constitutional
protection of property, it is necessary to review a final purpose of the constitutional property
clause, namely to support claims of immunity against uncompensated expropriation.
HS Ie in particular the right to citizenship (s 20 FC) and the rights of participation in cultural, religious and linguistic
communities (s 31 FC).
3S6 Cf 66 supra.
m Cf the description of the constitutional right to property as "derivative" by Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee LR
1099.
HS Cf 192 et seq infra.
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3.2.1.4. Immunity against uncompensated expropriation
Claims of immunity against uncompensated expropriation of private property would, in the
South African context, typically be based on section 25(2) FC and section 25(3) FC. In the
German context, these claims would typically be based on article 14 III GG. Immunity against
uncompensated expropriation means that the state cannot lawfully withdraw property from the
control of a private person unless that person is remunerated for the withdrawal. Claims of this
nature would, therefore, involve an inquiry into the constitutional validity of a specific action by
the state, or an inquiry into the payment of compensation, or both. Although the question of
compensation can, in other words, form part of inquiry into the justifiability of a specific
regulation, it can also by itself f~rm the basis of an inquiry into constitutional validity of a
specific regulation. For the purposes of the current exposition, the question of compensation will
be discussed as one of the requirements for constitutional validity of an expropriation.P" With
regard to this category of claims, it will henceforth be necessary to distinguish between different
kinds of regulatory actions with private property. Then it can be determined whether and to what
extent regulation of property needs to be compensated.
Regulation of property is the general term referring to all permissible state interferences with
patrimonial interests. The reference to deprivation of property in the South African context
usually refers to regulation of property taking place without remuneration of the deprived holder.
In Germany, this kind of regulation is referred to as the lnhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung
(determination of the content and limits of property), as it is found in article 14 I 2 GG. By
contrast, expropriation (the German equivalent being Enteignung) of property usually takes
place against payment of compensation to the deprived holder. It is a very severe form of
regulation, through which the property in its entirety (and not only specific patrimonial interests
pertaining to it) is withdrawn.
The issue of compensation is thus important in many respects. It is often difficult to determine
whether an extensive regulation of ownership entitlements amounts to partial expropriation (in
which case fair compensation should be paid) or qualifies merely as a regulation of property (in
which case compensation is not obligatory). In these cases, the basic question is whether
ownership is diminished through the act of infringement to a nudum ius or whether the
infringement pertains to a separate element of ownership that can be treated independently
without damaging the essence of the ownership concept. The focus should, furthermore, be on
whether the patrimonial interests of an individual or those of a specific group are infringed. This
issue will be discussed at a later stage.360
3.2.2. Stages of inquiries based on the constitutional property clause
The categorisation of the claims that could be brought in terms of a constitutional property clause
could have a profound influence on the content of the different stages of an inquiry based on the
359 Cf 207, 210, 236 et seq infra.
360 Cf 21Oet seq infra.
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constitutional clause protecting property. In the following paragraphs, reference will be made to
inquiries aimed at determining the constitutional validity of a specific interference with private
property, and to inquiries aimed at determining the payment of compensation. Thereafter, the
influence of the different view as to the object of protection and the purpose of limitation will be
briefly indicated.
3.2.2.1. Inquiries into the constitutional validity of an interference with property
Three basic questions determine the outcome of the constitutional validity of an interference with
private property.'" (i) the question whether the affected property right is at all protected by the
constitutional property guarantee; (ii) the question whether the action curtails the freedom of the
particular holder of the right; and (iii) the question whether the infringing action is
constitutionally justifiable. The determination of the constitutional concept of property, as well
as the investigation into the question of whether an infringement has taken place, outlines the
scope of the guarantee, whereas the question to justifiability serves as a qualification on the
results of the first two questions. These issues will be dealt with in detail in chapters 7 and 8 with
regard to both the jurisdictions in the present comparison. The following discussion merely
points out some basic differences between the approaches followed by the German and South
African COUltS.
In Germany, each of these three questions forms a separate stage of the inquiry as to the
constitutional validity of a specific interference with property.362 By contrast, the South African
Constitutional Court has in its first few dccisionsi'" shown an inclination towards the Canadian
"two-stages" approach to an inquiry concerning the constitutional (in)validity of statutes.
Assuming that the Canadian "two-stages" approach will also be followed in a constitutional
dispute about property, Van der Wale64 has formulated the structure of an inquiry into
section 25 FC also in two stages (although the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does
not explicitly protect the right to property along with the other categories of protected legal
rights).365 The applicants first bear the onus of proving that an infringement of a property right,
which is protected by section 25 FC, has taken place. As such the applicants would have to
affirm Ci) that the interest under discussion must qualify for protection under section 25 FC, and
(ii) that an infringement of this interest has taken place. Once these issues have been established,
the state (or the party relying on the validity of the relevant act), has the onus of proving that the
infringement is justi fied, either in terms of section 25 FC or in terms of section 36 FC or both.
This (admittedly small) difference in the preference of how the constitutionality inquiry should
be conducted, could perhaps be ascribed to the fact that the German courts are in general more
361 Cf De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 20 - 25.
362 Cf Picroth & Schlink Grandrechte (1998) 237 - 239 for a schematic representation of this three-staged inquiry.
363 le S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 100 - 102; Ferreira v Levin; Vryenhoek v Powel NO 1996 I
BCLR I (CC) 26H.
)M Van del' Walt Constitutional Properly Clause (1997) 28 and Van der Walt 1997 SAPRIPL 277.
36S Cf Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 - 361 for a description of the circumstances giving rise to the exclusion of a
property guarantee from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Cf also 11 225 supra.
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inclined to adopt an inquisitorial approach than their South African counterparts.i'" In Germany,
owing to the preference of an inquisitorial approach, the judge can consider issues and arguments
not raised by either of the parties to the case. In the South African system, the party bearing the
onus of proof has to lead the evidence and introduce the arguments necessary to lift that onus.
The importance attached to this procedural fact under the South African adversarial system,
resulted in South African scholars367combining the question as to which rights enjoy protection
in terms of a constitutional property guarantee, and the question as to whether infringement has
taken place, into a single stage of the investigation. The investigation into constitutional validity
of an interference with property in South Africa will then most probably consist of only two
stages.
Regardless of the number of stages in the formal structure of a constitutional property inquiry,
the elements368 investigated during the inquiries of both the Germany and South Africa legal
systems remain similar. The application of these different elements to the constitutional
protection of property will be briefly described in the following paragraphs.
3.2.2.l.l. "Threshold question"
The first element in a determination of the constitutional validity of a specific interference with
private property is connected to the question whether the interest upon which the applicant bases
the claim qualifies for protection under the constitutional property guarantee. In other words, the
court must determine whether the applicant's interest is "property" in terms of the constitution.
Some proprietary interests qualify more easily for protection than others. Nevertheless, this
"threshold" question/69 which attempts to clarify the existence of a property right qualifying for
protection under a constitutional property guarantee in a constitutional dispute, arises regardless
of the degree of difficulty attached to identifying the property interests at stake.
The acknowledgement of the purpose of a constitutional property clause to support claims for the
eligibility to hold property would influence this stage. As has been indicated above,37o
convincing reasons exist for upholding the eligibility to hold property through interpretation of
the constitutional property clause, even in cases where the property clause itself is phrased in
366 Katz 1987 TSAR 35, 37 - 38.
367 Kentridge & Spitz "Interpretation" in Chaskalson, Kentridge et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 11,32; Van
der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 28. In Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren "Introduction" in
Chaskalson, Kentridge et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) ch 1, 2 - 4 the question of the applicability of specific
human right guarantees on the facts in a given case is placed in the second stage of the investigation (ie under
"Interpretation") and the question of "application" is reserved only for issues dealing with the horizontal/vertical
operation of the Bill of Rights. CfDe Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 21 - 22 where it is implied that the
infringement question must be treated separately from the question concerning the protective ambit of a specific
fundamental right.
368 These are: (i) The inquiry as to whether a specific interest qualify for protection (that is, the "threshold
question"); (ii) the question of whether a specific action constituted an infringement upon a specific protected
interest; and (iii) the inquiry as to whether a specific infringement of a protected interest can be constitutionally
justified.
369 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 57 uses this term.
370 Cf 66 supra.
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negative terms. A further consideration would be the extent to which support for an
"institutional" guarantee of property can be deduced from the treatment of the threshold question
in a specific jurisdiction.V' It has been indicated already372 that a negative formulation of the
property clause does not exclude tbe posibility of an institutional guarantee arising from the
property clause. The convincing arguments of some authors373 in favour of upholding a
guarantee similar to that of article 14 GG in the South African context have also been discussed,
and will not be repeated here. At this point it can simply be mentioned that these kinds of issues
will contribute to determining the outcome of the "threshold" test. In the comparative evaluation
of the following chapters, the influence of these issues on the "threshold" question in the
different jurisdictions will again be referred to.
Once it has been ascertained that the interest for which the applicant seeks constitutional
protection indeed passed the "threshold" test one can proceed with the inquiry by determining
whether the constitutionally protected interest has been curtailed.
3.2.2.1.2. infringement question
The protective ambit of the property guarantee is then determined by the effect the curtailment of
the freedom has on the holder of the property right in terms of the constitutional property
guarantee.i" The main aim of this enquiry is to determine whether the freedom of the holder of
the property right has been affected by the action of one of the stale powers. The constitutional
justifiability of the action is only tested once it is certain that the holder's freedom has indeed
been affected.
In the South African "two-stage" approach.I" this clement still forms part of the first stage. In
other words, the property right holder has the onus of proving that he has a protected property
right, and that this right has been infringed by state action. Apparently it is more problematic to
prove the right or interest at slake (that is, to answer the "threshold question") than to identify the
existence of an infringcmcnt.Y" However, this does not mean that the question of infringement
can simply be ignored in the South African context. This element forms an important link
between the content of the protection afforded to right holders by the constitution and the
restriction of the scope of protection. It therefore deserves careful consideration. In the case of
Re Munhumeso377 a valuable guideline was formulated to determine whether or not a protected
right has been affected:
371 Cf 57 supra for a discussion of the terms "institutional guarantee" and "individual guarantee" of property.
372 Cf 61 supra
m leKleyn 1996SAPRlPL418.
m Lerche "Grundrechtlichcr Schutzbereich, Grundrechtspragung und Grundrcchtscingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof
(eds) l Iandbuch V (1989) I11n 45.
37S Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 28 ; Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 277 based on S v
Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 100 - 102; Ferreira v Levin and Others: Vryenhoek and Others v Powel NO
and Others 1996 I OCLR I (CC) 26H. Cf70 supra.
37(, Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 28.
317 1995 I SA 551 (ZS) 561D-E. Emphasis added.
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"The test in determining whether an enactment infringes a fundamental freedom is to examine its
effect and not its object or subject-matter. If the effect of the impugned law is to abridge a fundamental
freedom, its object or subject-matter will be irrelevant."
An application of the Munhumeso test in the context of the constitutional property guarantee
would mean that the inquiry would be satisfied if it can be demonstrated that either the purpose
or the effect of the state action (whether of legislative or administrative kind) was to encroach
upon the property rights protected in terms of the guarantee. An encroachment must, in other
words, exist before the question of justifiability arises.
In Germany, where the court has to consider all important points regardless of whether they were
raised by the parties or not, this element constitutes the second phase of the constitutionality
enquiry. The purpose of the state action affecting the right holder's freedom is mostly the result
of an attempt by the state to balance of conflicting interests. The interests can be those of two
individuals, or those of an individual on the one hand and the society on the other, or they can
even be conflicting interests of the same individual.i'" This requires the legislature to keep the
dual function of the property guarantee in mind: On the one hand, property must be useful to or
aimed at serving the private individual. On the other hand, it must also be useful to the public in
general. Harmonising the functions of private use and public usefulness is difficult. The success
of such a venture depends on the legislature's ability to combine these functions in such
proportions that a balance between the interests at stake can be worked out. 379 It should be
added, though, that the application of either a normative concept of infringement or a concept
that investigates more material requirements of infringement has given rise to divergent views
concerning the content of this stage of the constitutionality enquiry in German law, which will be
referred to again later in the present discussion.I" Be that as it may, the most important question
for determination at this stage of the inquiry is still whether or not a certain sovereign measure
affects a legal position protected by article 14 I 1 GG. Only once such an infringement is
identified, does the inquiry tum to the question whether the action by the state is justified or not.
The question of curtailment depends on the state action involved and the legal position that is
affected.381 Usually, the freedom of the property-right holder would be affected by a positive
action by one of the state organs. A right holder's position could, however, also be affected by
the non-compliance with a legal duty by an organ of state. A legislative infringement occurs if
ownership entitlements are abstractly or generally (that is to say not with regard to a specific
right holder) limited by the legislation. Legislation can, by itself, already concretely remove
378 Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich, Grundrechtspragung und Grundrechtseingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof
(eds) Handbuch V (1989) mn 47.
379 Schuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988) 115.
380 Von Heinegg & Haltern 1993 JuS 123. Cf the different approaches followed by different branches of the
judiciary as discussed at 214 et seq infra.
381 If it is, for instance, a legislative measure affecting the legal position in the sphere of intellectual property, the
legislative measure will affect the freedom of the right holder if the copyright holder of a specific work is in general
or with regard to specific parts of the relevant legal position curtailed to draw on the fruits of his or her labour and
performance. Von Heinegg & Haltern 1993 JuS 124.
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individuals' property rights completely or partially.382 Alternatively, one of the state's executive
organs can be authorised by law to enforce a removal of property rights.383
The question whether the conduct complained of was the effect of a legislative act, an
administrative action or a decision of a court of final instance is, however, not only important
because it could influence the outcome of the investigation as to constitutional justifiability of
such conduct, but also because it could help to determine the consequences of a possible
infringement. At this stage it could already in principle be determined whether any of the two
basic permissible forms of infringement, expropriatiorr't" or regulation385 of property are at
stake. In both South Africa and Germany these two forms of infringement are mentioned in the
constitutional text.
Once the effect of a speci fie state action on the fundamental right to property has been identified,
one can continue with the last stage of the constitutionality enquiry: determining whether the
specific state action constituted a justified limitation of property rights or not.
In South Africa, the party relying on the validity of a specific infringement would, in this phase,
bear the onus of proving that all the requirements justifying the infringement on property rights
were met. The infringement has, in other words, to qualify either as a deprivation of property or
as an expropriation. Also in German law, the basic premise is that a legislative infringement can
only be constitutionally justifiable if it represents either a legislative regulation of property in
terms of article 14 I 2 GG (Inhafts- und Schrankenbestinunungj.i'" or an expropriation
(Enteignung) of property in terms of article 14 III GG.
However, whereas the main issue during the previous stage of the investigation would have been
whether or not a speci fie action constitutes an infringement, the focus in the final stage is on the
question of the manner and extent to which the constitutionally protected right to property can be
382 These curtailments are referred to as "Eingriffe durch Gesetz" - cf Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich,
Grundrechtsprligung und Grundrechtseingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof(eds) Handbuck V (1989) mn 48.
383 Such a curtailment is called "Eingrif] auf Grund Gese/zes" - cf Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich,
Grundrcchtspragung und Grundrcchtscingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch V (1989) mn 48.
384 S 28(3) IC; s 25(2) FC. It is also sometimes referred to as compulsive acquisition of property. The German term
is Enteignung. Cfan 14 III GG.
385 In South A frica, this is usually referred to as deprivation of property, due to the choice of terminology in the
constitutions. S 28(2) IC determines that "No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than
in accordance with a law." S 25( I) FC determines that "No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law
of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property." Similarly, this concept is referred
to as Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung in Germany, because of this phrase being used in an 14 I 2 GG.
386 Even in English literature on German constitutional law, the term "deprivation" as it was used in terms of s 28 IC
of South Africa, is not employed. Usually, authors refer to this phenomenon as the "legislative competence to
determine the contents and limits of the property guarantee" or the "legislative interference with property". Cf ia
Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987); Schuppert
"The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988); Frowein Protection of Property in Relation
to Taxation Unpublished Report (1996); Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997). The use of this
ph ruses stems from the wording of art 14 I 2 GG, which grants the legislature capacity to indeed pass statutes
determining what the range and intensiry of the constitutional properry guarantee should be.
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limited by such an infringement. In order to establish whether these requirements are met, it is
necessary to take the relation between the constitutional provisions for regulation of property and
the provisions for limitations of rights in general into account. In principle, the justifiability of a
specific limitation of a fundamental right must be examined with reference both to formal and
material requirements for limitation. The requirements for limitation in Germany and South
Africa are similar in that if a limitation on the right to property must take place pursuant to a
law, the law should apply generally and should not permit arbitrary limitation of the right to
property.
In end effect, and if all other possibilities have been exhausted, it is the issue of proportionality
(Verháltnismáfigkeit) that determines whether a specific infringement was justifiable or not. As
will be indicated in the next chapters, the South African proportionality test differs slightly from
its German counterpart with regard to content and application. In the course of this exposition, it
will be argued that, although the proportionality test is applied correctly in the South African
context as a very final stage of the inquiry regarding the constitutional protection and regulation
of property, the considerations underlying this test should pervade the entire inquiry. For the
moment, this approach can best be illustrated with reference to the manner in which the second
element of the inquiry of constitutional validity of an interference with property is handled in
Germany. The most important question for determination at this stage is still whether or not a
certain sovereign measure affects a legal position protected by article 14 I 1 GG. Only once such
an infringement is identified, does the inquiry tum to the question whether the action by the state
is justified or not. However, it has been pointed oue87 that the purpose of the state action
affecting the right holder's freedom is mostly the result of an attempt by the state to balance of
conflicting interests.I'" In this process, the legislature has to take into account the dual function
of the property guarantee of serving the needs of the private individual and of being useful to the
public in general. Harmonising the functions of the private use and public usefulness of property
can only be successful if the legislature is able to combine these functions in such proportions
that a balance between the interests at stake can be worked out. 389 In such a process, similar
considerations as those that appear in the proportionality test can be used, but mostly in different
combinations and for different reasons.
3.2.2.2. Inquiries regarding the payment of compensation
The question concerning the payment of compensation can follow on an mquiry into the
constitutional validity of a specific interference, if it is found that such interference amounts to
an expropriation of property for which no compensation has been paid. However, mostly the
question of compensation is an independent issue which has very little to do with the
constitutional validity of the expropriation itself. A thorough discussion of the issues of valuation
387 Cf 72 supra.
388 Ie the interests of two individuals, or those of an individual on the one hand and the society on the other, or the
conflicting interests of the same individual. Cf Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich, Grundrechtspragung und
Grundrechtseingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof(eds) Handbuch V (1989) mn 47.
389 Schuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988) 115.
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connected to the determination of a compensation amount is unfortunately outside the scope of
this exposition. In the course of this exposition, the compensation issue will therefore only be
treated in its function as one of the validity requirements for valid interference of a specific kind
in South Africa and Germany. It is especially in this area of the law where the borderlines
between private law and constitutional law might be confusing or unclear, due to the grey area of
interferences with property that are di fficult to classify as either expropriations (Enteignungen)
or deprivations (lnhalts- und Schrankenbestimmungen).
3.2.3. Summary: object of protection and nature of limitation
In the course of the preceding discussion, reference was made on several occasions to the
influence that the approach towards the object of constirutional protection of property and the
nature Iimitation could have on the substantive issues to be incorporated in an inquiry based on
the constitutional property clause. This section contains a summary of the most important points
touched upon.
The understanding of the function attached to a specific formulation of the constitutional
property clause will influence the approach to the object of protection. In this regard, the
formulation of section 25(1) FC as "absolutely" negative, in contrast to article 14 I GG (which is
a positively formulated clause with negative elements), causes some scholars to hold the opinion
that something "less than property" is protected by section 25( I) Fe. The fallacies of this view
have been pointed out above.39o However, the influence of this view on later stages of the inquiry
into the constitutional validity of an interference with property deserves further attention.
De Waal, Currie and Erasmus?" point out, that the application of section 36 FC can have no
meaning ful application to section 25 Fe. The gist of their argument is that the criteria justifying
the limitation of rights have been included in the demarcation of the rights in section 25 FC
themselves, with the effect of making the basis for justifying the infringement of section 25 FC
the very reason why section 25 FC was infringed in tbc first place. This obviously must be
illogical. However, the incongruity does not stem from the two-stage approacb to the limitation
of section 25 FC, but rather from the starting point of their investigation. If the object of the right
protected by section 25 FC is limited to something less than property, section 36 FC would
become obsolete, because of the built-in limitations in section 25 FC. A number of
considerations dictate against such an approach. These are discussed later on.392 It must,
nevertbeless, be pointed out here that section 7(3) FC excludes the possibility that the limitation
provisions of section 36 FC could simply not be applicable on section 25 FC. In fact, section 7(3)
Fe supports a reading of the bill of rights in which section 25 FC and section 36 FC are applied
cumulatively. This would mean that the starting point of the investigation should be altered, so as
not to make the application of section 36 FC illogical.
390 Cf 61, 66, 68 supra. Van der Walt 1997 SAPR/PL 275 - 330 contains extensive analyses of all the variations of
this approach, as well as countcrarguments.
391 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus l Iandbook (2000) 393 - 394.
392 Cf 187 infra.
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Such an alteration could be effected by viewing the object of the right protected in section 25 FC
as the eligibility to hold an interest with economic value, which deserves constitutional
protection by reason of its purpose of assisting an individual to live a self-fulfilled life and to
make responsible choices regarding his or her patrimonial interests. There are many examples in
German law relating to article 14 GG where such an approach was sucessfully followed. These
examples will be discussed and applied to the South African context in due course.393
3.4. The structure of the judicial system and its relevance
for a constitutional property inquiry
In both South Africa and Germany various courts have jurisdiction in matters related to the
constitutional protection and regulation of property. The following paragraphs provide a brief
overview.
3.4.1. The South African judicial hierarcy and the property clause
Since 1910,394 the judicial authority in South Africa was divided between the Supreme Court,
which consisted of an Appellate Division and several provincial and local divisions, and a
number of lower courts, of which the magistrates' courts were the principal contingent. Certain
courts were also created by statute for a specific purpose. Of these statutory courts, the Land
Claims Court395 is important for purposes of this thesis. In the Interim Constitution.Ï" the
Constitutional Court was created, which would function as the court of final instance in
constitutional matters. The Constitutional Court had the same status and ranking as the Appellate
division. Neither court was empowered to hear appeals from the other. The Appellate Division
was the court of final instance in all matters where constitutional issues were not raised, and had
no jurisdiction to confer constitutional remedies like declaring legislation invalid on the basis of
the constitution.Ï" This system was changed slightly with promulgation of the Final
Constitution.
The Final Constitution determined that all courts operating immediately prior to its
commencement would remain intact thereafterr''" The structure of the courts would also remain
like it was in terms of the Interim Constitution, except for the changes introduced by the Final
Constitution.399 Accordingly, section 166 FC determines the new hierarchy of the South African
judicial system. The magistrates' courts and the statutory courts (including the Land Claims
Court) remained unchanged. However, under the Final Constitution, the former provincial and
393 Cf 156 et seq infra.
394 With establishment of the South African Union.
395 Established in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. Cf293 infra.
396 S 98 and 99 IC.
397 S 101 read with s 102 IC.
398ltem 16, schedule 6, FC.
399 S 165 - 180 FC.
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local divisions of the Supreme Court (and various superior courts of the fanner TBVC400 states)
were converted into the High Courts, wbich have constitutional jurisdiction, limited to a specific
geographical area. In terms of section 166 FC, read with item 16 of Schedule 6 FC, the Appellate
Division has been converted into the Supreme Court of Appeal, and has acquired constitutional
jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court remains intact, and has, together with the Supreme Court
of Appeal, jurisdiction over the whole of tbe Republic of South Africa. Both the Constitutional
Court and the Court of Appeal are appellate courts. The fanner decides constitutional appeals,
and the latter all other appeals, including those in which both constitutional and non-
constitutional matters have to be considered. The Constitutional Court has, additionally, non-
appellate jurisdiction and may sometimes function as a court of first instance.Ï'"
In general, jurisdiction is to be exercised concurrently between the Constitutional Court, the
Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts in respect of all forms of legislation. Although a
dispute over the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament, provincial legislation or delegated
legislation can thus be heard by any of these courts, it would normally be heard in the first
instance by the High Court. Concurrent jurisdiction is, however, limited by section 167(5) FC
which determines that any order made by the Supreme Court of Appeal or the High Court
invalidating an act of Parliament, a provincial Act, or conduct of the President, has to be
confirnled by the Constitutional Court.
Concurrent jurisdiction means that all courts within the South African hierarchy theoretically
have the ability to pronounce on issues pertaining to the constitutional protection and regulation
of property. In issues related to the expropriation of property and land reform and restitution
measures, the Land Claims Court would, however, usually be the court of first instance, because
it specialises in these matters. In matters concerning the regulation of property, tbe High Court
would probably be the court of first instance, whereas the Supreme Court of Appeal and the
Constitutional Court would probably function as appellate courts.
3.4.2. Shared jurisdiction in property issues within the German judicial hierarchy
The judicial system402 in Germany encompasses a compromise between maintaining the
independence of the different Lander in judicial matters and the desire for legal unity. After
reunification, the courts which existed in the fonncr German Democratic Republic had to be
incorporated in the structure of the Federal Republic.403 The German court structure is complex,
since it is based on the principles of specialisation and deccntralisation.t"
400 The territories of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei were regarded as "independent states" by the
apartheid government. Consequently, their judiciaries functioned "independently" from that of South Africa,
although the Appelare Division of the former Supreme Court was also the final instance for cases referred by the
courts of these territories.
401 le in matters lor which the court has exclusive jurisdiction in terms of 167(4) FC.
402 The main piece of legislation regulating the judicial structure and organisation is the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz,
403 Gesel! ZlII' Anpassung der Rechtspflege im Beitrittsgebiet. 30 June 1992, BGBII S 1147.
404 Foster German Legal System (1996) 39 - 41.
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Specialisation points to the division of the courts into different fields of jurisdiction. Thus, article
95 GG provides for courts with ordinary jurisdiction, administrative courts, labour courts, social
courts and revenue courts. The constitutional courts of the different Vinder and the Federal
Constitutional Court provide control over the courts of the other jurisdictions. Specialisation has
the advantage that specific issues can be decided by a court which was specifically created to
solve matters of a particular kind. Because of the specialist knowledge of the judges, the
individual can be assured that his or her case will be heard by an expert in the specific field of
law. However, it might be difficult to determine which court will have jurisdiction in a specific
case.
Decentralisation arises from the division between the federal and "provincial" (Vinder) courtS.405
Each Land has an own court structure in accordance with the general provisions of the Basic
Law and is responsible for administration of justice within its territory, but the overall structure
of the courts is regulated on a federal level. The federal courts (that is, the Federal Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshoj), the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), the
Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht)
and the Federal Tax Court (Bundesfinanzhoj)) are at the top of the judicial hierarchy. They act as
final courts of appeal, and have to ensure that the law in Germany is interpreted and developed
uniformly.
From the German judicial structure it appears that, normally, only one set of courts would have
jurisdiction over a given area of the law. In the field of property law, however, jurisdiction is
divided between administrative courts (where the Federal Administrative Court or
Bundesverwaltungsgericht is the court of final instance) and ordinary courts (where the Federal
Court or Bundesgerichtshof is court of final instance). The administrative courts have authority
to deal with the (administrative) matters concerning the actual expropriation. When, however,
the amount of compensation is contested, the ordinary courts have jurisdiction. Because these
issues are interlinked, both tribunals have been forced to define the "common good" and a
"compensable expropriation. ,,406As a result of this, the Federal Court of Justice and the Federal
Administrative Court share the jurisdiction on the standards according to which public and
private interests in the field of property regulation are balanced. Due to this shared jurisdiction,
several possible analytical approaches have been as developed as aids in determining the
intention of the legislature where infringements on property rights are concerned.Ï'" Moreover,
the Federal Constitutional Court has the function of protecting, interpreting and applying the
Basic Law,408 and does not function as another higher instance of the other branches of the
judiciary. It has developed its own interpretation of the property clause, which does not always
correlate with either that of the Federal Court of Justice or the Federal Administrative Court.
405 Art 92 read with art 95 GG.
406 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253 and n 34 to eh 6, 568. Cf also Dolzer Property
and Environment (1976); and Badura "Eigentum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) 653 - 696.
407 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253.
408 Foster German Legal System (1996) 48
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4. Structure and interpretation
Part Two: Background 10 the Constitutional Proleelion of Properly in Germany and South Africa
In this chapter, some of the structural aspects of constitutional property protection in Germany
and South Africa have been discussed in order to ascertain their influence on the interpretation of
the constitutional property clauses. Focus was placed on the formulation of the provisions of the
property clause in positive or negative terms. The influence of different approaches to
interpreting the property clauses according to their external appearances on the inquiry into
substantive issues of constitutional property protection have also been highlighted. In particular,
reference was made to the object of the constitutional right to property and the manner of
limiting such a right. These issues will also enjoy further attention in chapters 7 and 8. The issue
of application of certain elements resembling those involved in the very last phase of inquiries
related to the constitutional protection and regulation of properly - the proportionality test - has
also been mentioned. In the course of the next three chapters, this issue will surface again.
External appearance of a constitutional property clause is, however, only one of many factors
that might influence interpretation thereof. It is mostly closely connected with other factors
influencing interpretation. As has been indicated, the historical background can also give an
indication as to the nature of a particular property clause and the intention of the drafters thereof.
Furthermore, the interpretation of the property guarantees in both Germany and in South Africa
is linked to certain basic principles of constitutional interpretation. The property guarantees
should, for example, not be read in isolation, but with regard to the constitution as a whole. This
means that interpretation of the property clauses can only be embarked upon when certain
principles of state, like the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and social welfare state
(Sozialstaat), are taken into account. Once the importance of these factors has been established,
an attempt can be made to structure the constitutional property inquiry. The next chapter contains
an overview of the constitutional principles and their significance for the interpretation of tbe
constitutional property clauses in Germany and South Africa.
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[6] Basic principles of a constitutional order and
interpretation of a constitutional property clause
1. Relevance of constitutional values for the property order
The legitimacy of the traditional protection of property in South African common law needs to
be examined in view of the new legal order that has arisen after the advent of a new
constitutional order. Such an examination should be guided by the values underlying the new
constitutional dispensation. The Interim and Final Constitutions are the embodiment of the new
legal order in South Africa. The main virtue of this constitutional order is its potential to correct
the injustices integrated in existing law. The principles that form the basis of the constitutional
order in South Africa, like republicanism and democracy.i'" federalism.t'" constitutional state411
and social welfare state,412are to some extent comparable with the values underlying the German
Basic Law.
In both systems these principles or values are vital for interpreting the basic rights (Grundrechte)
or fundamental rights in general and the constitutional property clauses in particular. This chapter
is aimed at analysing the significance of some of these general constitutional principles for the
interpretation of property guarantees like section 28 IC, section 25 FC and article 14 GG. The
focus is on the approach that regards the whole constitutional text as a unity. In particular, two of
the fundamental constitutional principles on which an interpretation of a bill of rights is based, and
which are relevant for the interpretation of the property guarantees in particular, are discussed. They
are the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) principle and the social welfare state (Sozialstaat) principle.
2. The unity of the constitution
The unity of the constitution refers to the practice of interpreting all constitutional provisions by
applying certain general principles that are derived from the constitution as a whole. This
approach is apparently important from both the German and the South African points of view. In
Germany, the importance of this type of interpretation became apparent through the
jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court, whereas in South Africa this idea was directly
included in both the Interim and Final Constitutions. The following paragraphs illustrate the
meaning of an interpretation based on the unity of the constitutional text.
409 Cfn 416 and n 435 infra.
410 Cf n 417 and n 436 infra.
411 Cf 86 infra.
412 Cf 96 infra.
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2.1. "Innere Einheit" of the German Constitution
Part Two: Background to the Constitutional Protection of Properry in Germany and South Africa
The Federal Constitutional Court has developed certain rules of constitutional interpretation - in
view of the special political values contained in the Basic Law - which are applicable over and
above the normal rules of legislative interpretation. Very earl/13 in the jurisprudence of the
Federal Constitutional Court, it was determined that the constitutional text contains certain
general and fundamental constitutional principles which appear from a reading of the
constitution as a whole, and which are superior to the specific provisions of the constitution. The
Federal Constitutional Court stated in 1951 :414
"Eine einzelne Verfassungsbestimmung kann nicht isotiert betrachtet lind alleill aus sich heraus
ausgelegt werdeu. Sie steht in einem Sinnzusammenhang mit dell iibrigen Vorschriften der
Verfassung, die elne innere Einheit darstelit. Aus dem Gesamtinhalt der Verfassung ergeben sich
gewisse verfassungsrechtliche Grundsiitze und Grundentscheidungen. denen die einzelnen
Verfassungsbestimmungen untergeordnet sind."
This means that single constitutional provisions are to be interpreted in accordance with general
fundamental constitutional principles.t" like republicanism and dcmocracy.t" federalism.t'"
413 The decision in BVerfGE 1, 14 was handed down on 23 October 1951, two years after the enactment of the Basic
Law.
414 In BVcrfGE 1, 1432. Translation: "A single constitutional provision cannot be viewed in isolation and cannot be
interpreted only with reference to itself. Such a provision is to be understood in coherence with the other
constitutional provisions, which establish an inner unity. From the contents of the complete constitution certain
constitutional principles, to which the single constitutional provisions are subject, arise."
415 Kunig 1990 Jura (Special edition) 52 - 60; Avenarius Rechtsordnung (1997) 16 - 25; Freekmanri & Wegerich
German Legal System (1999) 56 - 62; Ebke & Finkin (eds) Introduction 1996 45 - 56; Robbers Introduction
(1998) 57 - 67; Foster German Legal System (1996) 146 - 153 all provide detailed discussions of the principles of
the German state.
416 Art 20 I GG and 79 III GG show that the German state is founded upon this principle, apparently, according to
Foster German Legal System (1996) 147, to ensure that the German people would nOL put too much faith, and
eventually power, in one person. The Basic Law does not attempt to outline ft complete model or example of what
democracy should be or consist of in state government, but rather require the presence of certain characteristics
usually associated with democracy. Art 20 II GG requires representative government. Further characteristics of
democracy and basic rights of democratic participation, like free speech, press, free opinion, independent media
(art 5) freedom of assembly (art 8) freedom of association (art 9), political parties (art 21) elections (art 38) and
parliamentary organs (art 39) are guaranteed. Detailed analyses in Kunig 1990 Jura (Special edition) 52 - 54, 60;
Ebke & Finkin (eds) Introduction 199646 - 47; Freckmann & Wegerich German Legal System (1999) 57 - 58;
A venarius Rechtsordnung (1997) 17 - 21.
417 The federal ist structure of the German state has its origins in the Holy Roman Empire of the ninth century and is
important for constitutional theory as well as for political practise. Both the separate Lander as well as the Bund
have sovereign status. The political weight of the Federal Government is, however, greater. Legislation is, in
principle, the task of the separate Lander (according to art 70 GG), although the several particularly important issues
(like international relations, defence, citizenship, currency) arc subject to the legislative authority of the Bund
(art 71 - 75 GG). In other fields (like civil law, criminal law, procedure, law relating to foreigners, etc) the Liinder
and the Bund have concurrent legislative authority (art 72 GG). However, if the Bund exercises its power to legislate
on a particular subject, as it has happened in most fields, the competence of the Lander to legislate on the same
subject is terminated. The BI/lid can also pass framework legislation (Rahmengesetzgebung). which leaves open the
possibility for the Ui/nier to legislate on the subject in order to fill in the details of such framework legislation. The
Bund can also in certain areas prescribe principles to ensure consistency (Grundsatzgesetzgebung). The Lander are
in principle responsible for administration, even in matters which have been regulated by the Federal legislature
(art 83 GG ct seq). The Bil/Id is assigned the administrative duties pertaining to the armed forces, foreign service etc
(art 32 GG). In all other matters the BUild can merely provide guidelines for the administration. For more
in formation on German fcdera lisrn, cf Kunig 1990 Jura (Special edition) 58 - 60; Avcnarius Rechtsordnung
continued
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Rechtsstaat,418 Sozialstaatï'" environmental protection'f" and subsidiarity.Y' Although these
rules in themselves constitute no basis for substantiating individual claims,422they are binding on
all courts and state organs that are expected to interpret the Basic Law. They are considered
regardless of the fundamental right at stake in a specific case. Thus, effect is given to the
principle of the unity of the constitution. The constitution not only binds the state authority to
uphold procedural safeguards, but also obliges the legislature to act in accordance with the
requirements of substantive justice when exercising its legislative function.
In interpreting the constitution as a unity, it could happen that fundamental rights conflict with
one another. In such circumstances, the Federal Constitutional Court determines how each right
reciprocally limits the other. Both (or all) rights are given the greatest possible relative
protection. By thus harmonising the protection of conflicting rights, a result is obtained which
affects all the rights at stake to the least possible extent. The court will also respect the basic
rights, norms or freedoms, and the fact that all the organs of state are integrated, as far as
possible. It will not follow an interpretation that will isolate a particular organ of the state.423In
this way the basic "principles of state" (or rather constitutional values) enshrined in the Basic
Law are constantly taken into account as interpretative devices.
The basic principles are - through the inner unity (innere Einheit) of the Basic Law - the
Leitmotifs that guide the legislature in performing its main function, and against which all state
action should be measured. Article 14 GG, like all other provisions in the Basic Law, cannot be
interpreted in isolation, but should be seen against the Basic Law as a whole.
2.2. "Conformity with the constitution" in South Africa
Section 39 FC contains an interpretation clause pertaining to the bill of rights. Section 239 FC
contains definitions of certain terms and is applicable to the Final Constitution in its entirety.
However, neither of these provisions can completely regulate constitutional interpretation, and to
some extent they even require interpretation themselves.F'
(1997) 23 - 25; Ebke & Finkin (eds) Introduction 1996 49 - 54; Freckmann & Wegerich German Legal
System (1999) 61 - 62.
418 Cf86 infra.
419 Cf96 infra.
420 Environmental protection is, according to Foster German Legal System (1996) 152, a recent addition to the
fundamental principles. Art 20a GG was introduced into the Basic Law on 27 October 1994 and requires the three
branches of the state to protect the natural surroundings. In South Africa, environmental rights are incorporated into
the Bill of Rights and protected under section 24 FC and section 29 IC.
421 Subsidiarity refers to the openness of the Basic Law to the European integration, as introduced (also recently) by
art 23 GG. In promoting the unification of Europe, Germany may confer sovereign rights upon European
Institutions, but without giving up its own existence as a state: sovereign rights of material significance must remain.
Foster German Legal System (1996) 153.
422 De Waal 1995 SAHJR 8.
423 Foster German Legal System (1996) 145.
424 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 123.
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The Constitutional Court continually lays down guidelines for the interpretation of the
constitution in general and the bill of rights in particular. These guidelines are based on a variety
of interpreting techniques. The court invokes the mechanisms of grammatical.f" systematic
(contextualj.t" teleological (purposive),427 historical428 and comparative429 interpretation.
However, the court does nol always seem to recognise that the different techniques have to be
considered in relation to one another. Moreover, these techniques have not been ranked
according to a specific priority. From the application of the different techniques, it nevertheless
becomes apparent that the court favours tbe idea that the constitutional text as a whole is
employed in order to determine the meaning of a specific provision. At least some of the court's
guidelines to interpretation of the constitution are based upon this premise. The technique of
purposive interpretation serves as an example: The constitution, particularly the chapter on
fundamental rights, is viewed as being of a different legal genus than ordinary legislation.V" It
constitutes a set of constitutional principles in terms of which the whole text has to be
interpreted.
Already under the South African Interim Constitution it was clear tbat the values stated in the
Preamble and the Postscriptt" would influence constitutional interpretation.432 This practice is
continued under the Final Constitution, as is apparent from the wording of the Preamble and the
fact that the values and principles are repeated in sections 1 and 2 FC.433 This indicates that the
425 This technique of interpretation regards the language of the text as the mediator of meaning. The language
therefore conveys and creates the meaning of a specific provision or text. Other contextcxtual factors arc then
decisive of the meaning of a text. Du Plessis 1999 Saskatchewan Law Review 310.
426 This technique of interpretation attempts to find the meaning of a specific provision by drawing on the system of
the text as a whole, and, according to some scholars, even by considering other legal precepts and institutions, the
legal system, the political and constitutional order, the international legal order and so on. Du Plessis 1999
Saskatchewan Law Review 310; De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handhook (1999) 133 - 135.
427 This technique is much acclaimed among South African constitutional lawyers. It entails that the core values
underpinning the listed fundamental rights in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom are "teased out" and that preference is given to an interpretation of a specific provision that best promote
those values. De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 125. Du Plessis 1999 Saskatchewan Law Review 311
indicates that teleological interpretation is not quite the same as purposive interpretation. It rather involves the
discovery of a purpose that has to be realised.
428 This technique of interpretation entails, on the one hand, a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the
drafting of a specific provision, and on the other hand, could also refer to the political history of a specific text. De
Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 130 - 133. AS such, this technique is prone to abuse and should be
employed with circumspection.
429 This technique involves comparison of the treatment of similar provisions or texts in different jurisdictions in
order to reach solutions. It is widely employed in South African constitutional jurisprudence. S 39( I) FC authorises,
but does not require, comparative interpretation. Du Plessis 1999 Saskatchewan Law Review 312.
·1)0 Davis, Chaskalson & De Waal "Democracy and constitutionalism" in Van Wyk, Dugard et al (cds) Rights and
Constitutionalism (1996) 126.
4)1 The portion of the Interim Constitution headed National Unit)' and Reconciliation, sometimes referred to as the
"Post-amble" or "A flerword."
432 Cases where the Postscript and Preamble have been employed for constitutional interpretation include: S v
Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC) par 262 - 264 (Mahomed J) and 363 (Sachs J); S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC)
par 112 (Sachs J); Kha!a v Minister ofSafety and Security 1994 4 SA 218 (W) 221 F-G; Qozeleni v Minister of Law
and Order 1994 3 SA 625 (E) 632A-G; Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 1996 2 SA 588 (W) 597G-598B; Du
Plessis I' De Klerk 19963 SA 850 (CC) par 75, 123, 125 - 126.
433 The" Afterword" has fallen away.
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property clauses - like all other provisions - cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the
constitution.
Moreover, section 39(2) FC (which corresponds more or less with section 35(3) IC) provides that
the "spirit, purport and objects" of the bill of rights must be taken into account by courts,
tribunals or forums when interpreting legislation.V" This also applies to cases where the common
or customary law needs to be developed. The spirit, purport and objects of the bill of rights are
best identifiable against a consideration of the bill of rights as a whole, and not only upon those
provisions that might be applicable in a specific case.
The result of interpreting certain provisions upon a reading of the constitution as a whole is that
certain principles inherent in the constitutional order (namely republicanism and democracy.t"
federalism.v" constitutional state437 and social/welfare state438) will have specific relevance for
interpretation of the constitution in general and of fundamental rights provisions in particular.
These principles make up the constitutional framework of the state and government. They will
shape the political and legal machinery of South Africa in the same way as similar principles
434 "Law" in terms of s 35(3) FC.
435 S 1 IC and s 1 FC in principle subscribe to the republican form of government. (However, certain forms of
traditional monarchy are acknowledged within the borders of South Africa. Cf s 211(1) FC that recognises
institution, status and role of traditional leadership according to customary law, however, still subject to the
Constitution, and s 212 FC that envisages the provision by national legislation of traditional leadership as an
institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. This section further foresees that national or
provincial legislation may provide for the establishment of houses of traditional leaders, and that national legislation
may establish a council of traditional leaders.) S 1 FC also provides the values on which a democratic South African
state will be founded: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms; (b) Non-racialism and non-sexism; (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law; and (d)
Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic
government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
436 In South Africa the questions of federalism and regionalism were hotly debated during the multi-party
negotiations. Cf Humphries, Rapoo & Friedman "Shape of the Country" in Friedman & Atkinson (eds) The Small
Miracle (1994) 150 - 177; Friedman & Humphries (eds) Federalism and its Foes (1993). With regard to the Interim
Constitution, Watts "Is the New Constitution Federal or Unitary?" in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994)
78 - 86 has indicated that many of the characteristics underlying a federal system (ie two orders of government,
legislative and executive competence of the provinces, representation of regional views through the senate, a
supreme written constitution, existence of a constitutional court) are present in the new South African constitutional
order. However, the form of the distribution of the legislative and executive powers and of financial resources
between the national and provincial governments reminds more of a regionalised unitary system. The Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994 have strengthened the federal character of the Interim
Constitution. In the Final Constitution, s 41 makes provision for co-operative government, which apparently resulted
from the influence of the German notions of Bundestreue (as explained in BVerfGE 12, 205 254), Kooperativer
Fëderalismus and Paktierender Fëderalismus. The National Council of Provinces created by s 42(1)(b) has also
been inspired by the German example (ie Bundesrat). However, Venter "Aspects of the South African Constitution
of 1996: an African Democratic and Social Federal Rechtsstaat?" 1997 ZaoRV 61 - 73 shows also that, in spite of
the "thoroughly regulated constitutional foundation" which has been laid for the development of a composite state in
South Africa, it is at this time still unclear whether the principles in s 41 (which contain the notion of co-operative
government and which can be categorised into (i) principles emphasising national unity; (ii) principles defending
areas of competence; and (iii) principles promoting good government and service to the public) will aid the
development of a centrifugal or centripetal state. He nevertheless remarks that, against the background of
constitutionalism, the possibility of "regional states" is not far-fetched. This view can be supported. Cf contra,
however, Booysen 1997 Loy LA Int'! & Comp U 800, 808.
437 Cf 86 infra.
438 Cf 96 infra.
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Pan Two: Background /0 the Constitutional Protection of Property in Germany and South Africa
have done in Germany. They will influence the direction of all state functions and will legitimise
the use of state power and the exercise of governmental duties. They could also be employed to
prevent the abuse of state power.
3. Principles inherent in a constitutional order
The constitutional state principle and the social welfare state principle are of particular
importance when individual freedom and social justice has to be harmonised in the sphere of
property rights. In the following paragraphs, these constitutional values (or "principles of state"),
which are to some extent present in both the German and South African systems, will be
compared briefly.
3.1. Constitutional state ("Rechtsstaat") and Rule of Law
Blaauw439 has shown that the concept of Rechtsstaat in effect incorporates the constitutional
state principle and that it must be distinguished from the Rule oj Law principle. The Rule oj Law
originated in England as a symbol of resistance against attempts by the Stuart kings to
institutionalise an absolutist regime at the cost of sovereignty of Parliament.T''' By contrast, the
notion of a constitutional state - evolving from the principle of Rechtsstaat, which in tum
originated in Germany as a solution to unchecked power441 - denotes a rigid, written constitution
(as opposed to parliamentary sovereignty) as highest directing normative principle.442
However, Blaauw4-l3 also pointed out that, although the historical influences on the development
of the concepts of Rule oj Law and Rechtsstaat differ quite extensively from each other, modem
versions of these concepts overlap to a certain extent. Her discussion of the distinctions between
the concepts of Rechtsstaat and Rule oj Law shows that both these concepts contain the ideals of
equality before the law, substantive liberties and rights, and the notion of law as a general
. . I 444pnncip e.
439 Blaau [sic] 1990 SALJ 89 - 90. This article (88 - 92) contains a short, but helpful exposition of the differences
between the concepts Rule of Lawand Rechtsstaat against their unique historical backgrounds.
440 Parliament was regarded as the representative of the people.
441 Mohnhaupt 1993/94 Acta Facultatis Politico-Juridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis de Rolando
Eotvos Nominatoe 45 shows that the Rechtsstaat was developed as a counterpoint against, on the one hand, the
police state (ic in the sense of the welfare state) and, on the other hand, against a system of despotic rule and
absolutism. The meaning of the Rechtsstaat principle has changed drastically over the last two centuries. In the 19th
century it originated from Kant's concept of the Slate (that freedom had to be governed by law), thus denoting the
Importance of legality in a legal system. After the World War II, the principle became associated with the state's
commitment to the realisation of justice. In Germany this is sometimes described as the progression from the formal
Rechtsstaat to the material Rechtsstaat. BVerftiE 9, 137 at 146. Cf De Waal 1995 SA/lJR 4 - 5.
442 Sobota Das Prinzip Rechtsstaal ( 1997) 27 et seq; 39 ct seq.
443 Blaau [sic] 1990 SALJ 96.
444 92.
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[6] Basic principles oj a constitutional order and interpretation oj a constitutional property clause
Although the term Rule of Law is used in the Final Constitution of South Africa, it is placed in
section l(c) FC directly after the value of constitutional supremacy.t" It is submitted that this
phrase should, therefore, be regarded as denoting a concept similar to that of the constitutional
state, which builds upon the principles of the German Rechtsstaat.446 Rule of Law as it appears in
the South African constitution should therefore not be understood in its traditional sense as
upholding parliamentary sovereignty, but rather as a mechanism for upholding constitutional
supremacy.
Since at least some of the elements of the German Rechtsstaat concept are present in the South
African concept of the constitutional state, this concept can prove valuable for the interpretation
of the constitutional property guarantee. These elements warrant a brief discussion.
3.1.1. The "Rechtsstaat" concept in German law
Sobota447 indicates that attempts to define the Rechtsstaat in Germany usually result in either
fragmentary, vague descriptions of this term, or in an unintended expansion of the concept.t"
Therefore most authors refrain from defining the concept, but embark on an enumeration of the
components of the formal concept449 of the German Rechtsstaat. The following paragraphs
provide an overview of these components.
3.1.1.1. Elements comprising the "Rechtsstaat" concept
Among the most important components that are mentioned by Sobota, the following can be
isolated as especially relevant to the proceedings in terms of article 14 GG and for the related
constitutional state concept in South Africa:
445 S 1Fe: "The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a)
Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. (b) Non-racialism
and non-sexism. (c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. (d) Universal adult suffrage, a national
common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness." Italics added.
446 Robbers Introduction (1998) 60 translates the Rechtsstaatsprinzip with as "the principle of constitutional
government under the rule of law," which indicates an indifference towards the finer historical distinctions between
these concepts. Nevertheless the importance of this principle is illustrated clearly by the author when he writes:
"Together with the comprehensive protection of Fundamental Rights, this principle expresses the ideal self-image of
the Federal Republic of Germany to an even greater extent than the principle of democracy."
447 Sobota Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat (1997) 21 - 24.
448 Problems such as those mentioned by Sobota Rechtsstaat (1997) 21 - 24, as well as the fact that most Western
democratic governments tend to refer to their regimes as complying with the Rechtsstaat concept, caused
Mohnhaupt 1993/94 Acta Facultatis Politico-Juridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestiensis de Rolando Eëtvës
Nominatae 45 to refer to its characteristic of "Januskopfigkeit. "
449 Blaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SAL.! 268 indicates that a coherent concept of the Rechtsstaat has not been developed
yet. In this regard a theoretical distinction is drawn between the formal Rechtsstaat concept, on the one hand, and
the material Rechtsstaat concept, on the other hand. The formal concept consists of certain elements for which no
uniformly accepted definition exists. The material concept is based on the idea of justice in law and in
administrative decisions.
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(i) Separation of powers (Gewaltenteilung) is required. This means that the three arms of
state authority"? should not have overlapping functions.V' In other words, the legislature is the
only body that has the power to limit fundamental rights and that the independent judiciary
should protect fundamental rights,4S2 including the right to property.
(ii) The principle of legality (Gesetzlichkeit; Vorrang des Gesetzes; Vorbehalt des
Gesetzes) must be adhered to. This means that the representatives of the people should have
adopted the legislation; that statutes find general application and that the legislature itself is
bound by such legislation until it has been repealed or amended.4s3 An important formal
safeguard flowing from the Rechtsstaat principle is entrenched by the Basic Law:4S4 the
democratically elected legislature must authorise all limitations of fundamental rights. This is
relevant in terms of article 14 I 2 GG, as the legislature is given the power to determine the scope
and content of the property concept.
(iii) The principle of legal certainty (Rechtssicherheitsgrundsatz / Bestimmtheitsgrundsatz)
must be observed. This means that legal measures and legal rules must be clear and consistently
applied and that state action must be sufficiently defined in order to remain predictable.Y''
Adherence to this principle is important in the context of the constitutional property clause in
evaluating the effect of certain legislative measures on private property. Because of the
difference in intensity of legislative measures creating regulatory interference with property and
those resulting in expropriation, article 14 GG provides for certain precautionary measures in the
formulation of legislation to this effect.4s6
(iv) According to the principle of trust (Vertrauensschutz), legitimate expectations are·
protected. 1f the state has created a specific situation and a person has acted on the reasonable
assumption that this situation will remain unchanged, then he or she can rely on such an
assumption.Y'
(v) The principle of proportionality (Verhdltnlsmáfiigkeitsgrundsatz) is also an important
aspect of the Rechtsstaat concept4SS applicable to the interpretation of article 14 GG (and all
450 Ie the legislature, executive and judiciary.
451 Sobota Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat (1997) 70 - 77; Foster German Legal System (1996) 149; Blaau [sic] 1990
SAU 81. Art I 111,20 111,97 III GG points to this principle in German Law.
452 Art 80 IGG.
453 Sobota Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat (1997) 77 - 85, 104 - 131; Robbers Introduction (1998) 60; Foster German Legal
System (1996) 149; Blaau 1990 SAU 81; Blaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SAU 268.
454 Art 19 II GG.
455 Sobota Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat (1997) 132 - 139; 154 - 188; Kleyn 1996 SA PRlPL 407; Robbers
Introduction (1998) 61; Blaau 1990 SAU 81 ; Blaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SAU 268.
~56Cf 207 Cl seq in fra.
457 This principle, together with that of legal certainty, give rise to the general prohibition of retrospective
legislation. Robbers Introduction (1998) 61; Kleyn 1996 SAPRIPL 407; Foster German Legal System (1996) ISO;
Blaau [sic] 1990 SAU 81; Olaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SAU269.
458 BVerfGE 23, 127 133; BVerfGE 6, 389 439; BVerfGE 16, 194 201 et seq; BVerfGE 17, 108 117 et seq;
BVerfGE 17,306 313; BVerfGE 19,342 348; BVerfGE 20, 45 49. The Court, however, deviated from this
viewpoint in a few decisions and tried to substantiate the foundation of the principle of proportionality with specific
reference to certain articles or a part of the Basic Law. Against this background, the Court held that the principle of
proportionality is implicitly evident in fundamental rights as such, or in provisions allowing for the limitation of
continued
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other basic rights) of the German Basic Law.459Proportionality is a method for determining
whether the reasons advanced by the state to justify limitation of a specific fundamental freedom
outweigh the values which underlie the constitutional commitment to the protection of that
freedom. It is only employed once it is clear that the state's actions conflict with the scope of
protection offered by the right,460and thus constitutes the very last stage in an enquiry into the
constitutionality of a particular infringement on fundamental freedoms.f" It entails that laws,
actions and measures of state organs should not exceed those strict limits within which a specific
legal purpose is pursued.462 Proportionality is usually tested by having regard to the objective
suitability (Geeignetheit) of the law, action or measure;463 the question of its necessity
(Erforderlichkeit);464 and the question of its reasonableness or its "proportionality" in the narrow
sense (Angemessenheit465).466 By applying the proportionality principle at the point in the
constitutionality inquiry where the justifiability of a specific restriction has to be determined, the
Court endeavours to come to an optimal decision, based on the hypothetical relationship between
an intended infringement and the intended goals to be attained by it. The intended infringement
such rights. (BVerfGE 19,342348 et seq; BVerfGE 27,344 at 352.) This gave rise to the argument that principle of
proportionality arose from the essential-content guarantee. In more recent decisions, however, the court has
apparently returned to its initial view that the principle of proportionality is based upon the Rechtsstaat concept. Cf
BVerfGE 38, 348 368 and BVerfGE 59, 275278.
459 Cf Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 193 et seq where the Federal Constitutional Court's uncertainty as to whether
this principle is founded in the Rechtsstaat concept or whether it is implicitly evident in the fundamental rights
themselves, is discussed. It is surely more acceptable, from a methodological perspective, to regard the principle-of
proportionality for the purposes of constitutional interpretation as part of the Rechtsstaat concept rather than part of
the essential content of each fundamental right, as the function of the latter is not particularly clear when
contemplating the reasons for the application of the proportionality principle.
460 Although the link between the "constitutional state" concept and "proportionality" has become somewhat blurred
during the drafting of the Final Constitution, the proportionality test is also the final stage in an inquiry concerning
the constitutional validity of an interference with human rights in South Africa. Cf 92 et seq infra. De Waal 1995
SAHJR 7 points out that, because the doctrine of proportionality is rooted in the material freedoms, it can be used to
measure the constitutionality of the state's limitations of fundamental rights and freedoms. It is, however, more
difficult to apply it in the context of the state's constitutional commitment to substantive equality or the furtherance
of socio-economic rights.
461 Very often the inquiry does not even need to go as far as applying the proportionality test. Constitutional disputes
can also be resolved simply by demarcating or defining the right properly, rather than by reliance on proportionality.
462 Foster German Legal System (1996) 150.
463 This means that the restriction which is being tested against the constitutional provisions should be appropriate or
suitable to achieve the objective intended. The intended aim of the legislation under discussion must be measured
against the possible means to achieve it, to determine whether a rational relation exist between them. Degenhart
Stqatsrecht I (1998) mn 278.
464 A cost-benefit analysis: the measure taken must not, in other words, be harsher than is necessary to achieve the
specified goal. Degenhart Staatsrecht I (1998) mn 279.
465 In relation to the importance and meaning of the fundamental right, no less far-reaching restriction would have
achieved the same result. This element is also sometimes referred to as proportionality in the narrow sense
(Verhdltnismëfligkeit im engeren Sinne). Degenhart Staatsrecht I (1998) mn 281. The proportional evening out of
the interests of the involved parties (ie the proportionality in the wider sense) should not be confused with the
classical investigation into the Angemessenheit (ie proportionality in the narrow sense) of a specific infringement
with a concrete purpose. The proportionality in the (wider) sense of the appropriateness of the relation between the
concepts of private property and social interest is rather a purpose of the wide leeway of the legislature in enacting
infringing legislation than is the case with the classical determination of the proportionality of a specific
infringement. Thormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 210.
466 Robbers Introduction (1998) 61; Blaau [sic] 1990 SAU 82.
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3.1.1.2. "Rechtsstaat" and property under the German Basic Law
is compared with an alternative measure that could attain the same resuIt.467 This mechanism is
important for determining whether curtailment of rights under the property clause is justifiable
and will be discussed in more detail in the course of the thesis.
The relation between article 14 GG and the Rechtsstaat concept in general becomes clearly
influential (i) in cases where the judiciary is confronted with the problem of judicial
development of the law, or (ii) when the balancing process requires a consideration of three or
more protected positions (instead of the usual two fundamental rights at stake), or (iii) in cases
where the courts have to determine for themselves the measure and intensity of the control they
can exercise.468 The right protected by article 14 GG places a duty on the judiciary to provide
effective factual protection. This duty would also include a procedure that effectively guarantees
the interests of the owner or holder of the relevant property right. In this manner, effect is also
given to the notion of the Rechtsstaat. The following paragraphs contain some examples.
The Federal Constitutional Court has on occasion held469 that it is constitutional in terms of
article 14 GG (and that it docs not amount to inadmissible judicial development of the law) to
usc the municipal Mie/spiegel in legal practice to determine a rent increase. The Mietspiegel is a
document compiled by or at least acknowledged by a municipality or landlord and tenant
associations within the municipal borders. In this document, the different "normal" rent levels for
residential premises within the municipal area are published. The location, size, nature, and
manner in which the accommodation is equipped arc factors taken into account when
determining the rent level. According to the Regulation of Rent Jncrease Act (Gesetz zur
Regelung der Miethohe), the lessor can only increase the rental up to the amount prescribed in
the Mietspiegelï'?
The court has, for instance, also indicated that the constitutional principles involved in the notion
of the Rechtsstaat apply when land is sold al an auction.V' The court also had to heed the notion
of the Rechtsstaat in considering whether a date for the sale in execution of the debtor's property
could be postponed due to the debtor's illness.472 In this particular case, tbe court committed
itsel f to the process of balancing the interests of both the creditor and the debtor, with particular
reference to the protection of the debtor's interests by paragraph 67 of the Sale in Execution
ACt.473
467 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 195.
468 Buchwald Prinzipien des Rechtsstaats (1996) 384.
469 BVcrfG (l.K) 03.04.1990 (1 BvR 269/90, 1BvR 270/90).
470 Brockhaus 191h cd XIV 578.
-171 BVcrfGE 51,150 lSG.
412 BVcrfG KTS 1981:!,564 - 565 (3.K).
473 Zwangsversteigerungsgesetz (Gesetz iiber die Zwangsversteigerung und Zwangsverwaltung vom 24.03.1897,
zuletzt geëndert am /8.2./998.)
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In another decision, the first senate of the Federal Constitutional Court had to pronounce on the
banking practice of inducing official authorities in the German Democratic Republic to agree on
certain non-commercial payment transactions by freezing bank accounts of German Democratic
Republic citizens held in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was decided that, upon a
consideration of the Rechtsstaat principle and article 14 I GG, this practice was constitutional.t"
The application of the Rechtsstaat concept in the context of constitutionally protected property
rights is also apparent in the treatment of the question whether social security claims qualified
for protection in terms of article 14 GG. The first senate of the Federal Constitutional Court475
decided that a patrimonial interest could qualify for protection under the property clause if the
interest is so strong that a deprivation without compensation (ersatzlose Entziehung) of the
interest would be in contradiction with the Rechtsstaat notion underlying the Basic Law. In the
case of social security claims,476the interests to be protected would comply with this requirement
if they:477 (i) befall the holder of such interests as exclusive rights for private use;478 (ii) are
based on considerable individual efforts of the holder;479 and (iii) serve the purpose of securing
the livelihood of the holder.48o
3.1.2. "Constitutional State" in South Africa
For almost two decades before the new constitutional order was introduced m 1994, South
African lawyers have recognised the European Rechtsstaat concept. However, the idea could not
really become part of public law doctrine in a system where the sovereignty of Parliament was
fundamental and where an easily amendable statute was employed as a constitution.Y' Venter
shows that the absorption of this concept into the new constitutional order in South Africa is all
the more surprising when it is borne in mind that:482
"[t]he main role-players in the multi-party constitutional negonanons that produced the 1993
Constitution were representatives of a liberation movement on the one hand, and on the other hand, of
an order that was established and was functioning under a constitutional dispensation founded in
English legal thinking."
474 BVerfGE 62, 169 - 189.
475 BVerfGE 16,94112; BVerfGE 18,392397.
476 BVerfGE 76, 220 247 has indicated that least claims for maintenance or transitional maintenance (Unterhaltsgeld
oder Ubergangsgeld) in terms of par 44 II 1(2) and par 59 II 2(2) of the Labour Development Act
(Arbeitsforderungsgesetz) qualify for protection. The question whether unemployment insurance and other claims in
terms of the same legislation also qualify for protection, were left open by the court. In BVerfGE 72, 9 18 this
question have been affirmed with certain qualifications pertaining to the minimum period required for payments into
the unemployment insurance fund.
477 BVerfGE 72, 9 18 - 19.
478 "[Vlermogenswerte Rechtsposition, die nach Art eines AusschlieJ3lichkeitsrechts dem Rechtstrager als
privatniazig zugeordnet ist, ... ".
479 "[Ajufnicht unerheblichen Eigenleistungen des Versicherten beruht, ... ".
480 "[Djer Sicherung seiner Existenz dient."
481 Venter 1997 ZaoRV73.
48274.
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Nevertheless, the preamble to the Interim Constitution recognised the need to create483
" 'n nuwe bestel... waarill alle Suid-Afrikaners geregtig sal wees op 'n gemeenskaplike Suid-
Afrikaanse burgerskap in 'n soewereine en demokratiese regstaat ... "
The fact that this recognition of the constitutional state (regstaat) appeared in the Preamble, but
was not incorporated in one of the "real" constitutional provisions, induced some authors'" to
argue that no constitutional state was created in the Interim Constitution. Instead, they argued, an
unenforceable directive for the creation of the constitutional state has been given to the
Constitutional Assembly. In spite of the provision in section 232(4) IC,485 it could perhaps still
be contended that the statement in the Preamble alone, however significant it might have been,
could not be sufficient to firmly establish the notion of the constitutional state (regstaat) in the
new constitutional order.
If any doubt still existed with regard to whether or not the Interim Constitution embraced a
notion similar to that of the Rechtsstaat, the inclusion of section l(c) FC has dispelled the
uncertainty, accepting that this section does not intend to refer to the Rule of Law in its
"traditional" sense,486 but supports the notion of constitutional supremacy.t'" Moreover, in both
the Interim and Final Constitutions the principles and elements characteristic of the Rechtsstaat
(both in the formal and in the material sense) were prescribed in the substantive provisicns.l'"
However, it does not follow from the incorporation of certain elements typical of a constitutional
state in the Final Constitution of South Africa that a constitutional state does exist in practice.
The following paragraphs will show how fragile the constitutional state notion in South Africa
really is.
3.1.2.1. Latent support of a "constitutional state" in the constitution
The following principles are apparently adhered to in both the Interim Constitution and the Final
Constitution, as well as in Schedule 4 JC that dictated the content of the Final Constitution:
(i) The separation of state powers principle is supported by section 96(2) IC, which
established an independent and impartial judiciary. Principle VII of schedule II IC also made the
separation of powers an indispensable requirement, binding the Constitutional Assembly. The
483 Translation: "a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in a
sovereign and democratic constitutional state ... ". The Afrikaans text is cited here to show the use of the term
regstaat (as opposed to constitutional Slate in the English version). SIS, Act 2 of 1994 determines (in the context of
the Interim Constitution) that the Afrikaans text is a source of reference in matters of constitutional interpretation.
Here it might help clear up the uncertainty caused with the use of the term Rule of Law. The German Rechtsstaat
cannot be directly translated into English and Rule of Law cannot really be regarded as its equivalent (cf 86 supra).
The most acceptable expression is therefore constitutional state, although this should not be confused with the
German concept of Verfassungsstaat, which forms part of the Rechtsstaat idea in that a rigid constitution is required.
~8~ De Waal 1995 SA HJR 4.
485 Which determined that, for purposes of interpretation, the provisions contained in schedules to the Interim
Constitution and the "Postscript" of the Interim Constitution should not have a lesser status than other "normal"
provisions, and could therefore also well be applicable to the Preamble of the Interim Constitution.
486 I . . f P I'c assuming sovereignty 0 ar lament.
.IX? Ct'87 supra.
~H8 Kleyn 1996 SAPRJPL407; Venter 1997 Za6RV75.
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impartiality and independence of the judiciary is now endorsed by section 165 FC. Moreover,
several of the provisions in schedule II IC supported the inclusion of a democratic system of
government and representation on all levels of government in the Final Constitution.Y' Provision
also had to be made for the horizontal separation of powers490 and the definition of the powers
and functions of government at national and provincial leve1.491Sections 44(4), 83 and 165(2)
FC, among others, adhere to these requirements by providing for the separation of powers and
reinforcing the requirement that government authority is to be exercised in accordance with and
subject to the Constitution.t"
(ii) The legality principle appears from section 4(1) IC read with section 7(1) IC and
sections l(c), 2 and 8(1) FC,493where the constitution is declared to be the supreme law.494Also,
the limitation of a fundamental right is only allowed in accordance with "a law of general
application. ,,495The reason for this is that the constitutional state ensures that the legislature is
the only body with the necessary legitimacy to limit the use of the fundamental freedomsl'" and
that legislation has to define administrative powers clearly. A further indication of the intention
to create a constitutional state appears from the characteristic of rigidity that is ascribed to the
constitution. This is particularly noticeable in the provision for a two-third majority for
constitutional amendments in section 62(1) IC and principle XV of schedule II IC (requiring
special majorities and special procedures for constitutional amendments). Section 74 FC serves
as a further indication of rigidity, requiring 75% of the National Assembly members and at least
six of the provinces to support constitutional amendments.l'"
(iii) The principle of legal certainty is endorsed in the special procedural constitutional
guarantees that are found in the Interim and Final Constitutions.498 Moreover, the provision for
the appointment of a Public Protector in sections 112(1) IC and 181(1)(a) FC not only
strengthens the constitutional democracy, but also supports the development of a system in
which maladministration, corruption, administrative injustice and inefficiency on the part of
489 Principles I (democratic system of government), XVII (democratic representation on all levels of
government), VIII (multi-party democracy), schedule II, IC.
490 Principle VI, schedule II, IC.
491 Principle XVIII, schedule II, IC.
492 Venter 1997 ZaoRV79.
493 Kleyn 1996 SAPR/PL 407 n 25.
494 Further support of this element is found in s 237 FC, that determines that all constitutional obligations must be
performed diligently and without delay. Grupp Siidafrikas neue Verfassung (1999) 31 - 32.
495 S 33(1) IC and s 36(1) FC.
496 In this regard, the question arises in South African context whether the fundamental rights may also be limited by
or pursuant to the common law. Because of codification in the German legal system, no need exists for a distinction
between statutory law and common law. Section 33(2) IC seems to indicate that fundamental rights may also be
limited by the common law in South Africa. In other Common-law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the phrase
prescribed by law is used instead of law of general application in order to make clear that common law limitation
can take place. CfDe Waal1995 SAHJR 5 n 10.
497 Grupp Sudafrikas neue Verfassung (1999) 98 - 99.
498 Eg in the Interim Constitution: s 22 IC (recourse to impartial judges), 25(3)(d) IC (right to be heard), 25(3)(f) IC
(nulla poena sine lege), 25(3)(g) IC (prohibition on double jeopardy), 25(3)(b) IC (right to a speedy trial). Cf De
Waal 1995 SAHJR 6. Also in the Final Constitution: s 33(3)(a) FC (recourse to impartial judges), 35(3)(i) FC (right
to be heard), 35(3)(1) FC (nulla poena sine lege), 35(3)(m) FC (prohibition on double jeopardy), 35(3)(d) FC (right
to a speedy trial).
93
Stellenb ch University http://scholar.su .ac.z
Part Two: Background lo the Constitutionat Protection of Property III Germany and South Africa
public functionaries can be exposed. How effective this will be in practice, is yet to be
determined.
(iv) The principle of trust is also embraced by section 25(3){f) IC and section 35(3)(m) FC.
(v) From the wording of the limitation ciauses499 and decisions of the Constitutional Court
on this matter, it is also apparent that a principle resembling that of the German
Verháltnismaiigkeitsprinzip is endorsed. According to Chaskalson P in the watershed decision
of S v Makwanyane,SOO it is implicit in section 33{ I) IC that the limitation of constitutional rights
for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society "involves the weighing up
of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality." The court used the
treatment of this issue in the constitutional courts of Canada, Germany and the European Court
of Human Rights to show that proportionality is an essential requirement of any legitimate
limitation of an entrenched right and to justify its application in the South African context.t'"
The decisions of Makwanyane and Zuma,502 however, influenced the formulation of the
limitation clause in the Final Constitution503 and therewith also the adoption of a South African
version of the proportionality principle.Ï'" Since then, many others have followed the same
reasoning and used the same terminology when pronouncing on the limitation of rights. 50SIn the
case of De Lange v SmlllsS06 the approach to limitation of rights propounded by Chaskalson, P in
the Makwanyane case (and pertaining to the limitation clause in the Interim Constitution) has
also been endorsed with regard to the limitation clause in the Final Constitution. Further,
Blaauw-Wolfso7 shows convincingly that the proportionality principle is also implicit in the
procedure for limiting rights under the Final Constitution, by classifying the requirements of a
law of general application restricting the right only 10 a certain ex/entSOS as the formal elements
which must be clarified before proportionality can be determined. The requirements that the
restriction should be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society then resembles
elements of the proportionality principle (that is to say Geeignetheit, Erforderlichkeiïïï" The
third clement iAngemessenheitï of the proportionality principle is evident in section 36(1)(e) FC
that requires a consideration of whether less restrictive measures could have been invoked to
m S 33 IC; s 36 FC. Kleyn 1996 SAPRJPL 407 n 25.
500 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).
501 Par 104 n 130.
502 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC); S v Zuma 19952 SA 642.
SOl Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRJPL 208. Section 36( I) FC determines: "The righrs in the Bill of Rights may be limited
only III terms of law of general application to the extent that the limitation IS reasonable and justitiabIe in an open
and democratic sociery based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors,
including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and ex rent of
the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the
purpose."
504 Cf 183 ct seq infra.
505 An overview of these decisions is found in Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRJPL 208 and n 106.
506 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) par 86 - 88.
507 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRIPL 209 et seq; ei contra De Waal1995 SAl/JR 7.
50R "[TJo the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom" s 36( I) Fe.
50Q Cf 89 supra.
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achieve the objective. On the basis of this analysis, it can be submitted that, even though the
roots of the South African proportionality test are mostly sought in its Canadian counterpart.i'"
the German Basic Law remains the best comparative agent as far as the content and nature of the
proportionality test in South Africa is concerned.
3.1.2.2. The "constitutional state" principle and property in South Africa
The South African constitutional order seems to subcribe to most of the characteristics of the
formal and material Rechtsstaat. South Africa can thus be regarded as a constitutional state.
Wiechers,"! however, refers to the present situation of South Africa as a "Rechtsstaat-at-rest."
He explains that the principle of the constitutional state is set in motion as a result of unbalanced
political forces, unfulfilled socio-economic needs, unkept promises on the part of the
government, frustration and outrage on the part of the citizens, conflict, strife, corruption, dirty
tricks and law-breaking.l'I He quite validly questions the strength and resilience of the South
African model of the constitutional state to maintain its essential theoretical features in practice,
and then remarks:513
"The answer to this question depends on the political forces in our country, and mote particularly ...
on the capacity and will of politicians and political leaders to deal with conflict within the ambit and
scope of Rechtsstaatlichkeit."
Exactly how the proportionality principle and the other elements constituting the South African
constitutional state will be used in future in interpreting the property clause, is to a large extent
still open to speculation. One can only expect that this issue will be particularly contentious in
cases where the restriction of property as well as other fundamental rights must be dealt with in
the same context. The reason for this is that the internal limitations of the property clause mirror
the general limitations provision to some extent. The same holds for cases in which the
constitutionality of restrictions will to a certain extent require political decisions. The inherent
tension between liberty and equality in the South African constitutional state lies at the heart of
these decisions. Wiechers514 cautions:
"Suid-Afrika moet die toon aangee om die sogenoemde Afrika-renaissance aan te moedig en te
inspireer. So 'n Afrika-renaissance is egter tot 'n misgeboorte verdoem as Afrika-lande nie die
gelykheidsgrondslag van die moderne regstaat met die ewe wesenlike vryheidsgrondslag kan paar
nie."
Some academics endeavoured to explain how the limitation clause and the property clause are
supposed to interact against this underlying tension between liberty and equality.i" These views
510 CfVan der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 339 - 340 and n 94.
511 Wiechers 1998 THRHR 624 - 634.
512 627.
513630.
514 634. Translation: "South Africa must set the pace to foster and inspire the so-called African Renaissance.
However, such an African Renaissance is doomed to miscarriage if African states are incapable of finding a
compromise between the essential bases of equality and freedom of the modem constitutional state."
515 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 275 - 330; Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 84 - 89, 105 - 109; Woolman
"Limitations" in Chaskalson, Kentridge et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 12, 1 - 34; Van der Walt 1995
continued
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are important for the interpretation of the property clause and will be discussed when the more
concrete provisions of the property clause itself are analysed in the following chapters. The
connection between the constitutional state, the social state and the property clause first has to be
established.
3.2. "Sozialstaat" and social welfare state
The term social welfare state is used in this thesis to indicate either the German notion of
Sozialstaat, or to refer to a South African concept comparable to that of the Sozia/staat.
Technically speaking social welfare state as a concept in English-speaking countries might
denote a concept which differs in some regards from the German Sozio/staal concept. However,
such particularities of the concept will be ignored. The thesis will focus mainly on the relation
between the concept of the social welfare state / Sozialstaat and the enforcement of socio-
economic rights.
Apart from the linguistic difficulties inherent in this term, a definition thereof is also
problematic. The famous statement of Zacher '" that it is the business of politics to define the
social welfare stale concept, summarises the difficulties experienced with this term. Indeed, this
principle is mainly substantiated through legislation and is consequently more dependant on the
political process and also more difficult to grasp than any other principle.i!" In spite of its
vagueness, however, the notion of the social weI fare state can be an important tool for
interpretation and limitation of fundamental rights. It is also of importance for the goals and
values chosen by the legislature and administration when enacting legislation and executing state-
policies respectively.i'"
The social welfare state principle embodies the state's designs for the political future, reflects
experiences of a political past and enables the state to form a workable structure in order to cope
with present realities.i" This does not mean that the political goals or programmes have to be
enumerated in the constitution itself, but rather that they must be left open to the political
process. A constitution may, for instance, explicitly or implicitly legitimise the pursuit of a
certain policy by granting state authorities certain competencies and regulating them. A state
could, however, also pursue the creation of a social state policy even though no express reference
has been made of it in the constitution. In such a case the state's action would indicate the
existence of certain clements of social policy;520 namely social security, a just social order and,
where possible, an increase in the general standard of living.
SAPRIPL 303 ct seq; Du Plessis & Corder Understanding Sal/th Africa's Transitional Bill of
RighfS(1994) 122- 133.
516 "Den Sozialstaat zu definieren, ist ein politisches Geschaft." Zacher "Sozialstaatsprinzip" in Stëdtcr & Thieme
(cds) Festschrift fur Hans Peter Ipsen (1977) 266.
511 De Waal 1995 SA/UR 8 n 21.
518 Dc Wet Constitutional Enforceability oj Economic and Social Rights (1996) 17; Kunig "Social Justice" in
Karpen (cd) The Constitution a/the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 197 - 198.
SI9 Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution a/the Federal Republic ofGermany (1988) 194.
S20 Cr98 and 104 infra for a detailed discussion.
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Social security could be described as the prevention of individual and general need in society. It
is aimed at preserving a community during times of crisis by supplying a comprehensive system
of social insurance, by alleviating liabilities caused by general disasters and by regulating certain
essential services and the prices on essential goods, or by protecting specific industries.r" Social
justice is directed particularly at the protection of socially vulnerable groups in order to prevent
exploitation and unfair dominance. It ensures more equitable bargaining positions for parties in
socio-economic relations, by eliminating or reducing the weaker party's dependence on and
exposure to the stronger party. This can be done either by a radical levelling of all inequalities, or
by systematically reconciling diverse social interests, such as those of employer / employee,
husband / wife, or owner / tenant. The ultimate aim is a balance in community interests.522 The
third element, the raising of living standards by the state, depends on the means available: in
times of economic crisis the means of the state would probably be limited and the demand for
higher living standards would have to make way for combating of more pressing needs.523 In
fulfilling the objectives inherent in these elements, the state attempts to guarantee a dignified
existence for all, to minimise the difference between rich and poor, and to control or eliminate
relationships of dependence in society.524
The principle of the social welfare state acts as a counterbalance the constitutional state or
Rechtsstaat principle=" and can rectify injustices brought about by the neglect of socio-
economic processes in system based on classical liberalism.Y" In the following paragraphs
adherence to the notion of the social welfare state in Germany and South Africa will be analysed.
3.2.1. The "Sozialstaatsprinzip" in Germany
The Basic Law does not mention the "Sozialstaatsprinzip" as such: this term was created through
constitutional theory and political discussion.Y' Yet, the Basic Law defines the Federal Republic
of Germany as a social federation (sozialer Bundesstaaïïi" and as a social constitutional state
under the rule of law (sozialer Rechtsstaaïï+"
The controversy surrounding the existence of the Sozialstaatsprinzip as a constitutional value (or
"principle of state") during the first decade after the promulgation of the Basic Law has subsided
after the Federal Constitutional Court has expressly recognised the existence of this principle.V"
521 De Wet 1995 SAJHR 30 - 49,36 - 39.
52239 - 40.
52342.
524 Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 189; De
Waal1995 SAHJR 8 n 21.
525 Stem 1981 TSAR 241 - 250.
526 According to Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany (1988) 190 - 191, the general idea of social justice as a goal to be pursued by the state originate in the
tendency to compensate for socially unacceptable consequences originating from the development of liberal
individual rights.
527 Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 188.
528 Art 20 I GG
529 Art 28 I GG
530 CfBVerfGE 1,97105; BVerfGE 3, 377 381; BVerfGE 6, 32 41.
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Further, the social welfare character of the German state was firmly established during the 1950s
and the beginning of the 1960s, with the political and economic stabilisation of Germany. During
this time, the German legislature also enacted comprehensive social welfare legislation,
independent from deciding whether or not it had a constitutional duty to do SO.531 Today, the
social welfare state principle enjoys equal status with the other principles of state, even though
the social welfare state principle is not manifested by a single constitutional norm, but rather
through a variety of statutes and administrative policy.532
The principle of the social welfare state has been employed repeatedly to establish the positive
aspect of fundamental rights, namely that they are entitlements to benefits.533 But this principle
also imposes an obligation on the state to work towards the common good. This means that it
provides an appropriate doctrinal basis for the limitation of individual interests.534 In this way:535
"social security as an institution created by the state, the 'social rights' of the Weimar constitution,
global steering in the context of a free market economy grown to a 'social market economy'. state
welfare providing social welfare benefits as well as other social facilities and welfare institutions all
arc the result and expression of a contradiction, which is elementary to an order guaranteeing broad
individual freedoms to a person and leaving il to his or her individual mental physical and economic
capabilities, how far these freedoms contribute to personal success."
Over the past 50 years the social welfare state concept has in a variety of cases shaped
governmental policy in Germany.
3.2.1.1. Elements of the "Sozialstaat"
Although the Federal Constitutional Court has not yet given an explanation of the content of the
Sozialstaat principle as such, it is possible to construct the basic substance of this principle by
analysing the decisions on "socially unjust conduct" in a number of eases.5J6 In this way it can be
identi (jed how the three elements of social wei fare policy in Germany, namely social security,
social justice and the raising of general living standards, were realised.
In the context of social security, the first important component of the social state is social
insurance. In 1952 the German Federal Constitutional Court obliged the state to guarantee a
human existence to all persons who were in need as a result of the war.537 This guarantee was
later extended to grant all persons in need a dignified existenee.538 It is now accepted in
S31 For a discussion of the early academic debate regarding the existence of the social state principle in Germany and
its historical relevance, cf Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
German)' (1988) 192 - 194.
m Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 193.
m Because the boundaries of rights stemming from the Soziolstaatsprinzip arc unclear and problematic, It IS
discussed and reflected in connection with several of the basic rights - arts I, 3. 6. 7. 9, 12, 14, and 15 GG. Foster
German Legal System (1996) 151.
5)4 Robbers Introduction (1998) 62.
S3S Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (cd) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 191.
536 This has been done by De Wet in her doctoral dissertation of 1995. also published as De Wet Constitutional
Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996). In the following discussion the structure of this work is used
as point of departure.
m BVerfGE 1,97.
538 BVerfGE 40, 121 133.
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Germany that every individual has a subjective right to a minimum subsistence level in the social
welfare state.539 However, the court went even further and declared that state protection stretches
beyond those in need: comprehensive accident insurance whereby the safety risks inevitably
associated with specific occupations are covered, should be shared by the individual and the
state.540 Similarly, unemployment insurance.i'" medical insurance542 and the granting of old-age
pensions to previously self-supporting persons who are unable to continue supporting themselves
because of changed social circumstances.Ïf constitute basic functions of the social state.
To realise social security, the state in the second place has to regulate certain essential services,
the prices of essential goods, and specific industries vital to the community. Directly after the
second World War prices of certain goods were fixed by legislation, thereby influencing the cost
of living.544 The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that such regulation did not violate the notion
of freedom of contract, because the restrictions were proportional to the crisis at hand and
because the legislation clearly determined the aim, contents and extent of these restrictions.t"
Price regulation was also allowed long after the war, whenever it was in the general interest of
the public. Thus the Federal Constitutional Court decided in 1964 that the regulation of the milk
price and the imposition of specific taxes on processed dairy products to alleviate the losses
resulting from the regulation of the milk price did not affect freedom of competition to such an
extent as to make the regulation of the dairy market unconstitutional, because it was necessitated
by the public interest.F" Cost regulation is also justified in connection with medical care547 and
housing.f"
In realising social security, the state in the third place also has to alleviate economic liabilities
caused by general disasters which affect some people more severely than others.i'" Thus the
Federal Constitutional Court decided that the state was obliged to compensate individuals as far
as possible for patrimonial losses suffered during the second World War. This did not presume
539 This viewpoint is usually supported by reading art 2 II with the social state provisions. Cf De Wet Constitutional
Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 21.
540 BVerfGE 45,376387.
541 This was acknowledged in BVerfGE 51, 115 125, although the court added that this kind of insurance was aimed
at compensating a person for losses suffered because of the fact of his or her unemployment and was not intended to
place the person in a position in which he or she could maintain a previously attained standard of living through
earning extra income.
542 BVerfGE 16,286304; BVerfGE 68, 193 209. The German state must ensure that people have access to proper
medical services without exposing them to excessive costs. For this purpose compulsory medical insurance has been
introduced. People under a certain income level are obliged to be members of a state-subsidised insurance company.
543 BVerfGE Il, 105 114 and 117. Cf also BVerfGE 62, 320 332 where it was determined that widow's pension
could also be seen as a further manifestation of the social state principle.
544 BVerfGE 8, 277 277and 278.
545 BVerfGE 8, 277 328. The legislation was transitional and was aimed at establishing normal price rations.
Besides, it was clear that price fixing would rather be the exception than the rule. This specific legislation was also
repealed once the markets retained their normal state.
546 BVerfGE 18,315.
547 BVerfGE 53, 366410.
548 BVerfGE 72,175 198.
549 De Wet 1995 SAJHR 39.
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full compensation: the notion of the social welfare state also implied that individuals themselves
had to bear a reasonable share of the burden.55o
Women benefited from the social justice element too: Legislation enabling women to claim
pensions from the age of 60, as opposed to the usual age of 65, was justified by the Federal
Constitutional Court on the basis that this amounted to compensating persons for past
discrirnination.V'' However, the court also made it clear that social justice did not mean that only
the interests of a specific group should be considered. Legislation promulgated in the sole
interest of a particular group must be necessitated by the public good and could not result in an
indiscriminate neglect of the interests of other groups in society.t"
In order to establish a system of social justice, the Federal Constitutional Court identified certain
socially vulnerable groups where a reconciliation of social interests would lead to unequal
treatment in favour of these social groups. It was, for instance, ruled that employees should be
protected against exploitation of their labour abilities.r" In order to grant needy persons
particular protection in the community, tax exempting legislation concerning the investments of
people with limited income (as opposed to the same investments by people falling in higher
income groups) was also considered reconcilable with the principle of equality.552
3.2.1.2. "Sozialstaat" and constitutional protection of property
The Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that the state was obliged to guarantee equal
education opportunities for all pupils.555 In addition, the Bavarian Constitutional Court held that
the social welfare state principle compels the state to attain a high employment rate.556 In this
way the third element of the social welfare state - the raising of living standards where possible -
has also been addressed, albeit only indirectly.
Article 14 Jl GG represents the point where the Sozialstaatsprinzip and the constitutional
protection of property in Germany meet. In terms of this provision, property imposes duties and
should serve the public interest. Society thus has an interest in the individual's exercise of his or
her right to properly. This is an expression of fundamental ethical values recognised by the Basic
Law: the creation of social justice.
100
The creation of social justice in the area of property law is described in constitutional terms as
the "social function" or the "social obligation" (Sozialbindung) of property. Article 14 II GG thus
refers to an attribute of property that exists irrespective of specific legislation. In practice, there
5S0 BVerfGE 27,253283; BVerfGE 7,129 152; BVerfGE 13,248259.
S51 Measures had to be laken to protect employees from inhuman working conditions, like a health-affecting working
environment, hazardous working conditions, unwarrantably long working hours, insufficient leave and inadequate
remuneration. BVerfGE 35,85206.
ssz BVerfGE 50. 57 107 - 108.
m OVerfGE 74, 12 179; BVerfGE 22, 180204; BVerfGE 5,85 198.
SH OVerfGE 74, 12 179; BVerfGE 4, 7 16.
sss OVerfGE 72, 278 290.
sS(,BayVfGH 13, 141 (b).
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is no difference between legislation based on article 14 I 2 GG and legislation based on article 14
II GG. In theory, however, a difference does exist. This can be explained as follows: In both the
case of article 14 I 2 GG and article 14 II GG a certain degree of legislative interference with
property rights is anticipated, and has to be tolerated if justifiable in terms of the constitution.
However, the "social obligation" of property as expressed in article 14 II GG goes much further
than article 14 I 2 GG, as it symbolises some of the fundamental ethical values recognised by the
Basic Law. Legislation promulgated in terms of article 14 I 2 GG might activate the social
obligation described in article 14 II GG, but does not create it. The "social function" of property
will exist irrespective of specific legislation, and is given effect by the courtS.557 On the contrary,
legislative determination of the content and limits of the property concept (in terms of article 14 I
2 GG) is to a much larger extent expected to fulfil a defining and delimiting function. The
theoretical connection between the legislative competence of article 14 I 2 GG and article 14 II
GG is described by the Federal Constitutional Court as the realisation of the social model by the
legislature in the determination of the contents and limitations of property in terms of article 14 I
2 GG. The normative elements of the social model result, on the one hand, from the
constitutional recognition of private property in article 14 I 1 GG and, on the other hand, from
the binding guideline of article 14 II GG. 558
Thus, the social function of property has two important consequences:
(i) It provides the legislature with guidelines concerning the extent in which it may restrict
the powers of disposal of the individual owner for reasons of public purpose. The more distinct
the social function of property is in a certain area, the greater leeway the legislature has for
regulation of property.
(ii) The social function of property also enables one to distinguish between different types
of property, because the social relevance of various objects of ownership differ widely. There are
kinds of property with a very distinct social character (for instance land or industrial property),
while others have less social relevance.559 Thus the degree of constitutional protection afforded
to a specific type of property can also be determined. Upon the question whether an act
establishing parity between management and labour in a board of directors violated the
constitutional property guarantee, the Federal Constitutional Court560 for instance remarked that
the social function of property demanded more restrictions on property than the individual or
personal function would allow. In this specific case it was, however, decided that the substance
and allocation of property would be preserved under article 14 I GG in any event, regardless of
the extent of a restriction on property in terms of the social obligation.
557 Kirnminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 86.
558 BVerfGE 37, 132 140: "Der Gesetzgeber steht bei der Erfiillung des ihm in Art. 14 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG erteilten
Auftrages, Inhalt und Schranken des Eigentums zu bestimmen, vor der Aufgabe, das Sozialmodell zu verwirklichen,
dessen normative Elemente sich einerseits aus der grundgesetzlichen Anerkennung des Privateigentums durch
Art. 14Abs. 1 Satz 1GG und andererseits aus der verbindlichen Richtschnur des Art. 14Abs. 2 GG ergeben. "
559 Schuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of Germany (1988) 110.
560 BVerfGE 50, 290 (Mitbestimmung).
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The right to property was, of course, also subject to the social interest in terms of article 153 of
the Weimar Constitution: a provision which was strongly emphasised during the national-
socialist regime. But, whereas the right to property could during this time be exercised only as
far as it served the aims of the National-socialist state,561 the right to property in post-war
Germany means that individual freedom must enjoy precedence. The premise was that owners
needed the liberty to determine the purpose of their property rights for themselves.562 During the
seventies, with the switching of political power from the Christian Democrats to the Social
Democrats in Germany, a stronger awareness of the social obligation of ownership became
apparent in political circles and in the legislation drafted during this period.563 Henceforth,
property may not be used to damage the public interest, just as it may be regulated in the public
interest. Yet, the regulation of property may 110t infringe the essence of ownership, even if it
would be in the interest of sociery.i" It is in this context that the interaction of protection of
property in private law and protection of property under the Basic Law is best illustrated.
The rent control in Germany serves as an example of the manner in which the leeway of the
legislature to enact legislation restricting the right to property is influenced by the socio-
economic interests involved. The Federal Constitutional Court ruled that a tenant could be
protected against termination of a contract of lease that is not based on a well-founded interest of
the landlord not specified in the contract.565 Legislation endorsing this notion was held
constitutional in terms of article 14 12 GG. Here the court expressly focussed on the role of the
social obligation of property in determining whether specific interests should be protected under
the constitutional property guarantee or not. The court remarked:566
"Ebensowenig wie die Eigentumsgarantie eine die soziale Funk/ion eines Eigentumsobjekts
lIIifJachtellc/e Nutzung schiitzt, kann Art. 14 Abs. 2 GG eine iibermtJjJige. durch die soziale Funk/ion
nicht gebotelle Begrenzung privatrechtlicher Befugnisse rechtfertigen .... "
Legislation regulating the right to property has to protect the owner's freedom and implement a
socially just order of property. Thus it must reflect a balance between the interests of all parties
involved.t'" On this basis, several lower court decisions were invalidated in 1974 by the Federal
Constitutional Court for the harsh manner in which a federal rent control statute
(Wo/7I1raumskiindigul/gsschutzgesetz) had been applied to owners of rental units. The court
102
561 Leisner "Eigcrnurn" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 31, 32. Cf also 38 supra.
562 Mn 33.
561 Von Brtinneck Eigentunisgarantie (1984) 125.
564 BVerfGE 14,263. The condemnation of private property might, for instance, fundamentally change the structure
of important social and personal relationships. The colleetivisation of agriculture is possibly one example of such a
fundamental change. In this situation, it is suggested that article 19 II GG could possibly be invoked to deny
government the power to recast these relationships. This would leave the wealth of the affected individuals intact.
Kornniers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253.
SM BVcrfGE 68, 361 367.
SM 368. (First slated in BVerfGE 37,132 140 - 141.) Translation: As little as the property guarantee can protect use
of the object of ownership that ignores the social function, can art 14 II GG justify an excessive restriction on the
private law entitlements of ownership not required by its social function.
567 BVerfGE 37, 132 140 - 141.
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decided that the disputed rent increase control legislation568 constituted a lawful restriction of the
property rights of the landlord/owner of a residential unit, as the property guarantee stipulated
explicitly that the property rights should be exercised in the general interest.569
The Contergan decisiorr'Ï" is another striking example of an important social concern overriding
a claim based on a traditional property right. In this case, a federal benefit plan to assist children
seriously deformed by a contraceptive drug marketed in Germany was contested. This entailed
the nationalisation of a trust fund for the victims of Contergan, and consequently it nullified
settlement agreements concluded in terms of private law that were to the exclusive benefit of the
parties to the settlement agreement and not to all victims of Contergan. The court upheld the
legislation nationalising the Contergan trust fund and converting it into a public law foundation
as constitutional in terms of the property clause, in spite of objections from individual right
holders in terms of the settlement agreement.
In conclusion, it can be remarked that the German Federal Constitutional Court successfully
moulded the egalitarian effect of the social state principle into a legal structure that could prevent
unrestricted state action and thus also totalitarianism. The limitation of freedom in the general
interest is emphasised by employing the requirements of proportionality and legal certainty. In
order to realise a fundamental social goal; the aim as well as the means of the limitation must be
clear, relevant and necessary. In this way the court balances freedom and equality and seeks to
guarantee a certain basic sphere of free activity.Ï"
3.2.2. The social welfare state principle in South Africa?
It is still not clear to what extent the social welfare state principle will be endorsed in South
Africa. This term is not specifically mentioned in either the Interim or the Final Constitution.
Nevertheless, several provisions in both Constitutions support some objectives similar to those
explained above in the German context. This could be interpreted as indications that the notion
of the social welfare state may be applicable in the South African context.
For instance, effect could be given to the objectives of the social state by enacting ordinary
legislation. In South Africa, governmental policy and recent legislation seem to support the aims
of social security, social justice and the eventual raising of living standards. The treatment of
property is in this context a key element to socio-economic reconstruction in South Africa.
Another possible mechanism of promoting the establishment of a social welfare state is to
entrench so-called socio-economic rights in a constitution. Several socio-economic rights find
protection in the bills of rights of both the Interim and Final Constitutions. Some of these rights,
568 Ie legislation determining that owners of residential units could only raise the rent of such residences in
compliance with the average rent in a particular area and thereby could not ask more rent for a residence than the
normal rental for similar residences in the specific area.
569 BVerfGE 37,132 14l.
570 BVerfGE 42,263.
571 De Wet 1995 SAJHR 46.
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like the right to restitution of land and redistribution of property, are also contained within
section 25 FC.
One of the most important effects of socio-economic rights is that they act as a counterweight to
other rights. Thus, socio-economic rights provide constitutional authority or protection for
legislation or administrative action aimed at introducing social reform. Enforcement of socio-
economic rights is also a mechanism of empowerment for the individual. These rights can be
used to test and invalidate legislation or administrative action at the instance of individuals
affected. They could also be used as an interpretative device, to slant the interpretation of statutes
so as to put the poor or disadvantaged in a more favourable position.s72 However, a challenge to
the constitutionality of legislation attempting to bring about social reform could be contradicted
by reliance on the social and economic rights in the Constitution.
In the following paragraphs, the possibility of successfully establishing a social welfare state in
South Africa will be discussed. Focus will be placed on the viability of social reform policies and
giving effect to socio-economic rights in the South African context.
3.2.2.1. Constitutional entrenchment of the social welfare slate
De WetS73 recognised that some provisions in the Interim Constitution indicated acceptance of
the social welfare state. The provisions of the limitation c1auses74 in the Interim Constitution
were - for the sake of upholding the democratic values of the constitution as a whole - applicable
to, inter alia, the equality clause (section 8(3) Ici75 and the right to freely engage in economic
activity (section 26(2) IC).576 Read with Constitutional Principle y577 of Schedule II IC, this ~as
an indication of the presence of the social welfare state concept in the South African context.
Although no direct mention is made of the social welfare state principle in the Final
Constitution.t" the evidence of the incorporation or this concept in the Final Constitution is
more substantial than in the Interim Constitution.V" For instance, the preamble of the Final
572 Budlcnder "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) ch 1,69.
573 De Wct 1995 SAJHR 47 - 48.
574 S 33(1) IC.
m This subsection determines that the right to equality (s 8( I) JC) and the freedom from discrimination (s 8(2) IC)
"(a) shall not preclude measures designed 10 achieve the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups
or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment of
all rights and freedoms" and that "(b) [c]very person or community dispossessed of rights in land before the
commencement of this Constitution under any law which would have been inconsistent with subsection (2) had that
subseclion been in operalion at the time of the dispossession, shall be entitled to claim restitution of such rights
subject to and in accordance with section 121, 122 and 123."
576 This subsection determines that the right lO freely engage in economic activity guaranteed in s 26( 1) IC "shall not
preclude measures designed to promote the protection or the improvement of the quality of life, economic growth,
human development, social justice, basic conditions of employment, fair labour practices or equal opportuniry for
all, provided such measures arc justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality."
577 This principle determines: "The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal
process. Equality before the law includes laws, programmes or activities that have as their object the amelioration of
the conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged on the grounds of race, colour or gender."
ns Kleyn 1996 SA PR/PL 408.
579 Du Plessis 1996 Steil LR 7.
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Constitution recognises the establishment of a society based on "social justice" and the
"improvement of the quality oflife of all citizens" as constitutional aims.
A further indication of the existence of the social welfare state principle in the South African
context is the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the bill of rights. Already in terms of the
Interim Constitution some rights could clearly be classified as social and economic rights.58o
These included environmental rights,58l children's rights582 and educational rights.583 However,
the issue of entrenching socio-economic rights was dealt with rather incompletely and
provisionally in the Interim Constitution.P" In the debates and negotiations preceding the
drafting of the two South African Constitutions, many politicians and scholars wrestled with the
question of whether and to what extent socio-economic rights should be entrenched.585 In view
of the implications that the entrenchment and enforceability of socio-economic right could have
for the establishment of a social welfare state, these questions need to be elucidated here.
Due to the vast demands that would be made on public resources to give effect to these rights,
direct enforcement of socio-economic rights is problematic. Enforcing socio-economic rights
directly, without limiting the claims of prospective beneficiaries, could undermine the
confidence in the bill of rights. It could also subvert the legitimacy of the bill of rights.586That is
why various alternatives were suggested during the negotiations preceding the promulgation of
the Interim Constitution:
(i) The National Party and the Law Commission were, for instance, in favour of social and
economic rights in a constitution only if they would be negatively enforced.587 Positive claims
against the state would, according to this view, not be entrenched in the constitution as
fundamental rights.
(ii) Proponents in favour of the entrenchment of social and economic rights argued that
such rights could be made legally enforceable once the legislature has qualified or circumscribed
their scope.588 In addition, they argued that the fact that social and economic rights cannot be
enforced should not be decisive in resolving whether or not such rights should be entrenched in a
bill of rights.589The value of such rights for the community and the possibility to enforce such
rights at a particular stage would, so the argument went, be more important.I" It has also been
580 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,68.
581 S 29 IC.
582 S 30 IC.
583S21IC.
584 Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 13; Cf also 44 supra.
585 De Wet Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 92 - 104 gives an overview of this
debate. Cf also ia Haysom "Constitutionalism, Majoritatian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights" 1992
SAJHR 451 - 463; Mureinik 1992 SAJHR 464 - 474; Davis 1992 SAJHR 475 - 490.
586Mureinik 1992 SAJHR 465 - 467; Corder, Kahanovitz, Murphy et al A Charter for Social Justice (1992) 21; Du
Plessis 1996 Stell LR 13.
587 De Wet Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 103.
588 Haysom 1992 SAJHR 461 call such right "framework rights" and remarks: " 'Framework' rights include those that
entitle citizens to forms of relief but the content of which can be left to statutory expansion."
589De Vos "Lessons from India" in Bennun & Newitt (eds) Negotiating Justice (1995) 106.
590 Haysom 1992 SAJHR 461.
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argued that the mere formulation of these rights in a bill of rights is advantageous, because it
would oblige the state to progressively realise socio-economic fundamental rightS.591 At the very
least, it would give the individual the possibility of claiming revision of legislation in order to
test the reasonableness of the legislature's conduct. 592
(iii) Other possible ways for such rights to be included in a bill of rights would be either to
incorporate them under a single notion defining the role of the state as "social provider,,,s93 or to
clothe them as "directives of state policy" that envision the achievement of specific socio-
economic goals.s94
These suggested alternatives to directly enforceable socio-economic rights all attempt to solve
the problems brought about by a lack of resources. It is sad but true that the success of giving
direct effect to socio-economic rights is inextricably linked to adequate financial backing. In a
developing country like South Africa the lack of resources could compromise the introduction of
a social wei fare state to such an extent that it should be considered whether it is worth the trouble
to entrench socio-economic rights at all. Still, the drafters of the Final Constitution decided to
include an even more comprehensive list of such rights. Section 27 FC guarantees the right to
health care, food, water and social security, and also provides for appropriate social assistance in
specific circumstances. Furthermore, access to housing,595 the right to education.i" and
environmental rights597 are guaranteed.598 Moreover, the relevant organs of state are accountable
to the Human Rights Commission in that they are required to furnish the commission with
information on the measures undertaken towards the realisation of fundamental rights related to
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the cnvironment.Ï'"
The increased emphasis on social and democratic rights in the Final Constitution may warrant
the description of South Africa as a social democracy,600 thereby acknowledging the state's role
in the regulation of the market, the provision of social welfare services and the protection of
institutions and mechanisms of political democracy. The ncw South A frican state can therefore
591Sachs Advancing lluman Rights (1992) 35.
592Mureinik 1992SAJIIR471.
593Eg the German Sozialstaatsprinzip, as described at 97 supra. Du Plessis 1996 Steil LR 13.
594Eg the Indian example: Cf Corder, Kahanovitz, Murphy Social Justice (1992) 20. Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 13;
De Villiers 1992 SAJIIR 29 - 49; De Villiers 1992 SAJHR 188 - 199; De Vos "Lessons from India" in Bennun &
Newill (cds) Negotiating Justice (1995) 83 - 85.
595S 26 FC.
5% S 29 Fe.
597S 24 Fe.
598 In discussing the certification of the Final Constitution, Sachs "Constitutional Developments in South
Africa" 1996 NYU JIl/I'I L & P 702 - 703 referred to the objection raised that the inclusion of social and economic
rights (i) would bring the court into the position of usurping the legislative function and (ii) would submerge first
generation fundamental rights under such claims. After dealing with these objections, it was remarked that: "Our job
was simply to ensure that all universally accepted rights were included, and that they were viewed as a platform - a
minimum, and not a ceiling." Cf Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of SOl/th Africa 1996 CCT 23/96,
online ut http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.html [16.09.1999] par 76 - 78.
599S 184(3) FC.
{lOO Du Plessis 1996 Steil LR 7.
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also be seen as "providing an enterprising and caring administration of the social market. ,,601
This not only includes the achievement of equality, but also requires diligent reorganisation of
resources.t'"
However, these socio-economic rights protected in the South African bill of rights are subject to
quite comprehensive limitations, in terms of the general limitation clause and the clauses
providing for these rights themselves. In terms of internal limitations, which are quite typical to
the socio-economic rights in the Final Constitution, the (progressive) realisation of many of these
rights is made subjeet to the availability of resources. 603
The right to medical treatment, which was the subject of two recent court cases, serves as an
example of how the courts understand this kind of internal limitation. In both Van Biljon v
Minister of Correctional Services604 and Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Nataf05
orders were sought for the provision of expensive medical treatment at the expense of the state.
In both cases the applicants relied on provisions of the bill of rights. In the Soobramoney case the
applicant relied on section 27 FC. In the Van Biljon case, section 35(2)(e) FC was the basis of
the claim, as the applicant was a prisoner. In both cases the state raised the lack of funds as a
defence. Furthermore, in both cases the medical treatment sought by the applicants would not
cure their ailments, but would extend their life expectancies and enhance the quality of their
lives. In spite of the similarities upon the facts, the court came to opposing decisions. The main
reason for this can be found in the fact that the right to medical care for prisoners is differently
phrased than in the case of section 27 FC. Section 35(2)(e) FC does not contain qualifying
phrases like "within its available resources" and "progressive realisation of these righ~s." It
might, therefore, have been easier for the state to get away with the lack-of-resources argument
in the case of Soobramoney than in the case of Van Biljon. In the context of section 27 FC it was
also for the court easier to pronounce upon a limitation of the rights protected, as this section
contains an internal limitation. In the case of section 35(2)(e) FC the court would have to be
convinced, in terms of the general limitations clause (s 36 FC), that it was authorised by law of
general application to limit the applicant's rights to adequate medical treatment.t"
3.2.2.2. Social welfare state and the protection of property rights
The interaction between the principle of the social welfare state and the fundamental right to
property in the South African context depends on the perception of the rights to restitution and
redistribution of land and the right to reform of land tenure. These "new land rights" created by
section 25(5) to (8) FC and the legislation resulting from section 25(9) FC could act as internal
counterweights to the constitutional protection of existing property rights. This is the premise
upon which the analysis in the following paragraphs is based. It is intended to indicate the
601 Corder, Kahanovitz, Murphy A Charter for Social Justice (1992) 28.
602 Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 7.
603 Cf s 26(2) FC; s 27(2) FC.
604 19974 SA 441 (C).
605 1998 1 SA 765 (CC).
606 CfKa Mdumbe 1998 SAPR/PL 460 - 470; Moellendorf 1998 SAJHR 327 - 333.
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elements of the social state prevalent in the constitutional property clause, and to consider the
question of how successful the establishment of a social welfare state through application of the
constitutional property clause could be.
Section 25(5) FC not only provides strong protection to the state in actions aimed at promoting
equitable access to land, but could also be used in litigation to compel the state to enact
legislation of this kind if it failed to do so in the first place.607 However, it is more likely that
section 25(5) FC would be used as a shield against challenges to administrative actions or fiscal
measures aimed at promoting equitable access to land, than as a sword in the hands of those wbo
need access to land.6os In the first instance, therefore, section 25(5) FC will be used as
justification for the social reform programmes designed by legislature.
Section 25(6) FC provides a contingent right to security of land tenure or comparable redress for
tenure made insecure because of past racially discriminatory laws or practices. The fact that the
light is contingent in the sense that it must first be given effect by an act of Parliament, does not
mean that it is an empty right: If Parliament fails to fulfil this duty, it may be held in breacb of its
constitutional obligations. If such legislation is enacted, however, it enjoys constitutional
protection against challenge. It must also be interpreted in accordance with the constitutional
obligation in section 25(6) FC.609 Social and economic development in the area of land tenure
requires that the narrower issue of land and property rights per se must be transcended and that
issues like social justice in the context of agrarian law and agricultural land distribution need to
be add~essed.610 The possibilities for analysing and discussing the legal and institutional aspects
relevant for social and economic development in the area of property law can only tben be fully
exploited.
The interpretation of the phrase past discriminatory laws and practices will be especially
problematic in this context. On the one hand, it will influence the formulation of reform
legislation. On the other hand, it will also determine how legislation of the apartheid era has to
be treated in a new constitutional dispensation.
Explicit racial discrimination was - by content and/or purpose - inherent in some of the laws,
policies and practices of the apartheid era, whereas racial discrimination was not explicitly
intended by others, but resulted from them. It is nowadays permissible in terms of the
"affirmative action" provision of section 9(2) FC to formulate new legislation - like laws
promoting tenure security - on an explicitly racial basis. However, some authors''!' believe that
legislation broadly promoting tenure security will go beyond addressing the results of past
607 This brings about problems connected with the separation of state powers. The court, for example, does not have
thc competence 10draft the legislation. Other problems include the remedy for non-compliance. The solution in this
instance would be for the court to issue nothing but a declaratory order thai the state is in breach of its constitutional
obligations. Budlcnder "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised J 998)
eh 1,69 - 70.
608 Budlcnder "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) ch J, 70.
609 eh 1,70.
610 Gutto Properly and Land Reform (1995) 25.
611 Budlendcr "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh I, 70 - 71.
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discriminatory laws and practices, and will therefore not be phrased so as to favour specific races
within the South African borders explicitly. A possible consequence of such an approach would
be that the legislation would no longer be protected by section 25(6) FC. However, such an
interpretation should be avoided, except if compliance with the constitutional obligation m
section 25(6) FC is not the major purpose of the legislation.t'?
The procedures for securing land tenure introduced in the course of the upgrading of land tenure
rights can also be jeopardised by the treatment of past discriminatory laws and practices. The
recent case of DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and otherst"
albeit only indirectly, raises the issue of how the courts should treat legislation perceived to be a
continuance of the racially based property order, without endangering rights created on the basis
of such legislation.
The legal question in this case revolved around the legislative competencies of the provincial and
national legislatures. The facts involved the enactment of section 6 of the North West Local
Government Laws Amendment Act614 by the legislature of the North West Province. This
section purported to repeal in its entirety a proclamation'T issued in terms of the Black616
Administration ACt.617 The Black Administration Act was one of two infamous statutes'ï" that
effectively made it impossible for the majority of (black) South Africans, to own land in some
87% of the country. Even upon a cursory reading, this proclamation conveys the demeaning and
racist nature of the system of which it was a part.619
The constitutional validity of section 6 of the North West Local Government Laws Amendment
Act was challenged on the basis that the purported repeal of certain provisions' of the
proclamation was beyond the legislative competence of the North West Province. Itwas claimed
that a repeal of certain sections in this proclamation would make it impossible for persons to
whom the applicant had sold houses in a township established under the proclamation, to have
their deeds of grant registered, or to mortgage their properties in order to finance their
purchases.F'"
In issues of property law reform and social justice, the outcome of the decision is not as
important as the fact that some remarks were made, in a minority judgement by Goldstone,
612 Ch 1,71.
613 CCT 22/99. Online at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/200012299.pdf [03.04.2000].
614 7 of 1998.
615 R293 of 1962.
616 The term "Native" was used in the earliest racial segragatory legislation to refer to matters pertaining to Black
South Africans. This had been replaced later with the term "Black". The latter term will be used in this analysis if
reference needs to be made to any of the acts initially promulgated to deal with the issues of so-called Natives.
61738 of 1927.
618 The other statute was the Blacks Land Act, 27 of 1913.
619 Cf decision ofNgcobo, J at par 2.
620 In the court of first instance (Bophuthatswana High Court), the application was upheld, upon the reasoning that
the purported legislative repeal dealt with a question of land tenure, which fell exclusively within the competence of
the national legislature. The majority of the Constitutional Court (at par 65, 72) refused to confirm this order of
invalidity, except insofar as it related to provisions concerning registration of title, which were regarded by the court
as the only matter pertaining to which the provincial legislature did not have the power to repeal the proclamation.
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O'Regan and Sachs JJ, about the constitutional obligation that s 25 FC places on the national
legislature to provide redress by legislative means for past discrimination in relation to land.
Section 25(6) FC is read by the minority to imply that insecure forms of land tenure arising from
discriminatory legislation of the past regime could not be abolished or reformed by any
legislature other than Parliament.621 It is then conceded that the jurisprudence of the transitional
era necessarily involves a measure of contradiction, as "fundamental fairness" at times requires
that aspects of the old discriminatory order have to survive immediate removal from the statute
books, pending their replacement by appropriate mechanisms under anew, more equitable
order.622
In essence, the minority of the court puts forward an argument in favour of upholding certain
forms of "lesser" property rights which were created under the laws of the apartheid regime and
which can still be created under the same laws at present. Certain mechanisms (like the
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Aet623) have already been introduced to "upgrade" tenuous
and insecure land rights, by gradually converting them into full ownership or secure property
rights, thus establishing a more expeditious way of acquiring land. If the law on the basis of
which these rights have been initially created is abolished, so the argument goes,
"underprivileged cornmunities'v" would no longer have access to the speedy and accessible
form of registration coupled with the deed of grant tenure.625
According to the view of the minority, therefore, the "meritorious desire" manifested in the
majority judgement "for a clean sweep of the past in the name of modernisation and de-
racialisation,,,626 has the unintended and ironic consequence of depriving underprivileged
communities from gaining access to a cheap form of land tenure that in terms of present national
legislation could be upgraded to full ownership. The minority thus argued that a repeal of the
(admittedly demeaning and racist) proclamation would not promote the constitutional objective
of fostering access to land. According to their argument, quite the reverse would be the case.
This argument was used to indicate that legislation pertaining to land tenure should fall within
the exclusive competence of the national legislature. It might be debatable whether this line of
reasoning is appropriate or not. The point here is that the minority judgement of DVB Behuising
(Ply) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and others indicates that it is questionable
whether pure liberationist ideology can by itself ensure socio-economic upliftrncnt of the
621 Par 103.
m Par 110. In the judgcment of Ngcobo J, (par 66 - 71) this issue is dealt with by referring to the provisions of the
Less Pormal Township Establishment Act, 113 of 1991 and the Development Facilitation Act, 67 of 1995. It is
argued that these statutes do provide the necessary mechanism for promoting development of land in urban and rural
areas for residential purposes, granting land tenure rights and shortening and simplifying procedures for the
dcsignanon, provision and development of land and establishment of townships. ln tum, the minority argued (at
par 106) that the purpose of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, 112 of 1991, is to transform existing insecure
title to freehold, and to permit continued granting of those forms of land tenure as well as their upgrading.
m 112 of 1991.
624 Par 110.
m Par Ill.
626 Par 110.
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marginalised masses of South Africans. At the very least, this case shows the need to carefully
consider the nature and function of the specific property rights which are to be protected.
Section 25(7) FC is in a sense the successor of sections 121 to 123 IC, although the restitution of
property (or equitable redress) to people or communities dispossessed of property after 19 June
1913 is now a right directly incorporated in the bill of rights itself. This right is, furthermore,
broader than those under the Interim Constitution are. It applies to all forms of property and not
only to deprivation of "rights in land" as under section 121 IC. Furthermore, whereas the
entitlement under the Interim Constitution arises from dispossession under or for the purpose of
furthering the object of a discriminatory law, section 25(7) FC broadens that to dispossession
under either a racially discriminatory law or such a practice.r"
The extent and content of the right to restitution are determined by the Restitution of Land
Rights Act,628which creates a very broad right to restitution. It applies to the dispossession of:629
"any right in land whether registered or unregistered and may include the interest of a labour tenant, a
share cropper, a customary law interest, the interests of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and
beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than ten years."
The fact that the statutory right to restitution is clearly broader than that accorded the
Constitution should not lead to statutory invalidity. The Constitution only states the minimum
rights that the state must establish. As long as an expansion of these rights do not compromise
any other constitutional right, there should be no reason why such an expansion should not be
permissible.ï''"
Other evidence of the acceptance of a social welfare state is perhaps noticeable III
section 25(8) FC, which serves as an internal limitation on the property clause. The relation
between this provision and the general limitation clause in section 36(1) FC continues to puzzle
interpreters of the property clause.631 One possible explanation of the relevance of this
subsection is that it acts as a directive to the courts that land, water and related reforms are
especially valuable as a result of the aim to redress the results of past racial discrimination.632
This interpretation is consistent with the broad purposive approach supported by the
Constitutional Court in interpretation and application of the bill of rights.633 If it were supported,
it would be a further indication of the presence of social welfare state in the South African
context.
627 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1, 71 - 72.
628 22 of 1994.
629 S I (Definitions): "Right in land".
630 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,72.
631 Cf Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 105 - 110; Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 275 - 330; Budlender
"Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,72 - 73; Van der Walt
Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 72 - 100; De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 160 - 162
and 413 - 415.
632 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,73.
633 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 125 - 127.
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4. Social welfare state, constitutional state and property guarantee
The relation between the principles of the constitutional state and the social welfare state may be
described as an ongoing interaction, aimed at creating a balance between liberty and equality.
This interaction is characterised by a relationship of challenged interdependence rather than
exclusivity.Ï'" A strict theoretical division between the principles of the constitutional state and
the social welfare state would not advance the practical application of these principles in
practice. It would also undermine the inherent objectives of the constitution by playing off two
di fferent concepts of state against each other, instead of reconciling them.635
In general, the constitutional state principle acts as an objective normative principle rather than
as a basis for substantiating specific claims. The constitutional state principle in conjunction with
fundamental freedoms serve as a counterweight to limit the increasing re-interpretation of rights
as demands. The social welfare state principle, on the other hand, incorporates a social welfare
philosophy into constitutional law and sets limits to liberal aspirations of an autonomous society.
Moreover, the social welfare state principle does not in itself provide individuals with a basis for
substantiating claims either.636 No law may conflict with either of these principles and all law
should be interpreted in the light thereof. Thus the state can serve not only the freedom of the
individual, but also his or her welfare.
112
The constitutional and social welfare state, therefore, reflect different sides of the same coin. De
Wet637 explains that they both bave the same centre of gravity, namely the protection of liberty,
security, equality and human dignity:
"[IJn a law state emphasis falls on liberty, security, equality and assistance in need - in that sequence.
The same elements exist in a social state, but in the opposite sequence viz assistance in need, equality,
security and liberty."
The fundamental individual freedom inherent in a system based on the constitutional state
principle would usually prevent the social welfare state from getting out of control. This is
crucial, because of the tendency towards collectivism inherent in the social welfare state
principle. An unchecked policy of state intervention could easily develop into a totalitarian
regime. Thus, the principles of the constitutional state and the social wei fare state arc in a fragile
equilibrium with each other. Wiechers638 explains:
"[Sjosiaalstaattikheid. ill die sin van maatskaplike en ekonomiese opheffing. rhoej] in geen opsig teen
regstaa/likheid ... ill te druis nie. As so 'II opheffing egter grondwellike waarborge en prosedures
634 Zacher "Sozialsiaatsprinzip" in Stëdter & Thieme (eds) Festschrift fitr Hails Peter Ipsen (1977) 260 - 261: "Ein
politisch IIIId prozeflhaf] verstandener Sozialstaat steht zu Rechtsstaat IIIId Demokratie im Verhaltnis der
wechselseitigen Verwiesenheit und Herausforderung, nicht aberim Verhaltnis des Uberwindens ader der
Ausschliefitichkeit, "
635 De Wet Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 34.
636 De Waal 1995 SAIIJR 8 n 21.
637 De Wet Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 34.
6)R Wiechcrs 1998 TIIRIIR 632. Translation: "The social welfare state, in the sense of socio-economic upliftment
need not clash with the constitutional state. However, if such upliftmcnt were to disregard the constitutional
guarantees and processes, and were to affect the interests of minorities, the constitutional slate could be under
imminent threat ".
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verkrag en die belange van minderhede op 'n ongrondwetlike lryse aantas, bestaan daar inderdaad 'n
gevaar dat regstaatlikheid bedreig kan word. "
Especially in a young democracy like South Africa, the greatest potential challenge to the
survival of the constitutional state lies in the undercurrent of social values which could be abused
through overemphasis. Venter639 mentions the potential of communalism overshadowing
individualism, Sozialstaatlichkeit gaining the upper hand over Rechtsstaatlichkeit and the
remedial promotion of the disadvantaged undermining the ideals of equality.
The role of the state is primarily to foster the ideals of governance through legality, the
promotion and protection of fundamental rights and the constitutional state principle. The state
must also heed this ideal in formulating and implementing policies on social and economic
development. This can be done either through legal regulation, or through providing the
necessary infrastructure, or both. In this regard, the German and South African systems are
comparable, although by no means similar. Ownership of land can, for instance, be a stabilising
element in society. However, this stabilising role can also be undertaken by the state; for instance,
through the provision of inter alia social security, licences and permits. The extent to which the
state assumes responsibility for providing in the socio-economic needs of individuals influence the
importance attached to private ownership in a given society.
In a democratic-social-constitutional-state system, proprietary relations must always be
characterised by an interaction between equality and liberty. A constitutional property
guarantee'ï'" can be a particularly good example of the necessary interaction between the
principles of the constitutional and social welfare state.641 In terms of their social function,
property rights are important in providing individuals with a sense of possessing an immediate
personal stake in the public realm, a sense of belonging to a community with whom they
identify.642 In a liberal society supported by the constitutional state principle, the individual can
acquire property according to his or her own free choice, thereby enlarging his or her sphere of
freedom. However, without regulation, this process could lead to misuse of property and abuse
of discretionary powers by owners. Freedom under the constitutional state should therefore not
be without limits. These limits are provided by the social welfare state principle. Thus, property
as a constitutional right means that the individual should be provided with the necessary sphere
of liberty in the patrimonial sphere with which he or she is responsible for creating his or her
f livi 643own way 0 rvmg.
In the context of the constitutional property guarantee, like in the field of private law property, it
is necessary to demarcate the borders of individual power and to determine the consequences of
an infringement of these borders by other individuals. Sometimes, existing proprietary relations
639 Venter 1997 ZaoRV82.
640 Like s 28 IC; s 25 FC and art 14 GG.
641 Kunig "Social Justice" in Karpen (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1988) 191; De Wet
Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights (1996) 34.
642 Salter "Social Dynamics of Property Law" in Harris (ed) Property Problems (1997) 271. Cf also
BVerfGE 24,367.
643 CfBVerfGE 30, 292; also BGHZ 6, 276.
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This approach is best illustrated in the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany,
where the fundamental purpose of the constitutional property guarantee is used as the starting
point of almost all important decisions on this aspect. It thus provides the basis for interpretation
and application of article 14 GG in its entirety. The property guarantee is accordingly described
as:645
can cause inequality in the chances of participation in social life to such an extent that "justice"
would require state intervention. In a legal system in which the constitutional state principle is
supposed to interact with the social welfare state principle, a purely legalistic interpretation of
property and ownership is not possible. The demands of equity shape the approach to property to
such an extent that the material needs, historical changes and the social function of property
rights quali fy the definition and application of a constitutional property guarantee.P"
"(a) a fundamental (human) right, (b) which is meant to secure, for the holder of property, (c) an area
of personal liberty (d) in the patrimonial sphere, (e) to enable her to take responsibility for the free
development and organisation of her own life (t) within the larger social and legal context."
As for the South African property clause, the courts still have to determine to what extent the
principles of the constitutional and social welfare state will be realised through section 25 Fe.
Given the requirements for deprivation and expropriation of property and the new (socio-
economic) rights created by sections 25(5), (6), (7) and (8), the South African constitutional
property clause certainly has the potential to support the introduction of a constitutional and
social welfare state in the South African context.
Social and economic development implies the increase of wealth and the effective and equitable
distribution of wealth within a society so as to enhance material, cultural, intellectual and
spiritual wcll-bcing.P" For proprietary relations in South Africa, this means that legal change
will have to influence and promote the individual's ability to participate in important societal
changes. Several issues could be raised in this regard:647
(i) The relations of power existing in the South African society need to be restructured in
order to establish equality. A programme supporting the redistribution of property would be
important in this regard. Furthermore, rights of tenure and proprietary relations that were in the
past not recognised, or not protected by law, need to be strengthened. The unequal division of
wealth between rural and urban inhabitants of South Africa also needs to be narrowed. This is a
6-14 This approach reminds of that in Hegel Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts (1896) transl by Dyde
Philosophy of Right (1996). Although first published at the end of the nineteenth century, some of the elements
present in Hegel's account of property law have retained contemporary relevance. Hegel's core contention is that
liberty cannot be separated from order and that an interconnection between all parts of the body politic is vital to the
common good and public interest. This philosopby has often been abused to justify the opinion that national leaders
should possess absolute freedom in realising what they perceive to be the world-historical mission of their nation.
lIegel's analysis nevertheless re-opens the question of which areas of social life should fall within the domain of
private property rights, thus providing a starting point in answering the question concerning the ambit of private
property and the extent to which il can be limited for the sake of public interest. Salter "Social Dynamics of Property
Law" in Harris (ed) Property Problems (1997) 257.
6-15 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 124.
64(, Guno Property and Land Reform (1995) 26.
M7 Adapted from Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 26 - 27.
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challenging task, as addressing regional inequalities has to be coupled with a strengthening of
national cohesion, while simultaneously respecting diversity of culture and lifestyle. A matter of
particular urgency, however, is gender inequality. This issue needs to be addressed, for instance,
through programmes empowering women to becomes owners of land (especially in rural areas).
(ii) Productivity needs to be promoted. In this regard it will be important to recognise
individual autonomy in the use land and business property. The state would, for instance, have to
carefully consider the wisdom of introducing regulation hampering free enterprise. Instead, the
state could be involved on another level, by increasing its participation in the organisation and
provision of material, technological and institutional support, whilst curbing excessive state
power and bureaucracy. In other words, the state should allow reasonable scope for
entrepreneurial initiatives in fulfilling its duty of promoting social and economic development.
(iii) It is, furthermore, vital that ecological balance is promoted and that the environment is
protected within a system of diversified land tenure and land use relations. This will ensure an
increase in the value of land in years to come.
However, the success of ventures like these will be determined by the ability of the courts and
legislature to resolve the inherent conflict between freedom and equality and to strike a working
balance between the protection of property and its regulation.
5. Individual freedom, social justice and proportionality
Thë purpose of this chapter was to provide a brief overview of the interaction of the constitutional
property clauses in Germany and South Africa and the constitutional values that form the basis of
the respective legal orders. The interplay between the constitutional state, the fundamental right to
property and the social welfare state ought to form an integral part of the discourse on property
and its place in society. This, once again, raises the question as to the place and function of the
proportionality test in the system of constitutional property litigation.
The tension between individual freedom and social justice is apparently inherent to the concept
of constitutional property. It has already been indicated648 that it is practically impossible to
consider any aspect of the constitutional property concept without simultaneously considering
this tension between different interests and conducting a process of balancing them. This
approach does not have to mean that the proportionality test, which is supposed to constitute the
very last phase in an inquiry about the constitutional validity of an interference with property,
needs to be uprooted and re-applied earlier in the investigation. It also does not attempt to
overthrow the two-stage inquiry into constitutional validity of interference with fundamental
rights.649 It rather advocates the proper application of the principles of the constitutional and
social state as elements of interpretation throughout the inquiry, so as to establish a less
648 Cf 74 supra.
649 For a discussion of this two-stage approach, cfDe Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (2000) 23 - 30.
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formalistic, more result-oriented approach towards the protection and regulation of property.650
This simply means that one or the other form of interest-balancing is part of each stage of the
entire process, and that the nature and function of the balancing process will differ according to
the stage of the inquiry in which it is employed. The following chapters will indicate that, in
some instances, this kind of balancing of interests in earlier stages of the inquiry as to the
constitutional validity of an interference with property will be similar - but by no means equal -
to the elements of proportionality.
The crucial question arising from this survey is what significance the courts and the legislature will
attach to the underlying values of individual freedom and autonomy, on tbe one hand, and social
justice and equality, on tbe other hand. This in tum opens an enquiry into the interaction between
the private law concept of ownership and the constitutional concept of public interest. In the
following chapters, an attempt will be made to address these issues by analysing the operation of the
German and South African constitutional property clauses and the areas where the private law and
constitutional regulation and protection of property overlaps. The different elements of the
constitutionality enquiry in South Africa and Germany respectively will be examined, with
reference to the different procedures followed by the courts in these jurisdictions. The manner in
which compensation for expropriation of property is determined under the constitutional order,
will also be discussed.
650 Such an approach could have been particularly useful in deciding the questions posed by the case of Harkl'en v
Lane 1998 1SA 300 (CC). Cf discussion al 241 ct seq infra.
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1. The "threshold question"
In both South Africa and Germany, the constitutional concept of property differs in some
respects from the private law concept. Some proprietary interests also qualify more obviously for
constitutional protection than others. This has, of course, implications for the kind of protection
afforded to right holders under private law and under the constitutional provisions. In this
chapter, this distinction will be discussed with a view to analysing the function of property in the
constitutional and private law contexts of Germany and South Africa.
2. Ownership and property in South Africa
Compared to the extensive attempts at giving content to the concept of property under the German
Basic Law, many unanswered questions pertaining to the constitutional concept of property in
South Africa still exist. Land reform and redistribution policies in particular still need to be
scrutinised. The first socio-political steps towards transforming the South African concept of land
have been taken through land-usc policies and programmes and innovative legislative refomls.65t
Legal theory should attempt to place the current socio-political function of property within an
acceptable legal theoretical framework and simultaneously set the conceptual scope for future legal
and social development.
The meaning of property under the constitutional order has not been fully explored in South
Africa yet. Some guidelines do exist, but for the moment the private law remains one of the most
important sources of reference in determining the type of protection that could be afforded to
property right holders under the constitutional provisions. The private law of property and land
rights that preceded the Interim Constitution is vital to a better understanding of legal and social
structures inherited from the old order. It will also continue to influence the objectives to be
pursued within a constitutional framework.652 The following paragraphs contain an analysis of
the existing private law concept of property in South Africa with the purpose of indicating the
possible development of a constitutional concept of property reaching beyond the traditional
boundaries of private law.
651 Eg Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991; the Restitution of Land Rights Act; the Land
Reform Pilot Programme of 1995; the Land Affairs General Amendment Act II of 1995; the Upgrading of Land
Tenure Rights Amendment Ac! 34 of 1996; the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996; the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 etc.
652 Gutto Properly and Land Reform (1995) 57.
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2.1. Ownership and property under private law
The South African private law concept of ownership is based mainly on the principles of Roman-
Dutch law and influenced to some extent by Pandectism.T'' Unlike the German private law of
property, the South African law is not codified. This means that the sources of property law in
South Africa stretch beyond that of a written code and supplementary statutes. It includes, for
instance, the law of precedent. Nevertheless, the South African and German principles are still
comparable, if not identical.
In order to explain the private law system of rights, and the place of ownership within that system, it
is necessary to consider the relevance of the theory of subjective rights for the property order.
Thereafter, one can determine the characteristics of ownership, the need for reform and the
initiatives undertaken in the private law context.
2.1.1. General structure of ownership and property under private law
The "law,,654is, first and foremost, a system of norms of conduct.f" These norms are formulated by
competent bodies in order to regulate the relations between members of a specific society in a just
and peaceful manner. The person is the basic constitutive element of society. The objective law
bestows rights and duties upon a person to be exercised in relation to other persons within a given
society.f" Apart from being a system of rules, the law also constitutes a dual network of legal
relationships (i) between the members of a society (persons / legal subjects) and objects which they
regard as bearing economic value (legal objects), and (ii) among the members of a society mutually
(legal subjects inter se). In other words, the law also consists of a system of subjective rights. Legal
norms (the "objective law") determine the content and limits of every right.657
In the South African private law, the institution of ownership is described within the context of this
subjective rights theory as a product of (i) the relation between a person (legal subject) and a
thing658(legal object), on the one hand, and (ii) relations between persons (legal subjects) inter
se, on the other hand.659 The legal object is juridically destined to comply with the juridical
needs of the legal subject.66o This is done to the exclusion of third persons. In other words, the
individual legal subject (person) can by law prohibit other members of the society (other legal
653 Van derWalt 1995 SAJHR 175 - 179.
654 le "Objektiewe reg" / Positive law.
655 Barnard, Cronjé & Olivier The South African Law of Persons and Family Law (1990) 3; Davel & Jordaan
Personereg Studentehandboek (1995) 1.
656 Van der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel (1988) 231.
657 Barnard, Cronjé & Olivier The South African Law of Persons and Family Law (1990) 4; Davel & Jordaan
Personereg Studentehandboek (1995) 1.
658 In the legal technical sense, the word thing (res) signifies a corporeal or tangible object external to persons,
which is further an independent entity, subject to juridical control by a legal subject, for whom it is useful and
valuable. Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction (1996) 19; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 23; Kleyn, Boraine & Du
Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 9.
659 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 17 where Van Zyl and Van der Vywer's theory of subjective rights is discussed in
relation to ownership.
660 Van der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel (1988) 231.
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subjects / third persons) from infringing his or her entitlements to the legal object.661 The holder
of the right can, in other words, enforce the right against anyone and everyone. The legal object
in this relation is a thing (res), and that is why the relation is then classified as a real right (ius in
re). If this real right amounts to a relation between the legal subject and an object belonging to
him or her, the relation is called ownership (ius in rem suam). If the real right amounts to a
relation between a legal subject and the property of another, a limited real right (ius in re aliena)
is at stake.
The relation between these different aspects of ownership within the theory of subjective rights
is exemplified by the decision of Elekrrisiteitsvoorsieningskol1unissie v Fourie en Andere.662 In
this decision, an attempt was made to explain the nature and structure of subjective rights,
because the case raised the question of whether the "right" of a landowner to the lateral and
surface support of the land is a subjective right, and then more particularly a real right (which
can be expropriated), or whether it is something completely different.
The case involved land owned by the first respondent (Fourie). The other respondents (Matla/the
collective enterprisc)663 held prospecting and mining rights pertaining to coal deposits in the
land. In terms of an agreement between them and the applicant (ESKOM), who was the public
authority responsible for the provision of electricity in South Africa, all coal mined on the land
would be supplied to the applicant, for the operation of a power station. In order to produce
sufficient coal for that purpose, unconventional high-recovery mining methods would have had
to be applied. This would have disturbed the surface of Fourie's land. The prospecting and
mining agreements between Fourie and Matla/the collective enterprise provided that the milling
operation should leave the surface of the land intact. ESKOM offered to purchase the right of
lateral and surface support from Fourie. The latter, however, refused to sell these rights
separately and offered, instead, to sell his land as such to ESKOM. As the parties could not agree
on a price, ESKOM subsequently purported to expropriate the owner's right of lateral and surface
support pursuant to section 43 of the Electricity Act.664 Thereupon the parties approached the
court.
The matters to be determined were (i) whether the "right" of lateral and surface support was
susceptible to expropriation in terms of the Electricity Act and (i i) whether ESKOM (which was
not the registered holder of mineral and mining rights) was eligible to acquire such a "right." The
661 Van der Wah 1988 De Jure 17; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 61 - 63.
662 1988 2 SA 627 (T).
663 The second, third and fourth respondents were mining companies, referred to as "die gesamentlike onderneming"
in the decision. The fifth respondent (Matla Coal Bpk) was a coal mining company.
6M 40 of 1958. In terms of S 43 of this act, a "compulsory purchase" may be sought by "an authorised undertaker or
any person entitled to cause electricity to be generated or to supply electricity in a particular area" for the acquisition
of "such land or any such right in, over or in respect of land as such undertaker or person may require for the
exercise of the power." The formalities preceding such a compulsory purchase included a public hearing to be
conducted by the Electricity Control Board in order to "determine whether the land or right in question is so
required ...". The public hearing was held, pursuant to which the Board reserved its finding and requested ESKOM
to seek a declaration of rights in respect of the legal feasibility of expropriating the "right" to surface and lateral
support in the specific case.
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court decided that a landowner's "right" to lateral and surface support is not a separate or
independent "right. ,,665Kriegler J explained that this case entailed the relations between two legal
subjects and a legal object in the following structure:
A
Fourie (owner)
(Legal subject)
IUS In rem suam
<,
-,
" -,
" ~
C
B
Matla / the collective enterprise
(mining right holder)
(Legal subject)
ius in re aliena
Land as an entity
(Legal object)
It involved the relations between A (Fourie, the owner), and B (Matla/the collective enterprise,
the mining right holder), and the thing, C (the land as an entity).666 Both A (the owner) and B
(the mineral right holder) have certain specific entitlements to the land as a consequence of their
relation to it. The relation between the owner and the land (AC-relation) contain those
entitlements pertaining to ownership. Fourie's entitlements with regard to the land result ex lege
from his ownership of it. They are "natural," "common" or "incident to the ownership of the
soil," but do not necessarily constitute "rights in" the land.667The relation between the mining
right holder and the land (BC-relation) is far more limited in content and stems from an
agreement with the owner (A), enabling the holder of the right (B) to enforce certain
entitlements. Certain mutual claims and obligations also exist between the owner and the holder
of the mineral right (AB-relation). The owner's entitlements with regard to the land result ex lege
from his ownership of it and are, therefore, natural, common or incident to the ownership of the
soil. However, they do not necessarily constitute rights in the land.668 It was, henceforth, held
that the right to surface and lateral support is, in fact, not really a "right" stricto sensu (AC-
relation), but rather an incident of the relation between the landowner and the holder of the
mineral right (Aê-relationj.ï'"
Kriegler J's explanation shows that the owner of a res has, through the subject-object relationship
between the owner and the thing (res), certain rights and entitlements. In this sense, the term
right would refer to the claim of a legal subject as against other persons to a legal object;
whereas the term entitlement would refer to the contents of such a right, denoting what a person,
by virtue of having a right to a legal object, may lawfully do with the object of his or her right.67o
The rights and entitlements of the owner are manifested in different ways in the different
relations that exist between the owner and other legal subjects, be that persons with some kind of
interest in the thing (like holders of mineral rights), or persons with no interest in the thing
665641C - 642A.
666641G_H.
667641H_I.
66864IH_I.
66964IJ - 642A.
670Van der Vyver 1988 SALf 6.
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whatsoever (like ESKOM, in the Fourie case). Lateral and surface support is, for instance, a
manifestation of the relation between the landowner as legal subject and the land as legal object,
relevant for the relation between the landowner (as legal subject) and the mining right holder (as
another legal subject). The landowner's claim to maintenance of the surface is, therefore,
inextricably linked to the relation between him or her and the mining right holder (AB-relation).
There is a tripartite relation between the mining right holder (legal subject with ius in re aliena)
and the land (legal object / res) and the owner (legal subject with ius in rem suam I dominium) in
that the owner must permit the mining right holder to exploit the land's mineral resources.
However, the relation between the landowner and the holder of mineral rights again requires that
the latter should respect the right of ownership - and all the incidents thereof - of the former.
Consequently, this entitlement''" can only vest in either the owner or the mining right holder. A
third party - one with no interest in the use and enjoyment of the land surface - cannot sensibly
acquire or hold the use and enjoyment of the land surface by itself in any way, because this
would strip the entitlement of lateral and surface support of its economic basis.672
Ownership thus comprises more than a mere physical relation between owner and object, but
rather - and more particularly - a network of juridical relations between a specific legal subject
and other legal subjects in general, to a legal object.673 Moreover, instead of merely signifying
the relation between two (or more) legal subjects inter se (personal right), the real right signifies
the relation between a specific person and a specific thing, as well as the relation between a
specific person and other legal subjects in general. Ownership thus symbolises a claim of a
specific type: the claim of a legal subject to a particular kind of legal object.674
Within these general confines, ownership comprises various aspects. It has a specific "formal
make-up" which distinguishes it from other juridical relations. Van der Vyver,675 in reliance on
Dooyeweerd, explains:
"Ownership is founded on certain substrata; that is, conditions that must essentially be satisfied before
the concept of ownership would be possible. For instance, being the claim of a legal subject to a legal
object, ownership presupposes the historical power base included in the notion of disposition
('beskikking') over an object; being a claim enforceable against other persons, ownership is
conditioned by the existence of inter-individual social relations; the protection afforded to the owner's
claim by the law implies relative scarcity, in the economic sense, of the objects of ownership; the
multiplicity of persons in the owner-third-parties relationship presupposes the modal aspect of
number; the protection of ownership is confined to a particular territory and thus implies the modal
671 Entitlement is used in the sense that Van der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigings-
bill/del (1988) 209 attributes lo it: "entitlement, which constitutes the contents of a right [in the sense of the claim of
a legal subject as against other persons to a legal object] and denotes what a person, by virtue of having a right to a
particular legal object, may lawfully do with the object of his right."
672 It would result in the situation that the mining right holder would be exempted from the obligation towards the
landowner to respect his or her entitlements of ownership, and that the land would become "Ol/verkoopbaar.
onverbindbaar [ell} onverbruikbaar" (640G-H) to the owner. Further, the "holder" of a separate "right" lo surface
and lateral support (other than the owner or mining right holder) would not be able to enforce it either, as the duties
and rights nowing from surface and lateral support (because of it being an incidence of ownership) would not befall
him or her.
673 V an der Merwe Sake reg (1989) I.
674 Van der Vyver 1988 SALf 9.
bn 10. Emphasis added.
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aspect of space; the object of ownership is taken from physical reality; ownership belongs to living
persons and is thus conditional upon the biotical [sic] aspect of reality; and so on."
The essence of ownership is inextricably linked to this formal make-up or basic substrata. These
components make up the structure of ownership. The content of ownership entitlements, related
to its history or social basis might be subject to change, but the structure as such will remain
constant. On the other hand, the material content of ownership is comprised in a number of
juridical entitlements, which might vary from time to time and case to case. In the following
paragraphs, the various ways in which ownership in private law is conceptualised with regard to
its material content will be discussed.
2.1.2. The material content of ownership in private law
A description of the true nature, identity and scope of the institution of ownership that elaborates
upon the definition of ownership in the context of the subjective rights theory, is problematic. In
South Africa, most modem scholarly definitions of ownership follow that of Van der Merwe,
being676
"[Eiendom is} ... die mees omvattende reg oor 'n saak omdat dit in vergelyking met beperkte saaklike
regte, >ryer bevoegdhede ten aansien van die saak verleen, hoewel dit steeds aan beperkings
onderhewig is. "
This definition was formulated with reference to: (i) the scope of the owner's capability to
enforce the unique ownership entitlements.Ï" and (ii) the characteristic qualities of ownership.P"
Thus, it indicates at least two very important aspects of the ownership concept: the owner's
capacity to freely act with the res at will, but within the limits set by the law,679and the unique
entitlements accruing to the owner because of his or her specific legal position. As such, Van der
Merwe's definition can serve as a starting point for distinguishing the characteristics of
ownership'f" from the characteristics of other rights and to ascertain the elements exclusive'f" to
ownership. This will be referred to as a "nature-identity description,,682 of ownership. The above
definition is also useful where a description of ownership is guided by the ambit of the owner's
rights and entitlements.t'" This will be referred to as the "scope description" of ownership.
676 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 173. A similar definition is found in Van der Merwe LAWSA XXVII par 104:
"Ownership is potentially the most extensive private right that a person can have with regard to a corporeal thing."
CfVan der Walt "Introduction" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 1; Kroeze "Between Conceptualism and
Constitutionalism" Unpublished Paper (1997) 5; Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 161.
677 As opposed to a description of the entitlements themselves (cfn 678 infra). Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 22 - 23.
678 Cf Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 242 - 258; and Honoré "Ownership" in Guest (ed) Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence (1961) 112 - 128.
679 Sometimes referred to as the "Uitoefeningsaspek" of ownership. Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 22 - 23.
680 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 20 - 21 mentions the characteristics of abstractness (residuary or indeterminate
nature), completeness (totality), elasticity, exclusivity (individuality) and independence (the moederreg
characteristic ).
681 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 21 - 22 mentions here the owner's capacities to dispose of and alienate the res, the
right to manage the res, the capacity to use and enjoy the res, and the capacity to vindicate. In such a definition, it is
usual to indicate that ownership entails more than just the mere sum of the owner's entitlements.
682 The terms used to describe the different approaches to defining the ownership concept are borrowed from Van
der Walt 1988 De Jure 23 et seq.
683 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 23; Gien v Gien 19792 SA 1113 (T).
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Unfortunately, the combination of two different modes of defining ownership could also confuse
the distinctions between a scope-based and a character-based definition of ownership. The
following paragraphs provide an overview of the di fferent ways in which the material content of
ownership can be defined, and the problems related to it.
2.1.2.1. The scope of ownership
Attempts at conceptual ising the content of ownership focusing on a description of its scope, do
not define or classify the entitlements of ownership themselves, but rather concentrate on the
ways in which ownership entitlements are exercised. The decision of Gien v Gien684 illustrates a
scope-based definition of ownership:
"Die uitgangspunt is dat '11 persoon ." met eli op sy eiendom kan maak wat hy wil. Hierdie op die oog
af ongebonde vryheid is egter '11 halwe waarheid. Die absolute beskikkingsbevoegdheid vail 'n eienaar
bestaall binne die perke wal die reg daarop plaas. "
The owner can thus do with the thing (res) what he or she wants, within the limits set by the law.
This means that the material content of the ownership concept is by no means absolute or
unlimited in practice. Public and private law limitations are clearly defined in most cases, but
they arc seen as "unnatural" or "exceptional" burdens on ownership.685 An owner that exercises
his or her rights and entitlements with regard to a thing (res) acts in accordance with the law,
except when the law renders his or her actions unlawful.
In Gien v Gien, unlawful action with the res was determined by the malicious motive, and the
objective unreasonableness, of the owner in the use of an apparatus producing explosive noises
at regular intervals on his farm to scare away baboons from a vegetable garden. From the facts of
the case it was apparent that the erection of the apparatus was the consequence of a long rivalry
between brothers on neighbouring farms. Another indication of objective unreasonableness in
the exercise of ownership entitlements was, inter alia, the relatively small benefit for the owner
from the use of the apparatus against the considerably larger disadvantage and discomfort for
his neighbour.686
2.1.2.2. The nature and identity of ownership
In a description of the nature and identity of ownership, two aspects are important: (i) the
characteristics usually pertaining to ownership; and (ii) the entitlements connected to the right of
ownership. In the following paragraphs, a brief overview is provided of the problems resulting
from such a description.
(,H4 1120C-E.
(,RS Van der Walt 1988 De Jl/re 23.
I\H(, 19792 SA 1113,1121 F-G.
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2.1.2.2.1. Characteristics of ownership
In the "traditional" private law property order, ownership is sometimes described as being
characterised by certain qualities: originality, elasticity, duration and independence. These
qualities then, according to the description, give the institution a position superior to all other
rights, whether real or personal. Other characteristics, which are also mentioned in this context,
include totality, absoluteness and exclusivity. An overview of the different characteristics
influencing the nature and identity of ownership indicates that this institution indeed takes a
hierarchical position superior to that of other limited real rights.687 However, it also indicates that
scholars by no means concur on the basic material elements constituting ownership.
(i) The term originality refers to the fact that ownership is described as the right from
which all other real rights can be derived. Therefore, ownership is sometimes described as a so-
called "moederreg" or "mother right. ,,688 An owner has the ability to dispose of many of the
incidents of the use and enjoyment of his or her res by granting limited real rights to others,
without losing the ownership itself in the process. As such, ownership is an abstract right: it
always will be more than the mere sum total of the separable entitlements pertaining to it.689
Another element of this characteristic is that, because any collection of ownership entitlements
per se would not necessarily constitute ownership itself, ownership is a complete right. This is
sometimes referred to as the characteristic of totality.69o
(ii) The elasticity of ownership is also referred to by some authors as its residuary
character.Ï" In terms of this characteristic, all other real rights pertaining to specific res are
viewed as unnatural burdens on ownership. When these other real rights (that always infringe the
rights and entitlements of the owner of the specific res) expire, the owner's entitlements revert to
their original content. Thus, no matter how many entitlements the owner disposes of, a
reversionary right to those entitlements is always retained. Once those entitlements are
extinguished, the ownership automatically becomes unencumbered again. This makes the
concept of ownership inherently elastic.692 Lewis693 considers this characteristic as the
distinguishing element of ownership.
(iii) In principle, ownership is also not of limited duration like many other rights. Other
(limited) real rights expire after a certain time: Usufruct, for instance, expires with the death of
687 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 19 refers to this aspect of the definition as the "Identiteitsaspek. " This entails the
definition of ownership according to the characteristics that distinguishes it from other (limited) real rights.
688 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175; Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 162.
689 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 20; contra Honore 107, 112, 113; Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 at 243.
690 Cowen New Patterns of Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984) 8 refers to this characteristic under the latin
title of plena in re potestas. Cf also the description of the various entitlements to ownership in Lewis 1985 Acta
Juridica 243 - 258 and the definition of ownership in Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120; Van der Walt 1988
DeJure20.
691 Kleyn, Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 163.
692 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175. Cf also the discussion of the viewpoints of various authors in Lewis 1985
Acta Juridica 255 - 256 concerning the primary importance attached to this characteristic.
693 Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 257.
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the holder of the right; real security rights (like pledge and mortgage) expire with repayment of
the debts on which these rights depend.694
(iv) Van der Walt695 describes the cbaracteristic of exclusivity as one of the most important
elements of ownership. This characteristic entails that the owner can exclude others from tbe
occupation, use and enjoyment of his or her property.696 In this way, the owner exercises a
"unique power of individual moral autonomy." In any contest about control, ownership is always
superior to any other right.
(v) The independence quality entails tbat ownership (because it is considered as the right
from which all other real rights originate) needs no further legal construction for its existence.
Unlike limited real rights, for instance, ownership is not dependent on or derived from any other
right. Van der Merwé97 describes this as the distinguishing element of ownership.
2.1.2.2.2. Entitlements pertaining to ownership
Sometimes ownership is also described by focussing on the entitlements that pertain to it: that is,
the entitlements that cannol be transferred to holders of real rights and thus cause ownership to
be more than the mere sum of the entitlements that can be transferred to other right holders.698
Such a description implies that these non-transferable entitlements are characteristic of
ownership and distinguish it from other real rights. The following entitlements are mentioned in
this regard:699
(i) The owner can dispose of the res. This means he or she can alienate, abuse or destroy it.
It also entails that the owner can decide who may lise or control the res, and therefore includes
the owner's capacity to grant rights in the res to third parties.
(ii) The maxim nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet, has the
consequence that only the owner has tbe capacity to alienate his or her ownership as such.
Holders of limited real rights might be able to alienate their real rights or the entitlements
pertaining to it, but ownership remains with the owner. Ownership is, in other words, "superior
to" limited real rights. The holder of a limited real right cannot alienate more than that which he
or she has.
(iii) The owner can vindicate the res. This means that he or she can claim the res from any
person, merely by proving that he or she is owner thereof, and that it is under the control of the
person against whom he or she institutes the claim. The onus is then on the defendant to prove
the lawfulness of his or her control.
694 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175.
695 Van der Walt 1995 SAJ/-IR 179. Cf also Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20 - 23.
696 Van der Walt 1988 De Jl/re 21.
697 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 176.
698 Lewis 1985 ACfa Juridica 243; Honore "Ownership" in Guest (ed) Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) 107.
699 Van der WHit 1988 De Jure 21 - 22. The owner's capacity to use and enjoy the res technically does not belong to
this categorisation, as it can be transferred by the owner lO another legal subject.
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2.1.2.3. Problems arising from attempts to define the content of ownership
Several problems are encountered in defining the material content of ownership. The reason for
this is that the choice of description of the ownership concept that focuses either on the nature
and identity or the scope of ownership is closely related to the theoretical approach that forms
the basis of private law rights.
Van der Vyver700 points out that the distinction between real and personal rights can be based on
the manner in which real and personal rights are enforced. That would entail an application of
the personality doctrine. In such a case, emphasis is more readily placed upon the obligations of
persons other than the holder of the right to respect (in the case of real rights) or to execute (in
the case of personal rights) the right. In terms of the personality doctrine, real rights distinguish
themselves from personal rights by the fact that they operate vis-a-vis all persons generally and
not only against particular individuals (or groups of personsj.?" As the personality doctrine
supports the absoluteness of real rights in the context of enforceability, it shows preference for a
scope description of ownership.
The distinction between real and personal rights can also be based on the objects of the rights as
portraying the essential difference between real and personal rights.702 This would entail an
application of the classical theory of rights. In such a case, emphasis is placed on the object of
the right rather than on its absoluteness or relativity.703A definition of ownership in terms of its
nature and identity is usually based on the classical theory of rights.
The- divergent theories underlying the nature of private law rights, however, create various
problems in defining the concept of ownership. For one, a focus on the different entitlements of
ownership might lend support to the idea that ownership consists merely of the sum of its
entitlements at a given point in time. Another related problem is which characteristics of
ownership are decisive for its material content. The apparent absoluteness of ownership, arising
from a description of its scope, could also be problematic. These problems could have
implications for the formulation of a constitutional concept of property and deserves closer
scrutiny.
700 Van der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel (1988) 222.
701 Cf Van der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel (1988) 220; Van der Merwe
Sakereg (1989) 61 where the view of FC von Savigny, as stated in his System des heutigen rëmischen Rechts (1840)
vol I at 373, is quoted as example of the personality doctrine. Cf also Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction
(1996) 39.
702 Van der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel (1988) 222.
703 Usually, the view of Landsberg Das Recht des burgerlichen Gesetzbuches vom J 8. VIII. J 896 (1906) vol I at 68
is quoted to portray the classical rights theory's point of departure: Real rights afford legal control over things,
creditor's rights afford legal control over persons. CfVan der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 62 n 27. However, in the work
of Van der Linden Regtsgeleerd, Praeticaal en Koopmans Handboek (1806) I 6 I, that was in principle also based
on the classical theory, mention is made in a secondary sense of the absolute and relative operation of real rights and
personal rights respectively. CfVan der Vyver "Private-Law Rights" in Strauss (ed) Huldigingsbundel (1988) 221.
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An attempt to describe ownership by means of the different entitlements that are comprised by it,
might lead to the view that ownership equals the sum of its entitlements, or that ownership
constitutes a "bundle" of smaller component rights. According to this bundle of rights theory,
property should be regarded as a variable set of legally enforced claims upon resources, instead
of a simple claim pertaining to a thing (res).704 A property right may consist of a number of
constituent rights, for example the right to hold, the right to use, the right to occupy, the right to
alienate, the right to bequeath, and so on. Each of these would then be a separate property right, a
separate "stick in the bundle" or, possibly, according to some authors, a separate right in
properly. 70S Property rights are, thus, conceived as economic relationships between legal subjects
with regard to the exploitation of natural resources.
The Appellate Division implicitly adopted this trend in the case of Sandton Town Council v Erf
89 Sandown Extension 2 (Pty) Ltd,706 by remarking that
"[0 ]wncrship of land connotes the existence of an aggregate of distinct and valuable rights inhering in
the owner. These include not only the right to exclusive possession and the right of disposal, but also
the right to the use and enjoyment of the land for all lawful purposes."
The facts concerned a claim for compensation" against the town council after it had laid
stormwater pipes over an erf belonging to the respondent. The court had to decide whether the
town council had to reward the respondent for damages other than for losses due to direct
physical damage to the land. In this case consequential losses, like diminution of the land's value,
sustained as a result of the municipality installing a drainage system on the property affected,
were at stake. It was held that the presence of the pipes had rendered the exploitation of the
business rights attaching to the relevant piece of land less profitable to the respondent. Therefore
the value of the land was reduced. Consequently, the respondent company (present owner) had
been partially divested (without its consent) of one of its "rights to" owncrship.Ï'" It was further
held that the action taken by the appellant was clearly akin to expropriation.709
The possibility of alienating or expropriating specific "portions" of ownership, separately from
the ownership in a specific thing (res) itself, seems to be an issue that keeps recurring in case law
and academic writing.7lo The treatment of this issue under the new constitutional order in South
Africa will be dealt with in the following chapters. However, a few remarks need to be made
concerning the view that property consists only of different component entitlements.
7001 Davis, Cheadle, & Ilaysom Fundamental Rights (1997) 241.
70S Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh I, 16.
706 1988 3 SA 122 (A).
707 In terms of s I34(b) of the Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939 (T), which entitled an owner of property,
over or on which a drainage system was installed by the municipal council, to claim compensation "for any damage
done."
70R 19883 SA 122 (A) 129£'-11.
70') 12911-1.
710 Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 243; llonoré "Ownership" in Guest (cd) Essays in Jurisprudence ( 1961) 107.
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The Fourie case7!! pointed out the difference between, on the one hand, the structural
relationship of a legal subject and a legal object as against third persons, and, on the other hand,
the entitlement of the owner (and of other persons in the case of certain limited real rights) to use
and enjoy the thing (res) concerned. Only the structural relationship can be called ownership.7!2
The owner can transfer a portion of the ownership (or several entitlements pertaining to
ownership) to a third party, making it legally permissible for that party to exercise the
entitlement(s) concerned. That entitlement "belongs" then to a person other than the owner, by
virtue of a right other than ownership (ius in re aliena). However, the entitlement does not
change its nature. It simply fits into another, different kind of structural relationship, which does
not qualify as ownership. Van der Merwe713 explains this phenomenon with reference to the
granting of servitudes by the owner to third parties:
"Bepaalde inherente bevoeghede [sic] van eiendomsreg kan wel aan 'n ander oorgedra word deur die
vestiging van 'n saaklike reg. Maar selfs wanneer 'n eienaar byvoorbeeld 'n serwituut aan iemand
anders verleen, staan hy nie sommige van sy regte aan iemand anders afnie. Hy stem slegs toe dat sy
eiendomsbevoegdhede op 'n bepaalde manier opgeskort word. Wanneer 'n serwituut tot niet gaan, val
die beperking weg en groei die eiendom weer tot sy volle omvang uit. Daar is geen sprake van
teruggawe van verleende regte nie. "
The entitlements comprising ownership are, therefore, viewed as a unity, and the fact that some
of those entitlements might at a given point in time be lawfully enforced by someone other than
the owner, does not amount to the conclusion that ownership equals the sum of its entitlements
and nothing more. Such a viewpoint loses sight of the unique structural relation (between the
owner, third parties and the res) which forms the basis of the concept of ownership.
2.1.2.3.2. The seminal characteristic of ownership
In analysing the description of the different characteristics of ownership, scholars differ as to
which single characteristic is the most important. Van der Merwe7!4 chooses the independence
quality of ownership as the distinguishing characteristic; Van der Walt7!5 focuses on exclusivity;
and Lewis7!6 on elasticity. However, no single characteristic can by itself distinguish ownership
from other legal institutions. It is the combination of all the characteristics that secure the
superior position of ownership in private law.
The material content of ownership depends on all these characteristics, because they are all
indispensable components for the ownership concept. Neither the originality nor the elasticity of
ownership is per se sufficient to define ownership. Likewise, the independence characteristic is
711 Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie 1988 2 SA 627 (T).
7I2 Van derVyver 1988SALJ8.
713 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 174. Translation: "Certain inherent entitlements of ownership can indeed be
transferred to another by the vesting of a real right. However, even when an owner confers a servitude, for instance,
to someone else, he does not concede his rights to someone else. He merely agrees that his ownership entitlements
are restricted in a certain manner. When the servitude terminates, the restriction falls away and ownership grows
back to its full scope. Returning of conceded rights is not at stake here."
714 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 176.
715 Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 179.
716 Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 257.
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distinctive only in relation to the characteristics of originality, elasticity and duration. In
addition, the feature of ownership making it endure for an indeterminable time also arises from -
and can only be effective within - the sphere of the other inter-related distinctive qualities of
ownership. The different characteristics are, therefore, inextricably linked.
2.1.2.3.3. The absoluteness of ownership
It has been indicated that the definition of the material content of ownership 111 private law
depends to a large extent on whether tbe classical theory or the personality doctrine forms the
basic premise. In the case of application of the personality doctrine, the question regarding the
absoluteness in the context of enforceability has never been clearly distinguished from the
question of absoluteness in the context of the owners' entitlements. Any discussion about the
content of ownership that does not recognise this delicate distinction, could fall prey to the mistaken
assumption717 that ownership is by nature unlimited.718
Absoluteness, being one of the basic general principles underlying the law of things/19 indicates
the security provided to all holders of real rights. This principle places the holder of a real rigbt,
therefore also the owner, in an unassailable juridical relation regarding the enforcement of the
right. However, when it is averred that ownership by nature can endure even the most severe
limitations without being mutilated by them, reference is made only to the characteristic "elasticity"
of owncrship.Ï'" Together with the other characteristics of originality, duration, independence,
exclusivity and totality - the "elasticity" of ownership enables the owner to exercise quite extensive
powers over the object of the right and over fellow legal subjects. But even if the owner has quite
extensive powers over the object, the exercise of the ownership entitlements does not make
ownership by nature absolute.
Viewed from a scope-perspective.Ï'" ownership becomes a mechanism through which the
individual can preserve and propagate the idea of freedom, which is one of the basic entitlements of
a legal subject. However, legal subjectivity also incorporates the notion of responsibility of the legal
subject, which has, of course, implications for the understanding of the concept of ownership. The
distinction between the enforceability of an owner's right and the content of the right of ownership
should not be disregarded. Though it may be true that an owner can enforce his or her right of
ownership against the entire world, it docs not provide the owner with an unlimited capacity to
act with the res at will. The owner's capacity to exercise ownership entitlements is still limited
by law and by the rights of others.
717 Van tier Merwe Sakereg (1989) 173 expressly warns against such an assumption.
71X Cf eg Kroeze "Between Conceptualism and Constitutionalism" Unpublished Paper (1997) 5.
719 Cf Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 10- 16.
720 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175. cr 125 supra.
721 Cf Vail der Walt 1988 De Jure 23 et seq. Cf also 124 ct seq supra.
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2.1.3. Limitations on the content of ownership
In the present century, growing socialist tendencies, increased control of property in the spheres of
public law in general and administrative law in particular, and expansion of rights of parties other
than the owner,722have contributed considerably to a demise of the once sacred, inviolable right of
ownership. Ownership has been regarded as sacred and inviolable since the French Revolution,
because of the individualism proclaimed through the natural law ideology of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries and the then prevalent laissez-faire principle of economic
control.723Nevertheless, it should be obvious that no community can tolerate ownership literally
unrestricted in its content. For the sake of socio-political morality, ownership needs to be
restricted to some extent. 724
The significance of the categories of limitations on ownership existing under common and
statutory law lies therein that the interests of the community in general, or specific groups within
the community, dictate how private property should under certain circumstances be regulated or
limited by the state or through legislation. In this manner, the question of protection of private
property under the constitution becomes relevant. Therefore, the different categories of
limitations on ownership must be kept in mind when determining the extent to which the
protection of ownership in terms of the constitutional property clauses overlap with the
protection of property under private law.
There are numerous examples of limitations on ownership entitlements in private law. The scope
of this work does not allow a complete descriptive catalogue of the existing limitations and the
different categories of limitations will be discussed only briefly. These categories are (i) limitation
of ownership by contractual rights and limited real rights; (ii) limitation of ownership by the rules of
neighbour law; and (iii) statutory limitation of ownership.
(i) An owner's entitlements can be limited by contractual rights that third parties have
against such an owner.725 Limitations like these are usually created by agreement between the
owners and the holders of such personal rights. These contractual rights are enforceable against
the owner personally, and can entail any infringement on the property rights of the owner that is
not contra bonos mores, impossible or illegal in terms of the law of contract. Rights like these,
being enforceable against a specific owner in his or her personal capacity, do not influence the
essence of the ownership institution as such, although the infringement on a specific owner's
entitlements could be quite extensive. The limited real rights that other parties may have
regarding the res can also limit an owner's entitlements. Such limitations are enforceable against
the owner qua owner,726 and because such limitations constitute subtractions from the dominium
they are enforceable against all subsequent owners of the res. For this reason the owner's
entitlements are curtailed to a larger extent than in the former case, although the infringement on
722 Eg Lessees, possessors etc.
723 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 176.
724 Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 1.
725 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction (1996) 117.
726 Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 164.
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ownership by a limited real right might in content be similar to a personal right. In the case of
iura in re aliena the limitation attaches to the object of the right to ownership and not to the
person of the owner. Therefore, the ownership in a specific res is in principle limited until the res
is destroyed or until the limited real right comes to an end. In the case of limited real rights
pertaining to immovable property, registration of these rights against the relevant title deed will
have the effect that subsequent owners will also be bound.
(ii) Neighbour law can also limit an owner's entitlements. The owner's exercise of
entitlements in respect of land is limited in the interest of the community of neighbouring
landowners or users of adjacent or nearby land. The principle sic u/ere tuo ut alienum non laedas
which determines that land must be used in such a way that other persons are not prejudiced or
burdened, forms the basis of this branch of law.727 Neighbour law is based, on the one hand, on the
principle of nuisance728 and therefore includes the criterion of reasonable use, limiting an owner's
entitlements with regard to the property to those acts that should be tolerated by the neighbours, as
set out in the case of Gien v Gien.729 On the other hand, there arc also some specific (or
"traditional") remedies of neighbour liability (like lateral support, encroachments, overhanging
branches and interference with the natural flow of water).730 According to these "traditional"
remedies of neighbour liability, the owner could under certain circumstances be liable to
compensate the neighbour on the basis of damages already incurred. These remedies usually
approximate the aquilian action, but with a narrower scope. The bases of liability accordingly
vary depending on the nature of the specific remedy and the requirements applicable.?"
Ilowever, the "traditional" remedies of neighbour liability arc mostly aimed at preventing
pending (or further) harm by invoking a prohibitory interdict or declaratory order.
(iii) Finally, a number of ordinary statutory provisions limit the owner's entitlements
regarding the usc of property, usually in the interest of the community. I [ere a distinction can be
made between limitations on movable and immovable property. In the case of movable property,
the lise of certain objects Iike motor vehicles as well as radio transmitters, radios and television
sets arc regulated by the Road Traffic Act732 and the Broadcasting Act733 respectively. The
m Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 185. Cf also Holland \I SCOll 1882 EDC 307.
728 This principle is derived from the ton principles in English law. Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) L97; KJeyn,
Boraine & Du Plessis Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 168.
m 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T).
730 These were mostly handed down mostly from Roman law, but were in some eases also influenced by English law.
Some even arc of English origin. Cf Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 197 - 213; K lcyn, Boraine & Du Plessis
Silberberg & Schoeman (1992) 168 - 193; Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction (1996) 120 - 131.
731 In the case of a claim for the loss of lateral support, the owner is vicariously liable for damages already suffered
by the neighbour. In the case of encroachments, the award of damages is but one alternative at the disposal of the
court, which is expected to balance the interests of both parties involved and to make a discretionary order. ln the
case of the actio aquae pluviae areendae (which is a remedy for a prohibitive interdict), the payment of damages
only becomes relevant if damage has been incurred after litis contestatio. Damages can be claimed with the
interdictum quod vi 0111 clam, but, again, on the basis of vicarious liability. A person is also entitled to damages
caused by dilapidated buildings, but only if a notice of protest was issued in terms of the cautio damni infecti, which
is then also the basis of this claim for damages. Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 197 - 212.
132 93 of 1996.
1)) 73 of 1976.
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Animals Protection Act734prohibits owners of animals to abuse, neglect, overburden, overwork
or frighten their animals and makes such behaviour criminally punishable. The possession,
acquisition or distribution of certain objects, like (i) oil and precious metals by private
individuals in terms of the Minerals Act;735(ii) certain photographic material in the Indecent or
Obscene Photographic Matter Act;736 (iii) certain substances in terms of the Abuse of
Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act;737 and (iv) objectionable
publications or objects in terms of the Publications Act; 738is also prohibited. The Arms and
Ammunition Act739also limits the entitlements of owners of weapons or ammunition in various
ways. Several limiting mechanisms exist also in the case of immovable property. The
Expropriation Ace40 and the Physical Planning Act741are two examples of specific legislation
that has far-reaching consequences for the limitation (or even dispossession) of the property
rights of landowners. Besides these, the Environment Conservation Act,742 the Advertising on
Roads and Ribbon Development Act,743 the Agricultural Pests Ace44 and the Conservation of
Agricultural Resources Ace45 limits the entitlements of owners of rural land. Various provincial
town planning ordinancesf", as well as legislation dealing with township establishment.i" the
nature and standard of buildings.Ï" and other issues 749affect the entitlements of owners of urban
land.
2.1.4. Import of private law for property and ownership in constitutional law
In the light of the debate concerning horizontal application of fundamental rights on private law
relations, one should examine the definition of property in both private and constitutional law.
The difference between property in private law and in the constitutional context is closely related
to the fact that property has a different function in each of these areas of the law. In private law,
the interests of owners are protected against interference by third parties. The purpose of
73471 of 1962.
73550 of 1991.
736 65 of 1996.
737 140 of 1992.
738 65 of 1996.
739 75 of 1969. Cf also Arms and Amunition Amendment Act 15 of 1999.
74063 of 1975.
741 125 of 1991. The guide plans, which were published from time to time already since the previous Physical
Planning Act 67 of 1988 can also contain provisions limiting the exercise of ownerhship entitlements.
742 73 of 1989.
74321 of 1940.
74436 of 1983.
74543 of 1983.
746 Eg the Town Planning and Township Ordinance 15 of 1986 (Transvaal); Land Use Planning
Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Cape); Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969 (OFS); and the Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949
(Natal).
747 Eg the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991; Provision of Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993
and the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995.
748 Eg National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977.
749 The Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965; Black Communities Development Act 3 of 1966 and 4 of
1984; Health Act 63 of 1977 and the Slums Act 76 of 1979 (which has been repealed by s 20 of the Housing Act
107 of 1997).
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property as a fundamental right is to protect the holders of property rights against interference
with their rights by the state, and to determine the circumstances under which such interference
would be justified in the interests of the public in general. If this divide is ignored, the whole of
private law might be invaded by the notion of property.750 Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the
definition of ownership in private law broadened over a number of years. The circumstances
giving rise to this broadening of the private law definition need to be examined in order to
determine the meaning of private law property for the constitutional context.
The past two decades have witnessed a considerable expansion of the concept of ownership
under private law. The Sectional Titles Act75 I and the "new patterns of landownership" are
iIlustrations of this tendency.
(i) Since the introduction of the first South African Sectional Titles Act on 10 June 1971
(and even more so after the coming into force of this act on 31 March 1973), the legislature has
set the pace for fundamental changes to property law, more particularly the law pertaining to
landownership.F' The enactment of sectional title legislation led to the first reconsideration of
the common law concept of ownership, as it existed at that time. Initially, the question of whether
sectional ownership could qualify as "true" ownership had to be resolved. In considering this issue,
Van der Merwe753 declared that the concept of dominium as it was understood in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century cannot pass muster any more. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth
century, ownership was regarded as a sacred, inviolable right. All limitations on the ownership
concept, albeit in neighbour law or public law, were regarded as irreconcilable with the true nature
of this institution. However, it was recognised that the institution of ownership has been irreversibly
alteredby several factors such as the industrial revolution, the rise or the workers' classes and the
two world wars. Indicating that sectional ownership should be seen as true ownership against the
background of a more dynamic definition of ownership that takes the particular nature of the object
of the right, as well as the extent of the limitations upon the right for the sake oftbe public weal into
account, Van der Merwe declared.i"
"Die talryke privaatregtelike eli publiekreglelike beperkings wal ill die jongste tyd in belang van die
gemeenskap aan eiendom en veral aan grondeiendom opgelê word. moel dus nie as onverenigbaar
met die eiendomsbegrip beskou word nie. maar as omstandighede wal die o/llvang en inhoud vail
eiendom ill 'Il konkrete geval bepaal. "
Van der Merwe's analysis of the sectional title legislation thus anticipated the acceptance by the
legislature of an ownership concept that includes a distinct social function, as opposed to one
supporting a theory of individualism. Although several acts and regulations contain provisions
limiting the ownership concept, the Sectional Tilles Act was the first concise reflection of direct
approval by the South African legislature of the "new" ownership concept, namely ownership as a
right exercised against acknowledgement of the correlative duties towards a community. In the
134
7S0 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 423.
751 Act 66 of 1971. This has in the mean time been replaced by the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. The lalter has
also been amended several times.
m Cowen New Patterns of Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984) 12.
m Cf 13I supra.
7~4 Van der Merwe 1974 TllRHR 122.
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narrow sense, duties to the community would in this context indicate a sectional owner's
responsibility towards the other sectional owners (in the sectional title community). However, also
the interests of the community at large are considered through sectional title legislation, particularly
its interest in affordable housing and the expansion of the category of home owners in the
community.
(ii) Since the coming into force of the Sectional Titles Act, several alterations to the
common law concept of ownership as it existed in South Africa755was made to accommodate
specific contemporary needs or to solve specific problems connected with the public wea1.756
This development has become known as the "new patterns of landownership," on the basis of a
paper delivered by Cowen at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1984.757 Cowen's
presentation gave the development of a dynamic concept of ownership in South Africa a new force.
It attempted to adjust the "well-trodden and somewhat outdated territory of established and
traditional theory,,758 of ownership, defined and described in terms of the terminological,
theoretical and dogmatic legacy of Grotius, Van Leeuwen and Van der Linden. In Cowen's
opinion the concept of ownership was partly extended by these "new patterns of
landownership.t'P" while it was simultaneously subjected to a growing tendency to restrict
landownership in the interests of society.Ï'"
Several scholars"! have, since these early observations in the context of sectional title legislation
and the "new patterns of landownership," commented on the concept of ownership. Numerous
new ideas have been explored. Yet, most writers seem to agree that ownership should be a
functional institution, thereby indicating that the definition, nature, content, characteristics and
protection of ownership are all influenced and shaped by the social implications of this
institution, as well as by prevalent ideologies and beliefs. They have explored the possibility of a
diversification of property rights within the field of private law,762and indicated repeatedly that
ownership is not only characterised by the existence of rights and entitlements accruing to the
755 Eg Share Block Control Act 59 of 1980 introducing share block schemes, Property Time-Sharing Control
Act 75 of 1983 introducing property time-sharing. More examples of such an extension of the common law concept of
landownership in the shape of air space development, nature conservation and planning laws followed.
756 Van der Walt "Future" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 27. Cf also Van der Walt 1999 Koers 259 - 294,
where it is argued that the statutory deviations from the "traditional" system of property law in terms of private law,
like the "new patterns of landownership", served the purposes of high-finance development and the provision of
upper-class housing, holiday accommodation and commercial premises and that non of these developments were
really aimed at serving the needs of the underprivileged, homeless, poor or dispossessed under the apartheid regime.
They also did not really constitute an alteration of the underlying principles of private property law, as all alterations
could still be classified within the existing hierarcical system of land rights. It is also argued that most of the early
land reform efforts, especially those introduced by the former National Party government in 1991, did not succeed in
breaking down the structural and dogmatic privilege of the common-law ownership paradigm.
757 Cf in general Cowen New Patterns of Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984); Van der Walt "Future" in Van
der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 26; Van der Walt "Introduction" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 3.
758 Van der Walt "Introduction" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 1.
759 Cowen New Patterns of Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984) 15 - 50.
76051 - 80.
761 Eg Pienaar 1986 TSAR 295 - 308; Corder & Davis "Introduction" in Corder (ed) Law & Social
Practice (1988) 1 - 30; Van der Walt 1995 TSAR 322 - 345; Van der Walt 1995 SAPRlPL 1 - 30; Van der Walt 1995
SAJHR 169 - 206; Lewis 1992 SAJHR 389 - 430.
762 Van der Walt 1995 TSAR 322 - 345; Van der Walt 1995 SAPRlPL 1 - 30; Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 - 206.
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individual owners, but also by inherent duties, limitations and responsibilities toward society.
However, the question as to the exact meaning of the "social function" of ownership is only
indirectly referred to.
The constitutional protection and regulation of property could solve some of the problems in this
regard. Private and constitutional law will most definitely influence each other, and the
incorporation of elements from customary property law can be expected. Moreover, in view of
the fact that direct horizontal application of the fundamental-rights provisions of the Final
Constitution on all law, the constitutional property provisions would for reasons of policy be
applicable directly to certain private law relations.Ï'" A glance at the development of the German
concept of property clearly indicates that tbe definition of property is not the exclusive domain of
private law.764 In the following paragraphs, the development of a constitutional concept of
property in South African law will be discussed, with a view to comparison with the German
law.
2.2. The constitutional concept of property
Tbe expansion of the property concept in South African private law provides a useful stepping
stone for incorporation of the constitutional definition of property into the property concept.
Moreover, the constitutional protection and regulation of property would avoid entrenching
property rights acquired during the apartheid era where their protection can no longer be justified
as a matter of public policy or morality.765 Ideally, a constitutional concept of property should, in
the South A frican context, limit the scope of property to advance economic development. This
ideal is not easily attainable. The realisation of this task is complicated by the fact that the
property clauses of the Interim and Final Constitutions provide few guidelines, if any, in defining
the constitutional concept of property.
The South African constitutional property concept is even more complex than its German
counterpart, owing to the incorporation of the land reform and restitution objectives in the
constitutions from the outset. Furthermore, neither the Interim Constitution nor the Final
Constitution provides a definition of "property." In fact, different terms are employed in the
Interim Constitution and Final Constitution to refer to proprietary relations protected by them.
2.2.1. Meaning of the terms "rights in property" / "property"
Section 28 IC used the term rights ill property766 and section 25 FC uses the term property,767
neither of which are properly defined in either of the constitutions. The judiciary and legislature
have to give content and meaning to these terms, depending on the supposed function of the
161 Kroeze 1994 SAPR/PI. 324 quoting Rautenbach & Malherbe Staatsreg (1993) 114.
164 BVerfGE 58, 300 (Nofiauskiesung) 339.
165 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren el af (cds) Constitutional Law (1996)
ch31,4-5.
766 Regte ill eiendom in the A frikaarts text.
161 Eiendom in the Afrikaans text.
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constitutional property guarantee in the South African society. The uncertainty concerning the
function of property in the constitution is apparent when these terms are interpreted.
The term rights in property, which was used in section 28 IC, was puzzling from the start,768
since this term was not known or acknowledged in either private or public law.769This caused
Chaskalson and Lewis,77o among others, to warn against the dogmatic inconsistencies that could
flow from such uncertainty:
"Although it has up till now been clear in South Africa that incorporeals can be the objects of rights
and are regarded as property, is this changed by the phrasing of s 28, which allows for the right to
acquire and hold rights in property? Can one have a right to a right in a right? The answer should
clearly be yes: but the awkward wording may leave room for the argument that only corporeals are
protected. "
The origin of the phrase rights in property was also not clear. Presumably the phrase was
inserted in the constitutional text to ensure that property was not equated with ownership, thus
widening the scope of constitutional protection to rights beyond those protected in terms of the
private law of property.": However, this intention did not appear from the interim property
clause itself. Hence, it was argued that this term could have either a progressive or a reactionary
meaning: 772It could, on the one hand, be interpreted so as to treat all rights as being on an equal
footing with the traditionally elevated right of ownership. On the other hand, it could also be
interpreted so as to support the notion of conceptual severance,773 which could provide a
reactionary court with the right ammunition to boycott any attempt at social reform.
At first glance, the phrase seems to refer only to real rights, as opposed to personal rights.774
Then only the "traditional" real rights such as ownership, mortgage, pledge (in respect of
movable things), servitudes, water rights, mineral rights and liens would be protected under
section 28 IC. This interpretation would also exclude rights that were not traditionally recognised
as real - like labour-tenants' "rights" of occupation, or "rights" of squatters to undisturbed
possession of their shacks. However, the protection of real rights only would conflict with the
general international idea that a constitutional property guarantee usually incorporates protection
for a wider range of rights based on a broader definition of property than that employed in pure
private law issues. Moreover, a wide interpretation of rights in property would avoid the
dilemma facing a court that has to choose between widening the concept of ownership (as known
in private law) or discarding it altogether.Ï"
768 Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 - 139; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 - 203; Murphy 1995 SAPR/PL 107 - 130.
769 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31, 5.
770 Ch 31,6.
771 According to Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 56, this
phrase was used to appease the concerns of traditional leaders that the Western notion of individual ownership does
not cater for communal ownership.
772 Davis, Cheadle, & Haysom Fundamental Rights (1997) 239 - 242.
713 Cf 128 et seq supra.
774 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31, 6.
775 Kroeze 1994 SAPR/PL 326.
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Nevertheless, the view soon prevailed that the drafters of the Interim Constitution intended a
more extensive interpretation of the property clause so as to include not only real rights but also
personal rights for constitutional protection.776 In its extreme, this could mean that property
rights would encompass the whole of private law.777 This even the negotiating parties could not
have foreseen. However, Van der Walt778 pointed out that the function of the court was not to
determine whether rights in property should be interpreted extensively. It was rather to
determine how far the courts could and should go in extending the guarantee of rights in property
to non-real rights in incorporeals. In other words, the problem in reality was the scope of the
court's interpretative competence. Whether the constitution used the term property or rights in
property would not make a substantial di fference to the solution of this problem.
In view of the dispute about the meaning of the term rights in property, section 25 FC has been
phrased to refer only to property. By this time, however, most South African lawyers realised
that the exact terminology was probably less important than the overall structure and function of
the property clause in the bill of rights as a whole.779 Therefore, the change in terminology might
have evaded some of the dogmatic problems, but did not sirnpli fy the "threshold" question in the
South African context. The courts are still faced with the problem of how far they should extend
the guarantee of rights in property to non-real rights in incorporeals.
By now, it seems clear that, regardless of whether the term properly instead of rights in properly
is used/8o the constitutional protection of property will extend beyond the limits of private law
rights. Perhaps the social welfare rights (like the rights to housing, food, water and security)
already included in the Final Constitution point to the preference of a wider approach. However,
the wording of sections 26 FC781 and section 27 FC,782 which both require the state lO take
reasonable measures "within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
these rights," emphasise, at least for the time being, the relative status of such social welfare
rights.783 Although there should be reservations concerning the classification of the rights
776 Van der Wall 1994 THRJ IR 193. Cf also Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 4 SA 532 (A) 539A-B where
Hoexter JA already (obiter) anticipated that property could under certain circumstances (here in the context of
applying the audi alteram partem rule in decisions by public officials) be wider than the traditional concept of
ownership.
717 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 423.
778 Van derWalt 1994 TJlRHR 193.
179 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 351.
780 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of SOlItIt Africa 1996 CCT 23/96, online at
htrp://www.constitulion.org.la/cert.html [06.08.l999J par 70 - 75.
7RI Housing: "( I) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. (2) The state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after
considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions."
782 Health care, food, water and social security: "( I) Everyone has the right to have access to - (a) health care
services, including reproductive health care; (b) sufficient food and water; and (c) social security, including, if they
are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance. (2) The state must take
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
each of these rights. (3) No one may be refused emergency medical treatment."
783 Cf Pienaar & Muller 1999 Steil LR 373, where it is pointed out that South Africa has one of the worst records in
the world in terms of income equality and social indicators like health, education, safe water and fertility. The
continued
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protected in s 25 FC as socio-economic rights, the true socio-economic rights in the constitution
could anticipate an interpretation of the constitutional property concept which would
acknowledge the limits of constitutional property protection.
Property law, especially land law, which was contorted most during the apartheid era, is in dire
need of reconstruction to mirror the spirit, goal and objectives of the new constitutions. The
socio-economic function of the property clause is therefore clearly to protect existing property
relations while, at the same time, consciously endeavouring to correct historical imbalances.Ï"
Obviously, private law will serve as a point of departure and orientation, but protection of
proprietary relations against the state should be based on the Constitution itself, taking into
account the fundamental purpose of the Constitutional bill of rights in general and the property
clause in particular. In other words, the protection of the property clause must always function in
the broader framework of establishing and maintaining a just and equitable balance between the
protection of existing property rights and the protection of the public interest in regulating the
use of property.Ï" This balance, together with the values of an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, the promotion of equality and freedom, should determine the extent to
which rights are protected.
2.2.2. Interests included in the protective ambit of section 25 Fe
Although section 25(4) FC786 functions as a definition clause within the property guarantee, it
does not address all problems of interpretation. The new property clause further does not contain
a numerus clausus of proprietary interests that deserve protection, and it is still up to the courts
and the legislature to define the limits of constitutional property.
Constitutions usually do not create new property rights.787 The rights already exist in law. The
function of the constitution is to restrict itself to describing the circumstances under which those
rights may be limited or removed. In South Africa, like in most other jurisdictions, the minimum
requirement for an interest to qualify as constitutional property seems to be that it must have
vested in the claimant. In other words, the right must have accrued according to the relevant
principles of common or statutory law. It is, therefore, something more than a mere expectation.
Further, the interest must, of course, have some kind of patrimonial value.788
The likelihood of certain proprietary interests being protected or not, enables one to create
different categories of interests. In what follows, the protection of various possible categories of
inclusion of socio-economic rights in the bill of rights might represent a strong commitment to overcome this
legacy, but could well remain an empty promise if the state is unable to tum around the economic tide.
784 Kroeze 1994 SAPRlPL 325.
785 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 71.
786 S 25(4) FC: "For the purposes of this section - (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and (b) property is not
limited to land."
787 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh 1, 10.
788 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 353.
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rights will be discussed.789 To determine whether a specific interest qualifies for protection, the
most important point to remember is that a balance must be struck between private property
interests and the public weal. Therefore, the inclusion of a specific proprietary interest within the
protective ambit of the constitutional property clause will depend - at least to some extent - on
the influence that protecting such an interest will have on the common good.
The first category would contain those instances where rights would so obviously exist, and
those interests that can so clearly be regarded as constitutional "property," that the "threshold"
question would barely need to be asked.79o This category would then at least include the
traditional private law rights to movable or immovable corporeal things and real rights.791 Most
probably, rights of usc (as opposed to ownership) with regard to immovable property would also
be included in this category, even though they are usually derived from contract or legislation.
Although these rights are not covered by the term "property" in the traditional (private law) sense
of the word, they are usually protected in other jurisdictions once they have vested and their
protection is socially justifiable.792
2.2.2.2. Other "private law" and commercial rights
The second category contain those interests which would probably only be protected once it is
proved that the "right" at stake exists and that it is worthy of being included in the protective
ambit of the property clause. Proof of such a right would usually be sufficient qualification for
protection.
Immaterial property rights (like copyright, patents, trademarks, confidential commercial
information, and so on) could for instance form an important part of this category. Furthermore
established and well-known commercial rights based on contract (like debts, claims, goodwill
and shares in a company) could also be included. Among these, land-use rights based on
contract, court orders or legislation are especially important in the context of the Final
Constitution. Such rights can even be protected vis-a-vis a private landowner if it is in the
interest of the public at large.
2.2.2.3. Benefits granted by the state
The third category could contain debts and claims against the state not based on contract.793 In
this context, one should distinguish between incorporeal participation rights (like rights to
789 The categorisation of Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 63 66 is used as point of departure
for the following discussion.
790 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 63.
791 Van der Walt 1994 TIl/UIR 193; Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds)
Constitutional Law (1996) eh 31, 4.
792 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 63.
793 Reich 1964 Yale Ll calls these interests the "new property" based on "state largesse." Cf n 57 supra.
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receive pensions and social security) and right connected to corporeal property, such as land. The
protection of both kinds of rights as "property" in terms of a constitutional guarantee could be
problematic, but the latter category in particular can be a rather difficult nut to crack. Therefore,
these subcategories of rights will be discussed separately.
2.2.2.3.1. Incorporeal participation rights
Incorporeal participation rights include a variety of claims emanating from what is usually
understood to be the field of public law. Licences, permits and quotas are included in this
category, as well as some rights pertaining to the social security and welfare of citizens.
Licences, permits and quotas issued by the state would probably be regarded as property and
protected if they have vested in the claimant and if they are regarded as valuable assets.
However, protection of social security rights through a mechanism like the constitutional
property clause needs further reflection.
Some scholars utilise the broad definition of property provided by section 25(4) FC to extend
constitutional protection to pensions, social and unemployment security, medical benefits and
similar grants.794 However, protection in this area is mostly problematic, and the qualifying
criteria differ slightly in various comparable jurisdictions. The courts will, however, first have to
consider these interests carefully before any clear guidelines in this regard can be assumed. Here
the application of the social welfare state principle could play a significant role in the South
African context.
Up to now the South African courts have treated the definition of constitutional property with
great caution. This is illustrated by the decision in Transkei Public Servants Association v
Government of the Republic of South Africa.795 In this case the High Court inter alia had to deal
with the question of whether or not housing subsidy benefits that were formerly granted to
Transkeian civil servants796 were fundamental property rights protected by section 28 IC. The
validity of various provisions of the Public Service Staff Code797 relating to housing subsidies
was at stake. Although the court refrained from determining whether a state housing subsidy was
794 Devenish Commentary (1998) 71; Davis, Cheadle, & Haysom Fundamental Rights (1997) 255; Underkuffler
1990 Yale LJ 127.
795 19959 BCLR 1235 (Tk).
796 These housing subsidies were found to be considerably higher than similar subsidies for Public Service
employees in South Africa, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Venda. Therefore the Staff Code determined that the higher
housing subsidies would still be afforded to the Transkeian civil servants for a period of six months, and that they
would thereafter receive the uniform amount laid down in the Code.
797 This code was issued in fulfilment of s 42 of the Public Service Act of 1994 (promulgated by Proclamation 103
of 1994) which required the Public Service Commission (established by s 209 IC) to devise a Public Service Staff
Code, the provisions of which would be binding upon all government departments and the public servants employed
by these departments. This was supposed to establish uniformity in the terms and conditions of employment of all
public servants in the whole of South Africa's national territory, therefore also in the formerly "independent" states
of Venda, Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Transkei, which each had its own statute governing the conditions of
employment in the Public Service.
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covered by the meaning of "property" in section 28 IC,798 it made some valuable obiter
observations about the scope of the constitutional property concept.
The court acknowledged that tbe meaning of "property" in section 28 IC might well be
sufficiently wide to encompass a housing subsidy benefit.799 The language of the Constitution
had to be given a generous and purposive interpretation,8oo especially since academics have on
the basis of comparative legal analysis expressed the view that the constitutional property
concept was not restricted to corporeal things, but rather extended to a variety of social and
economic interests and benefits.sol However, the court also remarked that, even if it could be
decided that housing subsidies could be included within the protective scope of section 28 IC,
the reduction of the Transkeian housing subsidy by the Staff Code802 would be a reasonable and
justifiable limitation of the right. It would, furthermore, not negate the essential content of that
right, the purpose being to effect uniformity of housing subsidy grants in the South African civil
service.
2.2.2.3.2. Rights granted by the state and based on traditional corporeal property
Another problem is posed by the intricate system of land rights, which has developed in South
Africa over the past century. The land tenure system based on the ideology of apartheid resulted
in the vast majority of the population being able to hold land only in accordance with customary
law (or purported codifications of it), or in terms of other statutory regimes, like the permits-
based system of land rights. Statutory permits were usually issued in terms of subordinate
legislation defining the rights and obligation of the permit holder and those who occupy the land
through him or her.so3 Such a permit conferred a statutory right to occupy land, which resembled
a personal right rather than a real right. The circumstances under which these permit-based rights
could be withdrawn from the bolders were extensively defined in legislation. Moreover, under
almost all of these systems, holders of land did not have the capacity to dispose of it.804
Constitutional analysts are consequently faced with the question of whether these land rights
should be protected, and, if so, to what extent. For instance, in terms of customary law, an
individual's interests in land consist of (i) the "right to avail" - an entitlement of a member of a
798 1247A. The application failed on other grounds. It was determined (1247 B-G) that the Interim Constitution did
not intend protecting property rights in the broad sense flowing from the employment relationship between civil
servants and the State during the transitional period. The bases of the decision was s 236(4) IC, which provided for
the enactment of laws to establish uniformity of terms and conditions of employment of civil servants and
s 236(5) IC, which expressly precluded the reduction of the pensionable salary or pensionable salary scale of civil
servants below that which prevailed immediately before the commencement of the Consritunen. The latter provision
was the only protection of this kind afforded to civil servants. No other protection was intended by the Interim
Constitution. Besides, the court reasoned that certain reductions in benefits were inevitable in order to achieve
uniformity.
799 1246J - 1247A.
800 1245H.
SOl 1246B-J.
802 Chapter D XX.
80J Eg proclamation R293 and the case of DVB Behuising ensuing from a continued reliance upon the permit-based
right established through proclamation R293. Cf 30 I et seq infra. Budlender & Latsky 1990 SAJHR 155.
804 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh I, 20.
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tribe to claim an allotment of land - and (ii) the individual's right to benefit from land already
allotted. 80SThe latter could be included within the protection of the constitution, as it is based on
the right to exclude others. The "right to avail" could be construed as analogous to a benefit
granted by the state,806and protected as such.
The concept "rights in land" is certainly not limited to ownership of land. It is submitted that the
new constitutional property concept can be extended to bring the right to hold land in terms of a
statutory permit or customary law under its protection.F" These rights should qualify for
constitutional protection, because they constitute special benefits granted by the state that fall
within the protective ambit of the constitutional property clause.
2.2.3. The nature of property under the constitution
From a traditional liberalist viewpoint, property is regarded not only as the most important
private law right, but also as the most important fundamental right.808The constitutional concept
of property might therefore overlap in some respects with the private law concept of ownership.
These two concepts should, nevertheless, be kept apart as far as possible, as the purpose of the
constitutional protection of property differs considerably from that of the protection of property
in private law. The latter aims at insulating the rights under discussion from an invasion or
interference not based on the owner's permission. The former aims at striking a just and equitable
balance between the interest of private property holders and the public interest in the control and
regulation of the use of property.f'"
It is, therefore, submitted that the material content of property in the constitution differs from the
property concept in private law. These concepts might, however, overlap to some extent. In
principle, the structural relation (owner - third parties - res) underlying property and ownership
in private law remains unaltered in the constitutional context. However, the kind of protection
afforded to holders of property rights change as soon as the state (as representative of the public
interest) is involved in the property relations. The material concept of property is, therefore,
much broader in terms of the constitutional provisions than under private law. The main reason
for this is that the social function of property is an important consideration in determining which
kinds of rights should be protected under the constitutional guarantee of property, thus allowing
a more diversified description of property.
According to one of the first commentaries on the new South African constitution."? the drafting
of section 28 IC was inspired by the modem concept of property as a bundle of rights. This has
induced some authors811 to equate the bundle afrights theory812 (or conceptual severance, as it is
805 Bennett Human Rights & African Customary Law (1995) 133, 144 - 145.
806 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh 1,20.
807 Cf eg the minority decision in the D VB Behuising case. Cf 281 et seq infra.
808 Kroeze 1994 SAPRJPL 326 and sources quoted there.
809 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 67.
810 Cachalia, Cheadle, Davis et al Fundamental Rights (1994) 91 - 92.
811 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 95.
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sometime referred to in constitutional law circles) with the movement towards a diversified and
socially functional concept of ownership. The bundle of rights theory was juxtaposed against the
"now rather outdated conception of property as thing-ownership." These authors cited the use of
the term rights in property in the Interim Constitution in support of their argument. Although the
term rights in property does not occur in the Final Constitution, supporters of conceptual
severance claim that this theory is still applicable.813
However, if one accepts that the constitutional concept of property is in principle much broader
than the private law concept of property, the bundle of rights theory has very little to contribute
to the development of the constitutional concept of property. Moreover, such an approach is not
in line with the objectives of the constitution regarding the property clause. If property is to be
interpreted in the constitutional context according to the bundle of rights theory, a regulatory
action by the state affecting one of the "rights" in the "bundle" may have unanticipated
consequences. It can happen that the state removes one of the entitlements constituting
ownership, without intending it to be an expropriation, for which compensation needs to be paid.
An illustration would be the case where the state introduces rent control and thus removes the
right of the owner to determine the rent or the right to terminate a tenancy. In terms of the private
law concept of ownership, actions like these are not regarded as expropriation and consequently
no compensation needs to be paid. However, if the bundle of rights theory arc applied to the
situation, it could mean that the withdrawal of one of the "sticks" (in this case the powers of
termination or setting the rent) constitute an expropriation of that particular "right in" property.
This would give rise to the duty to cornpensate.t" Thus, any form of regulation of the exercise of
rights in property - for example town planning regulations, zoning laws, environmental
regulation and public health regulations - could be susceptible to the argument that it is an
expropriation of one of the rights in property, which would be unlawful unless compensation is
providcd.i" This would not be conducive to the common good, because it affords right holders
more liberty than the state (and also the public in general) could uphold.
2.3. Evaluation
From the analysis of the provisions of the property clauses in the South African constitutional
order, it seems as if the private law concept of property will be a mere stepping stone to a
broader, more extensive constitutional concept of property. The public interest as well as the
social function attributed to property in the constitutional context will require a broader
interpretation of this term. This will have certain implications for the land reform and
redistribution initiatives of the South African government, which will be briefly mentioned in the
following paragraphs.
m cr 128 supra.
XIJ Van der Walt Constitutional Properly Clauses (1999) 24.
m 24.
RIS Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh I, 17 • 18.
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2.3.1. The "social importance" of property for purposes of definition
Section 28(1) IC referred explicitly to the right to "acquire and hold rights in property and, to the
extent that the nature of the right permits, to dispose of such rights." This indicated that the
extent of the entitlements is determined by their nature and social function. This is in line with
the development of a so-called "socialised" or functional property concept, which has developed
in private law since the 1970's. It is of particular importance for the two-stage approach to human
rights issues that was adopted by the Constitutional Court.816
The remarks made in the case of Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the
Republic of South Africa and Others about the protective ambit of the constitutional property
guarantee indicate the inevitable general tendency to consider the purpose and social function of
constitutionally protecting intangible assets as property. The categorisation of interests possibly
worthy of protection also indicate that the more difficult it is to justify constitutional protection
of an interest on the basis of its "traditional" protection in private law, the more reliance will be
placed on the social importance of that interest as justification for its constitutional protection.
Different considerations apply in the determination of the constitutional concept of property and
the private law definition of property. In terms of private law, interests qualifying as "property"
(or rather as things or res) are unconditionally and absolutely insulated against interference and
invasion not consented to by the owner.817 For the constitutional concept of "ownership" or
"property," the inquiry has to go further than merely recognising the obvious protection usually
afforded to owners in a private-rights context. The land-use rights envisaged for historically
disadvantaged communities and individuals by section 25 FC are in this regard of particular
interest and will therefore be discussed in the context of the effect of the constitutional concept
of public interest on private law rights concerning land.
2.3.2. Property and the public interest
Article 25 FC protects and guarantees property in a way characteristic of the new constitutional
order in general and the bill of rights in particular. Property is included and protected in the bill
of rights, in spite of the negative formulation of the guarantee. Property is, therefore, a genuine
constitutional right. The broad scope of the property concept under the constitution might raise
the question of whether apartheid-based property rights are also constitutionally entrenched.t"
It is submitted that the augmented scope of property protection in terms of the constitution does
not necessarily mean that all rights are unconditionally entrenched. Due to its broader material
content, the constitutional property concept differs from the private law concept of property. It is
merely by chance that the two concepts sometimes overlap. The constitutional property clause
does not really insulate or entrench "private law ownership" as such. It rather protects existing
816 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 351.
817 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 66.
818 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31, 4 - 5.
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rights in the form of derivative rights: by way of a guarantee that attaches only to a certain
entitlement which in fact arises, under existing laws that make provision for it, and that protect
the specific (contingent but actual) entitlement against certain kinds of governmental
impairment.V'' This view corresponds essentially with the German notion of property rights that
are subject to immanent restrictions as embodied in legislation.
The spirit and values of the South African bill of rights indicate that the aim of section 25 FC is
to establish a just and equitable balance between the protection of private property and the
promotion of the public interest. Section 25 FC, in other words, guarantees property without
necessarily falling foul of the liberalist view that the main function of the bill of rights is to
insulate private property from state interference and transformation programmcs.f"
The tension between individual autonomy and the collective good is an element inherent to the
concept of constitutional property. It is impossible to consider any aspect of the constitutional
properly concept without simultaneously considering this tension between and balancing of
different interests. This approach does not have to mean that the proportionality test, which is
supposed to constitute the very last phase in an inquiry about the constitutional validity of an
interference with property, needs to be uprooted and re-applied earlier in the investigation. It also
does not attempt to overthrow the two-stage inquiry into constitutional validity of interference
with fundamental rights. It rather advocates the proper application of the principles of the
constitutional and social state as elements of interpretation throughout the inquiry,821 so as to
establish a less formalistic, more result-oriented approach towards the protection and regulation
of property.822 This simply means that one or the other form of interest-balancing is part of the
entire process, and that the nature and function of the balancing process will differ according to
the stage of the inquiry in which it is employed. In some instances, this kind of balancing of
interests will be similar - but by no means equal - to the clements of proportionality.
The challenge awaiting the courts is that of finding an equitable balance between individual
interests and the public interest. The inclusion of a property clause in the bill of rights does not
per se mean that private property is privileged in relation to the public interest or some public
benefit. J nstcad, it indicates that the court deems it necessary to proceed to the substantive issues
raised in the second stage of the constitutional dispute rather than rule them out of order in the
first stage on the basis of a conceptualist approach to the meaning of the term property.823
SI9CfMicheiman 1981 Wash& LeeLR 1099.
820 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 304.
821 Cf eh 6, 81 ct seq supra.
m Such an approach could have been particularly useful in deciding the questions posed by the case of Harksen v
Lane 1998 I SA 300 (CC). Cf discussion at 241 et seq infra.
m Van der Wall Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 42.
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3. "Eigentum" under German law
In Germany, the same term (Eigentuml24 is used in private and constitutional law to indicate the
proprietary relations that receive protection. It will be shown in the following paragraphs that the
use of this term in constitutional law differs considerably from its use in private law, even though
the constitutional concept of Eigentum and the private law concept of Eigentum have some
elements in common.
3.1. "Eigenturn" in the German Civil Code
The German Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch), which came into force on 1 January 1900, is
based on classical liberal ideology.825 It fosters private autonomy and ownership. The German
Law on property is primarily contained in the third book (Dritter Abschnitt) of the Civil Code.826
Here, the allocation of property (Sachen ) to legal subjects who may have either ownershipv" or
possessionv" of this property is regulated. Other property rights, like rights of use and security
rights, are also regulated.
The third book of the Civil Code is divided into five parts (Titel). These different parts deal with
(i) the content of ownership; (ii) regulations for the acquisition and loss of ownership in
immovable property; (iii) regulations for the acquisition and loss of ownership in movable
property; (iv) the protection of property; and (v) co-ownership. Outside the Civil Code a number
of statutes deal with special aspects of real rights, like the Wohnungseigentumsgesetzï'" the
Erbbauverordnungr'' and the Pachtkreditgesetz. The provisions of the Civil Code on property
law pertain to material (substantive) law only. It does not deal with procedural questions. These
are mainly dealt with in the Grundbuchordnung. Most of the material law on property in the
Civil Code is based on Roman law.831
In view of its constitutionally destined social function, ownership - especially landownership and
ownership of means of production - is subject to several economically inspired limitations, or
824 Cf Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 413 where it is indicated that the correct translation of Eigentum in art 14 GG is
"property" rather than merely "ownership." This is furthermore clear from the official translation and from the fact
that a far wider range of proprietary interests than ownership in the private law sense is protected under this article.
825 CfOlzen 1994 JuS 328 - 335.
826 Par 854 - 1296. Par 90 - 103 BGB provide definitions of the basic legal terms, such as "thing" (Sachen),
"component" (Bestandteile, Zubehër, Inventar), and "fruit" (Friichte).
827 Eigentum, that is, legal control over an object.
828 Besitz, that is, factual control over an object.
829 Gesetz ilber das Wohnungseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht.
830 Gesetz Ober Maj3nahmen zur Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und zur Sicherung land- und forstwirtschaflicher
Betriebe.
831 Foster German Legal System (1996) 278. The land registration system in Germany has its own origin: After
political unification of Germany in 1871, a cadastral survey was undertaken, on the basis of which the whole of the
German territory was divided into numbered plots. This survey, together with its associated taxation registers, is the
foundation of the land registration system. In case of a numbered plot belonging to a private persons, the name of
the owner is entered into the land register (Grundbuch). Such an entry can indicate a change oflegal position, and is
constitutive of ownership. Erasures or strikings through of any kind are prohibited. If an entry has to be cancelled, it
needs to be underlined in red, and a cancellation note needs to be made. Southern 1993 ICLQ 691.
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limitations pertaining to building regulations, town planning and environmental protection.832
The following paragraphs contain a description of the place of ownership within the structure of
German property law, the characteristics of ownership and its significance for property
protection under the German Basic Law.
3.l.l. General structure of rights in rem under the Civil Code
According to paragraph 903 BGB read with paragraph 908GB, the rights in rem pertain to both
corporeal movables and immovables.Y' Because of the different rules applicable to immovable
and movable property, these two subject areas are usually treated separately in commentaries on
the Civil Code. The distinction between movable and immovable property is relevant with
respect to the modes of acquisition and the types of real rights available, as well as with regard to
the kind of publicity required in order to protect third parties or the public in genera1.834
Although the distinction does not have any noticeable theoretical effect as to the quality of
property rights, it does have practical implications due to the impact of public law - especially
planning and environmental laws - on land.
Under the civil law, the owner has a "right" of control (Herrschaftsrecht) over the object at stake,
which means that he or she can uphold the rights and entitlements pertaining to the res against
anyone and everyone. In this sense, ownership (like all other rights in rem) is theoretically
absolute. This should be contrasted with the effect of contractual or obligatory rights, which bind
only parties to the agreements that give rise to such rights.835 The absolute legal effect of real
rights on third parties poses a risk to the public in general. In order to enable third parties to
assess the scope of possible risks arising from another person's "absolute" rights, the instances
recognised by law as having absolute legal effect need to be defined clearly. This is done in the
Civil Code by, on the one hand, allowing only a limited category of real rights to exist,836 and, on
the other hand, prescribing limitations on the so-called full rights.837
Herrscliaftsrechte are, therefore, restricted by law and standardised to a large extent. The
freedom to develop new categories of rights, characteristic for the law of obligations, does not
exist in the property law under the Civil Code. Variations that do not fall within the categories of
rights in terms provided by the Civil Code are considered void. In order to have absolute effect,
particular forms of rights must be observed. This results in a numerus clausus of real rights
contained in the Civil Code,838 which is also known as the principles of Typenzwang and
Typenfixierung. The principle of Typenzwang means that only those forms of the right that have
832 Avenarius Rechtsordnung (1997) 168.
S33 Schuppcrt "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988) 108.
83~ Publicity is integrated into the act of transferring or establishing a real right. With movables, for instance,
publicity entails the actual handing over of the res. With immovables, the publicity requirement is met with entry of
the change in the legal position in the land register (Grundbuch).
83S Ebke & Finkin (eds) Introdl/ction (1996) 229.
836 Baur & Sturner Sachel/recht (1999) 27; COl/traWieling Sachel/recht (1994) 6,8.
m Seiler "Yorbem" in Standingers Kommentor (Drittes Buell Sachenrecht) (1996) mn 7.
838 Westennann BGB-Saehenrecht (1994) mn 4; Ebke & Finkin (eds) introduction (1996) 230.
148
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
[7J The relevance of the concept of property for protection under constitutional and private law
been established by law can be created and exercised.839 Typenfixierung determines that the
content or the substance of a particular real right cannot be varied. The effect of this is that
property rights can only be established in the way provided for by the Civil Code and
supplementary legislation, making property law rather rigid.84o
Nevertheless, the Federal Court of Justice protects certain relative (personal) rights by affording
them "real effect." This happens when a specific relative right is consistent with a specific legal
position. For instance, the lessee of an apartment enjoys legal protection against the infringement
of his or her rights pertaining to occupation of that apartment, which is quite similar to the
protection afforded an owner of such an apartment. The lessee holds a "quasi-real right," which
can be enforced even against the owner of the apartment. Such "quasi-real rights" do not qualify
as real rights in the true sense of the word, as they only have some of the characteristics of real
rights.841
Another example is found in the treatment of so-called Sondernutzungsrechte. These are rights
of exclusive use over the common property, which forms part of an apartment ownership scheme
to an apartment building. According to paragraphs 10 I and 15 I WEG,842 these rights are
contractual in nature, but paragraph 10 II WEG provides that these rights can be registered in the
Grundbuch upon request by the interested parties. Accordingly, the Federal Court of Justice
determinedr" that, when a Sondernutzungsrecht has been registered, the right is not "purely
contractual" in nature any more, but through registration has acquired real effect (dingliche
Wirkung). The theoretical tenability of distinguishing between "real" real rights and personal.
rights "with real effect" is questionable and has been debated extensively by the German
authors.844
3.1.2. The concept of "Eigentum" under the Civil Code
Ownership is described in paragraph 903 BGB as the right to dispose of a res at will and, to the
extent that the law and the rights of third parties permit, exclude others from interference with
the res:845
903 [Befugnisse des Eigentiimers] Der Eigentiimer einer Sache kann, soweit nicht das Gesetz oder
Rechte Dritter entgegenstehen, mit der Sache nach Belieben verfahren und andere von jeder
Einwirkung ausschliej3en.
According to most of the commentators.t" this provision technically contains no definition of
ownership. The circumscription of the owner's entitlements and their limitation by law and by
839 Wieling Sachenrecht (1994) 8.
840 Foster German Legal System (1996) 280.
841 Baur & Sturner Sachenrecht (1999) 28.
842 Wohnungseigentumsgesetz (Apartment Ownership Act).
843 BGHZ 73, 146 148.
844 Schnauder "Die Relativitat der Sondemutzungsrechte" 1990 Festschrift fur Johannes Bármann und Hermann
Weitnauer 567 et seq.
845 Translation: "[Entitlements of the owner] The owner of a thing (res) can, as far as the law or the rights of third
parties do not prohibit, act with that thing (res) at will and can exclude others from interfering with it."
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the rights of third parties is not regarded as a technical definition of ownership.Ï" It is also
apparently accepted in most of the recent commentaries that a technical definition of Eigentum
would be merely of theoretical significance, and therefore the issue is mostly avoided.848 Instead,
focus is placed on the object of ownership, the entitlements of the owner and the limitations on
ownership, in an attempt to sever the concept of ownership from its content.849 The following
paragraphs provide a brief overview of the object of ownership and the entitlements of the owner
under German law, as well as the limitations on the right of ownership.
3.1.2.1. Object of ownership and entitlements of the owner
Paragraph 90 BGB determines that only corporeal objects can qualify as things (res) within the
meaning of the law. This includes movable as well as immovable objects, but is still a much
narrower definition of property than that which is found in the constitutional context.8SO
Moreover, in terms of the Civil Code, ownership can vest only with regard to these corporeal
objects. By contrast, other real rights - like Nieflbrauch (usufruct) or Pfandrecht (pledge) - can
also have a right as object.85I
ISO
The identity of the ownership concept is read into paragraph 903 BGB by the commentators,
who regards ownership as the most comprehensive right of control permitted by law with regard
to the res.8S2 As such, Eigentum has a position superior to that of other real rights. It is tbe all-
embracing right ill rem. According to paragraph 903 BGB, the owner can act with his or her res
at own discretion and can exclude others from infringing upon the res. This provision thus
ascribes a positive and a negative nucleus of meaning to the entitlements of the owner: Property
rights can be used actively, allowing the owner to use the property in specific ways, but it can
also be used in defence, to preclude third parties from interfering with it. This constitutes a
description of ownership on the basis of the entitlements, combined with the decisive
characteristic of cxclusivity.f"
(i) The owner's ability to act with the res upon own discretion constitutes the positive
"power" (Rechtsmacht) of ownership. It includes, infer alia, use and abuse, alteration,
846 Cf Seiler "Vorbcm" in Staudingers Kommentor (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) mn 6; Seiler, Roth & Kohler
in Standingers Kommentor (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 2; Baur & Stërncr Sachenrecht (1999) 268
provides a discussion of its characteristics without providing a definition.
W COl/tra Wieling Sachenrecht (1994) 81.
84& Baur & Sturncr Sachenrecht (1999) 268; Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers KOII/II/entar (Drittes Buch
Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 7; Eckert Sachenrecht (1999) mn 114. Cf Olzcn 1984 JuS 328 - 336 for an historical
overview of the development of the concept of ownership in civil law and the polemical discussion (around 1973)
about the continued relevance of the concept of ownership in view of the increasing number of public law
limitations on ownership. Cf also Sontis "Strukturelle Berrachtungcn zum Eigcnturnsbcgriff" 1973 Festschrift
Lorenz 981 ct seq.
&.190Izen 1984 JuS 328 - 329.
850 Cf 156 infra.
851 Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommenter (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 3.
852 Baur & Starner Sachenrecht (1999) 269; Seiler "Yorbem" in Staudingers Kommentor (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht)
(1996) mn 6; Eckert Sachenrecht (1999) mn 114; Westermann BGB-Saehellrecht (1994) mn 103.
H5J Westermann 13CIJ-Sachenrecht (1994) mn 42; Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommentor (Drittes Buell
Sachenrccht} (1996) § 903 mn 2.
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consumption, and destruction of the res. The owner can also transfer, encumber, bequeath or
abandon the res. 854
(ii) The negative component of the owner's "power" (Rechtsmacht) comprises the
characteristic of exclusivity that is attributed to ownership. The owner can exclude all arbitrary
infringements on the res by third parties, for instance, change of possession, use and abuse,
alterations, consumption, damage or destruction of the res by the third party, or infringement of
the owner's legal position pertaining to the res. Several legal remedies are at the disposal of the
owner in case of infringement by third parties: On the one hand, the owner can act in self-
defence and self-help (for instance, acting under Notwehri" Notstancf56 or Selbsthilfe.857) On
the other hand, several legislative mechanisms (like claims for vindication of the res,858 claims
for abatement of hindrance.f'" and claims for correction of entries in the land register, 860) ensure
extensive protection of the owners' rights and entitlements.f"
However, it is also agreed that even a comprehensive right of control over certain objects cannot
be without limits. Therefore, the Civil Code immediately after stating the entitlements of the
owner determines the limitations on those entitlements.f''' Further, in the case of neighbouring
pieces of land or pieces of land situated close to each other, it can also happen that the positive
"powers" of one landowner can collide with the negative "powers" of his or her neighbours or
the other owners of adjacent land. Here the law has placed some restrictions on the entitlements
of owners.
3.1.2.2. Limitations on the right of ownership
In paragraph 903 BGB it is provided that the owner of a thing may, so far as the law and the
rights of other do not oppose, manage the thing as he or she likes and may exclude others from
interfering with it. This phrase means that certain laws and rights of third parties give determine
content of the right of ownership and set the limits of an owner's entitlements.Ï'" so that he or she
can only exercise the inherent positive and/or negative "powers" to a certain degree. Paragraph
903 BGB foresees two kinds of limitations on the right of ownership: limitations by normative
law and limitations by the interests of third parties. Normative law includes constitutional law,
statutory law as well as subordinate legislation.l'"
854 Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommentar (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 10. Cf also BGH
NIW 1994, 188.)
855 Par 277 BGB.
856 Par 228,904 BGB.
857 Par 229 BGB.
858 Par 985, 823 BGB.
859 Par 1004 BGB.
860 Par 894 BGB.
861 Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommentar (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn Il -12.
862 Par 903 - 924 BGB (Erster Titel).
863 Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommentar (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 13.
864 Mn 14.
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Most limitations by normative law stem from public law, and are contained in legislation of
either the federation or the different Lander, or both. In the field of building and construction
law86s (Bauordnungsrecht, Bauplanungsrecht, Bundesbaurecht) several building and security
regulations866 can result in a limitation of the owner's right. Further, in agricultural law
(Agrarrecht;B67 strict provision868 on the alienation and subdivision of land limits the subdivision
of agricultural land into units that are not economically viable. According to forestry laws
(Forstrecht), 869 owners of forestland have to abide by timber felling quotas, and have to
reafforest in keeping with prescribed rules. Similarly, many environmental law provisions87o
limit the rights of owners. For instance, owners of dangerous industrial and nuclear plants need
special permission for establishment, in accordance with the Federal Act on Protection against
Intromission'i" and the Atom Act.872 Certain buildings are protected as ancient or historical
monuments by provincial legislation.I" Provisions in these statutes can have a restrictive effect
on the entitlements of the owners, as can the statutes in traffic law.874
In the field of private law, the neighbour law provisions of the Civil Code and corresponding
legislation contain certain limitations on the right to ownership. The Civil Code itself contains
only rudimentary provisions pertaining to the limitation of an owner's rights with regard to
immovable property by that of his or her neighbours. Paragraph 905 BGB contains the principle
cuius est solum, eius est usque ad caelurn et ad inferos. However, it also states that the owner
cannot prohibit infringements in the area above or below his or her land if he or she has no
interest in the exclusion of such infringements. More specific regulations on the mutual rights
and duties of neighbours are contained in the legislation of the different German Lêinder.87s
Paragraphs 905 to 924 BGB deal with various aspects of neighbour law: emission, encroachment
of buildings and plants and various duties to eliminate dangers. In principle the effect of these
provisions is that the limitation of the owner's entitlements constitutes an assertion of the
ownership entitlements of his or her neighbour.
Another general limitation is found in paragraph 9048GB, which deals with the infringement on
property rights by a third party in cases of urgent necessity (Notstand). Simultaneously, this
paragraph, read with paragraph 228 BGB, provides justification for infringing the property of
anothcr.876
86~Cf Baugesetzbuch.
866 Eg par 14, IS, 19 - 23, 24 and 85, Bougesetzbuch.
867 Grundstiicksverkehrsgesetz,
1168 Par 2, 9, Grundstiicksverkehrsgesetz; Flurbereinigungsgesetz,
86'1 Bundeswaldgesetz,
R70 Eg Bundesnaturschutzgesetz; Wasserhaushaltsgesetz,
M71 B dest .. Ilil/ esunnusstonssc tutzgesetz,
sn Atomgesetz.
Mn F. l'.g Ham »urger Deukmalschutzgesetz,
M74 Eg Luftverkehrgesetz; Bundeswasscrstroflengesetz; Telegraphenwegegesetz,
H7S Cf Seiler "Vorbem" in Standingers Kommen/ar (Driues Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) mn 8 and the reference
provided there,
87(, Cf MOiler Sachenrecht (1997) mn 302 - 317;
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However, the most important general limitation on ownership under the Civil Code appears in
paragraph 903 BGB itself. The absolute rights of third parties that affect ownership in a specific
case determine the content of the right to ownership. The rights of third parties pertaining to a
specific object of ownership are external limitations on the right to property.877 Such rights
would include the limited real rights with regard to the thing (res), like Erbbaurecht (heritable
building right), Dienstbarkeiten (servitudes) and Pfandrechte (pledge). As these rights enable the
holders thereof to exercise some entitlements in terms of the thing (res), they limit the power of
disposal of the owner.878However, personal rights are not regarded as limitations on ownership
as such, as these rights are not absolutely enforceable and only bind the owner in his capacity as
party to the agreement which gives rise to rights like these.879
3.1.3. The Civil Code's ownership concept from the perspective of the Basic Law
It is generally accepted that, under the German Civil Code, ownership has a standardised base
(einheitlichen Basis) as formulated (but not defined) by paragraph 903 BGB. As for the question
of enforceability, ownership is seen as an absolute right (Vollrecht / Herrschaftsrecht), but that
does not mean that ownership is also absolute with regard to content. Many restrictions on
ownership, whether it is as a result of public law, private law or the rights of third parties, have
to be tolerated by the owners.880
One of the most basic aspects of the German society is that individuals are given the freedom to
set and fulfil their own goals, thus freely developing their personalities. This is not possible
without a substratum of objects over which the individual can exercise contro1.881Ownership is
seen as personal freedom to exercise control over things or objects.882 However,
acknowledgement of the right of ownership (that is, the freedom to control own objects) vis-á-vis
other legal subjects does not explain how the interest of the owner should be balanced against the
interests of public at large. That is a question oflegal policy, the content of which is in Germany
determined by the Basic Law. The legislature is allowed to determine the content and limits of
ownership, but is not allowed to negate the essence of the right. However, since a social function
is ascribed to ownership, certain entitlements flowing from ownership are sometimes restricted
without being compensated.
In principle, therefore, the Basic Law determines the relation between owners and the state. On
the one hand, it determines the extent to which the state can infringe the owners' entitlements. On
the other hand, it also determines to what extent owners can protect themselves against
infringement by the state. Especially with regard to the latter part of the equation the Civil Code's
conception of ownership plays an important role. Article 14 GG provides no definition of
877 Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II (1991) mn 997.
878 Muller Sachenrecht (1997) mn 291; Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommentar (Drittes Buch
Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 25; Wieling Sachenrecht (1994) 82.
879 Seiler, Roth & Kohler in Staudingers Kommentar (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) § 903 mn 25.
880 Seiler "Vorbem" in Staudingers Kommentar (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht) (1996) mn 6.
881 Wieling Sachenrecht (1994) 79; BVerfGE 50, 290 339; BVerfGE 68, 193222.
882 BVerfGE 24,389; BVerfGE 31, 239; BGHZ 6, 276.
153
St llenbos h University http://schola .sun.ac.za
Parr Three: The Constitutional Inquiry into Properly Protection and its Relevance/or the Extsting Properly Order
Eigen/urn. This raises the question as to the importance of the meaning attached to ownership in
the Civil Code for the constitutional context.
Although it has formerly been acknowledged in Germany that the nature of ownership had to be
determined mainly by private law,883 the more recent common opinion is that notion of property
ascribed by private law cannot be equally authoritative for constitutional purposes.i" The
properly concept prevalent in constitutional law is dualistic. On the one hand article 14 GG
limits the protection of property to that which guarantees a minimum of patrimonial rights
enabling an adequate flexibility of activity. In other words, it constitutes an institutional
guarantee of property. On the other hand article 14 GG also contains an individual guarantee of
property, through which the property concept is enlarged. This harks back to article 153 of the
Weimar Constitution, which contained a property clause almost identical to that of article 14
GG. Under article 153 of the Weimar Constitution, an enlarged concept of property rights was
appl ied for purposes of interpretation. The extent of the constitutional guarantee in the
Constitution of the Weimar Republic included not only material things (res), but also financial
assets (including all categories of titles to movable and immovable things), creditor's rights and
"rights" of membership in associations.i"
After the Basic Law came into force, the Federal Court of Justice continued to apply this more
extensive concept of property for purposes of interpreting the Basic Law.8SG The Federal Court of
Justice reasoned that property should be interpreted in the light of its historical development
under the Civil Code. This reasoning was supported by the early decisions of the Federal
Constitutional Court.887 ln this line of reasoning, the Deichordnung decision888 is the most telling
example of the Federal Constitutional Court's earlier emphasis on the overriding importance of
private law in defining the content and limits of property. The logic of these cases was eroded
when the Federal Constitutional Court decided to develop a constitutional concept of property
that is derived from the Constitution itself.
m Leisner "Eigenrurn" in Isensee & Kuchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 73 - 74. The Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany declared in 1952 (BVerfGE I, 264 278 - 279) that the notion of property, as used in the Basic Law
constitutes the legal institution of property, as it has been formed by civil law and by the views prevailing in society
(t'das Rechtsinstitut Eigentums, so wie es das biirgerliche Recht und die gesellschaftlichen Anschauungen geformt
haben"). German eivil law defines property rights as the sum of legally permitted dominance over an object: The
relevant section (par 903 T BGB) reads: "Der Eigentitnier einer Sactie kann, soweit nicht das Gesetz oder Rechte
Driller entgegenstehen, mit der Sac/le nach Betteben verfahren IIl1dandere \/011 jeder Einwirkung ausschlieflen. "
(Translation: The owner of a thing may, in as far as the law and the rights of others do not oppose, manage the thing
according to his pleasure, and may exclude others from any interference with it.) However, the scope of application
of the Civil Law Code is limited to material objects only (par 908GB). These definitions nevertheless do not lcad to
the conclusion that the Basic Law protects only ownership rights directed at material objects, ie movable and
immovable things. Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Intpact oj lntemational Law
(1987) 76.
HH4 Sehuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution oJ Germany (1988) 108.
MRS Kimminieli "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and impact oj III/emotional Law (1987) 76;
RGZ 109, 319 and confirmed by RGZ 111,320; RGZ 129, 146.
HHh BUIIZ 6, 270.
HK7 BVerfGE 1,264278; BVerfGE 11,6470; BVerfGE 28, 119142.
NHM BVerfGE 24,367.
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3.2. The shift from a private law based concept of property
to a "purely" constitutional meaning of property
In 1981, with the handing down of the famous NaJ3ausldesung decision,889 the court departed
from its own previous view (to consider property in the light of its historical development under
the Civil Code) and expounded the boundaries of public control. The Federal Supreme Court
questioned the validity of the Water Resources Act,890a federal statute interfering with the right
of an owner to dispose of the groundwater under his or her property. Designed to preserve public
water supplies against contamination or other uses damaging to the public welfare, the Federal
Water Resources Act required any person whose activities affected the quantity or quality of
groundwater to procure a permit granted for limited periods and specified purposes sanctioned
by law. The plaintiff owned and operated a gravel pit near Munster. For decades he had freely
used the groundwater beneath his property for the purpose of extracting gravel. This unlimited
use of groundwater was restricted in 1968 with the creation of a new water conservation district
by the city of Rheine. The quarry was located within the district and near the city's water wells.
Because these wells were threatened by the quarry operation, the city denied the operator a
permit to use the water beneath his property. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the
plaintiff sued the province of North Rhine-Westphalia for damages, claiming that the denial of
the permit for wet gravel extraction violated his right to property as well as his right to pursue his
profession. He was successful in the court of first instance. The court there relied on the
traditional kind of property protection afforded to owners under paragraph 903 BGB, and argued
that the right to property encompasses every possible and economically reasonable utilisation of
that property. On appeal, the Federal Court of Justice referred the case to the Federal
Constitutional Court for adjudication. The decision of the Constitutional Court's at the time came
as somewhat of a surprise to property lawyers.
The Federal Supreme Court, on the basis of paragraph 905 BGB,891held that the right to dispose
of the groundwater found on the premises is part of the property rights inherent to ownership and
that the Water Resources Act892therefore violated a right which was indigenous to property.l'"
The Constitutional Court rejected this decision.I" It concluded that the objections raised against
the legal regulation of groundwater was based on the mistaken assumption that groundwater
would be legally inseparable from the right to property.f" In the constitutional context, this
889 BVerfGE 58 225 (Naj3auskiesung) 300.
890 Wasserhaushaltsgesetz (in its amended version of 16.10.1976).
891 This section is the embodiment of the Roman Law principle Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad cae/um et ad
inferos, and reads: "Das Recht des Eigentiimers eines Grundstiicks erstreckt sich auf den Raum uber der Oberfliiche
und auf den Erdkarper unter der Oberflëche ... "Translation: " The right of the owner to a piece of land extends to
the space above the surface and to the terrestrial body under the surface ...".
892 Wasserhaushaltsgesetz.
893 In the eyes of the Federal Supreme Court, the Water Resources Act amounted to an expropriation of property
because it constituted an EingrifJin die Privatrechtssphare, that is to sayan "infringement in the private sphere".
894 BVerfGE 58, 300 (Naj3auskiesung) 332 - 333. This rejection was based on the argument that, in spite of
s 905 BGB, the right to control the flow of groundwater has been reserved for the provincial legislatures in that the
power to regulate Water Law lay within their exclusive competence.
895 BVerfGE 58, 300 (Naj3auskiesung) 335.
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argument did not assist the plaintiff. According to the court, it was incorrect to assume that the
Water Resources Act would lead to erosion of the substance of the right to property.896
It was held that the constitutional meaning of ownership could neither be deduced from ordinary
statutes, which ranked lower than the Constitution, nor could the scope of the property guarantee
be determined on the basis of private law regulations.897 The significance of this decision for the
German concept of property becomes clear through an analysis of the concept of property in
terms of the Basic Law.
3.3. "Eigentum" in the German Basic Law
The Basic Law docs not contain a definition of the concept of ownership in the constitutional
context.898 Article 14 [ 1GG is phrased in general terms: The guarantee could in principle
encompass all conceivable forms of propertl99 and it is left to the legislature to determine which
proprietary interests would qualify for protection.9oo Judicial interpretation is not mentioned in
article 14 [ GG as a possible means of determining the scope and content of property, although
the competence of the ordinary courts to interpret statutory law and the competence of the
Constitutional Court to interpret the Basic Law has never been doubted.?"
The general perception is that article 14 GG protects only existing property relations,902 but the
lack of a constitutional definition of "Eigentum" opens the system of constitutional protection to
the dynamics of development in the German society.903 This means that the legislature and the
Federal Constitutional Court must allow changes in common perceptions to be channelled into
R96 The court explained (348) that property ownership does not result in the loss of usufruct simply because the
owner's right to usc groundwater would be subject to governmental approval. The property owner's right had always
been primarily the right to usc the surface of the property, whereas the right to take material buried in the ground
had always been subject to far-reaching restrictions. Even the right to dispose of surface property was in many ways
subject tot constitutional restriction. The possibility of making meaningful economic use of property as a rule does
not depend on whether or not groundwater can be brought to the surface or used by the owner.
897 BVerfGE 58, ]00 (NajJauskieslillg) 335. "Del' Begriff des VOII del' Verfassung gewdhrleisteten Eigentums mujJ
ails der Verfassung selbst gewonnen werden. Aus Normen des einfoehen Rechts, die im Range unter der Verfassung
stehen. kali" weder der Begriff des Eigentunis jm verfassungsrechtlichen Sin" abgeleitet noch kann aus der
privatrechtlichen Rechtsstelhing der Umfang der Gewahrleistung des konkreten Eigentunis bestimint werden."
898 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG KOII/II/e"rar (1994) mn 6]; BVerfGE ]6, 281 290;
BVerfGE 42,26] 292 - 29]; BVerfGE 51, 19] 218; BVerfGE 58, ]00 (NajJaliskiesllllg) 335.
899 Private property and productive property (Produktiveigentum); immovables and movables; as well as small
commercial enterprises and large corporations are protected in terms of an 14 GG. CfThonnann Abstufungen in der
Sozialbindung des Eigenmms (1996) 6] - 75.
900 An 1412 GG.
901 Cf, however, Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International
Law (1987) 82.
\102 The right to engage in the acquisition or the transfer of property rights has to be derived by way of interpretation,
usually by making use of art 2 GG (the right to personal freedom) or of the property guarantee itself, by evaluating
the nature of different proprietary interests. Art 2 [ GG is, with relation to the property guarantee, the lex generalis
and art 14 I GG the lex specialis. It is therefore preferable to deduce the right from the institutional guarantee of
private property itself Kimminieli "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights. Institutions and impact ofInternational
Law (1987) 82.
903 BVerfGE 20, ]51 (ToIwIll) ]55.
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law, while maintaining the Basic Law as a guideline to measure such changes.Ï'" Thus, the
constitutional property guarantee anticipates a differentiation between the various kinds of
property, according to the kind of the protection it deserves.90s
3.3.1. Property interests included in the protective ambit of article 14 GG
The German constitutional property guarantee as such does not contain any information on the
scope of the protection that it provides. The court thus has to decide which patrimonial interests
are included or excluded from the constitutional guarantee. Here the crucial question is whether
the inclusion of specific patrimonial interests in the protective sphere of article 14 GG would
serve the fundamental constitutional purpose of securing a sphere of personal liberty for the
individual. Protection of a specific interest should, in other words, enable the individual to act on
his or her own initiative and to take responsibility for his or her actions, while participating in the
development and functioning of the broader social and legal community.ï'"
The decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court on the constitutional protection of property
have enabled legal writers to draw up a system of protected rights.907Private law and public law
entitlements would qualify to a similar extent for the protection of article 14 GG, insofar as such
property interests could be described either as (i) Leistungseigentum (that is to say, property
acquired by an owner on the ground of his or her own efforts,908whether in money or labour),909
as (ii) Sicherungseigentum (in other words, those objects required to maintain a subsistence
904 BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung) 389; BVerfGE 25, 112 (Niedersáchsische Deichgesetz) 117: "Inhalt und
Funktion des Eigentums sind dabei der Anpassung an die gesellschaftlichen und wirtschaftlichen Verhiiltnisse fáhig
und bediirftig; es ist Sache des Gesetzgebers, lnhalt und Schranken des Eigentums unter Beachtung der
grundlegenden verfassungsrechtlichen Wertentscheidung zu bestimmen. " Translation: "The contents and functions
of property are capable and in need of adaptation to social and economic conditions. It is the task of the legislature
to undertake such adaptation while taking into account the fundamental constitutional guideline concerning ethical
values."
905 This layering or categorising of the differentiated limits of the property guarantee according to the object of the
right at stake is sometimes in German legal literature referred to as the Abstufung der eigentumsrechtlichen Grenzen.
CfThormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 214 - 218.
906 Badura "Eigenturn" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 2; Van der Walt Constitutional
Property Clauses (1999) 151; Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Doog GG Kommentar (1994) mn 1.
907 The following categorisation is borrowed from Leisner "Eigenturn" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989)
mn 85 - 95. It must be added, however, that not all writers share Leisner's view of the characteristics belonging to
constitutional property. The main point of distinction is that Leisner views the inclusion of public law patrimonial
rights or interests into the protective ambit of art 14 GG not as an extension to the constitutional concept of property,
but rather as a natural consequence of the scope of the property guarantee as laid down in art 14 GG. On the
contrary, some writers view the inclusion of public law patrimonial interests into the protective ambit of art 14 GG
as a development or extension of the scope of art 14 GG. (Van der Walt Constitutional Property
Clauses (1999) 152.) Regardless of the theoretical implications and the different approaches towards the
characteristics of constitutional property, it seems as if many authors implicitly follow the categorisation of
constitutionally protected patrimonial interests into Leistungseigentum, Sicherungseigentum and
Vertrauenseigentum. CfWendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (ed) Kommentar (1996) mn 28.
908 Such a performance can consist of either a monetary contribution or of labour, but should in all circumstances be
rendered by the owner himself or herself.
909 Eg BVerfGE 14,288293.
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level),910 or as (iii) Vertrauenseigentum (that is to say, legal positions that objectively require
protection because of the legitimate reliance placed upon such protection),"!'
3.3.1.1. Expanded category of private-law rights and patrimonial interests
The premise adopted in German constitutional law is that the property guarantee includes, but is
not restricted to, rights in corporeal things. In fact, the property guarantee embraces almost all
private law rights, as well as interests with economic value.912 Thus, all patrimonial rights
enabling the holder thereof to determine how they can serve his or her interests best are
protected.Ï''' Rights relating to corporeal as well as incorporeal objects are therefore incorporated
in the protective ambit of article 14 GG.
The application of article 14 GG to private law interests and rights are restricted by certain
general principlcsr'"
(i) Only specific individual rights or assets are protcctcd.i'? not patrimony, wealth or estate
in general.Ï'" This point is important, because it determines, for instance, whether the duty to pay
taxes is subject to the provisions of article 14 GG. The assumption that taxes pertain to general
wealth and not to specific objects of property, renders an application of article 14 GG to the
limitation of property by tax law and practice difficult.917 The Federal Constitutional Court tried
to escape this dilemma by first arguing918 that taxation generally does not affect the
constitutional guarantee of property. An infringement of the property guarantee could therefore
only be considered if the tax burden is excessive or if his or her wealth is fundamentally affected.
This decision resulted in the perception that article 14 GG is no effective bulwark against the
avaricious exercise of the state's power of taxation.919 The Federal Constitutional Court has, in
the mean time, modified its view to the extent that tax laws may in principle be reviewed on the
basis of the constitutional property guarantee. However, a violation of article 14 GG would only
apply in extreme cases. Article 14 GG would, for instance, apply when - notwithstanding the
effect it might have in individual cases920 - the taxation in general would have a strangulating
effect or would amount to confiscation. The tax burden is said to have a strangulating effect
(Erdrosselungssteuer) when it makes it impossible for an individual to continue a lawful
910 Eg BVerfGF. 32, III 142.
911 Eg BVerfGF. 14,263278 read with BVerfGE 58, 81 121.
912 Pierorb & Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht li (1991) mn 999.
913 Van der Walt Constitutional Properly Clauses (1999) 152.
914 Badura "Eigcntum" in Benda, Maihofcr & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 37.
915 Cf BGIIZ 62, 96; BGHZ 72, 211 218 el seq: BGH 1975 NJW 1017; BGII 1976 NJW 1313; BGH 1980NJJV 387.
916 BVerfGE 74, 129 148. Cf also Picroth & Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht /I (1991) mn 1003; Papier "Art. 14"
in Maunz & Durig GG Kommentor (1994) mn 8; Kimminich Eigenrum Enteignung Entschiidigung (1976) mn 57;
BVerfGE 4, 7 (tnvestitionshilfe) 17.
917 It is, moreover, problematic to determine the proportionality of taxation, as taxes arc usually collected to provide
money for the general budget and not for financing definite policy objectives. Schuppcrt "The Right to Property" in
Karpen (cd) Constitution of Geril/ali)' (1988) 112.
918 BVerfGE 4, 7 (Invcstionshilfe),
919 Schuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988) 112.
920 BVerfG 1976 NJW 101 {Vennëgenssteuer}.
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professional activity.Ï" The tax burden has a confiscatory effect (Konfiskatorischen Steuern)
when it completely deprives a person of a specific property right.922The Federal Constitutional
Court does not offer a clear explanation of the term confiscation in this context. From the
literature on the subject it seems that taxes on assets are considered confiscatory if they force the
owner to surrender these assets over a certain period. The tax will be considered confiscatory if it
is impossible to finance it out of the revenue normally received from the assets.923
(ii) Further, expectancies or contingent "rights,,924are as a rule not guaranteed: only vested
rights which have been acquired925 already are protected.Y" The property clause would thus only
provide protection for existing rights. It also does not provide for the acquisition of rights.927
Consequently, the wide concept of property recognised for purposes of article 14 GG does not
simply include all rights or interests which have some patrimonial value.928
(iii) The use of property is protected by article 14 GG: the holder of the right can retain,
alter, use or consume his or her property. Negative use is also guaranteed: the freedom not to use
the property.Ï" Protection of the use of property will, however, only be under discussion if some
other fundamental right does not protect the action of the holder of the right.93o
(iv) Further, the right holder's right to defend his or her interests in administrative or court
proceedings, also against third parties, is included in article 14 GG.931
921 BVerfGE 16, 147 161; BVerfGE 82, 159 190. Frowein Protection of Property in Relation to Taxation
Unpublished Report (1996) 16 - 17.
922 BVerfGE 23, 288 315 states: "Ein Verstoft gegen Artikel 14 GG kann allenfalls dann in Betracht kommen, wenn
die Geldleistungspflichten den Pflichtigen ilbermdfiig belasten und seine Vermëgensverháltnisse grundlegend
beeintráchtigen warden, also eine Konfiskation darstellen wiirden." Translation: "A violation of article 14 GG could
only be considered where the obligations to pay money would be an unreasonable burden on the debtor
fundamentally affecting his economic conditions, amounting in fact to a confiscation."
923 Frowein Protection of Property in Relation to Taxation Unpublished Report (1996) 15 - 16; Mul3gnug 1991
JZ996.
924 "[Njicht blofie Umsatz- und Gewinnchancen, Hoffnungen, Erwartungen und Aussichten." BVerfGE 68, 193222
and BVerfGE 74, 129 148.
925 The so-called Bestandschutz.
926 Wendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (ed) Kommentar (1996) mn 44 points out that in some cases, a vested property interest
can include, for example, the right to acquire future profits. This is distinguishable from the case (eg BGHZ 23, 235;
BGHZ 55, 261) where a person relies merely on an existing favourable legal situation in basing its claim for
protection of a future interest. BVerfGE 78, 205 211 et seq.
927 Erwerbschutz. Kleyn 1996 SAPR/PL 414 n 71.
928 However, those rights and interests, which fall within the protective ambit of article 14 GG, are guaranteed in
several ways. Not only is the continued existence of these rights - and therewith the freedom of the owner to retain
his or her property - protected, but the owner's freedom to use, consume, and dispose of the property at will also
falls within the ambit of article 14 I 1 GG. The enforcement of these rights in the constitutional context nevertheless
takes on another dimension than in private law: The social obligation related to property requires a balancing of
individual and social interests in the definition of constitutional property.
929 Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II (1991) mn 1007.
930 Eg reading of a bought magazine is protected in terms of art 5 I 1, not in terms of art 14 GG. Similarly, use of an
automobile vehicle is protected in terms of art 2 I. However, use of a piece of land for purposes of securing a loan
(mortgage), would be protected in terms of art 14 GG.
931 Verfahrensgarantie. Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II (1991) mn 1010.
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It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss each private law right that falls within the
proteetive ambit of the property clause in Germany separately. However, the following rights
could be mentioned by way of example. In general things (das Sacheigentum), real rights
(dingliche Rechte),932 real security rights,933 possession (der Besitz),934 the right to heritable lease
of land (das Erbbaurecht),935 most personal (contractual) rights (Forderungsrechte),936 rights of
membership with patrimonial value (Vermogenswerte Mitgliedschafts- und Gesellschaftsrechte)
like shares (Aktien),937 and copyright, patents and registered trademarks (Urheberrechte,
eingetragene Warenzeichenl38 among others,939 fall within the protective ambit of the property
guarantee. The protection of incorporeal property and certain rights to develop land will be
discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs as specific examples of the extension of the
category of protected private law rights by the COUttsand authors.
3.3.1.1.1. Incorporeal assets
Incorporeal assets include certain patrimonial rights, which are protected in private law, but not
necessarily as property. The inclusion of these interests within the protective ambit of
article 14 I I GG therefore constitutes a remarkable deviation from the private law concept of
ownership. Examples are tenants' rights, which are in private law governed by contract, the right
to goodwill in established and operating business concerns,940 and intellectual property.
The Federal Constitutional Court held that the right of a tenant to live in a rented apartment
constitutes "property" within the meaning of article 14 I GG.941 The tenant would thus be
protected against termination of a contract of lease by the landlord if termination is not based on
a well-founded interest of the landlord942 and if such an interest is not specified in the contract.943
The Federal Constitutional Court justified its decision to place a tenant's right of occupation
within the protective ambit of article 14 I 1GG as follows.?"
"Die Wohung its fur jedermann Mittelpunkt seiner privaten Existenz. Der Einzelne ist auf i/wen
Gebraueli zur Befriedigung elementarer Lebensbediirfnisse sowie zur Freiheitssicherung und
932 Wendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (cd) Kommenlar (1996) mn 24.
933 Hypotheken, Grundschulden, Pfandrechte: BVerfGE 1991 DVBI 376 et seq.
934 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommen/ar (1994) mn 200.
93SBVertVE79,174191.
936 BVcrfGE 68. 193222; BVertVE 42, 263 (Contergan); BVertVE 83, 201 {Vorkaufsrecht); BVertVE 45, 142 179.
937 BVerfGE 14.262276.
938 Copyright: BVcrtVE 79, 29 40. Patents: BVerfGE 36. 281 290. Trademarks: BVerfGE 51, 193 216 et seq. Cf
also BVcrfGE 79. 174 191; BGHZ 77, 179 182; BVerfGE 25,371 407; BVertVE 31.229; BVcrfGE 36,281.
939 cr Badura "Eigcnrum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (cds) Handbuch (1994) mn 35 - 39; Bryde "Artikel 14" in
Von MUnch & Kunig GG Kommentor (1992) mn II - 24; Wendt "An. 14" in Sachs (cd) Kommentor (1996) mn 24.
940 "Eingerichteter IIl1d ausgeiibter Gewerbebetrieb. "
941 BVerfGE 89. I (Besitzrecht des Mieters); Judgement of 18October 1993 I BvR 1335/91 1994 Neue Justiz 25.
')42 BVerfGE 89, I 10.
943· .Judgement of 18 October 1993 I BvR 1335/91 1994 Neue JUStlZ 26.
944 BVerfGE 89, I 6. Translation: "A dwelling place is the centre of every person's private existence. The person is
dependant on a place or dwelling for complying with elementary needs of living, as well as for securing his freedom
and for self-fulfilment. However, the largest part of the population cannot afford to fulfil this need through
ownership. Instead, they are forced to rent living space. The possessory right of a lessee, under these circumstances,
has the same function of ownership of things."
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Entfaltung seiner Personlichkeit angewiesen. Der Grofsteil der Bevëlkerung kann zur Deckung seines
Wohnbedars jedoch nicht auf Eigentum zuriickgreigen. sondern ist gezwungen, Wohnraum zu mieten.
Das Besitzrecht des Mieters erfullt unter diesen Umstënden Funktionen, wie sie typischerweise dem
Sacheigentum zukommen. "
On the other hand, the Federal Constitutional Court in 1974 overruled several decisions of the
courts of lower instance on account of the unduly harsh application of a federal rent control
statute to owners of apartments occupied by tenants.945The court stressed that the social function
of property is important when it needs to be determined whether specific interests should be
protected under the constitutional property guarantee or not. However, the court also remarked
thaë46
"Ebensowenig wie die Eigentumsgarantie eine die soziale Funktion eines Eigentumsobjektes
mifiachtende Nutzung schiitzt, kann Art. 14 Abs. 2 GG eine ilbermiijJige, durch die soziale Funktion
nicht gebotene Begrenzung privatrechtlicher Befugnisse rechtfertigen. "
The right to goodwill in a commercial enterprise ("established and exercised commercial
activity,,947)is an example of a private law right which is regarded by many authors,948 as well as
the Federal Supreme Court949and the Federal Administrative Court,950as "property" in terms of
article 14 GG. However, it has not been acknowledged as a right qualifying for constitutional
protection by the Federal Constitutional Court.951 The notion of "commercial enterprise"
(established and exercised commercial activity) is usually defined in very broad terms to
recognise the fact that business property is more than the mere sum of its individual property
holdings.952 Commercial activity often entails the capability to make profits, thus giving rise to a
whole range of so-called business property rights. Business property might, for instance, be
affected if the state decides to withhold certain vital licences or permits. However, the Federal
Constitutional Court953held (without explicitly deciding this point)954 that, seen from a property
law perspective, the enterprise de facto comprises all those objects and rights forming part of its
patrimony. However, the court did not want to acknowledge that the business enterprise as an
entity enjoyed legal protection in terms of the property clause,955because its patrimonial interests
945 BVerfGE 37, 132 (Wohnraumskilndigungsschutzgesetz).
946 140 - 141. Translation: "As little as the property guarantee can protect a function of the object of ownership that
disregards the social obligation of property, can art 14 II GG justify a disproportionate limitation of private law
entitlements that are not necessitated by the social obligation."
947 "Eingerichteter und ausgeiibter Gewerbebetrieb. " Cf BVerfGE 4, 7 (Investitionshi/fe) 17.
948 Wendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (ed) Kommentar (1996) mn 26; Kimminich Eigentum Enteignung
Entschiidigung (1976) mn 75; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 153 - 154.
949 BGHZ 23, 157 162 et seq; BGHZ 92, 34 37.
950 BVerwGE 62,224226.
951 In BVerfGE 77, 84 118, the Federal Constitutional Court excluded goodwill of this kind (that is to say,
bestehende Geschiiftsverbindungen, einen erworbenen Kundenstamm oder die Marktstellung eines Unternehmens)
from the protective ambit of article 14 I GG.
952 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 154.
953 BVerfGE 51, 193 221 et seq.
954 Kimminich Eigentum Enteignung Entschiidigung (1976) mn 77; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses
(1999) 154.
955 BVerfGE 51, 193 221 et seq: "Es ist die Frage, ob der Gewerbebetrieb als soleher die konstituierenden
Merkmale des verfassungsrechtlichen Eigentumsbegriffs aufweist. Eigentumsrechtlich gesehen ist das Unternehmen
die tatsiichliche - nicht aber die rechtliche - Zusammenfassung der zu einem Vermogen gehërenden Sachen und
Rechte, die an sich schon vor verfassungswidrigen EingrifJen geschiitzt sind. "
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and rights in themselves already fell within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.956 As such,
rights relating to business concerns would not comply with the requirement that only specific
(vested and existing) patrimonial rights will be protected by article 14 GG. Consequently, an
investigation into the protective scope of article 14 GG is not mandated in cases where a
legislative alteration or rescission influences economic and financial policy measures. These
measures might hold factual advantages for commercial enterprises, but they do not necessarily
hold legal advantages.t"
(iii) The Federal Constitution Court has, in a number of decisions,958 furnished the legal
basis upon which the patrimonial aspects of "intellectual property,,959 enjoy constitutional
protection. According to the court, the protection of intellectual property under article 14 GG did
not follow from the statutory protection of copyright as such, as this includes protection of non-
patrimonial aspects.960 Instead, intellectual property enjoys constitutional protection in terms of
article 14 GG, because of the functions of the property clause. For instance, the function of the
property clause as an individual guarantee will result in protection of the holder of copyright in a
specific work, in the case where legislation orders the free distribution of that work.961 Tbe
patrimonial aspects of intellectual property are means by which an individual determines his or
her economic destiny, and exercises his or her independence and freedom.962 Therefore,
intellectual property deserves constitutional protection.
3.3.1.1.2. Development of rights with regard to land
Property protection within the category of rights to land has always been particularly
complicated, mainly on account of the fact that rights and benefits granted by public authorities
are not traditionally included in the ambit of ownership entitlements. These entitlements hover
on the boundary between private and public law. The property guarantee clearly covers land-use
rights lawfully acquired and exercised. However, certain lanel-use rights which are unlawful or
which have not been exercised, can also be protected in terms of the constitutional property
guarantee. This would require, at least, that the "holder" of these rights has the pennission for
exercising them, and that such permission has been acquired legally. The withdrawal of such a
land-usc right would then affect the holder thereof so severely its constitutional protection is
warranted.963 It is not always easy to determine whether a land-use right like this complies with
all the requirements for protection. The protection of Boufreiheit and Anliegergebrauch
respectively serve as examples.
956 BVcrfGE 51, 193 {Schloflberg) 221.
m I3G11Z45, 83 (Knáckebrot).
m Copyright cf BVerfGE 31,229239; BVerfGE 49,382; BVerfGE 79, 2940 ct seq; BVerfGE 81, 12 16; Patents cf
BVerfGE 36, 281 290; Trademarks cf BVerfGE 51, 193 216 cl seq; BVerfGE 78,5871.
959 Geistiges Eigentum which includes patents and copyright of printed material.
Q(,()CfBVcrfGE31,229241; BVcrfGE79, 125.
961 Cf Von lIeincgg & Haltem 1993 JuS 123; BVerfGE 31,229239.
962 Badura "Eigenrum" in Benda, Maihofcr & Vogel (cds) Handbuch (1994) mn 2.
963 Van der Wall Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 154; Leisner "Eigcntum" in Isensee & Kirchhof
Handbuch VI (1989) 105.
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(i) The question whether the right to erect buildings on land964fell within the protective
ambit of article 14 I 1 GG, has given rise to varying opinions. Some authors are of the opinion
that this Baufreiheit is an element inherent in the concept of private ownership of land, and that it
should be protected on this basis.965Another opinion is that the right to erect buildings on land
depends on a grant by a public authority'f" and that the numerous building law limitations result
in this right being practically without content. 967 If this view is followed, building law
regulations would not be monitored in terms of the constitutional property guarantee, and
landownership would be stripped of part of its functions, namely free and exclusive use.
Alternatively, if the guarantee of article 14 GG is aimed at preserving the function of property
expounding private individual use, a particular kind of use could not simply be excluded from
protection of the property guarantee. Moreover, it is dogmatically unsound to construct the
freedom to erect buildings on land as "Nutzungszuweisung. ,,968Instead of investigating the
constitutionality of limitations on the right to erect buildings on land, the issue is investigated
from the premise that Baufreiheit is ab initio excluded from protection. Consequently, all more
strictly limited fundamental rights would be reduced to mere state-granted (or state-approved)
activities. This would, in tum, make the socialisation of land provided for in article 15 GG969
impossible. As such, it would be in breach with the social welfare state principle underlying the
Basic Law.
(ii) The right to use roads and public spaces adjacent to private land (Anliegerrecht und
AnliegergebrauchrÏ'" is regarded as part of the landed property flowing from the nature and
location of the land.971 Access to public roads, and free access of air and light from the adjoining
street are thus guaranteed for the local residents.972 The concept of Anliegergebrauch includes,
for instance,973 the use of the windows and outer wall of the building facing the street for
purposes of advertising by resident shop owners (that is to say, for placing overhanging
advertisement boards or posters in view of passing pedestrians and traffic); use of the adjoining
street and pavement for loading purposes within reasonable limits;974 and use of the adjoining
964 CfBVerfGE 35, 263276.
965 Papier "Artikel 14" in Maunz & Durig Grundgesetz Kommentar (1994) mn 58; Badura "Eigentum" in Benda,
Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 79.
966 "Baubefugnis als offentlich-rechtliche Nutzungszuweisung. "
967 "Schrumpfung der Freiheit auf Null." Cf Papier "Artikel 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommentar (1994) mn 60;
Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 104.
968 Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 104.
969 "Grund und Boden. Natuschiitze und Produktionsmittel kannen zum Zwecke der Vergesellschaftung durch ein
Gesetz, das Art und Ausmaj] der Entschiidigung regelt. in Gemeineigentum oder in andere Fromen der
Gemeinwirtschaft iiberfiihrt werden. Fur die Entschiidigung gilt Artikel 14 Abs. 3 Satz 3 und 4 entsprechend."
Translation: "Land, natural resources and means of production may be transferred to public ownership or other
forms of public enterprise by a law which determines the nature and extent of compensation. In respect of
compensation the third and fourth sentences of paragraph (3) of Article 14 shall apply mutatis mutandis."
970 As well as the limitations on the use of property brought about by the public use of such roads.
971 Badura "Eigentum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 87; Van der Walt Constitutional
Property Clauses (1999) 154.
972 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Dilrig GG Kommentar (1994) mn 115.
973 Papier Recht der ëffentlichen Sachen (1998) 19 - 20.
974 The reasonableness of this action will depend on the local customs, frequency, and measure to which traffic is
hindered thereby.
163
Stellenb sch Univ rsity http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Pari Three: The Constitutional Inquiry into Property Protection and its Relevance/or the Existing Property Order
pavement and street for purposes of parking bicycles or motor cars.975 In this sense,
Anliegergebrauch can be viewed a form of public use limited to the residents of a specific
area.976 However, Anliegergebrauch does not allow a business concern (like a restaurant) to
place tables or a vending machine on the adjoining pavement or to place free-standing poster
boards there to advertise on behalf of a third party. These activities are consequently not
protected by article 14 I 1GG.977 The owner, possessor or holder of land adjoining a public road
or street therefore is entitled to use it, subject to reasonable use by the public. Temporary
limitations on the right to use of and access to public roads adjoining landed property (due to, for
instance, road repairs or building renovations) usually have to be tolerated by the local residents.
They arc, however, protected against limitations of a more permanent nature in terms of the
constitutional property guarantee.978 In terms of the guideline formulated by the by the Federal
Administrative Court,979 protection in terms of article 14 GG is afforded if it can be reasonably
expected that the limitation of the local resident's rights of use will continue permanently.
However, if it could at the outset be reasonably foreseen that usc of a specific area would cause
nuisance due to the nature or natural, probable development of a speci fie residential or industrial
area, the use would be unreasonable and unworthy of constitutional protection. If the nature and
use of the public road or street is materially changed, the benefit thereof for the public in general
prevails over the interests of the owners of adjacent land.98o It is only in exceptional
circumstances that a local resident could claim that the status quo be continued.981
3.3.1.2. Public law rights and benefits as "property" in terms of article 14 GG
It is problematic to determine the concept of property in cases where public law rights with
economic value are at stake or where ordinary legal rules attribute specific benefits only to a
speci fie person who has obtained some form of official authorisation for holding those benefits.
However, a similar threshold test as applied with regard to private law rights with economic
value is applied where public law rights or benefits with economic value are at stake. It has to be
determined whether protection of the particular right in question would serve the purpose of the
property guarantee. The right or benefit for which protection is sought must, in other words,
secure an individual's personal development in society. Similar to the question in the context of
private law rights with economic value, protection is afforded only if the individual has, at least,
acquired a vested right (or benefit). The inquiry into the scope of the protection afforded by
article 14 I 1GG is, however, usually more intensive than is the case with private law rights with
economic value.
975 Provided that the possibility of parking exists.
976 Papier Recht der offentlichen Sachen (1998) 19; Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Diirig GG Kommentar (1994)
mn 120.
977 Cf BGHZ 30, 241; BGIIZ 48,65.
!)78 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Dilrig GG KOII/II/entar (1994) mn 116.
979 BVerwGE 38,209219.
9HO Badura "Eigcntum" in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 87; Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz &
Diirig GG Kommentor (1994) mn 117.
9~1 Badura "Eigcnturn'' in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) mn 87.
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Private and public law entitlements qualify to a similar extent for the protection of article 14 GG.
The latter need not qualify as entitlements in terms of the private law definition of ownership,
but they at least have to fall within the patrimony of private individuals,982 being either
characteristically Leistungseigentum, Sicherungseigentum, or VertrauenseigentumF' Because
the threshold question is usually investigated more intensively where public law rights or
benefits are involved, the characteristics of eigene Leistung, Existenzsicherung and Vertrauen
play a more important role in determining whether constitutional protection will be afforded than
in the case of private law rights. However, this does not mean that these characteristics are of no
consequence in the private law context. These characteristics of constitutionally protected
property merely surface more readily in an inquiry where public law rights or benefits are at
stake.
Claims for pension or unemployment benefits,984 which exemplify social welfare titles
emanating from public law, are for instance in appropriate circumstances included within the
protective scope of article 14 GG.985The courts have determined that these public law claims
must meet certain requirements to qualify for protection. Constitutionally protected social
welfare benefits must be (i) exclusively assigned to the insured for his or her private use; (ii)
based on considerable personal efforts (eigene Leistung) of the insured;986 and (iii) aimed at
securing the continued well-being (Existenzsicherung) of the insured.987
The concept of eigene Leistung (personal efforts) could create some interpretative difficulty.Ï'"
However, fears that this concept could be interpreted either too strictly or too widely were
proved to be unfounded.Ï'" The importance of this criterion as mechanism for determining which
state-granted benefits qualify as "property," and as a general justification for the protection of
certain interests as constitutional property990 has been established.
In the context of medical aid insurance, the concept of Existenzsicherung has been expressly
acknowledged by the Federal Constitutional Court991as an element of the constitutional property
concept:992
"Konstituierendes Merkmal einer Sozialversicherungsrechtlichen Position ist es schliefllich, daj3 sie
der Existenzsicherung des Berechtigten zu dienen bestimmt ist. "
982 Eg claims for tax refunds: BVerfGE 70, 278 285; child allowance: BSG 1987 NJW 463; subsidies:
BVerfGE 72,175 193 et seq.
983 Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 85 - 95; Wendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (ed)
Kommentar (1996) mn 28. Cfn 907 supra.
984 BVerfGE 58, 81 112; BVerfGE 72, 9.
985 Eg Social security (national insurance): BVerfGE 58, 81 109 and BVerfGE 66, 234 247; Unemployment
benefits: BVerfGE 72, 9 19 and BVerfGE 74, 203 213.
986 BVerfGE 1, 264 277 et seq; BVerfGE 50, 290 340; BVerfGE 58, 81 112.
987 Decision of7 July 1985 1985 DVBllOI5; BVerfGE 69,272 300 et seq; BVerfGE 72, 918 et seq.
988 Cf the criticism of Meyer-Abich Der Schutzzweck der Eigentumsgarantie (1980) 50 - 57; Wendt
Eigentum (1985) 113 - 120, 86 - 90.
989 Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 86 - 88.
990 Mn 89.
991 Judgement of 16.7.1985 - 1 BvL 5/80 reported in 1985 BB 1537 - 1540.
992 1538. Translation: "A characteristic feature of a right emanating from social insurance is, after all, that it is aimed
at securing the continued well being of the holder of the right."
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Claims based on medical aid insurance would for instance qualify as property if they promote the
well being of the majority of the population and if these grants have been provided as an
essential service over a long period. According to the courts, the insured can, in other words,
count on it as an additional source of securing his or her personal well being.993
Apart from indicating how the criterion of Existenzsicherung is applied in the process of
determining the threshold question, this example also indicates the caution of the courts in
setting these criteria as general rules for the determination of constitutional protection of
property. Almost all forms of property are aimed at advancing the material well being of the
individual in one way or the other. Nevertheless, it is argued that the requirement of
Existenzsicherung should only be applicable to a limited category of patrimonial interests,
namely interests based on social welfare policies, or perhaps more generally to public law
interests with economic value.994 However, such an argument could too easily result in a
confusing system of di Ifcring criteria for constitutional protection, depending on the nature of
the contended right or interest. This would make the threshold question too complicated and
could flout many claims for constitutional protection simply because the nature of the right or
interest is contentious.
It is submitted that the criterion of Existenzsicherung in the context of constitutional protection
of property should be viewed against the interplay between the Rechtsstaat and the Sozia/staat
principles within the German constitutional order.995 It is, in other words, not a full-fledged
requirement for constitutional protection, but rather an indication of possible constitutional
protection that has to be seen in the light of the combined individual and social function of
property within the German constitutional order. The quoted dictum of the Federal Constitutional
Court, therefore, acknowledges that when certain interests have the effect of advancing the
continued well-being of those who benefit therefrom, these interests could also qualify as
constitutional property.996
This reasoning provides the necessary link between protection of "new" (public law) property
relations and "traditional" (private law) property relations. All interests that advance the well
being of an individual will qualify for constitutional property protection; provided that they are
appropriated (that is, that they have vested in or have been assigned to a specific person for his or
her exclusive usc). This holds true, not only for property interests arising from social welfare
policies, but also from property relations in private law and elsewhere. Land, patents and
trademarks - even money - can have the effect of advancing personal well being.997 Those
elements indicating whether a particular patrimonial interest in the sphere of public law,
especially in the context of social welfare, qualify for constitutional protection are thus also
993 cralso BVerfGE 40, 6584; BVerfGE 53, 257 294.
994 Leisner Eigentum (1996) 57 - 59 point out, for instance, a too broad definition of Existenzsicherungseigentum
could considerably infringe individual freedom, and could complicate the already difficult "threshold question" even
further by introducing a layered protection of property interests.
'NS cr 81 ct seq supra.
996 Leisner "Eigcnturn" in Iscnsec & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 92.
997 Mn 93.
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present in the context of private law rights. However, private law rights mostly qualify so
obviously for constitutional protection in terms of the property clause, that these indications of
eigene Leistung, Existenzsicherung and Vertrauen hardly ever need to be considered in the
course of determining the threshold question.
3.4. Evaluation: property in the German constitutional order
From an analysis of the concept of property under the German Civil Code and under the Basic
Law, it becomes clear that the German concept of property in constitutional law has been
developed into something quite different from the private law concept of property. This can be
ascribed to the changes in the German social order since the promulgation of the Basic Law, as
well as to the interpretation of article 14 GG in the light of the basic constitutional principles like
the Rechtsstaat and the Sozialstaat. Article 14 GG thus guarantees a subjective constitutional
right, not a subjective private right.998
In this sense, property protection under the constitution has to be distinguished from property
protection in the sphere of private law. Nevertheless, private law property rights are controlled
by the German Civil Code and related statutes, which have to comply with the requirements of
article 14 GG. If these private law rules determine or protect the proprietary relations between
individuals in such a manner that the basic constitutional right to property of either party is
affected, the court can be approached with a complaint against the probable unconstitutionality
of that the particular rule of private law directly. 999
3.4.1. Property and development of the social order
The lack of a definition of property rights in the Basic Law opens the system of constitutional
protection to the dynamics of developments in the society.IOOOThis places great responsibility on
the shoulders of the legislature and the Federal Constitutional Court. The Basic Law must be
maintained as the mechanism by which changed public perceptions can be channelled into
law.IOOIIn German law, the process of defining constitutional property was characterised by
different phases. Initially, efforts were made to formulate a suitable principle for the definition of
property. In subsequent phases, the definition was applied in ways that took the values and
political ideology pervasive in society at a particular point in time into account.
998 Mn 4.
999 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 126 accordingly shows that it is therefore unnecessary to
revert to the theory of Drittwirkung or to a horizontal constitutional complaint against another private party - the
complaint is directed at the statute itself.
1000 BVerfDE 20, 351 (Tolwut) 355.
1001 CfBVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung) 389.
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Article 14 GO does not guarantee protection of a set of individual property rights, but rather
property in general.lOO2 The ownership guarantee itself makes no distinction between different
kinds of property or different types of ownership. Although the ownership protection afforded by
article 14 GG is not graded or differentiated,IOO3 variable degrees of restriction on ownership
protection arise from the social welfare function of ownership.loo4
The property guarantee in the German legal system covers those actions that facilitate freedom
for the citizen in the economic sphere. in this way, provision is also made for the functional
change of the right to property. Formerly the basis of the individual's well being was the
ownership of land or the family enterprise. The individual's well being is now gradually being
linked rather to the proceeds of his or her own labour, which is reflected in his or her right to
participate in the benefits of the social welfare system.'?" This change in the function of the
property guarantee is at best illustrated by the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court on
social wei fare benefits. The court determined that social insurance pensions fall within the
protection of the property guarantee, on the basis that the function of social security is to
safeguard the personal well being of individuals.loo6 The court also took into account the fact that
pension benefits are not granted by the government as a measure of social assistance. These
benefits are to a large extent based on the individual's personal efforts and should therefore fall
within the ambit of the constitutional property guarantee.I007
Papierl008 ascribes the intensified inquiry to the transformation of constitutional property
protection by the claims set by public law rights from a so-called Abwehr- (Freiheitsjrecht into a
so-called Teilhaberrecht. I Ie explains tbe difference between them as follows: 1009
"Grundrechtliche Teilhaberrechte komzen abel' nie die dem Freiheitsrecht eigene Stringenz,
Verbindlichkelt und anspruchskonstituierende Unmittelbarkeit aufweisen. Sie geben de", Gesetzgeber
eher Direktiven und partlelle Zielvorgabe im komplexen legislatorischen Abwágungsvorgang."
The term Abwehrrechte indicates the function of fundamental rights pertaining to the protection
afforded to individuals against unjustified curtailment of their constitutional status by the state.
The term Freiheitsrechte denotes that the function of fundamental rights is to afford
1002 Leisner "Eigenrurn'' in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 46. "III erstaunlicher Kontinuitat ist in del'
Judikatur aller oberst ell Gerichte stets vail 'dem' Eigentum die Rede. 'Bodeneigentum' etwa oder urheberrechtliches
Eigennon sind demgegeniiber deutlich untergeordnete Spezialbegriffe. "
1003 Leisner "Eigcnrum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 46; OssenbOhl "Economic and Occupational
Rights" in Kirehhof & Kommers (cds) Germany and its Basic Loll' (1993) 270.
11)0.1 Osscnbuhl "Economic and Occupational Rights" in Kirchhof & Kommers (eds) Germany and its Basic Law
(1993) 270. Cf204 et seq infra.
lOOS Hesse Grundzugc (1993) mn 443: "Mil Recht ist deshalb davon gesproehen worden, duJ3uil/er den Bedingungen
der modernen lndustriegesellschaft soziale Sicherheil weniger eine Frage privatrechtlicher Verwendung des
produktiven Eigentums sei als ei/le solche der offenttienen Austeilung VOII Bezugsrecluen und daj3 die publizistischen
Eigentumssurrogate entscheidend geworden seien. "
100(, I3VerfGE 53,257289.
IO()7289.
lOOM Papier "An. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommenlar (1994) mn 129.
1009 Translation: "Constitutional participation rights can, however, never display the same stringency (rigorousness),
commitment and immediacy of claiming capacity as freedom rights. Much rather do they provide legislature with
directives and partial goals in the complex process of legislative balancing."
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constitutional protection to individuals to arrange their lives freely and to take responsibility for
their own actions, thereby contributing to the affairs of society at large. Reference to
Teilhaberechte focuses on the function of fundamental rights to ensure that the individual has
access to state resources and the services'?" that the state is in the financial position to provide
when fulfilling its responsibility to the public by balancing its divergent public functions.10ll In
this regard, the social welfare state principle assumes great importance in determining the scope
of the constitutional definition of property.
3.4.2. Property and the basic constitutional principles
Article 14 I 2 GG confers on the legislator the authority to determine the "content and limits" of
property, but read with article 19 II GG, the Constitutional Court is required to define the
essence of property in order to protect the freedom associated with it.1012The court has tended to
approach this problem of definition by considering the property guarantee within the framework
of the Constitution as a whole. In reality, however, it has relied more heavily on the historical
development of the concept of property in the Civil Code than on any systematic or teleological
approach to constitutional interpretation.l'T' One problem in this regard was the continuing
tendency of the Federal Supreme Court to define the right to property more broadly than the
Federal Constitutional Court, occasionally bringing the two tribunals into confrontation.Y'"
From the court's treatment of the "threshold" question it is clear that some of the requirements
applied in determining the constitutional concept of property are not limited to questions relating
to the property guarantee exclusively.1015As happens with all fundamental rights, the elements of
the Rechtsstaat principle'Y" are employed time and again to determine how far the state conduct
is limited in view of the objects of the fundamental property right. But the constitutional property
concept should be defined more specifically than by merely applying the values underlying the
Rechtsstaat. This is indicated by the importance attached to the institution of property as
sUCh.1017
1010 Hesse Grundziige (1993) mn 287 - 289.
1011 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommentar (1994) mn 129
1012 BVerfGE 42, 263 (Contergan) 292.
1013 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 254.
1014 CfBVerfGE 3, 58 where the Constitutional Court declined the Supreme Court's invitation to regard civil service
tenure and its associated job benefits as "property" within the meaning of the Basic Law.
1015 Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 75.
1016 In particular the principles of legal certainty (Rechtsicherheit / allgemeine Bestimmtheit), proportionality
(Verhiiltn ism iij3igkeit) and necessity (Erforderlichkeit), and the duty to conduct a balancing of interests
(Abwiigungsverpflichtung) Cf88 et seq supra.
1017 BVerfGE 45, 142 173 determines that the core of ownership should not be affected. BVerfGE 58, 300
(Naj3auskiesung) 338 determines that the constitutional recognition of private ownership should be heeded when
determining the limits of the property guarantee. BVerfGE 62, 169 183 focuses on the correspondence between the
purpose of the infringement and the social function of the object of ownership when determining that any
infringement on ownership should not excessively burden or unreasonably influence the patrimonial sphere of the
owner.
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The characteristic element of trust (Vertrauensschutz) inherent in the Rechtsstaat principle
assumes a deeper meaning within the constitutional property guarantee. Especially within the
sphere of patrimonial public law interests, it is clear that trust in the state's maintenance of the
status quo is an important constitutive element of the constitutional property concept. Where it
can reasonably be expected that a legal position would be protected as property in the
constitutional context, the legislature should have legitimate reasons for the curtailment of rights
that could stem from such a legal position. lOISThe principle that social security benefits granted
by the state are not by nature objects creating trustlOl9 therefore becomes an important factor for
limitation of the property concept.I020 This point will also be mentioned again in the next
chapter.
3.4.3. Property as a fundamental right
In determining the constitutional concept of property in German law, the focus is on the question
of whether the object of the right is an asset of economic value, rather than on the question of
exclusive dominance.'?" In constitutional law, the concept of property is, therefore, wider than
in private law. Nevertheless, a concept of property that is as wide as to include all rights
representing economically valuable assets, also needs to be limited. Some of the most important
limitations entail that contractual claims are protected by the constitutional property guarantee
only if they arc not connected with an activity contrary to public policy.lo22 Furthermore, claims
emanating from the public law sphere are considered to be property rights only if they have been
acquired by the holder as a result of his or her own effortsl023 or if they serve to advance his or
her well being.
The Federal Constitutional Court has over years abstracted certain elements of a constitutional
property concept in particular. Thus, the relation between the object and the subject of ownership
- the Zuordnungselement - has been acknowledged by the court on several occasions: 1024 Owners'
rights of disposal and alienation of their property at will are liberties which should, in principle,
be protected by the property guarantee. Reference has furthermore been made to the object's
value or usefulness - the Substanz of ownership - as an element of the constitutional concept.1025
In this regard, the Federal Constitutional Court provided clear insight into the reasons for
constitutional protection of property when it decided that the municipality of Sasbach could not
rely upon an averred infringement of article 14 I I GG in attempts to prevent the erection of a
nuclear power station by the Kernkrafiwerk Siid GmbH and the Ministerium for Wirtschaft,
Minelstand und Verkehr of 8aden- Wi.irttemberg on the district borders. The municipality is a
1018 BVerfGE 58, 81121.
1019 "Soziale Staatsgeschenke sind eben illrem WeselI nach Sc/Wil kein Gegenstaud \'011 Vertrauen. "
1020 Leisner "Eigcnrurn" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 95.
1021 This question pertains to the protection of properry in private law and under the Civil Code.
1022 Ie Prostitution. Kirnrninich "Property Rights" in Starck (cd) Rights. Institutions Gild Impact oj International
Law ( 1987) 77.
1023 BVcrfGE 18,392.
1024 BVcrfGli 31,275285; OVerfGE 42,263 (Contergan) 294, BVerfGE 31,229240 - 241.
1025 Leisner "Eigcntum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 81,82,84.
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public law juristic person and therefore does not fall within the category of juristic persons
whose fundamental rights would traditionally be guaranteed.1026 It could in any event not claim
the protection of article 14 GG. However, the court in any event decided that insofar as
municipal property - in this case agricultural land - is used for public purposes, it does not fall
within the protective ambit of the property guarantee. The court also added that, even if the
municipal property is not employed for public purposes, it would in any event not enjoy the
protection of article 14 I 1 GG. The reason for this was that the municipal property would still
not fulfil the function of property that the constitutional guarantee intends to protect. Property
should serve the owner's private interests and should be the basis of the owner's private initiative
if it is to qualify for constitutional protection.1027
3.4.4. Property as a "purely constitutional" concept
The Nafiauskiesung decision indicated that the constitutional concept of property should be
deduced from the constitutional context itself and not from the concept of ownership as defined
in the civil law and through ordinary legislation. Nevertheless, this is hard to attain. The "truly
constitutional" requirements applicable in defining the concept of property - the principles of
legal certainty (Rechtsicherheit / allgemeine Bestimmtheit) and necessity (Erforderlichkeit), the
proportionality principle (Verhaltnismëfiigkeit), and the duty to conduct a balancing of interests
(Abwágungsverpflichtung) - are not limited to questions relating to the property guarantee.I028
Moreover, the role that the civil law concept of ownership in Germany has played in the
development of a constitutional concept of property cannot be denied. It is, however, not the
civil law rules themselves, but rather the underlying principles of classical property law, that are
noticeable in the constitutional concept of ownership.lo29 For instance, in cases where the
characteristic exclusivity quality of ownership - prevalent both in the constitutional context and
in the civil code - is under discussion, the civil law remains the most important analogous source
for constitutional interpretation. Similarly, in cases where private relations have to be
determined, the private use requirement of the constitutional property clause can also only be
understood against the background of the civil law concept of ownership.
Further, in spite of the Federal Constitutional Court's aim of developing an "independent"
constitutional property concept, ordinary legislation plays an important role in the determination
of the constitutional concept of property. Through article 14 I 2 GG, the legislature is given the
capacity to determine the contents and limits of property. This gives rise to two conceptual
possibilities. Leisner103o explains that the legislature could proceed from the premise that the
constitutional contents of property are already stipulated, in which case it should determine the
1026 Ie private law, natural juristic persons. BVerfGE 61, 82 100 - 101.
1027 BVerfGE 61,82 108 et seq.
1028 Leisner "Eigenturn" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989): mn. 75.
1029 Mn 73 - 74.
1030 Mn 54.
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limitation upon the concept. Alternatively, the legislature could define the concept itself, and
then determine the limitations upon it.I031
The question of which of these conceptual possibilities are to be preferred, depends in principle
on the political orientation of the state and of the constitutional court and the consequent extent
to which the property concept can be reformed in terms of the political convictions of the
government.I032 Some authors accept that property is a creation of the legal order and that the
content of ownership cannot be predetermined.I033 This would mean that the Basic Law simply
protects that concept of property which has been defined by ordinary legislation. This view
could, however, be misunderstood.Y" The ordinary legislature, in defining the concept of
property, still has to legislate in accordance with the prescriptions of the constitution.
Ordinary legislation, in defining the constitutional property concept, therefore does not influence
the "independence" of the constitutional property clause, but plays an important interactive role
between the constitution and the public policy.'?" The Basic Law assigned the function to the
legislature in article 14 I 2 GG to define the property concept in order to protect the interests of
the individual and of the public in general.I036 The legislature consequently has a twofold
responsibility: On the one hand, it has to make the rules of private law governing the protection
and transfer of property. On the other hand, it should safeguard public interests by giving them
consideration in drafting legislation.
The Nafsauskiesung ruling was the first decision in which equal weight was attached to public
law and private law in setting boundaries to the use of property. This is what makes this decision
important. The court supported the view that private law and public law contribute to the
determination of the constitutional legal position of the property owner. The body of property
Jaw represented in the Civil Code does not exclusively define the constitutional concept of
property. All regulations of property existing at a particular point in time determine which
specific rights the property owner enjoys.I037 If these regulations divest the property owner ofa
certain control over his or her property, then this control is not included in his or her
constitutional right to property.I038 In the context of constitutional property, the limitations
imposed by public and private law regulations arc therefore not regarded as external and
additional, but rather as necessary ingredients of the definition of constitutional property.1039 An
1031 "Entweder der einfache Gesetzgeber 'findet dell verfassungsrechtlichen Eigentumsinhalt 1'01" und zieht diesem
Schutzbereich Schranken, oder er definiert ihn, er bringt ihn hervar lind beselirankt ihn (sodann). "
1032 Badura "Eigentum" in Benda. Maihofer & Vogel (eds) Handbuclt (1994) mn 3; Leisner "Eigcnturn" in Isensee &
Kirchhof Handbuck VI (1989) mn 55.
1033 Leisner "Eigcntum" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 57.
1034 Cf the explanation of Leisner "Eigentum" in Isensee & Kirchhof l landbuch VI (1989) mn 57 - 58.
1035 Cf Von Brunncck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 163 et seq for a discussion of the role of ordinary legislature in
expanding or limiting the entitlements of ownership in terms of the constitution since the coming into force of the
Basic Law. It is shown that the developments effected by legislation mirror those of the politics and economic
policy at specific points in time.
1036 fG 8 rfJ'BVer E 5 ,300 (Na auskiesung) 335.
1037 Pieroth & Schlink Gnuidrechte - Staatsrecht IJ (1991) mn 997.
1038 BVerfGE 58, 300 (NafJauskiestlllg) 335 - 336.
1039 Picroth & Schlink Grunarechte - Staatsrecht 1/ ed (1991) mn 997.
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owner in terms of private law would thus in terms of constitutional law not necessarily always be
able to exercise those entitlements with regard to the property that would promise the greatest
possible economic advantage.
Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court made it clear that, in determining the question of
whether a specific proprietary interest qualifies for constitutional protection, the purpose and
function of the property guarantee has to be considered against its place in the German
constitutional order as a whole.104o This affirms the influence of civil law and ordinary
legislation on the formation of a constitutional property concept, while simultaneously
explaining that constitutional law relations act as another important co-determinative force.1041
These factors all contribute to the establishment of a constitutional concept of property in the
genuine sense of the word.
4. The continued role of private law ownership
in the constitutional context?
Together with concepts like person, family and agreement, the institution of private property is part
of the core of modem South African private law.1042 This is also the case in German law. In the
German private law of property, corporeal res are susceptible of becoming objects of ownership.
Incorporeals are, mostly, regulated through other legal mechanisms. As a result of its strong civil
law tradition, the South African private law of property, too, is characterised by the conceptual
domination of corporeals as the main proprietary objects. This explains the use of the term law of
things when denoting that part of the patrimonial law in which the relations between legal
subjects and legal objects are regulated.1043 Moreover, the structural domination of ownership as
the most comprehensive and most valuable of all property rights was seen as the basis of
property in private law.
In both South Africa and Germany, however, the introduction and interpretation of a constitutional
clause protecting property changed the direction of property law quite dramatically.Y'" An
important aspect of this change of direction is the nature and content of the property concept.
Criteria as to the scope and content of that which is supposed to be protected under the
constitutional property guarantees can be a structural characteristic valuable for interpretation of
the relevant property clauses. However, in neither the German, nor in either of the South African
constitutions'Yf an explicit definition of the constitutional property concept is given, thus
leaving the concept of property under the constitution open to the influences of socio-political
pressure in both these systems.
1040 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommentar (1994) mn 63; BVerfGE 36, 281 290;
BVerfGE 42,263292 - 293; BVerfGE 51,193218; BVerfGE 58, 300 (Naj3auskiesung) 335.
1041 Leisner 1983 DVBI64.
1042 Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 169.
1043 Van der Merwe LAWSA XXVII par 5.
1044 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 350.
1045 Interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993; Final Constitution, 1996.
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The adoption of a constitutional property clause in the South African context once again raised the
question whether a concept of ownership cast in the mould of the Roman-Dutch authors and the
Pandectists sufficiently meets the needs of society.l?" The needs of the present-day South African
society are now to a large extent portrayed by the objectives of the Constitution. In this sense, the
introduction of the constitutional property clause in South Africa resembles another step in the
process of transformation and rejuvenation oftbe property concept initiated by scholars like Van der
Merwe, Cowen and Van der Walt. More than twenty years have passed since the need for change
was first recognised.Y" In the mean time, South African lawyers have increasingly accentuated
the political and social role of property against the backdrop of a new political dispensation.1048
Property is increasingly being regarded as a bond, rather than a barrier, between the individual and
society.1049 The need for a concept of ownership which can explain the many and varied existing
real relationships, and which can conform to the different functions of properly, is increasingly
expressed,loso causing lawyers to doubt the primacy of ownership in relation to other real rights.IOSI
Many South African authors have joined in the propagation of the idea that most of the social
limitations on ownership are indeed not only exceptions to the rule.IOS2 The introduction of a new
property order with the promulgation of the Interim Constitution in 1994 underscored the need to
rethink the content and function of ownership, also in private law. Moreover, in a legal order where
constitutional supremacy is the highest value, and the aim of the constitution is to "[h]eal tbe
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and
fundamental human rights" 1053the legitimacy of the concept of ownership as an essentially private
law institution, which was violated by statute upon statute in order to serve the purpose of racial
segregation, is constantly qucstioned.I''"
An analysis of the concept of property and its relevance for protection of holders proprietary
rights in private law and in constitutional law indicates that the concept of property under tbe
constitution differs considerably from that concept in private law. Therefore, right after the coming
into effect of the "interim" property clause, focus was placed almost exclusively on the property
interests that could or could 110t be included under the term rights in property in section
1046 Cf cg the discussions of Erasmus Interaction Unpublished doctoral dissertation (1998) 452 - 453, Kroeze
Between Conceptualism and Constitutionalism Unpublished doctoral dissertation (1998) 267 - 269.
1041 Cf discussion of Van der Merwe's work in the field of sectional title, and Cowen's analysis of the understanding
of ownership as plena ill re potestas at 133 et seq supra.
104ft Cowen New Patterns oj Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984) 10, 78; Milton "Ownership" in Zimmermann
& Visser SOl/them Cross (1996) 699.
1049 Van der Walt 1995 SAJ/IR 205; Rycroft "Socio-Economic Rights" in Corder (cd) Lalli & Social
Practice (1988) 274; Cowen New Patterns of Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984) l O, 78.
10SO Van der Walt 1995 SAJIIR 205 - 206; Milton "Ownership" in Zimmermann & Visser SOl/them
Cross (1996) 699; Cowen New Patterns oj Landownership Unpublished Paper (1984) 9, 76.
10SI Cowen New Patterns of Landownership (1984) 19,73; Van der Waltl988 De Jure 325; Milton "Ownership" in
Zimmermann & Visser SOl/them Cross (1996) 698 - 699.
1052 Milton "Ownership" in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross (1996) 698.
1053 Preamble to the Final Constitution.
1054 Van der Walt "Future" in Van der Walt (ed) Land Reform (1991) 21 - 22.
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28 IC.1055Traditional private law conceptualism induced lawyers to concentrate on the question
of how the new property concept should be interpreted.Y" and this resulted in a list of rights that
would, according to common opinion, most probably fall within the protective ambit of the
property clause. Most of these speculations have not been confirmed by the South African courts
yet. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the most important new categories of property that could
probably enjoy protection are: (i) personal rights related to proprietary interests; (ii) customary
land law rights; (iii) informal land rights; (iv) rights aimed at land reform; (v) immaterial
property; (vi) commercial property (rights related to business enterprises); and (vii) interests in
terms of social welfare policies (also known in other jurisdictions as "new property" rights or
"public law" rights).
In Germany, the concept of ownership has also been broadened considerably: to such an extent
that an overview of the interests protected under article 14 I 1 GG can, by itself, fill volumes.1057
In spite of the need to formulate a "purely constitutional" concept of property as propagated by
and after the NajJauskiesung decision, the "traditional" civilian concept of property still forms the
basic premise of any inquiry.1058 However, through the decisions of the German Federal
Constitutional Court, the concept was expanded, so as to include not only corporeal objects, but
also (almost) all rights which can form part of a person's estate. Property in terms of the Basic
Law's "erweiterte" EigentumsbegrifJincludes not only ownership in things (res), but also other
(limited) real rights in things (res), immaterial and intellectual property rights, creditor's rights,
rights to pension, shares and other shareholder's rights, and even certain claims pertaining to a
person's profession or occupation. Consequently, it appears that also in Germany the discussion
about the content and limits of the civilian concept of ownership is not over.1059To some extent, the
problem of acknowledging a more diversified concept of ownership in the private law context, or of
affording more rights the kind of protection that absolutely enforceable rights should have, is more
problematic because of the closed category of rights acknowledged by the Civil Code. The
discrepancy that has arisen in the practice of the Federal Court of Justice and the provisions of the
Civil Code, for instance, with regard to the retention of title constructed as pledge without
possession, cannot be overlooked.
This once again raises the question of whether the concept of property in private law, and therefore
also the property order in general, needs to be adapted. A good case can be made for the
abolishment of the civilian concept of ownership as it is found in South Africa on the basis that the
"ordinary" Roman-Dutch law principles of property as they are found at present in the South
African common law, are subordinate to the constitutional principles. Further, it can also be
argued that the "standard" private law view of property law is too eurocentricised for the
1055Van der Walt 1995 SAPRJPL 298 - 345; Kleyn 1996 SAPRJPL 419 - 423; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 - 203;
Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169 - 206; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 132 - 134; Kroeze 1994 SAPRJPL 325 - 327; Lewis
1992 SAJHR 393 - 411.
1056Van der Walt 1995 SAPRJPL 298 - 299.
1057Cf Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommentar (1994) mn 56 - 203; Kimrninich Eigenturn Enteignung
Entschiidigung (1976) 55 - 84.
1058Kimrninich "Artikel 14" in Von MangoldtIKlein Bonner Kommentar (1992) mn 31.
10590lzen 1984 JuS 335.
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majority of South Africans who has no interest in the Roman-Dutch heritage of South African
property law.I060
It is submitted, however, that these arguments need not result in the view that the Roman-
Dutch/Pandeetist principles of property are of no consequence in matters pertaining to the
constitutional protection of property. From a practical point of view, it would simply be
impossible to eradicate the existing structure of property law without further ado. The law of
property and the system of land rights, which preceded the new constitutional order in South
Africa, are vital to an understanding of legal and social structures inherited from the old order.
They will continue to influence the transformation pursued within constitutional framework and
the prevailing social reality.I061 Moreover, certain provisions in the Interim and Final
Constitutions provide for legal continuity.I062 In a reform of the structure of property law in
South Africa, the Roman-Dutch/Pandeetist could therefore still influence the interpretative
approach to property.I063
The influence that the Roman-DutchiPandectist tradition could still have on the development of
law under the new constitutional order in South Africa need not be negative. It can provide an
acceptable interpretative structure for the provisions of private law. Moreover, the principles of a
critical analytical approach are already present in the Roman-Dutch legal thinking.1064 The
Roman-Dutch/Pandeetist tradition can still reflect the sense of justice endorsed by the
constitution. There can be no doubt that this is indispensable for proprietary relations in the new
legal order. It further no longer needs to bear the brunt brought about by its association with
apartheid legislation, which changed the proprietary relations in South Africa in order to effect
spatial segregation the di fferent races.
176
Nevertheless, the function of the Roman-Dutch law within the legal system in general and the
property law order in particular should be adapted. It should not be used as the instrument for
rationalising the existing scheme of policy and principle, but rather as the source from which
logical and just changes to the existing scheme should be effected. The interpretative
significance of Roman-Dutch law in the South African context therefore docs not lie in its
aptitude for teleological pragmatism, which is described as the method of creating a "productive
misunderstanding of historical material to force it into the service of present day needs" in order
to design "alternative trajectories of institutional and policy change."I065
It is submitted that such an approach will not, in future, establish the necessary credibility for the
Roman-Dutch law as an authoritative source of law in a constitutional order. Roman-Dutch law
1060 Cf cg a similar argument in the case of S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) where certain typically "African"
values were used as considerations in the abolishment 0 f the death penalty in South Africa.
1061 Gutto Properly and Land Reform (1995) 57.
1062 S 4, 229 IC; S 2, Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 6 FC.
1063 Van der Merwe 1998 rSA R I I.
1()64 14.
I06S 15.
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is not to be the tool with which to provide law reformers with a "constructed reality.,,1066The
abuse of, in particular, the Roman-Dutch law of property under the previous regime excludes
such a possibility. Of all the constitutional resourcesl067 with which Roman-Dutch law is, in our
time, on equal footing, it can least afford the doubts that such an approach might raise. The
universal and timeless elements to be deduced from this source of law could still supply law
reformers with principles by which to adapt the law to comply with modern day needs of society.
However, transposing existing legal principles to serve institutional and policy issues in the
interests of the modern South African society does not require "interpretative
misunderstandings." Instead, what is needed is an equilibrium between the values portrayed by
the specific constitutional resource and the values embodied by the Constitution itself, that is to
say the values of human dignity, equality and freedom that "underlie an open and democratic
society." 1068
The guiding principles for evaluation of the civil legal tradition and the new constitutional order
are, therefore, found in the Constitution itself. The Constitution provides a historic bridge
between the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict, suffering and
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class
or sex.1069This could mean that some of the existing civil law principles might fall into disuse or
be replaced by more adequate mechanisms from other resources, like customary law or foreign
law. But those principles that do survive the scrutiny of the constitution would have, by
themselves, more to contribute to the development of the property order.
The function of the constitutional property clause should, however, not be confused with
traditional protection of property in private law. In private law, the purpose of the protection of
property is to insulate the right in question absolutely from an invasion or interference not based
on the owner's permission. In constitutional law, the purpose of the property clause is to ensure
that a just and equitable balance is struck between the interests of private property holders and
the public interest in the control and regulation of the use of property.Y'"
Property as a constitutional right differs fundamentally from property as a right in private law.
The differences between the property in its constitutional and private law senses are not
restricted to the concept of property or to the range of property interests that can be included
under the property clause in the Constitution. They also extend to the kind of protection that each
right can get and, most importantly, the reasons why and the consideration in terms of which the
protection is afforded in an individual case.1071Property as a right in terms of the constitution
1066 In the words of Van der Merwe 1998 TSAR 5 who explains this term by saying that "The passage of time has
imbued the 'old authorities' with larger-than-life dimensions and, even as codification in the Netherlands (in 1809)
reduced them to cultural artefacts, their fame and their value increased in their adopted country ie South Africa."
1067 Ie customary law, legislation, as well as foreign law and international law as prescribed by s 39 FC
(Interpretation clause).
1068 S 39(1 )(a) FC.
1069 Post-amble, IC.
1070 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 67.
1071 70 - 71.
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does not mean that each entitlement recognised or protected by private law is insulated from
state interference. Existing entitlements can be changed, restricted, and subjected to new or
stricter controls, limitations and levies without compensation. Tbese alterations should only be
justified by the public interest. The legislature will inevitably be faced with the social need to
regulate the use of property. However, it is not restricted to either leaving existing rights intact or
expropriating them against compensation. The state's power to regulate proprietary relations can
be employed to introduce the necessary social control over individual property rights. Ion
Further, property interests that are not recognised or protected by private law can be
acknowledged and protected by the constitutional property clause, if that protection is justified
by the constitutional function of the property clause and the public interest.
178
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Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
[8] Constitutional limitations on property rights:
regulation, expropriation and the property order
1. CTeneralrennarks
Once it is established that the constitutional concept of property overreaches the concept of
ownership in private law, it is necessary to determine to what extent the constitutional guarantee
of property will tolerate limitation by the legislature or administration. An answer to this
question will determine the extent to which existing rights would recede to accommodate new
policies. A further interesting aspect concerns the extent to which the interests of right holders in
terms of the constitutional property guarantee can be protected from interferences by actions of
private persons. This raises the issue of horizontal application of the property clause. This
chapter contains a discussion of the different methods by which constitutional rights in general
and the fundamental right to property in particular can be restricted in Germany and South
Africa.
2. Limitation of rights in general
The Interim Constitution's limitation clause, although exclusively South African, contained
certain aspects of the limitation of the constitutional property right found in Germany (and
Canada).1073 Section 33(1) IC reminds of the German manner of limitation by providing that
rights entrenched in the chapter on fundamental rights could be limited by law of general
application, provided that such a limitation would be permissible only to the extent that it was
reasonable and justifiable under specific pre-conditions. Further, a limitation was not supposed
to negate the essential content of the right in question. Limitation of certain rightsl074was further
subject to the requirement of necessity.
However, the South African Constitutional Court chose not to follow the German approach to
limitation of rights blindly. The court observed that, although the way in which the rules for
limitation of fundamental rights are applied in Germany (and Canada) may well be of assistance
in the South African context, there was no reason why the South African analysis should be
fitted into either of these modes.1075The observations of the Constitutional Court in S v Zuma
and S v Makwanyane'[" concerning the interpretation of the general limitation clause in the
Interim Constitution, 1077apparently influenced the drafting of section 36 FC to a large extent.
1073 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 201.
1074 Ie rights entrenched in slO, II, 12, 14(1),21,25 or 30(1)(d) or (e) or (2) IC. Similarly, limitations of rights
entrenched in s 15, 16, 17, 18,23 or 24 IC, also were subject to the requirement of necessity, in so far as these rights
related to free and fair political activity.
1075 CfKentridge J in S v Zuma 19952 SA 642 (CC) par 35; Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC)
par 110.
1076 CfKentridge J in S v Zuma 19952 SA 642 (CC) par 35; Chaskalson P in S v Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC)
par 110.
1077 CfBlaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 201 - 208; Woolman 1997 SAJHR 107.
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Thereby, reliance on the general limitation provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms of 19821078and the decision of R v Oakesl079 was important. The Canadian treatment
fundamental rights limitation was in tum influenced considerably (through the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights) by the German theory on proportionality and the limitation of
rights.1080Since the Canadian Charter contains no property clause, and the German Basic Law no
general limitations provision, the South African limitation of property rights is in some ways
quite unique. In fact, for a better understanding of the application of section 36 FC, the South
African law relating to constitutional property rights limitation needs to be juxtaposed with
property rights limitation in both Germany and Canada. However, the scope of the present
inquiry only allows a comparison between the South African and German positions.1081 The
following discussion will therefore endeavour to explain the differences and similarities in the
German and South African methods of limitation.
2.1. Requirements for limitation of rights under the Basic Law
One of the most important functions of the Basic Law is to limit the powers of the legislature in
order to create effective guarantees of fundamental rights.1082 However, no general limitation
clause appears in the first nineteen articles of the Basic Law, which constitute the German
catalogue or basic rights. The degree in which the different fundamental rights are restricted is
usually determined by the guarantees of the different rights provided in articles I to 19 GG
themselves.1083 The separate guarantees of basic rights in the German Basic Law are usually
restricted through one or more of the following methods: 1084
2.1.1. Restriction directly through legislation
In some cases guarantees are explicitly restricted by or pursuant to a law.IOS5This means that the
legislation may restrict the fundamental right directly,IOR6or that a fundamental right may be
limited in terms of administrative discretion explicitly sanctioned by a statute.1087 In the latter
case the legislature still has to determine the conditions to be complied with for the restriction to
be constitutional. In both instances, the restriction will be either simple or qualified in nature. A
180
1078 Van der Walt Constitutional Properly Clauses (1999) 357.
1079 1986 19 CRR 308.
1080 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRIPL 319; Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 96.
rosI Valuable discussions of the Canadian theory of property rights limitations can be found in Van der Walt
Constitutional Properly Clauses (1999) 93 - 95 and 353 - 358; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1997)
84 - 86; Allen 1993lCLQ 536 ct seq; Bauman 1992 SAJHR 344 ct seq.
1082 Cf Lintpens Funktion & Grenzen del' lnhaltsbestimmung des Eigentums Doctoral Dissertation (1973) 69
concerning the limitations inherent to all the constitutional norms in general and the limitations with regard to the
preservation of the concept of private property in particular.
IOMJ Blaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SALf 271;
IOK4 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 187 - 191. Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1991) mn 292 ct seq.
IOK5 Gg art H II GG.
108(. Only the legislature may formulate such a restriction; the executive and the judiciary arc precluded from such
action.
1087 Gg art 10 II GG.
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simple restriction does not list any further particular conditions to be complied with,1088whereas
a qualified restriction requires specific conditions to be complied with.l089Certain rights may not
be restricted at all by or pursuant to a law.l09o In case of a simple limitation, the freedom of the
legislature to restrict a fundamental right has the widest scope. In case of a qualified restriction,
the scope is not as wide, and in the last instance where no restriction is allowed, the legislature
has practically no freedom to restrict the fundamental right.l091
However, for the constitutionality of legislation restricting fundamental rights, several general
conditions must be fulfilled. The Federal Constitutional Court describes this process as an
interaction between the fundamental rights, which protect individual freedom, and the limitation
provisions, which enable adequate consideration of the public interest.lo92 These general
guidelines for limiting the legislature's capacity to restrict fundamental rights can be found in
article 19 I GG, I093 which constitute the so-called Schranken-Schranken in the German
constitutional dogmatic structure. This term refers to the fact that the legislature, in exercising its
capacity of limiting specific basic rights, can only act within the borders of limitation set by the
Basic Law.
In terms of article 19 I GG, the following conditions for legislative restriction of rights must be
fulfilled: (i) A right can be restricted only by or pursuant to a law. (ii) A right so restricted must
be based upon a law that has general applicationF" (iii) A law enabling restriction of a right
has to specify the fundamental right concerned and explicitly mention the part of the guarantee
against which the restriction operates.1095Further, article 19 II GG requires that the essence (or
"essential content") of a fundamental right may not be affected.l096 This essential content
requirement applies to all rights without exception.1097 The proportionality principlel098 stems
from the basic constitutional principle of the Rechtsstaat, and will thus also be invoked by the
1088 Eg art 2 II GG; art 8 II GG.
1089 Eg art 13 III GG: "Intrusions and restrictions ... shall otherwise only be permissible to avert danger to the public
or to the life of an individual or, pursuant to a law, an acute threat to public safety and order, in particular to relieve
a housing shortage, to prevent an epidemic or to protect young persons at risk."
1090 Eg art 4 III GG: "Nobody may be forced against their conscience into military service involving armed combat.
Details shall be the subject of a federal law." Art 5 III GG: "Art and science, research and teaching, shall be free.
Freedom of teaching shall not absolve anybody from loyalty to the Constitution." Art 8 I GG: "All Germans have
the right to assemble peacefully and unarmed without prior notification or permission."
1091 Pieroth & Schlink Grondrechte - Staatsrecht II (1991) mn 299.
1092 BVerfGE 7, 198208 et seq.
1093 Art 19 IGG: "Soweit nach diesem Grundgesetz ein Grondrecht durch Gesetz ader auf Grond eines Gesetzes
eingeschriinkt werden kann, muj3 das Gesetz allgemein und nicht nur for den Einzelfall geiten. Auj3erdem muj3 das
Gesetz das Grondrecht unter Angabe des Artikels nennen. "
1094 Art 19 I 1 GG: Verbat des einschrankenden Einzelfallgesetzes.
1095 Art 19 I 2 GG: Zitiergebot.
1096 Art 19 IIGG (Wesensgehaltsgarantie): "In keinem Faile darf ein Grondrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet
werden."
1097 This provision was the result of the treatment of limitations of fundamental rights under the Weimar
constitution. The specialised order of limitation in the Weimar Constitution lead the Weimar judges to interpret the
constitution in such a manner that the legislature was said not to be bound by the fundamental right. Consequently
the legislature could negate the right completely and undermine the protection offered by such fundamental rights.
1098 Verhiiltnismafligkeit (Ubermafiverbot),
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court to determine whether and to what extent a restriction is to be allowed,1099regardless of the
speci fie basic right at stake.
2.1.2. Restriction by basic rights mutually
In some cases, different fundamental rights might come into conflict with each other. In these
cases, the collision of rights 1100has to be resolved by means of legislation or by giving the
constitutional provisions a specific meaning. Where a fundamental right (which may be
restricted) has to be balanced against a legitimate public interest provided for in the Basic Law,
the Federal Constitutional CourtllOI tries to give partial effect to each right and attempts not to
sacrifice either the specific right or the public interest completely. Thus, both the fundamental
right and the public interest are "optimised" in a relative way. IIessell02 refers to this practice as
the Herstellung praktischer Konkordanz, The achievement of so-called practical concordance is
also important in the context of conflicting rights in relations among private individuals.ll03 In
such a case the courts should apply tbe principle of equality assiduously, as the practical
concordance of the rights aims at creating a situation in which both (or all) the rights at stake can
be exercised as far as possible to their full potential.II04
2.1.3. Internal modifying components
Sometimes the guarantees of specific basic rights themselves contain some internal modifying
components, which help determine the scope of a specific right and thus also the extent to which
it can be limited."?' Hessell06 refers to these limits as the Grundrechtsimmanenten Grenzen tbat
are to be determined by interpretation of the different basic rights. The limits to an individual's
basic rights are thus determined with reference to the rights of other individuals in society, or the
bani mores as interpreted in the light of the Constitution.1107
2.2. General limitation of rights in South Africa
The investigation into the limitation of rights in South Africa differs somewhat from the
limitation inquiry in Germany. The main distinction is the presence of a general limitation
1099 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 191.
1100 Cf the explanation of the terms "collision of rights" and "competition of rights" in Blasuw-Wolf & Wolf 1996
SAU 273 - 274.
1101 BVcrfGF. 41,2951; BVenGE 41,6578.
1102 Hesse Grundziige (1993) mn 317 - 320.
1103 Cf 260 et seq infra.
I I ().I Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 74.
IIOS An example of such immanent limits to a right would be the qualification in article 8 [ which states that the right
to peaceful (/1/(/ unarmed assembly is guaranteed. Logically, no constitutional protection is afforded to violent and
armed assembly. Similarly, article 8 II subjects only open-air meetings to restriction, and not meetings in closed-off
rooms.
1106 I [esse Grundziige ( 1993) mn 310.
1107 Cf Blaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SALf 275.
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clausell08 in the South African bill of rights, and the absence of a similar provision in the
German Basic Law. In Germany, as has been indicated.l''" the limitation of rights is effected by
legislation (within which the Schranken-Schranken doctrine operates and to which the essential
content principle has to be applied), other basic rights, and/or internal modifying components. In
South Africa, limitation of fundamental rights is effected by the provisions of section 36 FC read
with section 7(3) FC, as well as certain internal modifiers 1110 and specific limitation
provisions I111 within the different fundamental right provisions.l'V The following paragraphs are
aimed at giving an overview of this process and applying it specifically to the constitutional
property clause.
2.2.1. The general limitation clause of the Final Constitution
The function of the general limitation clause is mainly to stipulate the constitutional authority for
limiting fundamental rights, and to provide the controlling requirements for such a limitation.lll3
The Interim and Final Constitutions both contain general limitation clauses.i!" For present
purposes, only section 36 FC will be discussed. This provision reads:
"The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including - (a) the nature
of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the
limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and (e) less restrictive means to
achieve the purpose."
Section 7(3) FC lays down the general rule that all the rights in the bill of rights are limited in
principle:
"The rights in the Bill of Rights are subject to the limitations contained in or referred to in section 36,
or elsewhere in the Bill."
This provision clearly determines that the rights in the bill of rights are not absolute and that
constitutional protection of the fundamental rights is subject to certain constitutionally
determined limitations. In the constitutional context, therefore, the absolute enforceability of a
right like dominium - as it is encountered in private law - is not acknowledged. In fact, the
existence of a general limitation provision indicates that the protection of fundamental rights -
also those rights endorsed by section 25 FC - are in principle restricted. In other words, in spite
of the guarantee contained in each fundamental right provision, authorised restrictions on those
rights can exist. These authorised restrictions are not imposed by the constitution itself, as the
1108 S 36 FC.
1109 Cf 180 et seq supra.
1110 These are also sometimes referred to as "demarcations." CfDe Waal 1995 SAHJR 25.
1111 These are also sometimes referred to as "special limitations." CfVan der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 279.
1112 The terminology might be somewhat confusing in certain sources. Eg in Panel of Constitutional Experts'
Memorandum (Re: panel memo on "speciallimitations"/"qualijiers" and general limitation) of 20-02-1996. Online
at http://www.constitution.org.za/exmemo/cp320026.html [19.01.2000]. Reference is made to both special
limitations and internal qualifiers without that a distinction is drawn between these two concepts.
1113 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 284.
1114 S 33 IC, s 36 FC.
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function of tbe constitutional limitation clause is to stipulate the constitutional authority and
provide the controlling requirements for a limitation, and not to limit the rights of own
accord.1115
Moreover, the existence of a single, separate limitation clause in the Final Constitution does not
mean that its principles should mechanically and without distinction apply to the limitation of all
rights and freedoms protected in the chapter on fundamental rights. The fact that specific
limitations have been included within certain guarantees to simplify the inquiry shows that the
words of the general limitation clause could have a variety of meanings within the different
contexts of separate rights and freedoms. After the meaning and function of specific limitations
and internal modifying components have been pointed out in the following paragraphs, it will be
indicated that the justifiability of all interferences'{'f with property should be determined by
cumulatively considering the limitation provisions of section 36 FC and the more specific
limitations and internal modifying components of section 25 FC.
2.2.2. Specific limitations and internal modifying components
Although both specific limitations and internal modifying components appear 10 certain
provisions of the chapter on fundamental rights, a specific limitation differs from an internal
modifying component in that the former does much more than simply demarcating the right.
Whereas an internal modifying component is inserted with the purpose of providing greater
clarity in respect of some of the vague and indeterminate words used in describing the protected
conduct and interests.i'!" a specific limitation provides the legislature with special grounds to
limit that rigbt.1118
Specific limitations were incorporated in the right to equality,1119 the guarantees of freedom of
religion, belief and opinion,lI2o and freedom of economic activityl121 and also the right to
rus This consideration is important in categorising the kind of claims endorsed by the constitutional property clause.
Cf65 supra.
1116 Ie deprivations and expropriations.
1117 The following provisions in the Final Constitution serve as examples of internal modi fying components: S 14
FC (Privacy): "Everyone has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have - (a) their person or home
searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications
infringed. S 32 FC (Access to information): "( 1) Everyone has the right of access to - (a) any information held by the
state; and (b) any information that is held by another person and that is required Jar the exercise or protection oj
any rights." Emphasis added.
IIIR Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 105 - 106; De Waal 1995 SMUR 25; Van der Walt 1997 SAPRIPL 281.
The language is usually couched in negative terms and directed al the state. The provisions cannot therefore be
considered as mere demarcations.
1119 S 8(2) IC: "No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly, and, without derogating
from the generality of this provision, on one or more of the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethnic
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language."
1120 S 14 IC: "(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion,
which shall include academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. (2) Without derogating from the generality
of subsection (I), religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions under rules established
by an appropriate authority for that purpose, provided that such religious observances are conducted on an equitable
basis and attendance at them is free and voluntary. (3) No/hing in this Chapter shall preclude legislation
recognising - (a) a system oj persollal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion; and
continued
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property.1122In the Final Constitution, this practice has been continued by the express mention
made of it in section 7(3) FC. Therefore, some of the specific limitation clauses have been
retained and some others have been included in the final text. The guarantees of equality,1123
freedom of religion, belief and opinion,1124and expression 1125are a few examples of the kind of
clauses containing special limitations.
The state bears the onus of showing that it exploited a specific limitation,1126 whereas the
complainant bears the onus of showing that his or her activity fell within the scope of a
demarcated right.1127Internal modifying components or demarcations would then typically be
important in the first phase of the constitutionality inquiry, where the scope of the guarantee is
examined.1128The function of specific limitation provisions is, on the contrary, more important
(b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified procedures." (Emphasis
added).
1121 S 26 IC: "( 1) Every person shall have the right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood
anywhere in the national territory. (2) Subsection (1) shall not preclude measures designed to promote the
protection or the improvement of the quality of life, economic growth, human development, social justice, basic
conditions of employment, fair labour practices or equal opportunity for all, provided such measures are justifiable
in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality." (Emphasis added).
1122 S 28 IC: "(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the
nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights. (2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted
otherwise than in accordance with a law. (3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law
referred to in subsection (2), such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to
the payment of agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such
period as may be determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking into account all relevant factors,
including, in the case of the determination of compensation, the use to which the property is being put, the history of
its acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those affected and the interests of those
affected." (Emphasis added).
1123 S 9 FC: "(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation,
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. (4) No person may unfairly discriminate
directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be
enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination."
1124 S 15 FC: "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.
(2) Religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions, provided that - (a) those observances
follow rules made by the appropriate public authorities; (b) they are conducted on an equitable basis; and (c)
attendance at them is free and voluntary. (3) (a) This section does not prevent legislation recognising - (i) marriages
concluded under any tradition, or a system of religious, personal or family law; or (ii) systems of personal and
family law under any tradition, or adhered to by persons professing a particular religion. (b) Recognition in terms
of paragraph (a) must be consistent with this section and the other provisions of the Constitution." (Emphasis
added).
1125 S 16 FC: "(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes - (a) freedom of the press and
other media; (b) freedom to receive or impart information or ideas; (c) freedom of artistic creativity; and
(d) academic freedom and freedom of scientific research. (2) The right in subsection (1) does not extend to -
(a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement of imminent violence; or (c) advocacy of hatred that is based on race,
ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm." (Emphasis added).
1126 Logically, the individual cannot be burdened with the onus of showing that the state "did not exploit the specific
limitation clause".
1127 De Waal1995 SAHJR 25.
1128 Woolman 1997 SAJHR 108 indicates the difficulties that arise if internal modifying components are to be treated
as part of the inquiry concerning justifiability: "The limitation stage [ie the inquiry into the justifiability of an
infringement upon a fundamental right] directs our attention primarily, if not exclusively, to the reasonableness and
justifiability of a limitation in an open and democratic society based upon human dignity, freedom and equality.
continued
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when the justifiability of an infringement has to be determined. Therefore, the language used in
such specific limitation clauses often reminds of the general limitation clause,1129 whereas an
internal modifying component usually, linguistically, takes the form of an adjectival or adverbial
phrase. The property clause provides a good example.
The generally accepted purpose of a specific limitation provision is to express one or more of the
elements usually contained in limitation clauses in more specific terms with regard to a particular
fundamental righr.1130 In this way, the specific limitation provision indicates how tbe general
limitation provision should be applied to a particular fundamental right. Thus, although each
right is not limited separately within the South African Constitution, the presence of specific
limitations could have the consequence that the limitation of single fundamental rights differs
si ightly from each eiber.'!" In the context of constitutional property protection, internal
modifying components in section 25 FC will help to define the content of the right protected by
section 25 Fe. By contrast, speci fie limitations will control limitations of the protected right."32
In the field of constitutional property in particular, many varying analysesll33 could provide
insight into the nature of the provisions affecting property protection in section 25 Fe. In
sections 25( I), (2) and (3) FC alone, there are several provisions affecting the protection of
property in one way or the other: 1134
(I) No one may be deprived of property except ill Ier/ns of law of general application, and no law may
permit arbitrary deprivation of property.
(2) Property may be expropriated only ill terms of law of general application - (a) for a public purpose
or ill the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and
manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a
court.
(3) The amount of the compensation and the lime and manner of payment must be just and equitable,
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests 0/ those affected, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, including - (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of
the acquisition and usc of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct
state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property;
and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.
It is important to determine whether tbese provisions amount to internal modifying components
or to specific limitations, as this will provide clarity about their function and application in the
constitutionality inquiry. In this regard the relationship and differences between internal
modifying components, specific limitations and the general limitation clause must be examined.
Consideration of the nature and scope of the right is something that should already have laken place. To engage the
question of a right's nature a second lime would seem 10 invite analytical confusion."
1129 De Waal 1995 SAHJR 25 - 26.
lUO Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 106.
ILlI COl/tra Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 210. However, Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 107 correctly points
out that the presence of a specific limitation clause could, as a result of careless drafting or of complicated
compromises struck during the negotiations, in some instances simply repeat clements of the general limitation
clause without adding or qualifying anything. In such a case the specific limitation would, naturally, have no
influence on the application of the general limitations clause 10 a specific fundamental right.
IIJ2 Van der Walt 1997 SAPR/PL 281 - 282.
IIJJ Cf the discussion of Van der Walt 1997 SAPRIPL 275 - 330.
1114 Emphasis added.
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2.2.3. Section 25 Fe and the general limitation, specific limitations
and internal modifying components
Many divergent views exist on the effect of the general limitation provisions on section 25 FC in
view of the specific limtations and/or internal modifying components present in this provision.
The approaches diverge not only on the classification of the different "limiting elements" in
section 25 FC, but also on the manner in which section 25 FC should interact with section 36 FC.
The following paragraphs provide an overview.
2.2.3.1. Classification of the provisions in section 25 FC
Exponents of the view that section 25 FC does not guarantee property itself, but only the right
not to be deprived of property otherwise as in accordance with the provisions of section 25 FC
hold the opinion section 25 FC contains no specific limitations. All "limiting elements" should
accordingly be regarded as internal limiting components.T" This approach cannot be tenable. It
has been indicated1136 that the function of a specific limitation clause is, first and foremost, to
determine the effect of section 36(1) FC on a specific case. The provisions in section 25(1) and
(2) FC therefore would rather amount to specific limitations, and not to internal modifying
components. The provisions of section 25(1) and (2) FC determine the requirements for a
limitation of property, rather than define the right that is to be protected. By contrast, the
provision in section 25(5) FC, that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to foster conditions that will enable citizens to gain access to land
on an equitable basis, can perhaps be seen as an internal modifying component.I''" Further, the
provisions of section 25(3)(a), (b), (c), and (d) FC necessitate an inquiry into the permissible
actions or entitlements of the property holder, and can therefore be regarded as internal
modifying components describing the outer scope of the protected right.1138
Accordingly, it could be said that section 36 FC provides the structural and value-based
framework within which the specific terms of section 25 FC should be interpreted.
Section 25 FC confirms the general provisions of section 36 FC. This would explain the
repetition of certain requirements, and place section 25 FC in line with the provisions of
section 7(3) FC. Section 25 FC thus renders certain provisions of section 36 FC more
1135 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 293; De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (2000) 393.
1136 Cf 184 supra.
1137 Cf mention made by the Panel of Constitutional Experts' Memorandum (Re: panel memo on "special
limitations"l"qualijiers" and general limitation) of 20-02-1996, available online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/exmemo/cp320026.html [19.01.2000], where this provision is described as being a
"special limitation or internal qualifier." From the definition provided in this document for the term(s), it becomes
apparent that focus is placed only on the so-called internal modifying components.
1138 Van der Walt 1997 SAP RIPL 312 explains: "... while the market value of the property is taken into account when
determining compensation, certain current uses of the property, certain practices relating to the history of the
acquisition and use of the property and certain state investments and subsidies which enhanced the value of the
property are excluded from the protection against expropriation and will not be included in just and equitable
compensation. These provisions exclude certain aspects or possible entitlements from the protection of
section 25(2) FC and 25(3) FC generally and ab initio, and can therefore be described as internal modifiers."
187
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part Three: TireCanstttutional Inquiry into Property Protection and its Relevance/or the Extstlng Property Order
specifically applicable to the property clause, and states additional requirements only applicable
to situations where section 25 Fe has to be invoked.1139
2.2.3.2. interplay between section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe
Different theories exist regarding the interplay between section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe.
Because the approach to this issue will determine the applicability of the proportionality
principle to the South African property clause, an overview of the different theories is necessary.
(i) Some scholars argue that section 36 FC should not be applicable to section 25 FC at
all.l140 This is indeed the inevitable conclusion that will be reached if a process is followed by
which the provisions of section 25 FC themselves are first exhausted before turning to an
examination of the influence of section 36 FC on a specific matter. De Waal, Currie and
ErasmusT" explain:
"It seems that s 36 can have no meaningful application to s 25. The rights in s 25 have been qualified
lO such an extent that il is unlikely that any violation of' those rights can be justified. Put another way,
if an applicant is able to discharge the difficult burden of showing that the rights in s 25( I)-(3) have
been violated, the state wi Il be unable to justi fy the violation in terms of s 36."
Several considerations dictate against such an approach. For one, section 7(3) FC determines that
the rights in the bill of rights are limited by section 36 FC. No express exclusion of section 25
Fe from the effect of section 7(3) FC is provided. The mere existence of specific limitations
within section 25 FC does not justify a deviation in this regard.1142 in fact, the specific
limitations within section 25 Fe points to the existence of a functional relationship between
section 25 FC and section 36 FC. A general limitation clause might contain clements describing
(i) the organ of state empowered to impose a restriction, (ii) the procedures to be followed to
impose a limitation, (iii) the purpose for which the limitation may be imposed, and the
relationship between the purpose and the limitation, and (iv) the conditions and circumstances
under which a limitation may be imposed.U'" A specific limitation provision can either exclude,
amend, explain, repeat or provide detail about these elements of the general limitation clause.
Depending on the speci fie function of the speci fie limitation provision, the provisions of the
general limitation can be superseded by it or not. In the case of section 25 FC, no indications
exist that the speci fie limitation provisions are aimed at excluding some or all of the elements of
the general limitation provision. Instead, an analysis'!" of the provisions of section 25 FC and
section 36 FC rather indicates that the specific limitation provisions in section 25 FC are aimed
at repeatingl145 or explaining or providing marc dctaill146 with regard to the elements contained
Ill') Van der Walt 1997 SAPR/PL 327.
1140 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (2000) 393 ct seq.
1141394.
1142 Rautenbach Gel/era! Provisions (1995) 106 - 107.
114384-85.
1144 Cf h . ft c analysis 0 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 288 et seq.
1145 Ie the provision in s 25( I) FC that "no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general
application" repeats the similar phrase in s 36(1) FC. The only difference is thai limitations in terms ofs 25(1) FC
arc called "deprivations", but these terms basically mean the same. This provision therefore does not add to or alter
continued
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in section 36 FC.1147This, together with the inclination to interpret the separate provisions of the
bill of rights in the light of the Constitution as a whole,1148confirms that section 36 FC is not
only applicable to section 25 FC, but that it is applicable cumulatively, and not disjunctively. In
contrast to the argument of De Waal, Currie and Erasmus as set out above,"49 the application of
section 36 FC to the property clause does not introduce a third stage into the constitutionality
inquiry in which the onus of proving justifiability reverts to the party challenging the
constitutional validity of a specific interference with property.
(ii) It can also be argued that section 36 FC will only apply to section 25 FC in exceptional
cases. This argument is also based on the view that the provisions of section 25 FC should be
exhausted before the analysis tum to section 36 FC. If the state cannot justify the limitation on
the basis of the specific limitation provisions in section 25 FC, a third phase is introduced, in
which the state (or the party relying on the validity of the limitation) gets another chance to
justify the limitation in terms of the more general provisions of section 36 FC.IISOHowever, the
inconsequence of such an approach has been pointed out by De Waal, Currie and Erasmus, and
quoted above.llsl Moreover, such an approach would also require that section 25 FC is read in
isolation from section 36 FC, which goes against the reading of single provisions in conformity
with the constitutional text in its entirety.IIS2 It would require that the courts override non-
compliance with the specific limitation provisions of section 25 FC if compliance with the more
general provisions of section 36 FC can be indicated. The practical possibility of such an
approach is questionable.I'Y
(iii) A third argument against cumulative application of section 25 FC and section 36 FC
emanates from the view that section 25 FC does not entrench property rights as such, but merely
guarantees the right not to be deprived of property.T" Exponents of this line of thought argue
that the "limiting elements" in section 25 FC all constitute internal modifying components,
any of the elements of the general limitation provision. Similarly, s 25(2) FC provides that property "may be
expropriated in terms of a law of general application". In this case, an addition is made in the sense that the
interference must assume the form of an "expropriation", which is a rather severe form of limitation. It thus also
provides detail about the limitation, as is explained in n 1146 infra.
1146 Ie the provision in s 25(1) FC that no law "may permit arbitrary deprivaiton of property", which would have
been covered by s 36(1) FC anyway, even if not expressly mentioned in s 25 Fe. The express inclusion of this
phrase merely serves the purpose of making the application of the elements of s 36 FC more particular in the context
of s 25(1) FC. In the case of s 25(2) FC, which requires that limitations should be in the form of "expropriations",
the requirements for justification are provided. These provisions affect the purpose of the limitation as well as the
procedures to be followed. As such, they specify the way in which tow of the elements of the general limitation
clause have to be seen in the case of property.
1147 The provision in s 25(8) FC that none of the provisions in s 25 FC may impede land reform, as long as any
deviation from the provisions of s 25 FC is still in line with s 36 FC further confirms the applicability of the general
limitation clause on s 25 FC.
1148 Cf 83 supra.
1149 Cfn 1140 and 1141 supra.
1150 Woolman "Limitations" in Chaskalson, Kentridge et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 12, 14.
1151 Cfn 1140 and 1141 supra.
1152 Cf 83 supra.
1153 CfVan der Walt 1997 SAPRJPL 292.
1154 This view is based on the "less than property" argument in the context of the object of protection of section 25
FC, which is discussed at 61, 66, 68 and 76 supra.
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which restrict the right that is protected in section 25 Fe. According to this view, there can only
be a question of a limitation of the right in section 25 Fe when deprivation or expropriation other
than as provided for in section 25 Fe bas already been established. Then, only, section 36 Fe
enters the scene. The merits of this "less than property" argument have been discussed
elsewhcrc'I'" and will not be repeated here. For present purposes, a discussion of the implication
of this argument for limitation of property right must suffice. Van der WaltllS6 explains:
"[T]he 'less than property' thesis does not ... necessarily exclude the general application of section 36
to the property clause. It is possible, however, to argue that the 'less than property' thesis effectively
restricts the general application of section 36 to the property clause to certain special cases, in the
sense that in terms or this thesis section 36 will not find application to the property clause as long as a
restrictive law or state action that affects property rights complies with the more or less formal
provisions or section 25 ... "
According to this approach, limitations of property will only be subjected to scrutiny in terms of
section 36 Fe if it appears that they do not comply with the limitation requirements in section 25
Fe. Such an approach leaves practically no scope for the consideration and balancing of the
interests of the individual and society, because the parameters of such an interest-balancing
venture have to be determined by the provisions of section 25 Fe in colaboration with section 36
Fe. What is more, the exclusion of section 36 Fe from the inquiry into the constitutional validity
of an interference with property would effectively oust the proportionality test from the process,
as this test is incorporated or "codified" in section 36 Fe.IIS7
(iv) In the view of Van der WaltllS8 the point of departure in a determination of the effect
of section 36 Fe on section 25 Fe is article 36 Fe itself. This approach is based on the structure
and functions of limitation provisions and on the proportionality test as it appears in section 36
Fe. It indicates that the assumption that tbe specific limitation provisions should be applied
before the general limitation provision, is wrong. Section 36 Fe should be the standard upon
which section 25 Fe elaborates. This would mean that the provisions of section 36 Fe would, for
instance, be employed to determine whether an interference with property is arbitrary or not. As
such, section 36 Fe read with section 25 Fe would determine the constitutional limits of
property. This view seems to be most acceptable, although it could raise concerns about the time
and manner in which the proportionality test should be applied in an inquiry as to the
constitutional validity of an interference with property. This issue will be dealt witb in the
discussion on the principle of proportionality with reference to the property clause.lls9
2.2.3.3. Evaluation
The aforegoing discussion should have indicated that constitutional property protection and
limitation in South Africa involve all three possible kinds of limitations: internal modifying
components or demarcations within section 25 Fe; specific limitation provisions within section
1155 Cf 61, 66, 68 and 76 supra.
1156 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRJPL 312 - 313.
1157 Cf242 ct seq infra.
1158 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRJPL 327 - 329.
1159 Cf242 ct seq infra.
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25 FC; and the provisions of the general limitation clause of the Final Constitution. This raises
the vexing question of why some of the more "formal" requirements'P" for limiting the right to
property are repeated in section 36 FC and section 25 FC. This repetition could even support the
argument that section 36 FC does not apply to section 25 FC, simply because of the specific
limitation already present in the latter. However, the principle of conformity'I'" requires that no
provision - and this includes the property clause - can be treated in isolation from the rest of the
constitution. Given the importance of section 36 FC, which is a strong embodiment of the values
underlying the constitution as a whole, the argument that the provisions of section 25 FC exclude
those of section 36 FC should be rejected. Besides, nothing in section 25 FC indicates that the
general provisions of section 36 FC do not apply to the property clause. The specific limitations
that can be identified in section 25 FC do not conflict with any of the requirements in section 36
FC. They simply repeat, explain, clarify and extend the elements of the general limitation
clause.1162Therefore the inclusion of a specific limitation within section 25 FC also does not
point to the intention to confer a right, only to deny the right straight afterwards.I''" It simply
makes it easier for the legislature to limit the right within the enumerated circumstances.
Indeed, section 36 FC applies to the property clause, and it applies in all circumstances. Theories
favouring the idea that section 36 FC only applies in some cases, as a kind of "very last resort" or
because it is indirectly excluded through the negative formulation of the right in section 25
FC,1164should also be rejected. The argument that section 36 FC will only apply once all other
possibilities have been exhausted, and that it therefore is a very last resort that is not always
available to either or both of the parties involved, is (like the first argument) in conflict with the
principle of conformity. Arguments based on the negative formulation contained in
section 25 FC fail on an extended version of basically the same counter-argument. The
conformity principle (or rather, the tendency of the court to follow a purposive interpretation of
the constitutional provisions) renders a narrow distinction between negative and positive
formulations of rights in one and the same bill illogical. Moreover, comparison with other
jurisdictions indicates that a positive or negative formulation - or, for that matter even a general
or specific negative formulation'I'f - of the guarantee to property, does not cause a significant
difference in the protection afforded to property in the various legal systems.i'" In fact, the
Constitutional Court found that a negative formulation such as that of section 25 FC appears to
be widely accepted as an appropriate formulation of the right to property.l'"
The exact function of the proportionality principle in the South African context is closely related
to the issue of how section 25 FC and section 36 FC interact with each other. Therefore,
1160 Ie limitation only in terms of a law of general application.
1161 Cf 83 supra.
1162 Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 106 - 107; Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 289.
1163 CfDe Waal1995 SAHJR 25 - 26.
1164 This argument is based mainly on the theory that section 25(1) FC guarantees something "less than property."
CfVan der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 295 - 299; also 61 supra.
1165 Cf n 316 supra.
1166 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 299 - 301.
1167 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 CCT 23/96, available online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.html[26.09.1999] par 72.
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reference will again be made to the different theories on the interplay between these provisions
when the issue of proportionality is discussed 1168 in the course of the analysis of the limitation of
property rights. From a study of section 25 Fe in its relation to section 36 Fe, the more formal
requirements of such a limitation should be quite clear, as they appear in both these clauses. To
be constitutional, a deprivation or an expropriation of property (that is to say a limitation on the
right to property) has to be effected in terms oj a law,1169 which must be oj general
application.ll7o Moreover, such a Law may nOLpermit arbitrary limitation'[" of the right to
property.l172 Furthermore, an expropriation in particular must be Jar a public purpose or in the
public interesl,1173 and is subject to the payment of compensationÓ'" the amount of which
should be either agreed to by the affected parties, or determined by a court, in which case it has
to be just and equitable.'!" In any event, all limitations of the right to property need to be
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom. Moreover, the general limitation clause compels the court to take certain factors
into account in order to determine whether a limitation would comply with this requirement.l'Ï"
These requirements will enjoy further scrutiny in the course of this chapter.
3. Limitation through "vertical application": regulation
and expropriation of property
In both South Africa and Germany, provision is made for two basic types of infringement upon
private property rights that could qualify as justifiable if certain requirements are met. In South
Africa, the infringement has to qualify either as a deprivation of property in terms of section
25( I) Fe, or as an expropriation in terms of section 25(2) Fe. Similarly, the basic premise under
German law is that a legislative infringement'!" can only be constitutionally justifiable if it
represents either a legislative regulation of property in terms of article 14 1 2 GG (Inhalts- und
1168 Cf242 ct seq infra.
1169 S 25( I) and (2) FC; S J6( I) FC.
1170 S 25( I) and (2) FC; S 36( I) FC.
1171 S 2S( I) FC. Expropriation is regarded as a special subcategory of deprivation. This means that expropriatory
actions would also be subject to the requirement of non-arbitraryness,
lin S 25(1) FC.
1173 S 2S(2)(a) FC.
IIH S 25(2)(b) FC. Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 115. Similar requirements were set in the
Interim Constitution: Section 28(3) IC laid down two explicit requirements for expropriations: they would be
permissible for public purposes only, and they would be subject to the payment of compensation. Further,
expropriations had also to comply with the more general requirement for deprivations as stated in section 28(2) IC
as well as with the limitation provisions of section 33 IC.
1m Contrary to the situation in most other legal systems, the South African property clause also provides some
indications of how the justness and equability of the compensation amount should be determined. Cf s 25(3) Fe.
1176 S 36(1)(a) - (e) FC.
1177 An infringing administrative act is justified if it is based on an enabling statute and still within the authorised
limits set by this statute. The same principle applies to court decisions (of the final instance) creating an
infringement. llowcvcr, ill the latter case an additional question must be considered, ie whether the relevant court
has misjudged the meaning and scope of article 14 GG. Consequently, in the case or infringement through
administrative actions or final-instance court decisions stemming from specific legislation, the constitutionality of
the legislation itself should also be tested. Von Heinegg & Haltem 1993 JuS 124.
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Schrankenbestimmung), 1178 or an expropriation (Enteignung) of property in terms of article 14 III
GG.
Although the requirements that render deprivation (regulation) and expropriation of property
permissible might differ, the methods by means of which these infringements on property rights
are instituted in Germany and South Africa bear a considerable degree of resemblance.
Therefore, it is always important to determine which type of infringement was intended. This is
sometimes easier said than done.
3.1. Difference between regulation of property and expropriation
Particularly in cases where the infringements on property rights were initiated through
legislation, or where the constitutionality of an act enabling administrative or judicial
infringement must be tested, the outcome of the decision might be influenced by the type of
infringement intended. Both in Germany and in South Africa, determining whether the
infringement was intended to be either a regulation of property or an expropriation will not only
be decisive for the question as to the admissibility requirements applicable to a specific
infringement, but also for the question of whether compensation has to be paid. As a rule,
compensation is paid in the case of expropriation, but not in the case of deprivation.T" In
addition, the circumstances permitting deprivation of property are generally perceived to be
broader in scope than in the case of expropriation.V'" It is therefore necessary to distinguish
between regulation (in the narrow sense of deprivation) of property and expropriation already
when determining whether a curtailment of the protected interests has taken place. This will
enable the investigation to proceed to the last stage of the constitutionality inquiry and beyond.
At its simplest, the distinction between regulation and expropriation in both Germany and South
Africa lies in the extent of the infringement: If the owner's freedom is curtailed, but not
completely eliminated, a regulation of property has occurred. If the ownership itself is entirely
withdrawn (either through discontinuation or through transfer to another legal subject), an
expropriation has occurred. In general, expropriation is also distinguished from regulation of
property by two related aspects: Expropriation is specific whereas regulation of or legislative
interference with property is abstract in nature. This also has the consequence that expropriation
has a direct effect on specific individuals, whereas legislative interference applies more
1178 In English literature on German constitutional law, the term "deprivation" as it was used in terms of s 28 IC, is
not employed. Usually, authors refer to this phenomenon as the "legislative competence to determine the contents
and limits of the property guarantee" or the "legislative interference with property". Cf ia Kimminich "Property
Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987); Schuppert "The Right to
Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988); Frowein Protection of Property in Relation to Taxation
Unpublished Report (1996); Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997). The use of this phrases
stems from the wording of art 14 I 2 GG, which grants the legislature capacity to indeed pass statutes determining
what the range, and intensity of the constitutional property guarantee should be.
1179 In Germany, however some cases oflegislative regulation of property demand payment ofa financial settlement.
This does not amount to compensation for expropriation in its true sense and does not cause a change in the nature
of the infringement.
1180 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,38.
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generally. IlSI As a legislative interference could, however, be so extensive that it could have the
same effect as an expropriation, a further distinction between these two concepts are often
needed. This issue has already been discussed by both German and South African courts.
Regulation (in the narrow sense of deprivation) and expropriation of property are, both in
Germany and in South Africa, only permissible or justifiable if the requirements provided for in
the respective constitutions are met. The following paragraphs compare the requirements for
regulation (in the sense of deprivation) and those for expropriation of property in German law
and in South African law. This will be followed by a description of how limitations on property
can be effected by the administration or the legislature in German and South African law. The
problems of distinguishing between the different types of limitation in both legal systems will
then be discussed.
3.2. The justifiability of limitations on property under German law
Article 14 I 2 GG authorises the legislature to "determine the contents and limits" of the property
guarantee, and thereby grants the legislature the ability to regulate property. However, the legal
position protected by article 14 I 1 GG, should essentially remain intact. According to
article 14111 GG, an infringement on property can also occur by expropriation (Enteignung).1182
This is a more intensive infringement on property rights, as it does not merely limit the property
rights but removes them altogether from the holder's sphere of influence. It must be kept in mind
that legislative regulation of the contents and limits of property, and expropriation, are both
mechanisms through which intended infringements on property rights can be justified.
Sometimes, actions of state also affect the right holder's freedom and property rights without it
having been intended as a curtailment.1183 If a measure directlyl18-1 and sufficientlyl185 intrudes
upon the ownership of the affected individual to such an extent that he or she is expected to
make a special sacri (ice, an expropriatory infringement (enteignende Eingriff) is said to have
taken place. This is probably the most a-typical, unintended and unexpected side effect of a
legitimate administrative action, and gives rise to a claim for cornpensation.t'f" On the contrary,
had the administration acted illegally or had it omitted to act where a legal duty existed, and had
an infringement arisen as result of this action or omission, a quasi-expropriatory infringement
1181 Schuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988) 113; BVerfGE 52, I
(Kleingërten}; Picroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 923.
1182 Art 14 III I GG and 14 III 2 GG: "Eine Enteignung is/ uur ZUlli Wahle del' Allgemeinheit zuliissig. Sie darf nur
durch Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gese/zes erfolgen, das Art und Allsmaft der Entschtidigung regelt."
1183 "Man kann jil/ale Grundrechtseinwirkungen. die als solche I'om Hoheitstráger als 'Griff' in den
grundrechtlichen Bereich gewollt sind, 1'01/ sonstigen Grundrechtseinwirkungen gleichen Effekis unterschieden, die
dal/II also 'eingriffsgleich' wirken. " Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich, Grundrechtspragung und
Grundrechtscingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof(eds) Handbuch V (1989) mn 50.
1184 An infringemcnt is direct if it follows from a state-created objective, if it puts into effect a situation created by
the stale, or i f it would result in a responsibility for the state. BGIIZ 92, 3441 ct seq.
118S le, if an individual right holder (Sonderopfer) suffers because the general borderlines on the limitation of
individual rights have been crossed and the curtailment would be of a unreasonable and unbearable intensity
(hinreichende Intensitdt).
IIR6 Schoch 1990 Jura 141.
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(enteignungsgleiche Eingriff) occurred.I''" For instance, reparation work to roads and streets can
bring about severe infringements on the rights of businesses in areas where the reparation work
is being done. If the infringements result from the fact that the maintenance authority has not
announced, prepared and executed the intended maintenance properly and in the least harmful
way, the infringement would be illegal and therefore quasi-expropriatory. If the relevant
authority, however, did everything within its power to reduce the effects of such an infringement,
and the consequences are still harsh, the infringement would nevertheless be legal and therefore
expropriatory.l'Y
Within the structure of article 14 GG, such unintended restrictions upon the holder of a right can
be problematic: Article 14 III 2 GG requires that the legislature should be aware of the full effect
of a curtailment of the freedom protected in the property guarantee. It is not clear whether the
concepts of enteignenden Eingriff and enteignungsgleiche Eingriff will survive the latest trends
in the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court pertaining to expropriation under article 14
GG. Authors are further not in agreement about the legitimacy and applicability of these
concepts.l'" In fact, enteignenden Eingriffe and enteignungsgleiche Eingriffe should be dealt
with on the basis of the Staatshaftungsrecht (state liability law).1190This issue will, therefore, for
purposes of the present chapter, be ignored. Instead, it will be indicated how the general
principles of limitation of fundamental rights in the German legal system translate into certain
requirements for regulation (in the sense of deprivation) and expropriation of property when read
with the specific requirements oflimitation provided by article 14 GG.
3.2.1. By or pursuant to a law
The authorisation for the German legislature to regulate property can be found in article
14 I 2 GG, which determines that the scope and content of property has to be determined by law.
Regulation of property thus occurs "durch die Gesetze".1191This refers mostly to formal law in
the sense of statute; but requirements for the nature and content of legislation might differ
depending on whether a legislative regulation or a full-fledged expropriation of property was
intended. In the case of expropriation in particular, such a severe limitation of the right to
property can only be successful if it is contained in formal legislation. It is argued that legislature
1187 140 - 141.
1188 Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1991) mn 1019a. For further examples, cf BGHZ 37, 44 (forest fire resulting
from artillery shooting exercises); BGHZ 97,369 (traffic noise infringing on the rights of landowners); etc.
1189 CfBryde "Art. 14" in Von Munch & Kunig Kommentar (1992): mn 56 et seq, 100 - 108; contra Papier "Art. 14"
in Maunz & Dilrig GG Kommentar (1994): mn 377; 406 et seq; 687 et seq. The German Federal Court of Justice is,
in terms of article 14 III 4 GG, the court of final instance in questions regarding the amount of compensation to be
paid. This court is of the opinion that concepts of enteignenden Eingriff and enteignungsgleiche EingrifJ should
remain intact. BGHZ 90, 17 at 20; BGHZ 91, 20 at 26 et seq See also BGH NVwZ 1986, 76 at 78; Maurer
Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (1997): mn 87 et seq. For an exposition of the different solutions to this discussion,
see Von Heinegg & Haltern 1993 JuS 215 - 217.
1190 Cf Von Heinegg & Haltern 1993 JuS 123 where it is argued that the question concerning expropriatory and
quasi-expropriatory infringements should not be relevant in the constitutionality inquiry, because it only serves the
purpose of determining exceptional compensation claims.
1191 Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 928.
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alone has the capacity to determine which actions would be for the public good 1192and to
determine for which purposes, situations and exigencies expropriation would be acceptable.I''"
3.2.1.1. "Legalenteignung" and "Adrninistrativenteignung''
The legislature itself can infringe upon property rights, or it can authorise an infringement by the
executive. In order to comply with the requirements of article 14 III 2 GG, an expropriation
therefore can take place through the expropriatory legislation itself, in which an individuals'
property rights are completely or partially, but speci fically removed by a legislative
enactrncnt.U'" This is usually referred to as Legalenteignung. Alternatively, onc of the state's
executive organs can be empowered by legislation to enforce a removal of existing individual
property rights of a determined or determinable person or group of persons on the basis of
expropriatory legislation.i'" This is usually referred to as Administrativenteignung.
A legislative expropriation (Legalenteignung) is characterised by the fact that the enactment of
the legislation itself, immediately, without any further administrative performance, withdraws
existing individual rights of a determined or determinable person or group of persons.1196
Because of its harsh effect, and because Legalenteignung also excludes the possibility of revision
by the administrative courts,"97 this kind of expropriation is only permissible under certain very
limited circumstances. The Detchordnungsbeschtufs'F" can be used as example. This case arose
from the damages caused by the flood in the city-state of Hamburg in 1962. The disaster resulted
in the passing of the Dikes and Embankments Act,1199 which provided for the conversion of
immovable property classified in the land register as Deichgrund (dikeland) into public property.
Thus, the land of owners adjacent to the dikes was expropriated directly by the relevant
legislation. All private rights over the property were terminated and provision was made for
compensation of the former owners. The former owners alleged that their fundamental rights in
terms of article 14 GG have been violated. The Federal Constitutional Court, however, decided
that consideration of the common weal sometimes require an interference with the rights of
owners. According to the court, the fundamental constitutional values would prohibit a revision
of the legal order that would remove constitutional protection of certain activities relating to
property or substantially curtail or suspend the sphere of individual liberty protected by the
fundamental right to property.1200 However, despite the broad principles, which protected
IIY2 I3VerIGE 56. 249261.
1193 OVerIGE 74, 264 285.
1191 These curtailments are referred to as "Eingriffe durch Geset:" - cf Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich,
Grundrcchtspragung und Grundrechtscingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof(eds) Handbuch V (1989) mn 48.
1195 Eg BVerIGE 56, 249 {Dtirkheimer Gondelbahn) 261; BVerfGE 74, 264 (Boxberg) 285 et seq. Such a
curtailment is called "EingrijJ auf Grund Gesetzes" - cf Lerche "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich,
Grundrcchtspragung und Grundrcchiscingriff" in Isensee & Kirchhof (cds) Handbuch V (1989) mn 48.
1196 Eg OVerIGE 45,297326.
1197 Because no administrative act is at stake.
1198 BVcrftiE 24, 367.
1199 l lasmburg Deichordnungsgeset: 1964.
1200 BVerIGE 24,367389.
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property and were mentioned by the court,1201it held 1202that the state could in this instance
legitimately place the dikeland properties under public control.
In the case of an administrative act of expropriation (Administrativenteignung) the legislation
under discussion empowers an administrative organ to execute the expropriation.F'" which must
still result in a withdrawal of existing individual rights of a determined or determinable person or
group of persons. Administrative expropriation can be effected upon the basis of ordinary
legislation, or subordinate legislation.1204This approach does not warrant an equitable outcome
in each individual case. Therefore the act would probably not amount to expropriation, but rather
to legislative interference with property, if ownership entitlements enabling the owner to use the
property responsibly remain.1205
3.2.1.2. Limitation and exercise of the legislature's ability to limit property rights
The legislature's capacity to determine the content and limits of property rights could give rise to
various dogmatic problems. One might ask, for instance, whether the competence to determine
the contents of property could be distinguished from the competence to determine limits of
property rights. Further, the dialectic relation between article 14 I 2 GG and article 14 I GG
could give rise to the argument that no effective constitutional protection of property rights can
possibly exist, as the state can later take back by law that which has been conferred by the
constitution at the outset.
As far as the competence of the courts is concerned, it has been argued that article 14 I 2 GG
contains only a uniform authorisation: defining the contents would accordingly fix the limits; and
setting the limits would also determine the contents.1206Others have contended that the Basic
Law clearly distinguishes between these two activities,1207 even though the two competencies
became so confused through the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court that it is
almost impossible to isolate them from each other.1208 Nevertheless, legislation legalising
encroachments upon property rights 1209are considered to determine limitations.V'" while
1201 The court declared (389) that the right to hold property is an elementary constitutional right which must be seen
in close context with the protection of personal liberty. This decision established that property is secured in the
hands of its owners, and that property itself, but also to some extent the value of property, is guaranteed. The court
explained that the function of the property guarantee was to secure a sphere of economic liberty for the holder of a
protected property interest, thereby enabling him or her to lead a self-governing life. Then the court indicated that
property could not be effectively secured if the legislature were empowered to replace private property with
something no longer qualifying as ownership in the true sense of the word.
1202392.
1203 Eg par Il I, Energiewirtschaftsgesetz; par 19 read with par 17, Bundesfemstrafiengesetz; par 85 et seq,
Baugesetzbuch. Cf also provincial legislation, eg par 1 Landesenteignungsgesetz von Rheinland-Pfalz;
Landesenteignungsgesetz von Baden-Wiirttemberg.
1204 Jung Das deutsche und das koreanische Enteignungsinstitut (1990) 29.
1205 BVerfGE 58,300301; Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 922.
1206 Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 83.
1207 Limpens Funktion & Grenzen der Inhaltsbestimmung des Eigentums Doctoral Dissertation (1973) 66 et seq, 109
et seq; Wendt Eigentum und Gesetzgebung (1985) 147 et seq.
1208 Limpens Funktion & Grenzen der Inhaltsbestimmung des Eigentums Doctoral Dissertation (1973) 71.
1209 Ie legislation which allows curtailments of the legal position of the holder of specific property rights.
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legislation necessary to create property rights and aiming exclusively at rendering possible the
protection of property'j!' is considered to be an instance of tbe determination of contents.
Although the legislature can with respect to the latter largely exercise discretion in defining
property, it should be sensitive to social change and the needs of the common good. Above all,
the legislature must be guided by a constitutional perspective in these matters, to create
conditions in which this right can flourish. If technological, economic, or social change begins to
endanger or threaten guaranteed rights, proper corrective measures may be required as a matter
of constitutional law.V'j
As to the apparently inherent discrepancy between article 14 I I GG and article 1412 GG, it is
acknowledged that legislative intervention will almost always affect existing rights.1213 However,
the theory of Schranken-Schranken ensures that a right is only limited to the extent prescribed by
the Basic Law. It is thus well accepted that, in the context of the German property guarantee, the
constitutional guarantee contained in article 141 1 GG and the social welfare function inberent in
property in terms of article 14 II GG provide limits to the legislative powers to regulate
property.'!" The legislature's powers are not as extensive as they appear to be at first glance.
Although article 14 I 2 GG docs not explicitly mention the limits on the competence of the
legislators as such, jurisprudence and jurisdiction unanimously assert these inherent limits. In
this regard, the Federal Constitutional Court1215 has indicated that, in regulating the content and
limits of property under article 14 J GG, tbe legislator is required to accord due weight to the
framers' fundamental value decision in favour of private property.1216 As with other fundamental
rights, balancing is the order of the day, as any legislative regulation is subject to certain
overarching values that influence the meaning of the entire Basic Law. These are the principles
of human dignity, personality, and equality, which are enshrined, respectively, in the first three
articles of the Basic Law. It is the legislature's responsibility to harmonise these values in
practice, even if it means that more weight is attached to some property rights than to otbers.
Finally, thc principles of rule of law (Rechtstaat/ichkeit), social justice (Sozialstaat!ichkeit) and
proportionality (Verhiiltnisméij3igkeit)1217 must be fed into the equation.12ls The legislature is
1210 Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights. Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 83;
Wendt Eigenrum und Gesetzgebung (1985) 148 - 149.
1211 Ie legislation which stipulates who is to be protected, and to what extent.
1212 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 297.
1213 Thermann Abstufungen ill der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 143 - 147.
1214 BVerfGE 58, 300 338; Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights. Institutions and Impact of
International Lalli (1987) 82 - 83.
1215 BVerfGE 14, 263 (Feldmithle) 277 - 278: "Der Regulungsbefugnis des Gesetegebers scheinen nach dem
Wortlaat des Art. 14 Abs. I Satz 2 GG keine Schranken gesent zu sein. Es ist jedoch selbstverstiindlich, doft jede
gesetzliche Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung sowohl die grundlegende Wertentscheidung des Grundgesetzes
zugunsten des Privateigentums im herkommlichen Sinne ZII beachten hat als ouch mit allen iibrigen
Verfassungsnormen ill Einklong stehen III11ft.also insbesondere dem Gleichheitssatz, dem Grundrecht auf freie
Enf.allllll[!. der Personlichkeit und dell Prinzipien der Rechts- II/Ill Sozialstaatlichkeit. "
121 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 254.
1217 Although no direct reference is made in the quotation from the Feldmiihle case (cf n 1215 supra) these words
were repeated in subsequent decisions with the addition that the legislator must not determine contents and
limitations in a grossly inappropriate manner encroaching upon the interests of the persons concerned without
ncccssiry or excessively. "[Del' Gesetzgeber] darf Inhalt IIl1d Schranken des Eigenmms nicht ill einer Weise
continued
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supposed to find the guidelines according to which the contents and limitations of property rights
are determined by observing the current ideas and perceptions in society.1219The function of the
Constitutional Court in reviewing an alleged intrusion into the right of property is to determine
whether lawmakers have adequately considered and properly weighed these competing
values.1220
The orientation of the legislature towards a determination of the contents and limits of property
against the changing demands of the society is noteworthy. Upon scrutinising the legislation
enacted since the promulgation of the Basic Law in 1949, Von Briinneck1221has identified three
phases in the German legislature's exercise of its competence to determine the content and limits
of property. 1222In the first phase (from 1949 until the 1960s) the legislature - in fostering a
liberal and social economy (sozialen Marktwirtschaft) - concentrated on securing property rights
by promoting private property with a wide range of entitlements for the holder.1223In the second
phase more focus was placed on the social elements in the same economic system. Private
property was still promoted, but only within the framework of state regulations designed to keep
the competitive market working efficiently and to secure social protection. Therefore more
restrictions on private property were acknowledged.P'" The second phase ended in the time of
the changeover of political power from the social-liberal coalition to the CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition at the beginning of the eighties. This introduced the third identifiable phase in property
legislation. Some individual property rights were broadened to correlate with the policy of less
state control and more individual rights and duties,1225but (contrary to the treatment of property
rights in the first phase) the broadening of individual property rights and correlative duties
depended much more on the type of property at stake.1226The development of the legislature's
regulatory competence can therefore not be described as a simple broadening, nor a systematic
limitation of property rights. Legislation regulating property varies according to the type of
property involved and the relevant moment in history.
bestimmen, die grob sachwidrig ist und in die Interessen der Beteiligten ohne Grund oder ubermafiig eingreift,"
BVerfGE 18, 121 132; also BVerfGE 21,150155.
1218 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 254.
1219 BVerfGE 20, 351 (Tolwutentscheidung) 355 - 366.
1220 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 255. In this regard, the treatment by the Federal
Constitutional Court of the various competing interests at stake is illustrated in BVerfGE 14, 263
(Feldmuhlebeschlufi); BVerfGE 37, 132 (Wohnraumkiindigungsschutzgesetz); BVerfGE 42, 263
(Conterganentscheidung); BVerfGE 52, 1 (Kleingiirten); BVerfGE 89, 1 (Besitzrecht des Mieters).
1221 Von Briinneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 163 et seq.
1222 In Von Briinneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 163 et seq no distinction is made between the different
competencies of the legislature in determining, on the one hand, the scope, and on the other hand, the limitations of
property. Cf contra Limpens Funktion & Grenzen der Inhaltsbestimmung des Eigentums Doctoral Dissertation
(1973) and Wendt Eigentum und Gesetzgebung (1985).
1223 Von Briinneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 163.
1224 Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 83; Von
Briinneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 163.
1225 Von Briinneck Eigentumsgarantie (1984) 163.
1226 164.
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3.2.2. Specific requirement for regulation of property: proportionality
The constitutionality of particularly legislative regulations of property is premised on adherence
to the principle of proportionality. By and large, proportionality is tested by considering the
objective suitability (Geeignetheit) of the law, action or measure; the question of its necessity
(Erforderlichkeit); and the question of its reasonableness or its "proportionality" in the narrow
sense (Angemessenheit). Objective suitability means that the restriction, which is being tested
against the constitutional provisions, should be appropriate or suitable to achieve the objective
intended. The intended aim of the legislation under discussion must be measured against the
possible means to achieve it, to determine whether a rational relation exist between them.
Necessity implies that the measure taken must not, in other words, be harsher than is necessary
to achieve the specified goal. Reasonableness (or "proportionality" in the narrow sense) means
that, in relation to the importance and meaning of the fundamental right, no less far-reaching
restriction would have achieved the same result. 1227
The principle of proportionality is the basis for binding legislature in determining the
relationship of fundamental rights and their restriction. It is, in other words, the method used to
determine whether the reasons advanced by the state to limit a freedom outweigh the values that
underlie the constitutional commitment to the protection of the freedom.1228 The principle of
proportionality also binds the executive in the exercise of its discretionary powers.1229 As such,
proportionality gives rise to the prohibition of excesses (Ubermaflverbot), which means that it
monitors and culls legislation, tempering harsh statutory provisions and substantiating exceptions
to the general rule without compromising the general applicability of the legislation.1230 Thus,
the Federal Constitutional Court has determincd'Y' that public authorities can limit the citizens'
general claim for freedom against the state only insofar as it is necessary for the protection of the
public interest.
3.2.2.1. Proportionality and the property clause
With reference to the property clause, the Federal Constitutional Court has deduced the
applicability of the proportionality principle from article 1412 GG read with article 14 I I GG,
particularly because they appear within one paragraph of the guarantee, and follow each
other.1232 Further, the social welfare function of property as it appears from article 14 II GG read
with article 14 I GG gives the proportionality test a unique structure in the context of the
property guarantee.123J The proportionality principle requires that legislation infringing upon
property rights acknowledges the holders' freedom and limit it reasonably, namely only as far as
1227 Degenhart Staatsrecht I (1998) mn 278, 279, 281; Robbers introduction (1998) 61; Olaau [sic] 1990 SAL.! 82.
122M However, constitutional disputes are often resolved by demarcating or defining the right properly, rather than by
reliance on the doctrine of proportionality. De Waal 1995 SAIlJR 6 n 17.
1229 Blaauw-Wolf & Wolf 1996 SAU 269.
1230 Blaauw- Wolf 1999 SAPRIPL 194.
1211 In BVeriGE 19,342348 - 349.
1232 BVeriGE 52, I 29.
nn BVeriGE 34 210,138 ct seq, 211 et seq.
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it is necessary and suitable. At the same time, the infringing legislation should allow only
proportional (suitable, necessary and proportionate/moderate) neglect of the social welfare
obligation.1234
In effect, this means that the German Uberma.fJverbot123S on the one hand, and the Gebot
sachgerechter Abwágung on the other should be complied with. The Federal Court has explained
these requirements.V'" It entails that, when enacting legislation in terms of article 14 I 2 GG, the
legislature has to consider both elements contained in the constitution: (i) the relationship
between constitutionally protected legal positions, and (ii) the demand of a social welfare system
of property ownership. It has to balance the different interests meriting protection. Neither one-
sided preference, nor discrimination is in line with the constitutional idea that private property
has to serve the society in which it operates. Corresponding therewith is the commitment of the
legislature to the constitutional principle of proportionality. The public good is not only the
motive, but also the limit up to which restrictions can be imposed on the owner. To be
constitutional, these restrictions must be necessary within the ambit of the regulated sphere and
structurally applicable to the property under discussion. Restrictions of the power of disposition
of the owner may not go beyond that what is necessary for the achievement of the purpose that
the regulation serves.
The dual task of the legislature created by article 14 I 2 GG must be seen against the dual
function of the property guarantee.1237 On the one hand, property must serve the needs of the
private individual and, on the other hand, it must also be useful to the public in general. The
legislature has the difficult task of harmonising these requirements of private use and public
usefulness. Its success depends on its ability to obtain a proper proportional combination of these
functions, which would create equilibrium in the interests under discussion.
3.2.2.2. Proportionality and balancing of interests under the property clause
In determining whether a fair balance has been struck between the individual interest at stake and
the public interest in general, the fundamental purpose of the property guarantee will be taken
into account by the courts. In several decisions the court indicated what a proper balance
1234 Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 929.
1235 "Der allgemeinen rechtsstaatlichen EingrifJsschranke des Ubermafiverbots ... entsprochen hat. "Von Heinegg &
Haltem 1993 JuS 125. Cf200 supra.
1236 BVerfGE 52, 1 (Kleingarten) 29: "Der Gesetzgeber muj3 bei Regelungen im Sinne des Art. 14 Abs. 1Satz 2 GG
beiden Elementen des im Grundgesetz angelegten Verhiiltnisses von verfassungsrechtlich garantierter
Rechtsstellung und dem Gebot einer sozialgerechten Eigentumsordnung in gleicher Weise Rechnung tragen; er muj3
die schutzwurdigen Interessen der Beteiligten in einen gerechten Ausgleich und ein ausgewogenes Verhaltnis
bringen. Eine einseitige Bevorzugung ader Benachteiligung steht mil den verfassungsrechtlichen Vorstellungen
eines sozialgebundenen Privateigentums nicht in Einklang. Dem entspricht die Bindung des Gesetzgebers an den
verfassungsrechtlichen Grundsatz der Verháltnismëfsigkeit. Das Wahl der Allgemeinheit ist nicht nur Grund,
sondern auch Grenze fiir die dem Eigentiimer auftuerlegenden Beschriinkungen. Um var der Verfassung Bestand zu
haben, mussen sie vam geregelten Sachbereich her gebaten und auch in ihrer Ausgestaltung sachgerecht sein.
Einschrënkungen der Eigentiimerbefugnisse durfen nicht weiter gehen, als der Schutzzweck reicht, dem die
Regelung dient. "
1237 Cf73 supra.
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between the interests of the community and the individual interests would be, and then reached
the conclusion that the particular statutes were invalid because they violated the the principle of
balancing competing interests. However, many recent decisions of the Federal Constitutional
Court are not consistent with each other.1238
The Federal Constitutional Court, for instance, held that copyright legislation providing for the
possibility to print protected materials for educational purposes is as such compatible with article
14 GG, but found that the exclusion of any royalties for this publication was a violation of article
14 II GG. The Court explained in detail that the exclusion of royalties was not demanded by the
public interest.1239 In a further decision,1240 the Court held that it is in accordance with article 14
GG to legalise performance of protected musical works in church services without the
permission of the author. However, the exclusion of any royalty for such a performance was also
found to be in violation of article 14 GG. In another matter, the court found that a change of
legislation that prohibited the continued use of lawfully acquired trademarks for wines is in
violation of article 14 GG. It therefore invalidated the legislation concerned.V" The court also
held that specific rules requiring publishers to provide copies for official libraries is in principle
compatible with article 14 GG. However, this is not so where a limited edition of a specific
publication at extremely high costs is involved.1242
The (classical) Verhiiltnismiijiigkeit test can, inter alia, involve an investigation into the social
wei fare function embodied in article 14 II GG. Therefore the Gestaltungsspielraum (that is, the
legislative scope or leeway) of the legislature is an important factor. Proportionality (in the wide
sense) is a general rule of constitutional interpretadion. It should not be confused with the
balancing of conflicting rightsl243 (Giiterabwagung) which is applied by some administrative and
civil courts, but not endorsed by the Federal Constitutional Court.1244
In terms of the theory of Guterabwiigung, the "abstract ranking" of rights and values depend on
their source. Constitutional rights rank higher than rights accorded by other statutes, just like
federal law is more important than tbe law of the Liinder.l245 For present purposes, the
hierarchical ranking of fundamental rights, which are proposed by this theory, needs to be
mcntioned.F" According to this hierarchy, freedom would, for instance, rank higher than
1238 Pieroth & Schlink Grandrechte (1991) mn 986a remarks that the latest decisions of the Federal Constitutional
COUrI indicates that the ownership concept is in transit. Cases mentioned include: BVerfGE 37, 132
(Wohnraumkundigung); BVerfGE 45, 297 (Hamburger U-Bahn-Bau); BVerfGE 50, 290 (Mitbestimmung);
BVerfGE 52, I (Kleingarten); BVerfGE 58, 137 (Pflichtexemplar); BVerfGE 58,300 (N(ifJauskiesullg).
1239 BVcrfGE 31,229.
1240 BVerfGE 49,382.
1241 BVcrfGE 51, 193.
1242 BVerfGE 58, 137.
1241 Eg De Waal 1995 SAHJR 6 n 17 indicates that proponionality can also be employed in cases where the court is
called upon to balance conflicting rights, because balancing is a form of limitation of rights. This is an over-
simplification of the process which really takes place when invoking the proportionality principle.
12<14 BVcrfG E 7, 198 (Liirh) 208 ct seq
1245 Art 31 GG.
124(, Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 198 - 199 provides an excellent overview of this theory of Gtuerabwágung. The
present discussion is based on her exposition of the matter, but the sources quoted by her arc omitted in order to
avoid duplication.
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property rights and other rights which protect objects, because freedom is inextricably connected
to the person. Furthermore, the importance of a right depends, inter alia, on its relevance to the
community, which in tum links with the importance of freedom. This theory basically foresees
that the more fundamental a right is for the maintenance of values in a democratic state, the
higher its position in this pyramid of fundamental rights will be. Freedom of expression or
occupational freedom, would, for instance, rank higher than property rights. In addition to this
"abstract ranking" there is a "concrete ranking" of rights which can be applied in a particular
instance to determine which right enjoys preference over another, or which right has to give way
to another. This depends on the "values" or "interests" at stake, the intensity of the infringement
and the degree to which a right deserves protection. A right with a low ranking, from an abstract
perspective, could be awarded a higher ranking in a specific case, depending on a number of
other factors involved.1247 The actual number of values or interests can thus also playa role in
the specific situation. In principle, more interests take precedence over a single interest; the
public interest is more important than an individual interest and multiple freedoms come before a
single freedom. The extent to which one right enjoys preference over another is not specifically
delimited by the theory of abstract or concrete ranking. A number of other criteria still has to be
considered, namely interpretation in conformity with the constitution, the principle of equality,
the Rechtsstaat concept and the principle of proportionality. These criteria are also applied when
two rights have the same ranking.1248
Blaauw-Wolfl249 shows that the principle of proportionality and this balancing-of-conflicting
rights theory (Guterabwágung) overlap and might even sometimes lead to the same results. The
latter is, nevertheless, based upon a system of weighed or ranked fundamental rights where the
general importance of a certain right or freedom depends on its relevance for the community.V'"
Proportionality in the (wider) sense of propriety in the relation between the concepts of private
property and social interest is much rather a function embodied in a broad legislative competence
(Gestaltungsspielraum) to determine the content and scope (framework) of the property
guarantee. 1251
In the constitutional context, the disadvantage of the theory of Giiterabwágung is that it
encourages subjective assessment of constitutional norms and often even replaces a true
interpretation of the constitutional norms. This amounts to a denial of the Rechtsstaat concept,
which is the origin of the proportionality principle.1252 It also confuses the distinction between
the proportional leveling of the interests of the parties involved (in other words, proportionality
1247 For example, the owner of a factory with relatively high pollution emissions must be willing to accept a
'depreciation' of his property rights. In the concrete case his property is less deserving of protection than the
property rights of others, even in another context.
1248 CfBlaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 198 - 199 and the sources quoted there.
1249 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 198 - 201.
1250 This theory determines that the more fundamental a right is for the maintenance of values in a democratic state,
the higher its position is in the hierarchy of fundamental rights ("abstract ranking"). Moreover, the factors applicable
in a concrete case determines the value attached to fundamental rights for that specific case only ("concrete
ranking"). Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 198.
1251 Thormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 210.
1252 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 199.
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in the wider sense) and the classical investigation into the Angemessen heit (that is,
proportionality in the narrow sense) of a specific infringement with a specific purpose.I253
Therefore, Giiterabwágung or the balancing of conflicting interests should only be resorted to if
the elements of suitability and necessity have been investigated in a specific case and could
provide no clear answer as to the constitutionality of the restriction. Moreover, even if the case
requires a "real" balancing of interests in the sense that the proportionality in the narrow sense
should be investigated, a predestined hierarchical ranking of the different rights, freedoms and
values, should not be endorsed: 1254
"Vielmehr stelit das Prinzip der Einheit der Verfassuug die Aufgabe einer Optimierung: Beiden
Giitem miissen Grenzen gezogen werden. damit beide ZIIoptimaler Wirksamkeit gelangen konnen ....
'Verháltnismêfiigkeit' bezeichnet ill dies em Zusammenhang eine Relation Zweier variabler Craften,
IIl1d zwar diejenige, die jener Optimierungsaufgabe alii besten gerecht wird, niche eine Relation
zwischen einem konstenten 'Zweck' lind einem oder IIIehreren variableu 'Mitteln '."
This would mean that proportionality in the (wider) sense of the appropriate relation between the
concepts of private property and public interest is something different from the classical
determination of the proportionality of a specific infringement.1255 ft represents the purpose of
granting the legislature such wide capacities in enacting legislation that creates interference with
private property.
204
3.2.2.3. Property, legislative structuring and levels of scrutiny
Because of the different elements of proportionality, the provision on legislative determination of
the contents and limits of property in article 14 I 2 GG is in a sense also intertwined with the
social welfare function, although these two provisions pursue different aims in the context of
article 14 GG as a whole. The case law on the matter shows that, even where the Federal
Constitutional Court found that the purpose of the legislation was to serve the general interest,
the concomitant hardship caused to the individual may lead to a violation of article 14 GG.1256
The constitutional property guarantee is to a large extent dependent on legislative structuring
(Gesta/tllng). In fact, the constitutional property guarantee is made specific and is given effect
through the enactment of ordinary legislation. In the context of the property guarantee,
1253 Thermann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 210.
12S
i
l Hesse Grundzuge (1993) mn 72. Translation: "The principle of the unity of the constitution rather requires an
optimisation: Both interests should be limited, as both should be optimally effective .... 'Proportionality' in this sense
signifies a relation between two interests which could vary in importance, a relation which would serve the required
optimisation best, not a relation between a constant 'purpose' and one or more varying 'means'."
IHS Thonnann Abstufungen ill eier Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 210, 143: "Dort ist die richtige Stelle. lim =u
fragen, oh eier Gesetzgeber ausgewogen ge/lllg zwischen Eigentum und Sozialgebot abgewogen hat, mie anderen
Worten. ob er sowohl die Freiheie nicht mehr als l'erllii/t/lislllajJig verkiirzt als auch die Sozialbindung nicht mehr
als verhliltntsmiijlig vernachlássigt hat. il Cf, however, also BVcrfGE 52, I 29 Cl seq; BVerfGE 72, 66 78 cl seq;
BVcrfGE 87, 114 138 el seq. "Das WaM der Allgemeinheit ist nicht nur Grund. sonderu auch Grenze fiir die dem
Eigentitmer aufzuerlegenden Beschriinkungen. Um VOl' eier Verfassung Bestand =11 Itabell, mussen sie vam
geregelten Sachbereich her geboten und auch in ihrer Ausgestaltung sactigerecht sein. Einschriinkungen eier
Eigntumerbefugnisse durfen nicht wei/er gellen, als der Schutzzweck reie/II. "em die Regelung dient".
1256 BVerfGE 58,137; BVerfGE 31, 229; BVerfGE 49,382 Frowcin Protection of Property in Relation to Taxation
Unpublished Report (1996) 8.
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legislature is assigned the task of putting the social model of property, the normative elements of
which are stipulated in article 14 I 1 GG and article 14 II GG, into practice.1257 Proportionality in
the narrow sense involves in particular the taking into account of, inter alia, the social welfare
function of property in terms of article 14 II GG.1258 It is here that the wide scope of the
legislature in enacting legislation affecting the rights of holders of patrimonial rights can be
questioned. The interests worthy of protection of the parties involved must be justly balanced
and brought into equilibrium. The specific type of patrimonial interest, with its particular
characteristics, should also be taken into account.
The kind of restriction imposed upon the property guarantee is closely connected to the
perception of the function of ownership under given circumstances. If the function of ownership
is primarily perceived to be the securing of the private freedom of the individual, legislative
restrictions operate within a narrow set of limits. If, however, the function of ownership is
perceived to be that of social benefit, the legislature's powers to determine the content and limits
of property (protection) are more extensive. 1259
The specific object of a property right for the holder thereof is relevant in considering the
justifiability of regulations upon the property, because of the approach of the Federal
Constitutional Court. Property is made subject to varying levels of scrutiny, 1260 depending on the
nature of the object of a specific property right and its importance for the individual as well as
society at large. The court tests constitutional justifiability against a higher standard when the
function of ownership as the means through which the individual can secure his material well
being, independence and freedom is at stake. 1261 By contrast, the court tends to grant the
legislature more scope in the enactment of constitutionally justifiable regulating legislation when
the social function 1262 of ownership - the social responsibility of the state and the power to
control the dangers and disadvantages of private autonomous use of property - is involved. 1263
1257 BVerfGE 52, 1 29. Cf also BVerfGE 37, 132 140, where the dialectic relation between constitutionally
guaranteed freedoms and a socially just property order is mentioned.
1258 Cf n 1255 supra. Thormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 143. Cf, however, also
BVerfGE 52, 1 29 et seq; BVerfGE 72, 66 78; BVerfGE 87, 114 138 et seq. "Das Wohl der Allgemeinheit ist nicht
nur Grund, sondern auch Grenze for die dem Eigentumer aufzuerlegenden Beschriinkungen. Um vor der Verfassung
Bestand zu haben, mussen sie vom geregelten Sachbereich her geboten und auch in ihrer Ausgestaltung sachgerecht
sein. Einschriinkungen der Eigntiimerbefugnisse durfen nicht weiter gehen, als der Schutzzweck reicht, dem die
Regelung dient. "
1259 BVerfGE 53, 257 292.
1260 Thormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 211 - 225; Van der Walt 1997
SAPRJPL 318.
1261 BVerfGE 50, 290 340. The legislature's legislative ability is therefore more limited in cases concerning property
interests acquired through the holder's own labour or performance, as well as in cases concerning the alienation of
property (because the capacity to dispose of property is elementary to the owner's freedom). Pieroth & Schlink
Grundrechte (1998) mn 933.
1262 An earlier draft by the Parliamentary Council that harbours the intent of this broad language reads: "Ownership
entails a social obligation. lts use shall find its limits in the living necessities of all citizens and in the public order
essential to society." This suggests that the legislator has been given a wide berth for the regulation of private
property in the public interest. Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253.
1263 Albeit without giving detailed reasons: BVerfGE 80, 137 150; BVerfGE 8, 71 80; BVerfGE 21, 73 83;
BVerfGE 50,290 340 and 347. This trend is also echoed in literature on the topic of art 14 GG. Cf Bryde "Artikel
continued
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Ownership of means of production, which provides power over third parties, would typically fall
into this category.1264 Landownership is also treated with caution, because of the argument that
land, which is an indispensable but limited resource, cannot be made completely subject to the
free will and power of the individual owner. In a just legal and social order, the public weal is
much closer connected to land than to many other kinds of patrimonial interests.1265
The social relevance of a specific kind of property is dependent on time and place, and has no
influence on the concept of property in general. "Socially relevant" property should not be
regarded as being either less or more valuable than property without any particular social
relevance.1266 It merely influences the courts' and legislature's obligation to consider certain
issues when attempting to regulate specific kinds of property: In the Kleingarten case,1267 for
example, the court struck clown a federal statute that sought to limit the right of landowners to
terminate garden plot leases. Garden plots rented from landowners on the fringes of large cities
were a major feature of German social organisation and once played an important role in feeding
the population. It was argued by the state that limiting the landowners' right to terminate garden
plot leases was consistent with the social welfare function of property and an emerging national
policy against urban sprawl. In the light of changed economic conditions and developments in
commercial agriculture, however, the court deemed the burden on the property owner
disproportionately heavy in relation to the value of the protected interest. From this example, it
should be clear that the legislature must carefully have considered either the specific nature of
the property interest at stake, or the meaning of the property interest for the right holder, or even
both.
In this manner - through the interplay of the liberty and social functions of property and the
legislature's scope to regulate property - a system of di fferentiated (or "scaled") protection of
various property interests has developed from the constitutional directives. In this regard,
Thormannl268 points out that the more the public interest is taken into account in the regulation
of property, the less the interests of individual owners will, as a rule, be heeded. Vice versa, the
situation is similar. Accordingly, each differentiation made between the requirements for
justifiable regulation of various kinds of property rights would simultaneously have the effect of
layering (or "scaling") the protection of property and of differentiating between the social
relevance of various kinds of property rights.
The ability of the legislature of translating the constitutional requirements into specific terms and
categorising property accordingly should not be curtailed to the extent that it cannot fulfil the
14" in Von Munch & Kunig GG Kommentor (1992) mn 63; Leisner "Eigcntum" in Isensee & Kirchhof
Haudbuch VI (1989) mn 60, 61.
1264 Cf BVcrfGE 79, 2941. Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 933. Papier "Artikel 14" in Maunz &
Diirig GG Kommentor (1994) mn 298 Cl seq.
1265 BVerfGE 21, 73 82 et seq; BVerfGE 52, I 32 et seq. Cf similar reasoning in BGBZ 23, 30 35;
I3GIIZ 80, III us. BGHZ 90, 4 IS.
1266 Leisner "Eigcnturn" in Isensee & Kirchhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 115; Thermann Abstufungen ill der
Sozialbindung des Eigentunis (1996) 21 1.
1267 BVerfGE 52, I.
1268 Thorrnarin Abstufungen ill der Sozialbindung des Eigentunis (1996) 38.
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functions placed upon it by the Basic Law and meet the expectations created by a democratic
order. Itmust still be possible for the legislature to be creative in order to be functional. This so-
called Gestaltungsspielraum'i'" of the legislature is of the utmost importance in the context of
the limitation of property rights in the public interest, and should therefore always be taken into
account by the courts when considering whether or not a specific regulation of property is
constitutionally justifiable. The assessments of the legislature cannot simply be thrown
overboard and be replaced at whim and fancy when constitutional interpretation is at stake.1270
3.2.3. Specific requirements for expropriation of property
Apart from the requirement which applies to both legislative regulation (in the narrow sense of
deprivation) and expropriation of property that the infringement should be undertaken by or
pursuant to a law (which, in the case of expropriation means formally enacted legislation),
additional requirements determine the justifiability of an expropriation. These are that (i) the
legislation must provide for compensation, and the type and extent of compensation must be
stipulated; 1271 (ii) the expropriation must be for the public weal; 1272 and (iii) the determination of
the amount of compensation must follow from a fair balancing of interests of the society as a
whole on the one hand and of the affected individuals on the other.1273 If these requirements are
not met, the basic right to property is violated. The owner's duty to tolerate an intrusion of his or
her basic right to property is determined by the Basic Law itself. These limits are fixed and
permanent. The legislature is not empowered to change them.1274 These requirements need closer
scrutiny.
3.2.3.1. Provision for compensation ("Junktimklausel")
Once it is certain that a specific expropriation is justified and valid in terms of the requirements
set out in article 14 GG, the constitutional guarantee of property in German law embodies a
"guarantee of value" (Wertgarantie). This entitles the individual to receive compensation upon
the expropriation of his or her right to property by the state.1275 The requirement that provision
must be made for compensation and that the type and extent of such compensation must be
1269 Ie the legislative scope or leeway.
1270 Thormann Abstufungen in der Sozialbindung des Eigentums (1996) 209
1271 Art 14 III 2 GG.
1272 Art. 14 III I GG.
1273 Art 14 III 3 GG. This so-called "Abwiigungsgebot" does not allow the allocation of mere nominal compensation.
However, it also does not require that compensation should always equal the full market value of the property.
Instead, the type and extent of compensation must be determined through a consideration of all the interests at stake.
Cf BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung) 421; BGHZ 39, 198 199. Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 944.
Richter & Schuppert Casebook (1996) 378 et seq. The act can determine the manner in which the different interests
should be rated and balanced, but should at least contain a set framework within which the compensation amount
could be determined and which provides for the consideration of the specific circumstances of each case. Cf
BVerfGE 24,367419. Richter & Schuppert Casebook (1996) 379.
1274 BVerfGE 24, 367 396; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 251.
1275 BVerfGE 24 367 (Deichordnung) 405; BVerfGE 74 264 (Boxberg) 283; Van der Walt Constitutional Property
Clauses (1999) 129.
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stipulated, is found in article 14 III 2 GG. This is the so-called Junktimklausel (linking-clause
provision), which applies to all legislation enacted after the promulgation of the Basic Law in
1949.1276 It obliges the state to compensate owners whose special rights and privileges are
forcibly sacrificed for the common good. Compensation can be in money or in kind,1277 but the
authorising statute must specifically determine the nature and measure (or amount) of
compensation specifically. 1278Although it need not provide a general formula for the calculation
of compensation, this is the general trend in practice. The statute may also specify a definite
measure if such is indicated and justified by the nature of the property in question. If no
provision is made for compensation, and/or if the statute does not determine the type and extent
of the compensation, the expropriation would be unconstitutional and therefore void.1279
The Junktimklausel has a two-pronged warning function. For the individual owner it must ensure
that expropriation takes place only once the compensation question has been cleared by the
democraticalJy elected legislature. Furthermore, it must protect the public (or more specifically
the national budget) from being burdened with expenses not foreseen by the legislature.1280
Therefore, the Junktimklausel cannot be impliedly incorporated into a statute, but it has to be
expressly stipulated.1281
Article 14 III 1 GG expressly stipulates that expropriation is only possible in the public interest.
Accordingly, the legislature must lay down the specific purpose for which expropriation may be
employed and this purpose must be in the public interest. 1282The legislature must, with regard to
this question, determine what is meant by "public weal." This involves a consideration of the
proportionality principle (Verhtiltnismiifiigkeiïï and is intimately connected with the
constitutionality test.1283 Therefore, a Legalenteignung will be tested against the question
whether or not legislature has defined the public weal correctly. An Administrativenteignung will
again be tested against the question whether or not the public interest has been served correctly
by the executive.1284
Competent courts must in the final instance decide whether a specific measure is in the public
interest.1285 In this regard, once again, proportionality (Verháltnismáfligkeit) is of supreme
127(. The Junktimklausel does not apply to pre-constitutionally enacted legislation. BVerfGE 56, 249 (Dlirkheimer
Gondelbahn) 261.
1277 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) ISO.
127K BVcrlGE 24, 367 (Deichordung).
1279 BVcrfGE 24,367418; Ipsen "Enteignung und Sozialisierung" in Von Hippel, Ipsen, Voigt et al Verhandlungen
(1952) 96 et seq; Bryde "Artikel 14" in Von Munch & Kunig GG Kommemar (1992) mn 87 et seq. Wendt "Art. 14"
in Sachs (ed) Kommentor (1996) I11n167.
mo BVerfGE 47,268287.
ml Bryde "Artikel 14" in Von Munch & Kunig GG Kommentor (1992) I11n 89; Pieroth & Schlink
Grundrechte (1998) I11n939.
1m Frowein Protection of Property ill Relation to Taxation Unpublished Report (1996) II.
12K) Cf BVerfGE 24, 367 (Detchordnung) 404.
12R4 Picroth & Schlink Grunarechte (1998) mn 942.
12KS Frowcin Protection of Property ill Relation to Taxation Unpublished Report (1996) II.
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importance.V'" Applied to the context of expropriation, the proportionality principle contains the
following basic components:
(i) Expropriation must be suitable: a specific public purpose is therefore required to justify
the expropriation. 1287Not all public purposes warrant the expropriation of ownership; only those
that, according to the proportionality principle, justify the withdrawal of all ownership
entitlements.V'" Some authors require an urgent state purpose.1289Expropriation is, for instance,
neither justifiable on mere fiscal grounds, nor on the basis of promoting individual interests.1290
On the other hand, the question about the extent to which expropriation is permissible in favour
of private enterprises has been left open by the Federal Constitutional Court.1291In terms of the
Deichordnung case,1292the public-purpose requirement was satisfied because of the pressing
need to build an effective system of dikes and embankments to avert a disaster similar to the
Hamburg flood of 1962. The court accentuated that art 14 III GG permits expropriation if the
common good requires it, and that the common good therefore limits the state's power to
expropriate property in terms of article 14 GG,
(ii) Expropriation must be requisite, which means that no other more lenient or less serious
method would have been appropriate. An Administrativenteignung is, for instance, more lenient
than its stricter counterpart, Legalenteignung. Therefore the latter is permissible only under
specific circumstances, since far less legal protection is afforded to the affected owner(s) and
since the constitutional order prefers legislation to be generally applicable. 1293
(iii) The expropriation should also be appropriate: a fair balance between the public
purpose and the withdrawal of ownership must therefore exist. Both the Federal Court of Justice
and the Federal Administrative Court have worked out the standards governing the attempt to
balance public and private interests in the field of expropriation. 1294In the Feldmiihle case1295the
Federal Constitutional Court also had the opportunity to pronounce on this issue. It sustained the
validity of a company reorganisation statute, which permitted shareholders that owned more than
three fourths of the capital stock to convert their joint-stock company into a new company in
spite of the opposition of the stockholder minority group. The court reasoned that the legislature
was acting in the general interest by fostering the creation of larger business enterprises and that
1286 BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung) 404.
1287 Cf Bëhmer's minority judgement in BVerfGE 56, 249 279.
1288 Richter & Schuppert Casebook (1996) 373.
1289 Cf Bëhmer's minority judgement in BVerfGE 56, 249 279.
1290BVerfGE38,175180.
1291 Cf BVerfGE 66, 248 (Hochspannungsleitung) 257; BVerfGE 74, 264 (Boxberg) 286. Cf also Von Heinegg &
Haltem 1993 JuS 126; Bryde "ArtikeI14" in Von Mi.inch & Kunig GG Kommentar (1992) mn 81 - 84.
1292 BVerfGE 24, 367 396.
1293 Bryde "ArtikeI14" in Von Mi.inch& Kunig GG Kommentar (1992) mn 73 - 75.
1294 Normally only one set of courts in Germany has jurisdiction over a given subject area of law. In the field of
property, however, jurisdiction is divided between administrative and ordinary courts: the former have authority to
decide whether property has been expropriated, the latter to decide the amount of compensation. Because these
issues are intertwined, both tribunals have been forced to define the "public good" and "expropriation." Kommers
Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253 and n 34 to eh 6, 568.
1295 BVerfGE 14,263.
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the three-fourths conversion rule was not manifestly disproportionate to the severity of the
encroachment on the property interest of minority shareholders.F"
3.2.3.3. Determination of compensation
According to article 14 III 3 GG, compensation for expropriation should reflect a fair balance
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In practice this entails that
expropriatory legislation can determine the manner in which the different interests should be
rated and balanced, and should at least contain a set framework within which the compensation
amount could be determined according to the specific circumstances of each case.1297 A court,
which has to adjudicate on a dispute about compensation, will have to pay careful attention to
this provision.
In the following paragraphs, some of the problems that could arise in the course of this balancing
of competing interests in the determination of an equitable compensation will be briefly
mentioned. For instance, the unconstitutionality of legislation permitting an administrative
expropriation could influence the affected property holders' ability to claim compensation.
Likewise, legislation can in principle not leave the determination of the amount of compensation
to the discretion of the state. Another issue is the importance of market value as an indication in
the determination of the amount of compensation.
3.2.3.3.1. Balancing of interests and market value
Under normal circumstances the balancing of interests will also mean thatjid/ compensation has
to be paid for the value of the expropriated property.1298 It is di fficult to justi fy the allocation of
mere nominal compensation on the basis of article 14 III 3 GG. Full compensation entails that
the market value of a specific object has to be established, and that this will usually constitute the
amount of compensation to be paid. However, the Abwagungsgebot of article 14 III 3 GG does
not require that compensation should always equal the full market value of the property.1299
More important is that, in order to achieve a fair blance of interests, the type and extent of
compensation has to be determined through a consideration of all the interests at stake.1300
Of course, the market value of the property and the financial loss of the owner will have to be
considered in order to establish a fair balance of the interests at stake. But these considerations
are not the sole determinants. They also have to be weighed against other interests (like the
1296277.
1297 BVerf'GE 24, 367 419. Richter & Schuppert Casebook (1996) 379.
1298 Frowcin The Protection of Property in Re/ation to Taxation (1996) 12 - 13.
1299 Papier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommentor (1994) mn 642 - 643; Bryde "Artikel 14" in Von MUnch &
Kunig GG Kommentor (1992) 882 et seq; Badura "Eigenturn'' in Benda, Maihofer & Vogel (cds)
Handbuch (1994) 367 et seq; Wendt "Art. 14" in Sachs (cd) Kommen/ar (1996) mn 170; BVerfGE 24, 367
(Deichordnung) 421.
1300 BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung) 421; BGHZ 39, 198 199. Picroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 944.
Richter & Schuppcrt Casebook (1996) 378 et seq.
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public interest) and all relevant surrounding circumstances. The Federal Constitutional Court has
occasionally held that there may be special reasons why full compensation need not be paid for
lawful expropriation. In the Deichordnung+" case, for instance, the court held that, despite the
broad principles protecting the right to private property1302the state could legitimately place the
land adjoining the dikes in Hamburg under public control. The court went even further and
arguedl303 that the Abwiigungsgebot of article 14 III enables (and also obliges) the legislature to
take cognisance of the peculiarities of the specific situation. The court thus arrived at the
conclusion that just compensation refers to an equitable amount of compensation as at the time
of the expropriation, which does not necessarily amount to market value. This confirms that
compensation need not be based on market value.
3.2.3.3.2. Consequences of unconstitutional legislation on administrative expropriation
Article 14 III 3 GG provides that the interests involved must be balanced in order to determine a
fair amount of compensation.v''" This applies to legislative expropriation as well as to
expropriation through administrative acts (Verwaltungshandlungen). In the case where the
administrative authority cannot support its action by underlying legislation permitting
infringement of property interests protected by article 14 GG, two possibilities arise: (i) The
situation could be that the administrative organ acts without legislative authority at all.
(ii) Alternatively, the administrative organ could be acting upon legislative authority, but one
that does not permit an infringement of article 14 GG's scope.1305The individual whose rights are
infringed by unconstitutional legislation cannot choose between legal action (that is, attacking
the law or act on the basis of illegality) and compensation. It is not possible to accept the
infringement on condition that compensation is paid.1306The affected holders of rights should
therefore object to the action itself.
1301 BVerfGE 24 367 (Deichordnung).
1302 It was acknowledged that art 14 I GG guarantees property both as a legal institution and as a concrete right held
by the owner and that the right to hold property is an elementary constitutional right which must be seen in close
context with the protection of personal liberty. The function of the property guarantee was further acknowledged as
securing for the holder of a property a sphere of liberty in the economic field, and thus also as enabling the holder of
a property right to lead a self-governing life. It followed that the protection of property as a legal institution
therefore serves to secure the basic right to property. The constitutional right of the individual is, in other words,
conditioned upon the legal institution of property. Property could thus not be effectively secured if lawmakers were
empowered to replace private property with something no longer deserving the label "ownership". Therefore, the
legislature's task is to regulate property in the light of fundamental constitutional values. It was, however, further
mentioned that the institutional guarantee prohibits any revision of the private legal order which would remove the
fundamental catalogue of constitutionally protected activities relating to the area of property and which would
substantially curtail or suspend the protected sphere of liberty protected by the fundamental right to property.
1303 BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung) 421.
1304 Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 944.
1305 Von Heinegg & Haltern 1993 JuS 214.
1306 BVerfGE 58, 200 (NafJauskiesung).
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3.2.3.3.3. The state's discretion to determine the amount of compensation
Acts permitting Legal- or Administrativenteignung will be unconstitutional if they contain
"salvatorische Entschádigungskiauseln," that is, clauses that permit compensation for
expropriation at the discretion of the expropriating authority.1307 This covers the possibility that a
statute could have an eventual, until then unforeseen and unintended, expropriatory effect.
Though invalid in cases of expropriation, "salvatorische Entschiidigungsklauseln" are
permissible and valid in the case of regulation (deprivation) of property. DOS In the latter case,
however, compensation is not a requirement for validity of the infringement on property rights in
terms of the constitution.
Regulation of property (Inhalts- und Schrankenbestimmung) in principle docs not require the
payment of compensation. It might, however, happen in exceptional circumstances that, a
monetary reimbursement must be offered to the affected owner(s) because the legislation
constitutes an excessive inroad on specific property rights and thus is in conflict with the
Ubermafiverbot. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the state will have exceeded its
capacity to regulate property without compensating the holders of the property rights if the
regulation intrudes upon the proceeds of the personal efforts of the affected person in
establishing his or her property rights, or if the provision for equality in the Basic Law is
violated.1309
Special arrangements are also made where a legislative infringement of property falls within the
legislative competence to regulate property, but nevertheless deprives the affected owner of a
subjective right or some other right that has been acquired 011 the basis of existing law. In such
If the burden of a regulation seriously affects an individual owner (for example by depriving him
or her completely of the use of the property), and if the regulation only benefits the public at
large, the state is obliged to compensate the owner. No compensation is due if a uniformly
imposed regulation confers benefits on all owners against limited sacrifices by all for the sake of
the common good. f f an individual affected by a general regulation is part of the public, and if he
or she benefits from the regulation, he or she is also expected to bear the costs thereof, in which
case his loss is not compcnsable.P'" For instance, a landowner forced to sacri fice a property
interest for the sake of the higher social good of his neighbour is entitled to compensation.V!'
This approach is based on the principle that burdens should be borne equally, and the affected
owner can claim an appropriate amount of compensation from his or her neighbour. This so-
called Ausgleichsanspruch (claim for equalisation payment) should, however, not be confused
with a "real" claim for compensation pursuant to expropriation in terms of article 14 III GG.
1301 I3ryde "Artikel 14" in Von MUnch & Kunig GG Kommenlar (1992) mn 90; Ipsen "Enteignung und
Sozialisierung" in Von lIippel, Ipsen, Voigt el al Verhandlungen (1952) 96.
IJOg Leisner "Eigcnrurn" in Isensee & Kirehhof Handbuch VI (1989) mn 173 - 179; BVerwG OVBI 1990585; BGH
NJW 1990 898; Brydc "Art. 14" in Von MUnch & Kunig Kommenlar (1992): mn 65; Maurer Allgemetnes
Verwaltuugsrecht (1997): mn 83; Popier "Art. 14" in Maunz & Durig GG Kommenlar (1994): mn 307 et seq.
131)9 BVcrfGE 58, 137 (Pflichtexemplar): Pieroth & Schlink Grunarechte (1998): mn 934 - 935.
1310 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253.
1)11 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) n 35 10 eh 6, 568.
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cases, the legislation must contain either a transitional provision or must provide for some kind
of compensation in the form of so-called Schadensersatz to be constitutional. Nevertheless, such
legislation still does not amount to expropriation. 1312
A regulatory measure with private property will not necessarily be transformed into an
expropriation if provision is made for compensation.U" Monetary reimbursement is simply
connected to the question of proportionality (Verhaltnismëjiigkeit) and should also be considered
at that stage of the investigation. Furthermore, a claim to monetary reimbursement can only be
brought if it was provided for in ordinary legislation. If no provision for reimbursement is made,
the affected holders of rights will not be able to claim reimbursement. Any claim they might
have must be directed against the infringing statute itself. If the legislative interference with
property rights is found to be unlawful, the former owner has to be reimbursed profits lost on
account of the infringement (lucrum cessans). 1314
3.2.4. Institution of property retained (essential content)
In the final instance the regulation (that is, deprivation or expropriation) of property is only
justifiable if the institutional guarantee of article 14 I 1 GG is maintained. When read with the
essential content provision of article 19 II GG, the institutional guarantee secures the existence of
certain basic norms.13l5 Together these norms amount to an institution which could appropriately
be referred to as "property." However, the relation between the institutional guarantee of
property and article 19 II GG is not as self-evident as it might seem at first glance.
The true function and place of the essential content provision within the structure of basic rights
in Germany is probably one of the most complicated theoretical issues in the German legal
system, and it is beyond the scope of this work to elaborate extensively upon it.1316 For purposes
of interpreting the property clause, however, one can safely assume that article 19 II GG is an
extension of the institutional guarantee already present in article 14 GG. This would move the
focus to the question concerning the intensity of limitations permitted by the essential-content /
institutional guarantee. The roles attributed to the principle of proportionality and the process by
1312 Maurer Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (1997) par 26 mn 65.
1313 BVerfGE 52, 1 at 27 et seq; BVerfDE 58, 137 at 145; BVerfDE 58, 300 at 320; BVerfDE 70, 191 at 199;
BVerfDE 79, 174 at 192; Bryde "Art. 14" in Von Munch & Kunig Kommentar (1992) mn 52.
1314 Frowein The Protection of Property in Relation to Taxation (1996) 12 - 13.
1315 "Grundbestand von Normen".
1316 For summaries of the different issues, cfBlaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 181 - 187. In BVerfGE 7, 198 (Lii/h) 204
et seq, the Court held that fundamental rights are first and foremost rights of the subject which accrue to the
individual as Abwehrrechte (ie as freedom from state interference). This would then be the purpose of the protection
of the essential content of fundamental rights in terms of article 19 II. However, the Court also emphasised that the
Basic Law was not intended to be a neutral constitutional system. It rests upon the constitutional norms of a
democratic Rechtsstaat and these objective basic norms (objektive Grundsatznormen) also act as an institutional
guarantee of fundamental rights. Thus, instead of looking at fundamental rights as rights of the subject accruing to
the individual who can exercise them against the organs of state, the court viewed them as the boundaries of state
competencies to limit rights in a negative sense (negative Kompetenzbestimmungen). The positive scope of the
individual rights guaranteed by the bill of rights therefore objectively restricts the scope of action left to the state
irrespective of the fact whether a specific individual asserts his/her rights. Accordingly, the objective function of the
bill of rights enhances the meaning and content of the individual rights as rights of the subject.
213
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Pari Three: The Constitutlonal lnquiry into Property Protection and its Relevancefor the Existing Property Order
which the interests concerned are balanced are central to this debate.
The Federal Constitutional Court has held that article 141 1GG entails a fundamental value
decision of the Basic Law in favour of private ownership.P!' It bars legislature from
withdrawing elements that form an elementary part of constitutionally protected participation in
the patrimonial sphere from the legal order, 1318 even i f the social welfare function of property is
taken inot account. Thus, it constitutes one of the so-called Schranken-Schranke. No
determination of the limits of property can ignore the fact that, in essence, the institution of
property should be retained. In effect, legislation therefore has to acknowledge the institution of
properry'<" by leaving the basic content of the property concept intact.1320 However, this still
leaves the question as to the manner of adherence to the institutional guarantee unanswered.
Would application of the proportionality principle suffice in securing the the essence of the
protected right, or would not even an overriding consideration of the public interest justify that
the right is hollowed out leaving only an empty shell? Up to now the Federal Constitutional
Court have not really had the opportunity to give a clear answer to this question.1321
214
Ilowever, the approach of the Federal Constitutional Court concerning the application of
article 19 II GG could be transplanted to the institutional guarantee of the property clause, since
it is accepted that the institutional guarantee of article 14GG amounts to a specialised essential-
content requirement. This would mean that the guarantee of the institution of property has the
function of protecting individual right holders against an unjusti fled curtai Iment of their
constitutional status by the state powers.1322 Nevertheless, the institutional character of the right
to property does not elevate the fundamental right to the level of an independent objective legal
norm.1323 The true function of the institutional property guarantee still is to curtail the powers of
state authority to encroach upon the individual's right to property. The institutional property
guarantee is, in other words, a Schranken-Schranke. The result is that the inviolable core of the
property right may not be encroached even if an overriding public interest exists. The principle
of proportionality therefore comes into play only once it is clear that the essential core of the
right to property is secure.
3.3. The German judiciary's methods of establishing type of infringement
It has been indicated that both the German administrative courts and the "ordinary" German
courts (Federal Court of Justice or Bundesgerichtshofï are involved in matters pertaining to
expropriation. The administrative court deals with (administrative) matters concerning actual
expropriation. When, however, the amount of compensation is contested, the "ordinary" courts
1317 "[Gjrundlegende Wertentscheidung des Grundgesetzes zugunsten des Privateigentums." BVerfGE 21, 150 ISS.
"la BVerfGE 24, 367 389.
111'/ BVerfGE 58. 300 338.
112°B fG 6 .Ver E 24, 3 7 (Deichordnungsbeschlujs) 389.
1.121 Pieroth & Schlink Grandrechte (1991) mn 1047.
1)22 Ie an Abwehrrecht.
1J23 er BVerfGE 50, 290 337.
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have jurisdiction. The Federal Constitutional Court in principle has the function of protecting,
interpreting and applying the Basic Law.1324
Due to the shared jurisdiction of the administrative and "ordinary" courts in Germany in matters
pertaining to expropriation, several possible analytical approaches have been developed as aids
in determining the intention of the legislature where infringements of property rights are
concerned. This means that the decisions pertaining to regulation and expropriation of property
are not always consistent. The different courts also apply different theories in determining issues
related to regulation and expropriation of property .1325
(i) The Doctrine of Individual Sacrifice (Sonderopfertheorie) of the German Federal Court
of Justice determines that an infringement constitutes an expropriation if, through it, the principle
of equality is breached. The specific owner (or group of owners) is thus forced to make a special
sacrifice.1326 Since its introduction into the German property law system, this doctrine has been
criticised mainly because its effect depends on the application of a very formal criterion.
(ii) The Doctrine of Intensity or Tolerable Sacrifice (Schweretheorie) of the Federal
Administrative Court, by contrast, entails that the intensity of the administrative measure
directed against the property, together with the weight of the burden placed upon the individual
owner, determines whether the limits of the social welfare function of property has been
overstepped.1327 An affirmation of this question would mean that there is no justification for
regulation of property without compensation. This doctrine is widely recognised in theory and
practice, since it orients the protection and regulation of property on specific values of a civil
society.1328Moreover, it enables an application of more general constitutional rules by which
legality of the state's actions against individuals can be tested. 1329 Therefore, this doctrine is more
widely supported than the theory of individual sacrifice.
(iii) The Federal Constitutional Court has declined to emphasise either of these principles
above the other, but considers them in tandem.mo Further, the court also applies the so-called
Doctrine of Situational Commitment. In terms of this approach, the concepts of regulation (in the
sense of deprivation) and expropriation are more formally circumscribed.P'" The general rule in
Germany is that the expropriation of private property is admissible only when adequate
1324 Foster German Legal System (1996) 48
1325 Cf, eg BVerwGE 3, 335 337 - 338; BVerwGE 4, 57 60; BVerwGE 32, 135 137; BGHZ 23, 30 32;
BGHZ 30, 338 341 - 342.
1326 BGHZ 6,270280 (NJW 1952, 972)
1327 Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights. Institutions And Impact Of International Law (1987) 87 -
88; Maurer Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (1997) § 26 mn 28; BVerwGE 5, 143 145 et seq.
1328 BVerwGE 5, 143 at 145
1329 Dolzer Property and Environment (1976) 25.
1330 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 254; BVerfGE 25, 112 121.
1331 In this sense, it seems as if the Federal Constitutional Court is more inclined towards the approach of the Federal
Court of Justice (which has jurisdiction in cases where "fair compensation" has to be determined). This demarcation
has been controversial ever since, although there seems to be agreement on the point that the competence of the
legislature to determine the contents and limits of the property guarantee must be defined formally (as opposed to
materially). Pieroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 921. "Sie legen generelI und abstrakt die Rechte und
Pflichten des Eigentiimers fest. "BVerfGE 58, 300 at 330; BVerfGE 72, 66 at 76.
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compensation is paid.1332 In addition, property can be regulated, but only to a tolerable
degree.1333 The Federal Constitutional Court decided that partieular legislative acts amount to a
regulation if they affect certain rights and duties that fall within the ambit of the protective scope
of article 14 GO. In essence, the legal position protected by article 14 I 1 00, should remain
intact. However, the owner's entitlements to use and enjoyment of his or her property are subject
to the obligations imposed by article 14 II 00.1334 Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the fact
that some objects of property rights are by nature burdened with higher social obligations than
others, and are therefore affected at an earlier stage than in the case of property rights which by
nature have a lesser social function. The protected area of property rights can, therefore, not be
determined by abstract reasoning, but presupposes that the owner's legal position is changeable,
depending upon the location and circumstances surrounding the property.1335 This doctrine by
whieh the protected area of property rights is dependent on external factors is most frequently
applied in the spheres of zoning and planning law; pollution control; conservation of nature and
the protection of historic sites.1336
Both the doctrine of individual sacrifice and the doctrine of intensity have 111 the past been
subject to intense criticism. They do not explain why certain owners are obliged to suffer
curtailment of their property rights without compensation, while others arc entitled to
compensation, or do not have to suffer tbe same kind of curtailment. The Federal Constitutional
Court's treatment of this issue shows that tbe social welfare function of property determines
whether regulation (in the sense of deprivation) or expropriation has taken place. The higher the
value of a specific object of property rigbts is for society at large, the more likely it is that
regulation, for which no compensation will be offered in return for the individual freedom or
private autonomy sacrificed in the process, is at stake. However, the social welfare function of
property is not expressly emphasised by either the Basic Law or the courts, and the broad
language in which article 14 II GG is formulated reduced its immediate and practical effect. On a
more theoretical level, the social welfare function inherent in the concept of property is
intrinsically connected with that of expropriation. By defining expropriation, the scope of the
social function of property is delimited, which in turn demarcates the area of public activity in
which no compensation is payable. For instance, the Federal Constitutional Court has in its
Naflouskiesung decision1337 held that, in distinguishing between the regulation of property and
expropriation, the starting point is the question whether ownership is diminished through the act
of infringement to a nudum ius. Furthermore, it needs to be determined whether the infringement
pertains to an element of ownership that can be separated from the concept and treated
independently without damaging the ownership concept itself in the process.1338 From this, the
court deduced that the Water Resources Act does not constitute expropriation by law. The Act
1m Kommcrs Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 254; BVerfGE 4,219.
nn BVcrfGE 21 150.
IH~ Kimminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights. Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 87.
uis Delzer Property and Environment (1976) 23.
1336 Kirnminich "Property Rights" in Starck (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International Law (1987) 88.
1337 BVerfGE 58, 200 (NajJallskiesung).
1m "Ohne diese Verselbstándigungsfahigkeit [ehlt das Objekt. dasjeder VorgalIg der Giiterentziehung wie auch der
Guterbeschaffung voraussetzt, " Picroth & Schlink Grundrechte (1998) mn 923.
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merely defines the content of property in relation to groundwater, as a matter of objective law.
Since the change in the law effected by this act did not result in a deprivation of a specific legal
interest protected by the institutional guarantee of Article 14 I GG, it does not constitute an
expropriation of property .1339
However, the real importance of article 14 II GG stems from the fact that it forms the
constitutional basis for legislative restrictions on the exercise of property rights without
compensation to the owner.1340The legislature has, in other words, been given a broad leeway
for the regulation of private property in the public interest.1341For example, the court sustained a
federal restriction on the cultivation of new vineyards not only because the regulation helped to
maintain the quality of German wine, but also because it contributed to the economic position of
the German wine industry as a whole, particularly wine-growers. The burden imposed by the
regulation was therefore not excessive. 1342
3.4. Justifiability oflimitations on property rights under South African law
In South Africa, by reason of the wording of the constitutions, and the principle of the unity of
the constitution for interpretative purposes, several possible variations on the infringement
concept exist. "Deprivation" of property is justifiable under certain circumstances. Moreover,
both the Interim Constitution and the Final Constitution also permit expropriation as a justified
infringement of the right to property, provided that certain requirements are met. In view of the
arguments in favour of a cumulative application of section 25 FC and section 36 FC, these
requirements need to be determined with reference not only to the provisions of the property
clause itself, but also to the provisions of the general limitations clause. Moreover, these
requirements need to be deduced from a simultaneous reading of these two provisions, and not
by reading section 36 FC subsequent to section 25 FC.1343
In the South African context, a deprivation is usually described as a broader genus of
interference with (or regulation of) property, with expropriation as one of its species.1344The
term deprivation implies a loss of enjoyment or of benefits. It is a generic term, which
circumscribes a whole range of possible regulatory interferences'Y" with the rights of citizens to
their property.1346If a deprivation of property takes place through the exercise of administrative
1339 BVerfGE 58, 200 (Nafiauskiesung) 338.
1340 An earlier draft by the German Parliamentary Council, which harbours the intent of this broad language,
provided: "Ownership entails a social obligation. Its use shall find its limits in the living necessities of all citizens
and in the public order essential to society."
1341 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 253.
1342254.
1343 Cf the discussion at 76, 188 et seq supra.
1344 Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 115. Cf, however, the arguments against this view that deprivation and expropriation
forms a conceptual continuity at 225 et seq infra.
1345 This term is also sometimes used to refer to "deprivations" in terms of section 28(2) IC, s 25(1) FC. Similar
terms like "acts of police power" have also been used on occasion. Cf Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 116; Murphy 1993
JJS 45; Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1, 23.
1346 Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 116.
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power (as is mostly the case),1347 the deprivations clausel348 has to be read with the
administrative justice clause1349 in the constitution for purposes of interpretation and analysis of
the regulation. An administrative deprivation of property rights will have to be procedurally fair.
Moreover, the reasons furnished by the administrative authority, whose action affected the rights
of a specific person, have to substantively justify the infringement. Deprivations of property can,
however, also be effected directly through legislation.1350 Legislative deprivation of rights in
property is also subject to the due-process principle. Deprivation can thus only take place in
accordance with validly enacted legislation.1351 Expropriation can be described as a deprivation
by the state with the specific characteristic that a right is completely withdrawn from the owner.
The right can then be appropriated without the consent of the owner by means of transfer or
extinction of the use exclusively assigned to the former owner. This is done for the benefit of the
public.1352
It can be expected that social reform legislation would encroach on existing property rights.
Restrictions of property rights could, for instance, include rent control legislation, orders of the
Land Claims Court creating lesser rights in land without expropriating the land from its present
owners,1353 industrial court incursions into the managerial prerogative, zoning regulations and
restrictions imposed under legislation protecting the environment and authorisation for
demolition of buildings presenting health hazards.P" In order to determine which of these
restrictions constitute mere deprivations, for which no compensation is payable, and which of
these restrictions are so severe that they amount to compensable expropriation, it will be
necessary to take a closer look at the requirements applicable to the different kinds of
interference with property rights.
3.4.1. Law of general application (not permitting arbitrary deprivation)
In the Interim Constitution, the requirement that the law establishing an infringement (on
property, inter alia) should be of general application, was expressed in the limitations clause,1355
1347 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31, 9.
1J48 Ic s 28(2) IC; s 25( I) FC.
1349 le s 24 IC; s 33 FC.
mo Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson. Kentridge. Klaaren Cl al (cds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31,9 refer to these as "non-administrative" deprivations.
IJSI Ilowever, this principle does not necessarily mean that due process must be substantive, but merely the certain
procedural safeguards should be heeded. CfChaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren el al
(cds) Constitutional Law (1996) ch 31,9.
13S2 Some authors, noteably Du Plessis & Olivier 1997 (I) 5 IIRCUSA 13, and Murphy 1995 SAPRlPL 116 define
expropriation with reference lo clements like the acquisition of title and permanency. Cf, however, the discussion at
241 infra.
1353 Up lO now, no such order has been made. However, the Land Claims Court docs have the capacity to make any
order il deems fit upon adjudicating a specific claim. This theoretically renders it possible for the court to create new
rights, or adapt existing rights lo such an extent that their content is not comparable to that of the original rights.
1354 Murphy 1993 JJS 45.
1355 S 33(1) IC.
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but not repeated in the property clause.1356 Now the requirement that only a law of general
application may limit property rights appears not only in the general limitation clause of the
Final Constitution.P'" but also in the property clause itself: in section 25( 1) FC, where
deprivations of property are regulated, as well as in section 25(2) FC,1358where expropriation is
regulated. Section 25(1) FC in addition provides that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of
property. This provision is not repeated in section 25(2) FC, dealing with expropriation. The
questions that arise from this formulation are: (i) the meaning of the phrase "in accordance with
law" or "in terms of law"; (ii) the meaning of "arbitrary" in the context of section 25(1) FC; and
(iii) whether deprivation and expropriation of property should be regarded as two separate
mechanisms, or whether expropriation can still be described as a genus of deprivation.
3.4.1.1. Meaning of "in accordance with law" / "in terms oflaw"
The phrase in accordance with law as it appeared in section 28(2) IC, was subject to three
fundamentally different interpretations:
(i) It could, on the one hand, denote the proper statutory authority of the legislature to pass
the specific legislation.P'" However, this interpretation does nothing but to endorse the trite
common law principle that deprivations of property require lawful authority. This interpretation
therefore deprives section 28(2) FC of any real meaning.1360
(ii) This phrase could, on the other hand, indicate that something equivalent to the
American "substantive due process" is required.l "" Under these circumstances, the phrase would
require that, in order to test justifiability, the courts would have to consider both the compliance
with formal procedural requirements, as well as the merits of the deprivation. However, the
South African Constitutional Court has already in Ferreira v Levinl362 referred to the pitfalls of
this approach, and is not likely to follow it in future.
1356 There it was only required that "No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in
accordance with a law." S 28(2) IC, emphasis added.
1357 S 36(1) FC.
1358 The general reference in section 28(3) IC to property rights that have been "expropriated pursuant to a law
referred to in subsection (2)" was amended in section 25(2) FC to the more explicit requirement that property may
be "expropriated only in terms of law of general application."
1359 Cf Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 2 SA 148 (C) 168G-H.
1360 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,24.
1361 This approach was adopted by the US Supreme Court during the period of "Lochnerism" and its application to
the South African constitutions was propagated by certain South African scholars. Cf Budlender "Constitutional
Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1, 25; Murphy 1995 SAPR/PL 117;
Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 31, 10;
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 411; etc.
1362 Ferreira v Levin NO, Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) par 182, online at
http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/ferreira.html[21.07.1999].This approach especially causes problems in the
area of division of powers. It expects the court to judge legislation on its merits, or wisdom. For this the court lacks
political authority and legitimacy problems will arise. Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge,
Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 31, Il. Moreover, this approach caused a constitutional crisis
involving a dispute between the legislative and judicial branches of government concerning their respective roles.
continued
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(iii) A third explanation is that this phrase could also refer to the concept of fairness such
as the notion inherent in the constitutional state principle.1363 This would require that the court
rejects a purely formalistic approach, and accepts a measure of legal protection against arbitrary
interference by public authorities, as the European Court of Human Rights did. If this is the case,
application in the South African context would be subject to two conditions: 1364the law should
be adequately accessible, and it should be formulated with sufficient clarity to enable tbe citizen
to foresee the consequences of his or her conduct and to regulate it accordingly.136s Budlender'<"
views this approach as the most acceptable, and predicts that it will also be followed by the
South African courts.
In view of the fact that (at least) the deprivations clause in the Final Constitution additionally
requires a law of general application not to permit arbitrary deprivation of property, it can be
argued that Budlender's approach is also in line with the specific limitation provision in
section 25 FC. These two requirements give content and set limits to the state's power to deprive
individuals of their property rights.1367
In Park-Ross v Director: Ojjice for Serious Economic Offellcesl368 it has been accepted that
legislative interference per se can constitute a deprivation of property. This case concerned tbe
Mossgas project for exploration and production of oil and gas off the Mossel Bay coastline. The
crucial question to be considered was whether sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Investigation of Serious
Economic Offences Act1369, which provided for the seizure and removal of documentation
pertaining to alleged economic offences, were constitutional. The applicants inter alia averred
that section 6 of this act (which provided for the search and seizure of documentation) conflicted
with section 28 IC and was therefore unconstitutional. In his decision, Tebbutt J emphasised that
in terms of section 28 IC a deprivation may occur in accordance with a law, and found that
section 6 of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act was such a law. Consequently,
seizure constituted a (permissible) legislative infringement of property rights.mo
3.4.1.2. Meaning of "arbitrary limitation"
In addition to requiring (in terms of both section 36 FC and section 25 FC)1371 valid interference
with property to be pursuant to a law of general application, the property clause provides a more
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 395 - 404; Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land
Law (revised 1998) eh 1,25 - 26.
1363 Budlcndcr "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,26.
IJ~ The requirement applied in ECIIR case law that the interference must be based in domestic law (cf Silver v
United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347 par 86 to 88) makes sense on an international level, but does not bring the
interpretation process further in South Africa.
1365 SUIlday Times v Uni/ed Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 245 par 49.
1)(>6 Budlendcr "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,31.
1367 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 408.
136R 1995 2 SA 148 (C).
13691170fl991.
1370 168G-1.
1371 cr 188 et seq supra for a discussion on the cumulative application of these provisions.
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specific requirement for limitation and requires a deprivation of property not to be arbitrary.1372
In S v Makwanyane,1373 Ackermann J provides an explanation of this term viewed against the
historical background and social structure of South Africa: 1374
"We have moved from a past characterised by much which was arbitrary and unequal in the operation
of the law to a present and a future in a constitutional State where State action must be such that it is
capable of being analysed and justified rationally. The idea of the constitutional State presupposes a
system whose operation can be rationally tested against or in terms of the law."
Ackermann J explains that arbitrariness, by its very nature, is dissonant with these core concepts
of our new constitutional order. He remarks: 1375
"Neither arbitrary action nor laws or rules which are inherently arbitrary or must lead to arbitrary
application can, in any real sense, be tested against the precepts or principles of the Constitution.
Arbitrariness must also inevitably, by its very nature, lead to the unequal treatment of persons."
Arbitrary action or decision-making is thus incapable of providing a rational explanation as to
why similarly placed persons are treated in a substantially different way. The absense of a
rational justifying mechanism will inevitably lead to unequal treatment.
In general, therefore, it can be said that the requirement of non-arbitrariness harks back to the
principle of the constitutional state,1376and that arbitrariness is inconsistent with values that
underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.1377 Accordingly,
arbitrary restrictions of the fundamental right to property would not pass constitutional scrutiny.
The arbitrary deprivation provision in section 25(1) FC is aimed at the legislative provision
permitting the deprivation, not necessarily at the deprivation itself. Because an alleged arbitrary
deprivation will have to be attacked on the basis of the provision allowing deprivation, one must
determine exactly what is meant by the term arbitrary in this context. In several recent decisions
the South African courts were faced with the interpretation of the term "arbitrary", although it
was not always in connection with interference with property. In the following discussion, the
impact of these decisions on the constitutional regulation of property will be discussed by
making use of the requirements in the Canadian interpretation of this term, as suggested by
Budlender.1378
3.4.1.2.1. Lack of criteria governing the exercise of the deprivation
A first requirement is that arbitrariness will be indicated by the lack of (express or implied)
criteria governing the exercise of the deprivation. Stated simply, as was done in the case of
1372 S 25(1) FC.
1373 19953 SA 391 (CC).
1374 par 156.
1375 par 156.
1376 This was clearly stated in New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa and
Others 1999 3 SA 191 (CC): "Arbitrariness is inconsistent with the rule of law which is a core value of the
Constitution." (par 24).
1377 Sv Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 19974 SA 1176 (CC) par 33.
1378 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998)
eh 1,34 - 35.
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The case of Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs,1382 in which it had to be decided whether
section 25(9)(b) of the Aliens Control Actl383 was in conniet with the Final Constitution,1384
illustrates this point. The applicants were spouses, one of whom was South African and the other
a foreigner who sought an immigration permit to settle in South Africa. Section 25(9)(b) of the
Aliens Control Act provided that an immigration permit could be granted to the spouse of a
South African citizen who was in South Africa at the time only if that spouse was in possession
of a valid temporary residence permit. Accordingly, if the foreign spouse did not have such a
permit, he or she would either have to separate until the application for the permit was processed,
or the South African spouse would have to leave the country. After having found that the right to
family life (which is not expressly included in the South African bill of rights) forms an integral
part of the right to human dignity,1385 O'Regan J held that, even though the purpose of section
25(9)(b) of the Aliens Control Act might be to grant a privilege to foreign spouses, its effect is
uncertain in any specific case because of the discretionary powers contained in s 26(3) and (6) of
the same act. The latter provisions render tbe grant of an immigration permit subject to the grant
of a valid temporary permit. However, tbe statutory provisions contemplate the possible refusal
of a temporary permit, but contain no indication of the considerations that would be relevant to
such refusal. Accordingly, it was held that the failure to identify the criteria relevant to tbe
exercise of the discretionary powers contained in section 26(3) and (6) of the Alien Control Act
introduces an "element of arbitrariness" to their exercise that is inconsistent with the
constitutional protection of the right to marry and establish a family.1386
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead, 1379this would mean that the word arbilraryt380 denotes "the
absence of reason, or, at the very least, the absence ofajustifiable reason.,,1381 Also, if legislation
would, for instance, lack specific provisions permitting deprivation, it could be arbitrary.
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From the example of the Dawood case, it can be inferred that the provision against
arbitrariness in the context of section 25(1) FC would mean that the interference of property
must be based on a law that provides the standards IQr the exercise of discretion as to the
deprivation of property. This could be issued in the form of a number of criteria, which should be
met in order to give effect to the deprivation.
1319 Woolwonhs (Pty) Ltd I' Whitehead (Women's Legal Centre Trust lntervening) 20003 SA 529 (LAC) par 128.
1380 In this case il was employed in terms of item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 to the Labour Relations ACl66 of 1995.
1381 Ironically, in this case, it was found that the pregnancy of the respondent, coupled with the wish of the appellant
to establish continuity within the ranks of its employees, was a justi fiablc reason for refusing to offer her a contract
of permanent employment and instead offering her a temporary position terminating exactly when her confinement
would start.
1JX2 2000 3 SA 936 (CC).
1383 96 of 1991.
1]8.1 Inter alia, the right to human dignity (s 10 FC).
1385 Par 36 - 37.
1386 Par 58.
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3.4.1.2.2. Rational connection between interference and purpose
A second requirement is that the deprivation should be justifiable. In the cases of S v Lawrence;
S v Negal; S v Solberg1387 and Prinsloo v Van der Linde1388 this requirement was explained as
meaning that a rational connection must exist between means and ends,1389in the respective
contexts of limitation on the right to engage in economic activity1390and the right to equality.1391
Non-compliance with this requirement, according to the court, would be arbitrary and
"incompatible with ... a society [based on freedom and equality J" .1392
This requirement for non-arbitrariness was repeated in New National Party of South Africa v
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others1393 where the effective exercise of the
right to vote was at stake. The two-stage process through which (non-)arbitrariness was
determined in this case is interesting for present purposes: first, it was determined whether a
"facial analysis of the provisions in issue, in relation to the Constitution, has been shown to lack
rationality"; whereafter the circumstances existing as at the date of the adoption of the statute at
stake were taken into account to determine whether it was capricious or arbitrary. 1394The inquiry
into the arbitrariness of legislative action is, thus, in essence an objective one.1395
In the case of Harksen v Lane1396 this requirement for (non- )arbitrariness was applied in the
context of the attachment of the assets of a solvent spouse in terms of section 21 of the
Insolvency Act. The appellant argued that the vesting of the property of the solvent spouse in the
hands of the master (and thereafter in the hands of the trustee) constituted a drastic and arbitrary
invasion upon the proprietary rights of citizens. Nevertheless, the court held that, although such
divesting of the assets of the solvent spouse might be inconvenient, potentially prejudicious and
embarrassing, and even drastic, such measures are not arbitrary or without rationality. The court
argued that the legislature acted rationally in enacting remedial provisions for the insufficient
provision - in the eyes of the legislature - made in common and statutory law for ensuring that all
the property of the insolvent spouse found its way into the insolvent estate. However, the
1387 19974 SA 1176 (CC).
1388 19973 SA 1012 (CC).
1389 19974 SA 1176 (CC) par 40.
1390 S 26 IC.
1391 S 8 IC.
1392 1997 4 SA 1176 (CC) par 40.
1393 19993 SA 191 (CC) par 24. In this case it was decided, within the context of the national elections of 1999, that
the requirement of the bar-coded identity document as the principal method of identification was, on the face of it,
rationally connected to the legitimate governmental purpose of enabling the effective exercise of the vote. The bar-
code on the document facilitated quick, easy and reliable verification of the fact that the name of the person had
been entered on the population register. In addition, it was argued that it was much easier for officers charged with
the verification of the necessary particulars at the point of registration and voting to perform this task if they were to
do so consistently by reference to a single type of identity document. Recognition of a multiplicity of documents for
this purpose could be potentially confusing, give rise to error and slow down the process. Accordingly, there could
be nothing irrational, arbitrary or capricious about the bar-coded identity document serving as the main
identification instrument, showing at a glance the citizenship and the age of the holder.
1394 Cfpar 25 - 30.
1395 Cf also Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic
of South Africa and Others 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) par 86.
1396 1998 1 SA 300 (CC) par 58.
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question with regard to the interim property clause that had to be considered by the court in the
Harksen case, was whether tbe interference with property encompassed in section 21 of the
Insolvency Act constituted an expropriation of property, for which compensation would be
payable. In focussing on the questions of expropriation and compensation in particular, the court
largely skipped the more important questions related to the requirement of non-arbitrariness and
its relation to the proportionality requirement of section 36( I) FC. This will be elucidated at a
later stage of the present exposition.1391
3.4.1.2.3. Procedural safeguards
A deprivation would, in the third place, be arbitrary if it is not preceded by a proper hearing or
other procedural safeguards. It must, therefore, also be procedurally justified. It is submitted that
procedural fairness in the context of a non-arbitrary deprivation of property would have to be
determined on a case by case basis. The circumstances of a specific case would thus determine
whether stricter or more lenient rules of procedure need to be applied in order eliminate
arbitrariness from the process of interference.
In this regard, it can be argued that application of a principle or legal requirement on a case by
case basis would naturally bring about a differentiation of approach from one case to the other,
which could render the process of decision-making unjust. In the case of Pretoria City Council v
Walker139R this objection was treated with the statement that1399
"[A)ny form of systematic deviation from the principle of equal and impartial application of the law
... might well have to be expressed in a law of general application which would be justiciable
according to the criteria of reasonableness and justifiability as set out in s 33 [of the Interim
Constitution]."
This case arose from the differentiated mannersl400 in which tariffs for the actual consumption of
water and electricity in different areas within the territory of the Pretoria City Council were
determined. The respondent objected to the enforcement of a debt owed by him to the city
council, on the grounds that the flat rate for water and electricity charges in the former municipal
areas of Mamelodi and Atteridgeville was lower than the metered rate charged to the respondent
and other persons in the former municipal area of Pretoria and that this meant that the latter were
subsidising the former; that the differentiation in the tariffs continued even after meters had been
installed on some properties in Mamelodi and Atteridgeville; that only residents of old Pretoria
had been singled out for legal action to recover arrears whilst a policy of non-enforcement was
followed in respect of Mamelodi and Atteridgevillc; and that the imposition of differential rates
was, inter alia, inconsistent with section 8(2) IC.
1397 Cf257 infra.
139R 1998 2 SA 363 (CC).
139<> Par 140.
1·100 The council had charged the residents of the former municipal area of Pretoria on the basis of a tariff for the
actual consumption of water and electricity supplied which was measured by means of meters installed on each
property in such area, whereas it had charged residents in the former Mamelodi and Atteridgeville municipal areas
(where 110 meters had been installed) a nat rate based on the amount of water and electricity supplied lo such areas
divided by the number of residences therein.
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The court found that respondent had to settle the debt owed to the council.I401 For present
purposes, the reasoningv''" of the court in making this finding is not as important as the court's
recognition of the fact that the selective institution of legal proceedings by the city council
amounted to a breach of the constitutional right not to be unfairly discriminated against.1403 One
could assume that, in the context of section 25( 1) FC, the procedural safeguards in the context of
ensuring non-arbitrariness would include, for instance, avoiding the selective application of
certain legislative measures that could constitute an interference with property.
Reference should also be made to case of Transvaal Agricultural Union v Minister of Land
Affairs, 1404 where the validity of the Restitution of Land Rights Act was contested on the basis
of, inter alia, section 28 IC and the just administrative action provision of section 24 IC. It was
alleged by the applicants that the provisions in the Restitution of Land Rights Act relating to the
manner in which the claims for resitution were to be treated by the Commission for the
Restitution of Land Rights impaired the rights of the owner of the land, as it did not provide the
owner with an opportunity of being heard by the regional land claims commissioner before any
decision is taken in regard to the publication of the notice of restitution. Eventually, the decision
resolved only the procedural issue of direct acces to the constitutional court, and there was no
need to pronounce on the justifiability of the interference with property. However, the court
remarked obiter that the restitution of land rights was a complex process in which the rights of
registered owners and other persons with an interest in the land had to be balanced against the
constitutional injunctions to ensure that restitution be made where this was just and equitable. It
further indicated that Parliament was given a discretion by the Interim Constitution to decide
how this process was to be carried out. Provisions in such legislation that were designed to
protect claimants and maintain the status quo pending determination of a claim therefore served
a legitimate purpose. The court further remarked that, even if it were assumed in favour of the
applicant that the contested provisions in the Restitution of Land Rights Act infringed rights
protected under, inter alia, section 28 IC, there was prima facie justification in terms of section
33 IC for such infringement.l'l'"
3.4.1.3. Conceptual continuity of deprivation and expropriation?
In the Final Constitution the property clause was reformulated with regard to the requirement of
the infringing law's general applicability. The aim of this reformulation was probably to rule out
1401 As to the question whether the conduct of the city council amounted to unfair discrimination, it was held that the
operation of the flat rate and its continued application on properties where meters had been installed in Mamelodi
and Atteridgeville, as well as the cross-subsidisation which might have resulted from any delays in implementing a
metered tariff, did not impact adversely on the respondent in any material way: there was no invasion of the
respondent's dignity nor was he affected in a manner comparably serious to an invasion of his dignity. Par 68.
1402 The court held that the debt that was owed by the respondent remained. Upon the question whether its payment
should be enforced, it was remarked that the finding that the conduct of the city council's officials amounted to
unfair discrimination was an intimation that the city council had acted incorrectly and that it should put its house in
order; it was not a vindication of the respondent's refusal to pay for services rendered. Par 94.
1403 Par 81.
140419972 SA 621 (CC).
1405 Par 36 - 37.
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any uncertainty about whether or not a broader meaning should be attached to the word law.1406
However, the reformulation did not exclude all problems. Because of the repetition of the
general applicability requirement in sections 25( 1) and (2) FC, and the ommission of the
reference to arbitrariness in section 25(2) FC, the new section dealing with cxpropriation'V" is
not as clearly linked to the deprivation provisionl408 as the old section 28(3) IC was linked to
section 28(2) IC. Consequently, it is not as easy to argue that expropriations are just one special
subcategory of deprivations. Instead, it is possible to argue that the drafters of the constitution
intended sections 25(1) and (2) FC to be separate provisions which have very little in common.
Such an interpretation would have implications for the assumption that the requirements for
deprivation of property should implicitly also apply to expropriation. In fact, it would destroy tbe
conceptual continuity on which a theory of regulatory expropriation could be construed.1409 It is,
furthermore, possible that the requirement of general applicability involves the preclusion of
laws designed to single out certain or easily ascertainable individuals. 14 10 Thus, this requirement
might in future pose the problem of distinguishing between laws which would be
unconstitutional because they affect a particular class of persons and laws that are aimed at
particular individuals, describing them by means of a class, but are nevertheless
constitutional.l'" I A cumulative reading of section 36 FC and section 25 FC might clarify some
of the problems in this regard. Even if the deprivation requirements of section 25( 1) FC do not
apply to situations in which expropriation of property is at stake, section 36 FC still provides that
expropriatory interferences with property must be subject to a law of general application.
However, it would be anomalous to distinguish between interferences with property against
which the (additional) requirement of non-arbitrariness would be applicable and those against
which it would not be applicable. Henceforth, it is submitted that, even if the wording of section
25(1) and (2) FC compared with section 28 rc could be prone to a different interpretation,
expropriation should nevertheless be linked to, and regarded as a species of deprivation.
Accordingly, the requirements of section 25(1) FC should also apply - in addition to those of
section 25(2) FC - to cases of expropriation. In determining whether an infringement on the right
to property is justified on the basis of section 36 FC read with section 25 FC, the first question to
be answered will be whether the infringement took place in terms of a law of general application.
1406 Cf the discussion of this issue in Budlcnder "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land
Law (revised 1998) eh 1,35.
14()7 S 25(2) Fe.
1408 S 25( I) FC.
1409 Van der Wall Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 341.
1410 Woolman "Limitations" in Chaskalson, Kentridge et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 12, 17 n 4 gives an
account of the drafting history of this phrase in connection with section 33( I) IC which indicates thai the drafters
had the so-called "bill of attainder" in mind when drawing up this provision.
1411 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (revised 1998) eh 1,34.
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3.4.2. Additional requirements for expropriation
Apart from the requirement that expropriation can only be effected pursuant to a law of general
application, both the Interim and Final Constitution in South Africa prescribe certain
requirements applicable to expropriations only. However, the public purposes requirement was
formulated more broadly in the Final Constitution, and the compensation requirement was
moved to a separate subsection.1412Although the texts differ, these requirements are present in
both constitutions.
The meaning of the concept expropriation will determine the approach to confiscation and
regulation of property. Expropriation could, for example, be regarded as a narrow concept
requiring the state to actually acquire or obtain some benefit.1413 The effect of this view of
section 25(3) FC on confiscation and forfeiture of property is devastating: If the term
expropriation is interpreted so narrowly that it includes only formal expropriation, then
confiscation and forfeiture of property would have to be regarded as deprivations of property.
Consequently, it would be possible for the legislature to "regulate" property to such an extent
that the property rights of individuals can be completely withdrawn without the duty of
compensation arising. Thus, the question of regulatory expropriation would be raised with
regards to some kinds of confiscation or forfeiture, especially in the case where the loss affects
an innocent owner in an exceptionally harsh and unfair manner.1414
It is, however, also possible to follow a less restrictive interpretation of the term expropriation.
Then the fact that the state actually acquires some benefit or gain from a confiscation or
forfeiture would be an indication of the fact that a specific infringement amounts to an
expropriation, without appropriation by the expropriator being necessary. Subject to the validity
requirements of section 25(3) FC and the proportionality principle, it might also indicate that
compensation is payable (for instance, when the owner whose property is confiscated or forfeited
was not involved in and innocent of the crime resulting in the confiscation or forfeiture).1415
In a discussion of the constitutional requirements for expropriation, it must be kept in mind that
the Expropriation Actl416 is still valid, and therefore also the court rulings pertaining to this Act
before the Interim and Final Constitutions were promulgated. Nevertheless, the existing law is
only valid in so far as it does not conflict with the explicit provisions of sections 25(2) FC or
25(3) FC.1417 '
1412 S 25(3) FC.
1413 Cfthe stance taken in Harksen v Lane NO 1997 Il BCLR 1489 (CC) par 32.
1414 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 342.
1415 342.
141663 of 1975.
1417 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 342 - 343.
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3.4.2.1. Public purpose / public interest
Section 25(2) FC provides that property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general
application, more specifically for a public purpose or in the public interest. Section 28(3) IC
contained a similar provision, but only made reference to the term public purpose. The
requirement of public purposes was stated in general terms.1418 This raised the question of
whether land reform measures would be incorporated into the idea of expropriation for public
purposes. The amended property clause in the Final Constitution explicitly addresses this
problem.1419 In neither of the constitutions an extensive definition of the terms public purpose or
public interest is given, but section 25(4) FC determines that, for the purposes of the property
clause, the public interest "includes the nation's commitment to land reform." The meaning of
terms like public interest and public purposes in the context of the constitutional property
guarantee is an issue debated in many legal systems. It also deserves closer scrutiny in the South
African context.
Bath the terms public interest and public purposes have, over the past century, been subject to
varying interpretations in South African property law.1420 It seems, however, as if this
terminology has not been exceptionally contentious, nor subjected to rigorous legal analysis.1421
Still, the case law on this matter is not adequate for application in the constitutional context. On
the one hand, expropriation for racially discriminatory and social restructuring purposes in South
Africa has in the past simply been upheld - or not questioned - as constituting a public purpose
or being in the public interest or for the public weal. On the other hand, the cases in which the
courts did attempt to interpret the terms public purposes and public interest can at best provide
only rather vague guidelines for interpretation of these terms in the new constitutional order.
Here, the vexing problem is trying to distinguish between applications of the term public
purposes interpreted broadly or narrowly.
3.4.2.1.1. Public interest and racial discrimination under apartheid
The Expropriation Act 1422 was used to expropriate white property for the purposes of homeland
consolidation and for the removal of certain "blackspots," such as Cerman in Natal. 1423
Legislation aimed at giving effect to the segregation policy under apartheid also frequently made
specific reference to "public putpose.,,1424 The courts also frequently upheld legislation
permitting expropriation for purposes of social restructuring which were racially discriminatory
1418 S 25(3) FC: "Where any rights in properry are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such
expropriation shall be permissible JOl' public purposes only and ...It Emphasis added.
1419 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 340.
1420 Cf Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees oj the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271;
Fourie v Minister vail Lande en 'n Ander 1970 4 SA 165 (0); White Rocks Farm (Pt)') Ltd and Others v Minister oj
Community Development 19843 SA 774 (WLD).
1421 Eisenberg 1995 SA.}IIR 208.
1422 63 of 1975.
1423 Eisenberg 1995 SA.}/IR 219 n 74.
1424 Ie s 13(3) Development and Trust Land Act 18 of 1936.
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for being in the public interest or for the public weal.1425Alternatively, racially discriminatory
actions by the state were not questioned by the courts on the basis of public purpose or public
interest.
However, in submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission some members1426 of the
judiciary admitted: 1427
"Apartheid was defmed by law and enforced by law, It is necessary, therefore, to acknowledge the
role of the legal system in upholding and maintaining apartheid and injustices associated with it. ...
Apartheid caused poverty, degradation and suffering on a massive scale. It denied to the
overwhelming majority of the population access to ownership and occupation of land, ... and to
fundamental rights and freedoms which are essential for the development of self-esteem. . .. What is
striking is the way in which these provisions were treated as 'normal law'. It was very rare to find a
judicial officer remarking on the racist and unacceptable character of apartheid law .. ,. Even where
legislation could not, as a matter of law, be ignored, judges should have acknowledged situations
where law and justice diverged. The divergence between law and juistice was only rarely
acknowledged by judges."
The case of Minister of the Interior v Loekhat and Others1428is a telling example of this attitude.
In this case, an expropriation by the state for purposes of effecting the policy of racial
segregation followed by the government around 1961 had to be evaluated. The court, however,
avoided becoming involved in a discussion about the virtues of the social transformation
envisaged by Parliament in enacting the Group Areas Act,1429and remarked that it did not have
the power to determine whether the legislation was for the ultimate common weal of all South
Africans. 1430 Under the new constitutional order, the courts should attempt counteracting similar
arbitrary legislative or executive action, should it arise. The interpretation of these terms by the
courts under apartheid legislation will not provide many helpful examples.
3.4.2.1.2. Different applications of the terms public purposes and public interest
The cases in which the courts did attempt to interpret the terms public purposes and public
interest can, at best, provide only rather vague guidelines for interpretation of these terms in the
new constitutional order. This is due to: (i) reservations concerning the question of whether these
terms should be interpreted broadly or narrowly; (ii) uncertainty about whether precedent on the
meaning of these terms outside the context of expropriation legislation would have an influence
on its interpretation within the context of expropriation; and (iii) uncertainty about the questions
whether these terms in the context of expropriation requires actual use of the land by the
expropriator and whether expropriation of one individual for the benefit of another would qualify
as being in the public interest or for public purposes.
1425 Cf also 51 supra.
1426 Ie Ismail Mohamed (Chief Justice); Arthur Chaskalson (President of the Constitutional Court); Michael Corbett
(former Chief Justice); Hennie van Heerden (Deputy Chief Justice); and Pius Langa (Deputy President of the
Constitutional Court).
1427 The Sunday Independent (19.10.1997) 11 (edited version of the submission made to the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission by Mohamed, Chaskalson, Corbett, Van Heerden and Langa).
1428 1961 2 SA 587.
142977 of 1957.
1430602E_F.
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The tenn public purposes has been used in South African law in a broad sense as well as in a
narrow sense. The reason for this, according to Innes J in the case of Rondebosch Municipal
Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society1431lies in the application of the
modifiying adjective public: 1432
"[t]he word public is one of wide significance, and it may have several meanings, between some of
which, in spite of their common origin, there are very real differences."
This decision indicates that tbe adjective public in terms like public purposes, public use, and
public interest is broadly applied to matters that pertain to or affect the people of a country or a
local community. It is, however, as frequently employed in a more restricted sense to denote
matters that pertain 1101 to the people directly but to the State or the Government representing the
people.
However, the interpretation of the term public pw-poses as a requirement for expropriation has
by itself caused problems because of the tendency in earlier jurisprudence to interpret this term
in contrast with public use on the one hand, and public interest on the other. 1433 An analysis of
the South African case law on the matter shows that public purposes originally denoted a benefit
in the sense of any specific advantage, as opposed to actual physical use required by public
use. 143-l In morc modem conceptions of the former term no distinction is made between these two
terms, especially when public use is employed in its broader sense as denoting an advantage for
the public, but not necessarily actual physical use of the property. It can therefore be accepted
that both public use and public purpose anticipated a direct public advantage as requirement for
expropriation, through either actual use of, or access to the property. By contrast, public interest
(in the context of limitations on property rights in particular) required only that the public derive
some indirect benefit from the expropriation of the property. 1435
In the Rondebosch-case,1436 for instance, public purpose had to be interpreted in the context of
section 115 of the Municipal ACt.1437 The court unanimously decided that the term public
purposes, when pertaining to the question whether land qualifies as "rateable property," must be
interpreted in the narrower sense as denoting matters pertaining to the state or governrnent.1438
Here, clearly, the term public purposes was intended to have the meaning of governmental
purposes. However, later decisions pertaining to expropriation of particular plots of land follow a
1~31 19111\0271.
1432283.
1433 Eisenberg 1995 SAJflR 208.
I~l~ Previously been defined narrowly in the United States of America and India (cf Karesh v City
Council 247 SE 2d 342; City of Ownensboro v McCormack 581 SW 2d 3 (Ky 1979); State of Bihar v Kameshwar
Singh AIR (1952) SC 252; Poletown Neighbourhood City Council v City of Detroit 304 W 2d 455), public use
indicated benefit through the actual physical use by the public of the property. Recently this term has rather been
employed in a broader sense as requiring some public advantage without actual physical use of the property.
Eisenberg 1995 SIUI/R 208 n 9.
1435 Eisenberg 1995 SAJHR 209.
1436 I91 I 1\ I) 27 I.
1437 45 of 1882.
1438 De Villiers CJ 280; Innes J 286. Laurence J 292 also founded that "it is not sufficient, to make purposes public,
that they should be altruistic, neither must the object in view be merely sectional, however large or important the
section concerned" and confirmed the strict interpretation of the term.
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broader interpretation of public purposes. 1439 The decision in Slabbert v Minister van Lande, 1440
that the intention of the legislature in enacting section 2 of the Expropriation of Lands and
Arbitration Clauses Proclamation 1441 was that the words public purposes had to be understood in
their unrestricted sense, apparently implies that these words assume a broader meaning in all
. . 1442expropriation cases.
In Slabbert v Minister van Landel443 the court had to determine whether an expropriation of
private land adjoining the official residence of the Prime Minister (as the head of state was then
called) was for public purposes in terms of the Expropriation of Lands and Arbitration Clauses
Proclamation.1444 The apparent purpose of the expropriation was to enlarge the premises in order
to provide more security and privacy for the Prime Minister. The court reasoned that the
proclamation was phrased in such wide terms that both the restricted meaning (in the sense of
governmental purposes) and the wide meaning (in the sense of interests of the community in
general) of the phrase public purposes was intended. Public purposes should, in the opinion of
the court, thus only be contrasted with the phrase private and/or personal purposes. 1445 Thereby
it is implied that an expropriation is for public purposes as long as it is not for private and/or
personal purposes.
This line of reasoning provides little help in clarifying the difference in meaning between public
purposes in the narrow sense of governmental purposes and public purposes in the wide sense of
public interest. In fact, it is stated in Slabbert v Minister van Lande that expropriating private
lands adjoining the official residence of the Prime Minister has the purpose of improving state
administration (or rather serves governmental purposes'<" by improving the security and privacy
of the Prime Minister) and therefore is also of general public interest.I447 By arguing along the
lines of public interest in general, the court fails to give an acceptable explanation of the reasons
for expanding the public purpose concept to include public interest, and fails to clarify the
possible distinction between public purpose in the broader sense and public interest.
In the context of expropriation, public purposes is usually understood to denote issues whereby
the whole population or the local public are affected, and not only matters pertaining to the state
or the govemment.l't" The wider interpretation of public purposes in expropriation questions is
explained in the case of Fourie v Minister van Lande.I449 The court argued that the term public
purposes is interpreted differently in matters pertaining to expropriation, on the one hand, and
1439 Fourie v Minister van Lande 1970 4 SA 165 (0) 175D; White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Community
Development 19843 SA 774 (W) 794B-D.
144019633 SA 620 (T) 621; cf Fourie v Minister van Lande 19704 SA 165 (0) 173H - 174E.
14415 of 1902 (Transvaal) as amended by the Expropriation Amendment Act 31 of 1958.
1442Eg Fourie v Minister van Lande 19704 SA (0) 174C-D.
14431963 3 SA 620 (T).
14445 of 1902 (Transvaal) as amended by the Expropriation Amendment Act 31 of 1958.
144562IH.
1446Referring to public purposes in the narrow sense.
1447622A-B; 622D-E.
1448 White Rocks Farm (Pty) Ltd & Another v Minister of Community Development 19843 SA 785 (N) 7931.
144919704 SA 165 (0) 170D.
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matters pertaining to legislation "not concerned with expropriation," on the other. It was pointed
out that, with the promulgation of the Expropriation Act, the term public purposes already had a
meaning attributed to it by a long line of earlier court decisions. The court is obliged to take
cognisance of this established meaning on the supposition that the legislature will use a term in
the same sense when incorporating it without further qualification into later enactments.1450
This illustrates the court's intention to interpret the term public purposes in the context of
expropriation by having regard not only to previous expropriation cases, but also to other
decisions that interpreted the term. In the Fourie case, an extensive analysis of both sets of the
existing case law was undertaken. The court also described the procedure to determine the
meaning of the words public purpose in a specific context. A historical survey of the use of the
phrase should be undertaken, and once the established meaning has been ascertained, it is
presumed that through subsequent use of such a term in an act which is in pari materia with
previous legislation, the legislature intended to use the term in its already established sense."?'
This procedure and its results were endorsed in the later decision of White Rocks Farm v
Minister of Community Developmenl.1452
Some decisionsl453 hold the opinion that the term public purposes does not imply that the
expropriator actually uses the land. Other decisions do not regard the expropriation of one
individual's private property for the benefit of another private individual as sufficiently
complying with the requirement of public purpose. In the case of Administrator, Transvaal v J
van Sireepen (Kempton Park) (Ply) Ltd,1454 for instance, the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court (as it was then called) gave an extremely wide meaning to the phrase "any purpose in
connection with the construction or maintenance of a road" in section 7( 1) of the Transvaal
Roads Ordinance.1455 The decision resulted directly in an interpretation of the specific provision
that included any purpose reasonably expedient to the main purpose for the specific
expropriation in terms of the ordinance (namely the building of roads). The indirect effect of the
decision was that an expropriation of one individual's property for what was essentially the
benefit of another, could still be for public purposes or in the public interest.1456
The Van Streepen case could be used in support of an argument that an interpretation making
expropriation of one private individual for the benefit of another, forms tbe basis of the
purported intention behind section 25(2)(a) FC read with section 25(4)(a) FC. However, it is still
HSO 170F-G.
I~SI 170G-II; 174H - 175A.
1m 19843 785 (N) 7931. Cf, however, the differing approach of Watermeyer, J in Durban City Council v SA Board
Mills Ltd 1961 3 SA 392 (C) 397C-E: In absence of indications lo the contrary, it was held that expropriation of a
piece of land for the purpose of widening a road in accordance with a town planning scheme was in the public
purpose. It was said that the municipality performing the expropriation was the authority charged with the duty of
planning the town, and in doing so were performing a public function. If an expropriation was necessary to enable
the municipality to perform a public function, it had to be in the public interest.
14S3 Eg African Farms and Townships Ltd \I Cape Town Municipality 1961 3 SA 392 (C) 396H.
I~S4 19904 SA 644 (A).
145522 of 1957.
14S6 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 343.
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questionable to what extent the guidelines existing in South African case law in general can
really make a substantial contribution in formulating the concepts of public purpose or public
interest with regard to the constitutional property guarantee. Many of the earlier decisions would
probably also be counterproductive in the context of testing the constitutionality of reform
legislation.
3.4.2.1.3. The inadequacy of existing judicial precedent for constitutional interpretation
The existing judicial precedent on the terms public purposes and public interest poses a few
pitfalls for their interpretation of these terms under the constitutional property clause. It raises the
question of how governmental manipulation of the law for purposes of social restructuring
should be handled by the courts, in which regard the choice of terminology and interpretation
thereof poses problems.
The application of the term public purposes to expropriation under apartheid legislation does not
provide any helpful guidelines for application in the constitutional context. Instead, they sound a
clear warning that the judiciary cannot simply accept that manipulation of the law by the
government for purposes of social restructuring is necessarily always in the public interest or for
public purposes. No matter how honourable the intentions of the legislature might be in a
specific case where property rights are limited in the public interest or for public purposes, a
constitutional standard should still be applied. The crucial question is what this constitutional
standard of public interest / public purposes should be.
Further, the choice of terminology and the interpretation thereof can be controversial in view of
the land-redistribution objectives of the government. A restrictive definition of public interest or
public purpose will preclude the possibility of expropriation for the sake of transfer to private
parties and thereby render the land redistribution programme ineffective. A too liberal definition
of public purpose or public interest might, by contrast, leave the legislature with unlimited
capacity to control private property at its own discretion, leaving it to the courts to determine
normative limits to this legislative capacity.
Most foreign jurisdictions attribute a broad meaning to the term public purposes.1457 The
Expropriation Act1458 also defines public purposes broadly so as to include any purpose
connected with the administration of any law by an organ of state. However, the meanings
attached to the terms public interest, public purposes, and so on, could still depend on the
context in which they are used. It is thus possible that the meanings of these terms may vary
from one situation to the other.
1457 Eisenberg 1995 SAJHR 216 et seq.
1458 63 of 1975. S 1 of the act contains a definitions clause.
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In Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic OjJences1459 the purpose of the search-
and-seizure infringement on the right to property and the right to privacy in terms of section 28
IC and section 13 IC respectively was considered. Tebutt J remarked:1460
" ... it must ... be accepted that, for the preservation of law and order and the proper investigation and
combating of crime, as well as for the protection of society and of rights of the members of that
society, searches may have to occur at times ... even if the right to privacy is affected thereby."
The court concludes that it must be accepted that property can be seized and removed pursuant to
such (permissible) searches. Thus the court indicates that a consideration of the public good is
present in the enquiry as to whether or not an infringement of property rights has occurred.
For purposes of limiting property rights in South Africa under the Final Constitution, the
inclusion of the term public interest in section 25(2) FC suggests that the provision in the Final
Constitution is of wider import. It can thus include expropriations that might have been u/tra
vires in terms of the narrower public purpose concept of the Interim Constitution.Y" Section
25(4)(a) FC also underscores this approach.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the addition of the term public interest in
section 25(2)(a) FC emphasises that the courts' powers to set aside expropriations on the grouds
of their purpose are limited. Chaskalson and Lewis1462 regard the inclusion of this term as a
warning to the judiciary to respect the choices made by the legislature or the executive as to
where the public interest lies. Such an approach to the interpretation of the terms public interest
and public purposes in the property clause does not realise that the legislative and executive
powers inherent in these concepts can easily be abused. The sanctioning powers of the judiciary
should be increased beyond merely respecting the decisions of the legislature and executive.
A ftcr all, to ensure that the objectives of land reform, redistribution and restitution are also
incorporated into an interpretation of the terms public purposes and public interest, section 25(4)
FC incorporates an additional mechanism to ensure that these terms are not "misinterpreted" by
the courts. It states expressly that public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reforrn
and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South A frica's natural resources.
1459 1995 2 S;\ 148 (C).
1'I(O() 16lW-G.
1·1~1Van der Walt Constitutional Properly Clauses (1999) 341.
14(,2 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren ct al (eds) Constitutional Law Revision
Service 2 (1996) eh 31, 22.
1463 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 341 - 342.
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So, even if it were uncertain whether expropriation for purposes of redistribution of land would
have been permissible in terms of section 28(3) IC, it is now clear that such an expropriation is
permissible in terms of section 25(2) Fe. Expropriation for the purpose of land redistribution,
which involves the withdrawal of property from one private person in order to transfer it to
another private person, will now probably be in the public interest. The public interest in this
ease is the general interest of the society in the implementation and promotion of an equitable,
effective and successful programme of transformation and land reform. 1463
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In this sense, it is advisable that public purposes and public interest be attributed a broad
meaning in the constitutional context of expropriation. A narrow interpretation of the public
interest / public purposes requirement in the constitutional property clause would be contrary to
the trends in constitutional law of other jurisdictions. Further, a narrow approach would render
several politically uncontroversial and commercially efficacious legislative provisions 1464
potentially unconstititutional.P'?
3.4.2.2.4. The Land Claims Court's definition of "public interest"
Recently, in Ex Parte North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils of
the Durban Metropolitan Area,1466 the Land Claims Court developed the concept of public
interest in the context of the court's capacity to order1467 that certain land must be excluded from
restitution.1468 The court will only make an order with the effect that certain land is excluded
from restoration if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest and that the public or any
substantial part thereof will suffer substantial prejudice unless such an order is made.1469 The
case arose from the purported development of Cato Manor, an area from which a large group of
persons have forcibly been removed during the apartheid regime. They applied for the order of
exclusion from restitution, and were opposed by claimants claiming restoration. During the
proceedings, the parties started negotiations and finally reached an agreement, which they then
wanted to incorporate into the court order under section 34(5)( d) of the Restitution of Land
Rights Act. The settlement entailed an agreement to proceed with the development as planned,
but subject to the proviso that where restoration was feasible any respondent who wished to
pursue a claim, would be entitled to do so. Respondents who wished to return to the area without
insisting on restoration or for whom restoration was not a viable option were also able to benefit
from the development.
Consequently, in order to determine whether the requirements of section 34(6) of the Restitution
of Land Rights Act had been met, the court had to scrutinise the concept of public interest.1470
The court found that both development of the land and restoration of it would be in public
interest in the instant case. It indicated that, due to the devastation caused and hardship suffered
as a result of the dispossession and removal, restoration would be a logical step to address the
historical injustice, and that it therefore would be in public interest. However, the court further
argued that a blanket restoration would result in the loss of the intended development. This could
ultimately also be in public interest, as becomes clear from, inter alia, the provision of affordable
1464 Eg s 440K, Companies Act 61 of 1973, which provides for the compulsory acquisition of minority shareholdings
by a successful take-over bidder who ownes 90 per cent of the shares in the company; s 24, Minerals Act 50 of
1991, providing for the compulsory acquisition of landowner's rights in the interests of mining activities on the land.
1465 Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law Revision
Service 2 (1996) eh 31, 22.
1466 1998 (1) SA 78 (LCC).
1467 S 34 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1468 Cf the discussion of Pienaar "Land Reform" Unpublished Paper (2000) 44 et seq.
1469 S 34(6) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1470 Ex Parte North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils of the Durban Metropolitan
Area 1998 (I) SA 78 (LCC) 83B-C, E-F.
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3.4.2.2. Compensation
housing for a disadvantaged community, opportunities for employment, tbe upgrading of
informal settlements, foreign investments and economic upliftment for the whole area that would
emanate from the development. 1471 The court thus found that any agreement that accommodated
both development and restoration, with the consent of all the parties concerned, would eminently
b . h bl" 1472e In t e pu IC interest.
Section 25(2)(b) FC only provides in general for compensation, determining that expropriation is
subject to compensation and that the amount, as well as the time and also the manner of payment
either have to be agreed upon by those affected, or have to be decided or approved by a court. A
more detailed provision is contained in section 25(3) FC. The amount of compensation and the
manner and time of payment have to be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance
between the public interest and the interests of those affected, upon taking into account "all
relevant circumstances."
3.4.2.2.2. Taking into account of all relevant circumstances
3.4.2.2.1. Compensation agreed upon by the affected parties or determined by court
As in section 25(2)(b) FC, section 28(3) IC provided that expropriation was subject to the
payment of agreed compensation. If no agreement could be reached, the court - taking account
of all relevant factors - had to determine the amount and time limit for payment of compensation.
Section 25(2)(b) FC contains an extension of the preceding section 28(3) IC in the sense that
provision is also made for approval by a court of the manner of payment of allocated or agreed
compensation. This is an improvement of the Interim Constitution's provisions, because it
enables a consideration of alternative forms of payment, for example payment by means of state
bonds.1473
Section 28(3) IC provided that a court, when having to determine an amount of compensation,
had to take into account
"all relevant factors, including ... the use 10 which the property is being put, the history of its
acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those affected and the interests of
those affected.
1471 Át 86H-87D.
1472 A section 34(5)-order was consequently granted. In Singh and Others v North Central & South Central Local
Councils 1999 (t) ALL SA 350 (LCC) another application was brought before the court by participants and other
claimants in respect of land in Cato Manor who were not party to the agreement that was incorporated into the s 34
court order. The applicants claimed that the respondents were in breach of numerous obligations under the said
agreement and claimed, in most instances, orders of specific performance. The application was dismissed on the
facts.
1473 Van del' Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 346.
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Reference to "all relevant factors" indicates merely that the enumerated factors do not form part
of a numerus clausus of factors.1474 Simultaneously, it indicates the general relevance and
relative importance of the other listed factors.1475 Section 25(3) FC also comprises a list of
"relevant circumstances" to be taken into account in the determination of compensation, but they
differ from those listed in section 28(3) IC. In particular, the new list of factors includes the
importance of considering the history of the property during the apartheid era, especially if the
expropriation was in one way or other connected to the new regime's land reform initiatives: 1476
Section 25 (Property) ...
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable,
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, including - (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of
the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct
state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property;
and (e) the purpose of the expropriation.
The factors which have remained are "current use of the property" and the "market value."
(i) The use to which the property is being put can, according to Budlender.l''" play an
important role when the property at stake is a scarce resource not being used in a socially
productive manner. For instance, in the case of speculative hoarding of land in a location where
access to land for housing is critical, the need for land and the owner's speculative exploitation of
the land should not be allowed to increase the amount of compensation payable.
(ii) Section 12 of the Expropriation Act,1478which is still valid and constitutes the main
statutory provision controlling the calculation and payment of compensation for expropriation, is
based mainly on the notion of market value as measure for compensation. In this regard, the
Expropriation Act conflicts with the purpose and intention of section 25(3) Fe. The market value
of the property is, obviously, a relevant factor, but in view of the whole constitution and the
property clause, it cannot be the only or most important factor in determining the just and
equitable amount of compensation.l'i" Existing legislation has to be interpreted in accordance
with the new constitutions. This will probably result in an adaptation of the focus on section 12
of the Expropriation Act to mirror the intention displayed by the constitutional property clause.
In Khumalo v Potgieter,1480 the Land Claims Court adopted a two-tiered approach by first
establishing the market value of the property at stake,1481and only thereafter considering the
influence of the constitutional indications for valuation of property to be expropriated on the
determined amount. 1482The court expressly excluded the possible influence that the presence of
the labour tenants on the land to be valuated could have on the eventual determination of the
1474 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh 1,64.
1475 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 345.
1476344.
1477 Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law (1998) eh I, 58.
147863 of 1975.
1479 Kerksay Investments (Pty) Ltd v Randburg Town Council 1997 1 SA 511 (T) at 522E-G.
1480 Khumalo and others v Potgieter and others, LCC 34/99.
1481 Par 72 - 92.
1482 Par 93 et seq.
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market value of the land, on the basis of the "Pointe Gourde" principle.1483 In considering the
"current use of the property" in terms of section 25(3) FC as a factor influencing the amount of
compensation, the court found that the presence of labour tenants, who are almost absolutely
insulated against eviction, can result in the present owner not being capable of deriving any
benefit from the land. It consequently warrants a limited upward adjustment of the compensation
amount. 1484
The investments made by the parties affected,1485 and the interests of the affected parties1486 are
not mentioned in the list of considerations in section 25(3) FC, whereas they seemed to be
important enough to be worthy of explicit mention under section 28 IC. However, some factors
have been broadened:
(i) Section 25(3)(b) FC does not refer only to the "history of acquisition", as was the case
In section 28(3) IC, but also to "use" of the property. The history of the acquisition of the
property is a fairly obvious consideration in cases where compensation has to be determined for
land which is to be expropriated now, and which was obtained by Forced removals and made
available to white farmers at low prices, with heavy state subsidies and/or favourable loans. It
should logically affect the amount of compensation in cases where the land is later expropriated
again for restitution or redistribution purposes. Housing subsidies provided by the state in urban
areas could, arguably, also fall within the ambit of this provision. In the Khumalo case, an
analysis of the "history of the acquisition" of the land indicated that the owner who was to be
expropriated bought the land in question at a time when the value thereof was already depressed
and expropriation was likely. This influenced the purchase price, and consequently, at
expropriation, justi (jed a downward adjustment of the compensation amount.1487
(ii) Further, explicit reference is made (in section 25(3)(d) FC) to the extent of direct state
investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of property. Tbe
extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital
1483 According to this principle, the increase or decrease in value of the land, which is attributable 10 the scheme
underlying the acquisition, should not be laken into account in the assessment of the market value of land acquired
in an expropriation. This principle emanated from the Privy Council decision of Pointe Gourde Quarrying and
Transport Co Ltd v Sub-intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565.
14~~ Khumalo and others \I Potgieter and others, LCC 34/99 par 94.
1485 The value of the mvcstmcnts in the property can affect the amount of compensation either positively or
negatively, depending on the circumstances. The market value will normally already reflect any positive influence
that investments might have had, and investments that do not raise the market value should probably not be
compensated. There arc, however, the extraordinary circumstances where compensation should perhaps be higher
than market value because of investments. Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New
Land Law (1998) eh I, 63 mentions two examples: (i) cases where market value is depressed by negative influences
not of the owner's making, like land invasions; and (ii) cases where someone else than the owner (the lessee, an
unlawful occupant) has made investments that should be considered for compensation.
148<> It is difficult to interpret the factor referring to the "interests of those affected," although it most probably
establishes a balancing factor similar to that which is found in German law. The compensation should therefore not
be so high that it makes expropriation and therewith the benefits (land or housing) to be received in terms of land
reform programmes impossible. Further, it should 1101 be so low that it causes substantial detriment for the current
owners and holders of rights in or to that land. Bud lender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlendcr, Latsky & Roux
New Land Law (1998) ch 1, 64.
14H7 Khumalo and others \I Potgieter and others, LCC 34/99 par 95.
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improvement of the property probably excludes indirect subsidies such as tax incentives and
drought or marketing subsidies. This factor has arguably also replaced the general factor of
investments in property as it appeared in section 28(3) IC. This has the effect that investments in
property can be taken into account when it affects the amount of compensation negatively.
Investments increasing the compensation amount now have to be regarded under the general
heading of "all relevant factors." Land that was expropriated from blacks during the apartheid era
was often made available to whites with the assistance of very beneficial state loans and
subsidies. This often made it possible to acquire or improve land, from which the current owner
could benefit if the effect of state investment was not taken into account. Moreover, this
requirement is in line with the general principles of expropriation and compensation, as it is
normally considered improper to allow compensation to be influenced by state actions and
developments or plans related to the expropriation.l'f"
(iii) The "purpose of the expropriation" is now explicitly mentioned in section 25(3)( e) FC
as a factor to be considered. Consideration of the purpose of an expropriation probably allows
the courts to ensure that the social importance of the expropriation is taken into account. When
an expropriation is in the public interest but not essential, a stricter measure may be applied, but
when an expropriation is for an essential public purpose (such as land reform or housing), the
courts should ensure that the amount of compensation does not prevent the state from addressing
the critical situation that requires the expropriation.U'" If the purpose of expropriation is the
restitution of the property to a formerly dispossessed claimant, the scales could be tipped against
the private owner. An investigation of the history of acquisition of the property might, for
instance, include a consideration of the fact that the property was obtained during apartheid era
for less than its true (market) value. If consistent with the principles inherent in the land
restitution programme, compensation should in such a case be determined on a basis where "just
and equitable" is seen in the context of effecting social justice rather than rewarding the
individual owner for the loss of his or her property and security of title. This implies that, in the
case of expropriation for purposes of land reform, compensation at a level lower than market
value would be highly likely. It is, however, questionable whether expropriation for purposes of
land reform without any compensation would be possible. Section 25(8) FC creates at least the
impression that it would be possible to deviate from the provisions of section 25 FC for purposes
ofland reform, as long as the deviation is still in accordance with section 36(1) FC.1490 It would,
obviously, not be possible to effect an expropriation that would not be in accordance with the
requirements in section 36(1) FC. An expropriation would therefore always have to be in
accordance with a law of general application, and can never be arbitrary, even if the
expropriation is aimed at land reform. The expropriation also has to be for public purposes or in
the public interest. Section 25(3)(e) FC, however, suggests that the purpose of the expropriation
(in this case land reform) may influence the amount of compensation payable, especially if
1488 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 346 n 124.
1489347.
1490347.
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weighed against tbe public interest.1491Although this might support arguments for a diminished
amount of compensation, it does not, in itself, justify the complete denial of an expropriated
owner's right to compensation. 1492
In the Certification case1493 it has been mentioned that it is not usual for a constitutional
document itself to mention specific criteria upon which compensation for expropriation could be
determined. It found, however, that the approach taken in section 25 FC were not in conflict with
the universally accepted view that compensation had to be "fair," "adequate," "full," "equitable
and appropriate," or "juSt.,,1494The fact that the drafters of both the Interim and Final
Constitutions resorted to this approach towards the determination of compensation indicates that
market value is not the only (or even most important) criterion to be considered in the
determination of the amount of compensation.U'" The explicit listing of market value as one of
the possible factors to be taken into account is, furthermore, clearly a sign that market value by
itself is not the only or even the most important factor. There is no simple equation which would
enable an easy evaluation of all the relevant factors. The facts and circumstances of each case
accordingly has a great influence on the outcome of the process.
240
The overall standard is that compensation should be just and equitable, taking into account all
relevant factors. What "just and equitable" means in a specific context, and which factors would
be relevant, should be determined with reference to the overall structure and purpose of the
Constitution, including the property clause and the limitation clause. Moreover, the specific
factors enumerated in section 28(3) IC and section 25(3) FC, are not the only relevant factors to
be considered: they simply constitute examples of what kind of considerations might be
important under certain circumstances.
3.4.2.2.3. Expropriation without compensation?
Van del' Walt1496has indicated that expropriation without compensation would only be possible
if the requirements of section 25(3) FC are complied with. This would render section 25(8) FC a
dead letter. Expropriation without compensation would, therefore, be possible only in the case
where the court (ruling upon a consideration of all the relevant factors, including the
circumstances of the acquisition, use and expropriation of the property) would find that payment
of compensation would be unnecessary, and that it is justifiable and equitable to withhold
compensation completely.1497 Ilowever, even under such circumstances, the court could probably
award nominal compensation, in order to pay lip service to the compensation requirement.
1491 347.
1492 Cf Khumalo and others v Potgieter and others, LCC 34/99 and the discussion of this decision at 238 supra.
149.1 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 CCT 23/96, online at
hllp://www.conslitution.org.za/cert.html[06.08.1999] par 70 - 75.
1494 Par 73.
1495 Cf Clanssens 1993 SAJIIR 422; Budlender "Constitutional Protection" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land
Law (revised 1998) eh I, S6 ct seq where the factors enumerated in s 28(3) IC are discussed.
1496 Van der Wah Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 347.
1497 No such decision has been made yet.
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3.4.2.3. Additional requirements from judicial precedent?
Certain points raised in the decision of Harksen v Lane NO,1498 where the court had to consider
the constitutionality of section 21 of the Insolvency Act,1499 could have far-reaching
consequences for the concept of expropriation as described in the South African constitutions.
Therefore, this decision needs further discussion.
3.4.2.3.1. Appropriation by the expropriator
In the Harksen case the court reasoned on the basis of previous and foreign case law,1500that an
expropriation amounts to more than a mere dispossession of property, and that appropriation by
the expropriator is a requirement.P'" Although the authorityl502 upon which the ruling was based
was not on all fours with the Harksen case, it was nevertheless decided that, in the case of
section 21 of the Insolvency Act, the temporary vesting of ownership in the Master or trustee did
not sufficiently fulfil the requirement of appropriation by the expropriator.P'" The court argued
that the purpose of section 21 of the Insolvency Act was to ensure that all property that belonged
to the insolvent spouse is contained in his or her estate at the point of liquidation. The property
rights of both the insolvent spouse and the solvent spouse are thus temporarily "suspended" by
the operation of law. The law also creates a procedure for the release of the property belonging
to the solvent spouse.1504The court, in reaching this decision, held it to be unnecessary to decide
whether the expropriation was for a public purpose as required by section 28(3) IC, and whether
the vesting of the property involved a public authority. Thereby it assumed that the appropriation
by a public authority is a constitutional requirement for expropriation.
Whereas the result of the ruling might be correct, the courts' pronouncements on the requirement
of actual dispossession or acquisition of the property by the expropriator as an element of
expropriation should be rejected. Such a requirement restricts the action of expropriation to
tangible property only. The constitution does not support such an approach. Further, restricting
the action to actual expropriations in the formal sense by requiring appropriation by the
expropriator, is an unnecessarily rigid requirement.1505The state need not have acquired a benefit
from the specific action, and even if this had been the case, the state nevertheless need not
necessarily have acquired exactly the same benefit or right that has been lost by the expropriated
14981997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC)
1499 24 of 1936. It was decided that section 21 of the Insolvency Act did not constitute an expropriation of property
and therefore was not subject to section 28(3) of the Constitution. Par 37. The case was eventually decided on the
basis of the equality clause (section 8 IC). It was held that section 21 of the Insolvency Act was not in conflict with
the equality guarantee or the prohibition against discrimination. Par 68. Cf also 255 et seq supra.
1500 Beckenstrater v Sand River Irrigation Board 1964 4 SA 510 (T) 515A-C; Hewlett v Minister of Finance
1982 1 SA 490 (ZSC); Davies v Minister of Lands. Agriculture and Water Development 1997 1 SA 228 (ZSC).
1501 Par 32.
1502 Cf n 1500 supra.
1503 Par 35.
1504 Par 36.
1505 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 338.
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party. In this regard, Van der Walt and Botha'sl506 comparative analysis on this issue indicates
that as far as constitutional property guarantees are concerned, the scope of the term
expropriation or compulsory acquisition can not be reduced or restricted to either physical
dispossession or actual acquisition by the state.
3.4.2.3.2. Permanent nature of expropriation
On the basis of the temporary nature of section 21 of the Insolvency Act, the court argued 1507
that, even if this section does result in a transfer of the ownership of the solvent spouse's property
to the master or trustee of the insolvent estate, the purpose of the section is not to acquire the
property. Instead, it is aimed at ensuring that the insolvent estate is not deprived of property
actually belonging to it. Therefore, it was held, section 21 of the Insolvency Act cannot be
described as permitting expropriation. This is another justified point of concern. The mention
made by the court of the [act that the limitation in section 21 of the insolvency Act is only of a
temporary nature, could result in an interpretation of the expropriation provisions in the
constitution that imports a requirement of permancy of expropriation. Such a requirement is not
explicitly mentioned in either of the constitutions.P'"
3.4.3. Proportionality in terms of the generallimitations clause
The inquiry into the proportionality of a specific restrictive action by the state has first been
described by Chaskalson, pl509 in the case of S v Makwanyane,1510 with regard to the
constitutional validity of the death penalty in terms of the Interim Constitution: 1511
"[An assessment based on proportionality] is implicit in the provisions of section 33( I) [IC). The fact
that different rights have different implications for democracy, and in the case of our Constitution, for
"an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality", means that there is no absolute
standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. [Proportionality] ...
calls for the balancing of di fferent interests. In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will
include the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society
based on freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that
purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the
limitation has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other
means less damaging to the right in question. In the process regard must be had to the provisions of
section 33(1) [IC), and the underlying values of the Constitution, bearing in mind that, as a Canadian
Judge has said, "the role of the Court is not to second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by
legislators. "
IS()(, Van der Wah & Botha 1998 SAPRIPL 20 - 21.
IS07 Par 35 - 37.
ISOR Van der Wah COlIst;IIII;Ollal Property Clauses (1999) 338.
1509 With reference to the limitation of rights in Canada and Germany and under the European Convention of Rights
of 1950. llowever, the South African Constitutional Court also asserted its independence at an early stage by
observing that the way in which the criteria relating to the principle of proportionality, or more specifically the
theory of interpretation and limitation of fundamental rights arc applied in Germany and Canada "may well be of
assistance" to a South African court, but there was no reason to attempt to fit its analysis into the Canadian mode (or
the German, for that matter). Cf Kcntridge J in S II ZIIII/a 1995 2 SA 642 (CC) par 35; Chaskalson P in S II
Makwanyaue 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 110.
ISIO 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).
1511 Par 104. Footnotes omitted.
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With this approach, the court on the one hand refrained from seriously considering the impact of
the essential-content guarantee.1512 On the other hand, the theory of a balancing of interests,
which apparently encompasses the principle of proportionality, but also some other elements,
was introduced.1513 The factors mentioned in the Makwanyane case were later included in the
limitation clause of the Final Constitution.P'" thereby codifying the South African
proportionality test within section 36(1) FC.1515Hence, a review of the structure of the general
limitations clause is important for an understanding of the proportionality principle in South
Africa.1516In the following sections, this issue will enjoy closer scrutiny. A distinction will also
be made between proportionality and the balancing of interests, whereafter the function of
proportionality and the balancing of interests in the South African constitutional context will be
discussed.
3.4.3.1. Proportionality and the limitation clause
Together with section 7(3) FC, section 36 FC lays down the general requirements for limitations
with regard to all the rights in the bill of rights. Briefly, these requirements entail thatl517 (i) the
rights in the bill of rights are not absolute, even in principle, but can be limited in terms of
thelimitation provisions in section 36 FC, or elsewhere in the bill of rights; 1518(ii) no law may
limit a right entrenched in the bill of rights except as provided for in section 36(1) FC or
elsewhere in the text of the Final Constitution; 1519(iii) the rights in the bill of rights may be
limited only in terms of law of general application; 1520and (iv) the rights in the bill of rights may
only be limited to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all
relevant factors, including those mentioned in section 36(1)(a) to (e) FC.1521 It has been
indicatedl522 that, contrary to the opinion held by some scholars,1523 the general limitations
clause applies in all cases of inquiry into the limitation of the rights to property. Consequently, it
must be determined - in case of both deprivation as well as expropriation - whether the
infringement was reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
1512 Cf249 et seq infra for a more detailed discussion.
1513 CfBlaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 203 for a more detailed discussion.
1514 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 202 indicates that in both the Makwanyane decision (1995 3 SA 391 (CC» and
the Zuma decision (1995 2 SA 642 (CC», the Constitutional Court made a number of key pronouncements
which directly influenced the manner in which the limitation clause of the Final Constitution was
formulated.
ISIS This test, as set out in the Makwanyane case, is strongly rooted in Canadian jurisprudence. However, there are
strong indications that the German theory of Verháltnismtifiigkeit influenced the development of the Canadian
proportionality test through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. In the Makwanyane case, reference
is also made to the German and European Convention law in the discussion of proportionality.
1516 Cf 183 supra. Cf also Woolman 1997 SAJHR 102 - 134 for an analysis of the limitation clause.
1517 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRlPL 314 - 315.
1518 Cfs 7(3) FC.
1519 Cf s 36(2) FC.
1520 Cf s 36(1) Fe.
1521 Cf s 36(1) FC.
1522 187 et seq supra.
1523 Cf in this regard also 65 et seq, 188 et seq supra.
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dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including the nature of the
right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the
relation between the limitation and its purpose, and less restrictive means to achieve the
purpose. 1524This, in brief, is the South African version of the proportionality principle.1525 There
is, however, more to this principle than might meet the eye.
"The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the
extent that lhe limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom."
As opposed to the method of the German Federal Constitutional Court for limiting rights by
applying the principle of proportionality, section 36(1) FC simultaneously circumscribes the
legislature's capacity to limit fundamental rights and provides some guidelines for interpretation
of this provision. The first part of the limitation clause, for instance, provides the constitutional
reference for limitation by the legislature: 1526
The second part of section 36( I) FC provides that all relevant factors must be taken into account
when limiting a fundamental right. These factors include the nature of the right, the importance
of the purpose of the limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the
limitation and its purpose, and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. In this way, focus is
placed on the interpretation of constitutional norms in a given case. Thus, two different aspects
of the principle of proportionality are combined within section 36( I) FC, through the
involvement of both the legislature and the courtS.1527
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The presence of a general limitation clause in a constitutional text need not mean that the
proportionality principle has to be applied mechanically to the limitation of all rights and
freedoms. The fact that the proportionality principle is also an instance of the constitutional
state,I528 together with the existence of a structure of speei fie limitation provisions 1529within the
constitution, requires that the proportionality inquiry can be adapted to the particularities of the
clause under discussion. As a matter of course, proportionality in the case of socio-economic
rights will differ from proportionality applied to material freedoms.
3.4.3.2. Proportional ity and the balancing of interests
In spite of differences in formulation and application, the function of the proportionality
principle in South Africa remains similar to that of Germany, namely to examine the question
whether the purpose of a speci fie limitation is proportionate in view of its consequences. In this
regard, the following remarkl530 of Chaska Ison, P in the Makwanyane case needs closer scrutiny:
1524 S 36( I) Fe.
1m Con/ra Oe Waal 1995 SAl-fJR 7 - 8.
1526 S 36( I) Fe. Emphasis added.
1527 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 210 - 211.
IS28 Cf 86 el seq supra.
1529 Cf 184 el seq supra.
1~30 19953 SA 391 (CC) par 104.
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"Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular circumstances can
only be done on a case by case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which
calls for the balancing of different interests."
This statement seems to equate proportionality with the balancing of interests in the South
African context. However, the construction of a balancing of interests could be misleading and
have different meanings, depending on the circumstances.P"
(i) The weighing up of competing values could be regarded as a balancing of interests, in
the sense that one interest or right takes precedence over another and that the preference
determines that the other interest or right is subordinate and should give way to the one taking
priority.1532Woolman1533 refers to this type of balancing as "the 'head-to-head' comparison of
competing rights, values or interests," which can assume the form of a balancing of one right,
interest or value against another. There are indications of such an approach in the Makwanyane
case.1534However several points of criticism can be brought against this approach.1535For one, if
different constitutional norms are weighted and ranked, and some regarded as more important
than others, the inner cohesion of the principles upon which the Constitution rests is endangered.
The equality of fundamental rights and the basic premises of democracy are played off against
each other, thereby seriously compromising the notion of the constitutional state. Furthermore,
an interpretation which allows for one interest or right to take precedence over another, resulting
in the subordination of one right to another, does not comply with the requirement that all the
rights in the bill of rights must be respected and promoted in the process. Such a balancing of
interests could at most have its foundation in secondary considerations and is not directly based
upon an analysis "in conformity with the Constitution.,,1536
(ii) The court could alternatively opt for an approach that would attain a harmonious
concretisation or practical concordance of the relevant provisions. In the terminology of
Woolman,1537 this would be the procedure of "striking a balance" between competing rights or
interests. This kind of "optimisation" of the relevant provisions would mean that each of the
relevant provisions co-influences the solution of the disputing rights without ranking them.1538
The German theory of praktische Konkordanz can here provide valuable examples.1539
(iii) Another possible approach can be found in the method of interpretation "in conformity
with the Constitution.v'P" Upon a comparison of the German counterpart rule of an
1531 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 178.
1532 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 213. She equates this approach with the Giiterabwdgung of German jurisprudence
and indicates (at 199) that, although it is followed by some administrative and civil courts in Germany, this approach
is controversial and has not been endorsed by the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE 7, 198 208 et seq). Only a
few academics support this theory in a constitutional context. Many eminent academics have rejected this theory out
of hand. Cf 20 1 supra.
1533 Woolman 1997 SAJHR 102 - 103.
1534 Cfthe discussion of Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 206 - 208.
1535 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 214 - 215.
1536 Cf 83 et seq supra.
1537 Woolman 1997 SAJHR 102 - 103.
1538 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 214.
1539 Cf 182 supra.
1540 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPR/PL 214. Cf also 83 supra.
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interpretation giving effect to the "innere Einheit" of the constitutional text,1541 this approach
would mean that a statutory provision must be interpreted in such a manner that it complies with
the normative principles endorsed by the Constitution: If it is possible to interpret a statutory
provision in more than one way, the interpretation which is in conformity with the Constitution
should be preferred. This principle of constitutional interpretation links the interpretation of legal
norms (Normauslegung) with a judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of the legal provisions
(Normenkontrolle). Jf the point of departure is that the Constitution is supreme and that all the
branches of state authority are bound to 'respect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of
Rights', the constitutional text is, as a matter of course, the most important source for the
concretisation of fundamental rights. This is probably also the meaning that Van der Waltl542
attaches to interest-balancing when explaining that "[i]n the Constitution there are reasons for the
protection of rights and for the limitation of rights, and the proportionality question involves a
balancing or consideration of the relative weight of these reasons in the specific context."
The term proportionality, on the other hand, is usually described in less uncertain terms. In terms
of German'<" and Canadianl544 jurisprudence, it consists of three elements:1545 (i) The limitation
must be necessary (erforderlich) to promote the public purpose served by it. (ii) The limitation
must be suitable (geeignet) to promote or serve that purpose. (iii) Finally, the limitation must be
moderate (zumutbar} - or rather, it must not be disproportionate - in its effects. There are strong
indications that the test as formulated in the Makwanyane case,1546 and "codi fled" in section
36( I) FC are based on German and Canadian jurisprudence, even though Chaskalson, P
expressed his reservations concerning the use of foreign jurisprudence in this regard.1547
The fact that Chaskalson, P uses the process of interest-balancing to describe proportionality test,
as in the dictum quoted above, must indicate that the former concept is used rather in a figurative
sense than in any of the legal-technical meanings that can be attached to it. Blaauw-Wolf
explains: 1548
"It would appear, though, that the emphasis of the Court ... is no longer on the 'weighing of values' in
the sense of the doctrine of Giiterobwdgung. Instead, the terminology of 'balancing of interests' is
invoked in the context of the principle of proportionality. In this 'balancing process' the age-old
likeness of Justitia and her scales which balances [sic] in favour of justice is used."
1.141 OVerfGE 82 I0 221; BVerfGE 34 165 199 et seq
ISJ2 Van der Walt 1997 SAPRIPL 321 - 322.
IS4} Cf87 ct seq, 200 et seq supra.
IS·IJ In the decision of R v Oakes 1986 19 eRR 308 it was held that, in order to be valid in terms of the general
limitation clause (s 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982), a limitation had to satisfy two
separate requirements: (i) The limitation has to be aimed at an objective that is important enough lo justify the
limitation of the right. (ii) It has to be justified in terms of a proportionality lest, which consists of three elements, ie
that the limitation has to be rationally connected to the objective and designed to achieve that objective; that the
means chosen to achieve the objective should impair the right as little as possible; and that there must be
proportionality between the effect of the measures and the objective they arc aimed at achieving.
IS4S Cf the summary of Van der Walt 1997 SAPR/PL 319.
1.146 Cf 243 supra.
I S47 Cf 243 et seq supra.
IS4~ Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRIn 209.
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This view is endorsed by the dictum of Ackermann, J in the case of De Lange v Smuts,1549 where
an exposition of the application of section 36( 1) FC is provided:
"The balancing of different interests must still take place. On the one hand there is the right infringed,
its nature; its importance in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom; and the nature and extent of the limitation. On the other hand there is the importance of the
purpose of the limitation. In the balancing process and in the evaluation of proportionality one is
enjoined to consider the relation between the limitation and its purpose as well as the existence of less
restrictive means to achieve this purpose."
Inevitably, the conclusion must be that the term interest-balancing surfaces in several shapes and
sizes in the process of determining the constitutional validity of specific interferences with
fundamental rights. One can go even further and say that proportionality is a very specific kind
of interest-balancing, which does not exclude other kinds of interest-balancing at other stages of
the inquiry into the constitutional validity of a specific interference with a fundamental right
such as property. This will be further elucidated in the following paragraphs.
3.4.3.3. Application of the proportionality test in the South African context
It has been indicated abovel55o that the South African proportionality test as formulated in the
Makwanyane case and codified in section 36(1) FC was to some extent based on the German and
Canadian approaches towards the determination of the proportionality of interferences with
fundamental rights. However, Blaauw-Wolfl551 drew attention to the fact that the provisions of
section 36( 1) Fe goes further - in some regards - than the "common" proportionality inquiries of
Canada and Germany. According to this analysis, the conditions for a valid limitation of rights as
set out by section 36(1) FC are: (i) that the restriction must be in terms of law of general
application; 1552(ii) that such a limitation must be reasonable; and (iii) that it must be justifiable
in an open and democratic society. The first criterion represents a formal requirement that must
be met before the inquiry can proceed to the proportionality test. The other two criteria are
comparable to the elements of the principle of proportionality: The requirement that it must be
"justifiable", is comparable to the inquiry whether a limitation is suitable or appropriate to
achieve a specific objective, whereas "reasonableness" requires that a limitation may not be
arbitrary, unfair or based upon irrational considerations. Further, section 36(1)(e) FC, which
provides that less restrictive means should be invoked to achieve the objective, could be
compared with proportionality in the narrower sense according to German theory.1553
1549 1998 3 SA 785 (CC) par 86 - 88.
1550 Cf243 et seq, 244 et seq supra.
1551 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 178 et seq.
1552 "Generally applicable law" can only be statutes made by the legislature and not administrative regulations or
decrees. The reason for this provision is that the democratically elected legislature must authorise the limitation,
being the organ of state endowed with legislative powers. However, the legislature must still remain within the
ambit of what has been authorised by the Constitution: it may only restrict a fundamental right to the extent that the
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom. This implies that a fundamental right must be left intact insofar as these requirements are not met.
Moreover, the limitation must apply generally and not solely to an individual case. Cf 218 supra.
1553 Cf 200 et seq supra.
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This approach tunes in with Woolman'sl554 plea for the rearrangement of the factors in section
36(1)(a) to (e) FC. It is correctly indicated that, for a proper limitation analysis, tbe factors
mentioned in section 36( I) FC should be rearranged in the correct order. First, the nature of tbe
right infringed should be considered, as this will determine the level of scrutiny to which a
specific limitation is subjected. Thereafter, the importance of the purpose of the limitation should
be considered in order to determine wbether it serves the values of openness, democracy, human
dignity, freedom, equality and all the other values underlying the bill of rights and the
Constitution as a whole. Then the relation between the limitation and its purpose should be
considered, as it makes sense to inquire about the means employed to achieve the objective in
their rational relation to the achievement of the objective. Once this has been determined, one
can consider whether less restrictive means to achieve the purpose exist. The inquiry into tbe
nature and extent of the Iimitation only becomes important after all the other factors have been
considered. This calls for a genuine balancing of the values at stake; a consideration of the
compromise of social interests reached by the government. This exercise might place the court
under immense political pressure, because it in principle involves a policy decision. It should
therefore be the very last resort in deciding whether a speci fie limitation of a fundamental right is
justified.
This approach furthermore ties in neatly with the function of the proportionality test in German
constitutional property law. Verhëltnismafiigkeit itself is tested only in the last stage of tbe
inquiry as to the constitutional validity of an interference with property, but it is connected to tbe
so-called Abstufung ("scaling") of the social function of property in the constitutional context.1555
According to this approach, legislature is given greater freedom to delimit the content of
property and to define the restrictions on property where it has a function of specific social
relevance. Moreover, the legislature has more latitude to define restrictions on interests that are
further removed from thc property holder's personal liberty.1556 For example, investment-based
interests are protected to a lesser degree in the consitutitonal context than an individual's interest
in having a roof over his or her head. In landlord-tenant relations, for instance, rent control and
other forms of tenant protection are almost routinely affirmed, because the tenant's interest is
personal and intimately connected with personal liberty, while the landlord's interest usually is
strictly economic.1557 In other words, the social importance and function of property interests
contribute to deciding upon the degree of restriction of the constitutional right to property that
would be justifiable in a specific case. This is relevant especially where different rights come
into contlict with each other.
This "scaling" of the kind of protection afforded to different proprietary interests can be
important in the determination of the proportionality or a specific interference with property, but
1554 Woolman 1997 SAJIIR I 10- III.
1555 Cf 204 el seq supra. Cf also Alexander "Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas" in Maclean (cd) Property and the
Constitution (1999) 106.
1556 Cf 204 et seq supra.
1557 Alexander "Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas" in Maclean (cd) Property and the Constitution (1999) 106. This
example is based 011 BVcrfGE 68, 361 and BVerfGE 89, I.
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can also be employed much earlier in the investigation as to the justifiability of a specific
interference with property. It harks back to the principles of the constitutional state and social
state underlying the constitutional orders of both Germany and South Africa,1558and therefore
can be important not only in the process of restriction of the constitutional right to property, but
also in its interpretation.
Applied to the South African context, this approach would enable a process of "interest-
balancing" earlier in the investigation as to the constitutional validity of a specific interference
with property, by a consideration and balancing of the principles underlying the constitution and
thus also the property clause of section 25 FC. This kind of interest-balancing should, however,
not be confused with an inquiry into the proportionality of a specific interference with property,
which will still constitute the final stage of a rather formal process of determining justifiability.
Instead, the importance of protecting specific interests at stake in a given case should simply,
without resorting to weighing or ranking, be considered against the basic principles of the
constitutional and social state.
3.4.4. Maintenance of essential content required?
The essential content requirement that appeared in section 33(1) IC1559was omitted in the
limitations clause of the Final Constitution. This was due to the difficulties experienced by the
Constitutional Court in determining the exact meaning of the essential content requirement in
section 33(1 )(b) IC, and the consequent reluctance of the court1560to pronounce on the matter.
The ommission of the essential content requirement could mean that the drafters of the Final
Constitution consciously intended to depart from the model anticipated by the Interim
Constitution and the German example, in which the essence of the right and the principle of
proportionality were harmonised. Instead, it appears that room is left for the Constitutional Court
to weigh and rank rights, allowing for one right to take precedence over another and ousting the
other in the process. If such an approach is followed, it could mean that in specific cases
guaranteeing a certain right could lead to the dissolution of another guarantee - even to the extent
that the innermost core of one right is denied for the sake of upholding another. 1561In the
following paragraphs, the problems with the essential content requirement are explained with
reference to the Interim Constitution. In addition the extent to which courts are still obliged to
respect the inviolable core of each fundamental right under the Final Constitution is investigated.
3.4.4.1. The essential content provision of the Interim Constitution
Section 33(1)(b) IC provided that
1558 Cf 81 et seq supra.
1559 S 33(1) IC: "The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, provided that
such limitation - (a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is - (i) reasonable; and (ii) justifiable in an open
and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and (b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in
question, and provided further that ..." Emphasis added.
1560 Cf S v Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC) par 132, 167,281,283 - 286,298.
1561 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 205.
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"The rights entrenched in [the chapter on fundamental rights] may be limited by law of general
application provided that such limitation - ... (b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in
question ... "
This meant that a limitation, even if reasonable and necessary, could not destroy the basic core of
a right by rendering it impossible for the right to serve its intended social function or by
permanently preventing an individual from exercising the right. The essential content
requirement thus ensured that there would be a final boundary beyond which a limitation would
result in a denial of the right.'562 In practice this point was seldom reached, as limitations
generally did not aim to destroy the essential content of a right. In most constitutional cases,
courts would limit themselves to the balancing of governmental and individual interests in order
to ensure that the limitation employed was proportionate to the objective pursued. The courts
would only turn to the essential content requirements as a final resort. In the Makwanyane case,
involving the constitutionality of the death penalty, six judgeslS63 considered the essential
content requirement, but preferred to base their decisions on other grounds after balancing
competing interests in the context of reasonableness and the values of an open and democratic
society. Provincial decisions have adopted a similar approach.1564
The meaning of the essential content inquiry has been the subject of speculation, and has given
rise to several, often contrasting, opinions. In the case of Nortje v AG, Capel565 Marais J
statedl566 that:
"The test of whether or not the essential content of a right has been negated may sometimes be
quantitative, semenmes qualitative, and sometimes both. Everything turns, I think on the nature of the
rights and its raison d'ctrc."
In the Makwanyane case, Chaskalson P raised the questionl567 whether the requirement of
essential content should be determined subjectively (from the point of view of the individual
affected by the invasion of the right) or objectively (from the point of view of the nature of the
right and its place in the constitutional order) or in some other way. This issue was not decided.
However, Mahomed .J in the same case declaredl568 that
"it is possible to consider a third angle which focuses on the distinction between the 'essential content'
of a right and some other content. This distinction might justify a relative approach to the
determination of what is the essential content of a right by distinguishing the essential core of the right
from its peripheral outgrowth and subjecting 'as law of general application' limiting an entrenched
1562 Erasmus "Limitation and Suspension" in Van Wyk, Dugard, et al (cds) Rights and Constitutionalism (1996) 650.
1563 Chaskalson (par 132 - 134); Ackermann (par 167); Didcolt (par 175); Kentridge (par 193 - 195); Mahomed
(par 298) and O'Regan (par 343).
1564 Cf Jeeva v Receiver of Revel/Lie 1995 (2) SA 433 (SECLD) 445D-H; Khala v Millister of Safety and Security
1994 (4) SA 218 (W) 227 - 228; S v Majuva 1994 (4) SA 26 (CK) 317. Only Marais J in S v Bhulwana 1995 (I) SA
509 (C) 511 and Nortje v AG. Cape 1995 (2) SA 460 (C) at 481- 484 has held that a limitation negated the essential
content of a right. That he reached this conclusion too hurriedly wilhout first attempting to balance the interests of
the respective parties in the context of proportionality and the values of an open and democratic society, is borne out
by the fact that other judges dealing with the similar issues (S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) and Jeeva v Receiver of
Revenue 1995 (2) SA 433 (SECLD) at 445D-H) did not find that the essential content of a right had been negated.
1565 1995 (2) SA 460 (C).
1566 484E.
1567 Par 132.
1568 Par 298.
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right, to the discipline of not invading the core, as distinct from the peripheral outgrowth. In this
regard, there may conceivably be a difference between rights which are inherently capable of
incremental invasion and those that are not."
The essential content requirement in the Interim Constitution, therefore, created rather difficult
obstacles of interpretation in the South African context. In the Explanatory Memoranda on the
Draft Bill of Rights, 1569 the difficulties with the "traditional" essential content test is explained:
"[I]t is a test that is not easily loosened from its German moorings and courts are likely to devote too
much of their interpretative energies to ascertaining the meaning of this phrase in German law."
Woolman1570 further indicates that the court was more concerned with circumventing this clause
than in applying it to specific cases:
"That is, the Court has had to find a way to make the limitation clause work without having recourse
to the 'essential content' requirement. The Court has discovered that there is nothing that the essential
content requirement can do that cannot be accomplished by simply tightening the rest of the tests
undertaken during limitation analysis."
Although it is necessary to recognize that there is a core content of most rights that may not be
destroyed by limitation, it is questionable whether the essential content requirement was a useful
component of the South African limitation clause. The requirement of essential content as it was
found in the Interim Constitution was, therefore, omitted from the Final Constitution's limitation
clause.
3.4.4.2. Consequence of excluding the essential content requirement
from the Final Constitution
It is difficult at this stage to assess what implications the omission of the essential content
provision would have in realising the constitutional objectives in general. Should courts interpret
the constitution as a textual unity, there are apparently sufficient checks and balances built into
the constitutional text to compensate for the lack of an essential content clause. Some authors,
however, regarded the exclusion of the essential content clause as unfortunate. 1571 Blaauw-
Wolfl572 explains:
"the principle of proportionality which in a sense 'superseded' the essential-content guarantee in
German constitutional theory, has not been interpreted in a similar manner in South Africa, where it
remains embedded in the norm requiring the essential content of a right to be left intact."
The lacuna created in this manner could too easily be filled by applying a "balancing of
interests" in the sense of weighing and ranking of rights, allowing one right to unconditionally
take precedence over another, and dismissing other rights in the process. This would be
analogous to the doctrine of Giiterabwiigung in German law, which is not generally accepted.
The omission of the essential content requirement could lead to a subjective weighing and
1569 Technical Committee of Theme Committee Four Explanatory Memoranda on the Draft Bill of Rights
(09.10.1995), online at http://www.constitution.org.za/cgi-binlvdkw_ cgi/xb45ff20b-1 0/Search/x2ccdbc/3#HLO
[04.02.2000].
1570 Woolman 1997 SAJHR 106.
1571 Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 105.
1572 Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 205.
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ranking of rights and interests which is not in the interest of legal certainty and methodological
c1arity.1573
De Waal, Currie and Erasmus.P" for example, explains that the limitation test of the Final
Constitution stipulates an investigation into the reasonableness and justifiability in an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality andfreedom of the limitation. This requires
proof that the law in question serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is
sufficient proportionality between the harm done by the law (the infringement of fundamental
rights) and the benefits it is designed to achieve (the purposes of the law).1575 Subsequently, in
the course of discussing one of the factors (more specifically, the nature of the right) to be
identified within the South African version of the proportionality test, the authors remark:
"Some rights weigh more heavily than others. It will therefore more {sic} difficult to justify the
infringement of such rights than other, less weighty rights. '" A right that is of particular importance
to the constitution's ambition to create an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
freedom and equality will carry a great deal of weight in the exercise of balancing rights against
justifications for their infringement."
This distinction can even be undertaken on a more fundamental level. Venter,1576 for instance,
argues that some of the constitutional values are more fundamental than others. In his opinion,
the constitutional value of human dignity is the most fundamental constitutional value (that is to
say the "nuclear value"),1577 whereas equality and freedom, being described as "processes" in
section I(a) FC, cannot be considered as quite on the same level as human dignity. The latter are
therefore "supporting nuclear values".1578 If such an approach is supported, the bill of rights
could be open to the interpretation that rights supporting human dignity rank above all other
rights, even if support of these rights would further the aims of achieving equality and advancing
freedom.
Proponents of this line of thought usually overlook the fact that these values are inextricably
linked to each other and to the fundamental rights depending on them. Their case studies barely
go beyond tbc infringement of the right to life as considered in the Makwanyane case.1S7? Thus
the need for a "symbiotic unison" between, for example, human dignity and equality,1580 and also
the dialectic of freedom and equality - which Du Plessisl581 described as a constructive
157) Such an extension could, however, probably be challenged on the basis that the court would exceed the scope of
its constitutional powers.
1574 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 150 - 159.
1575 150.
1576 Venter" A IIicrarchy of Constitutional Values" in Constitution and Law Seminar Report (1997) 17.
1577 Upon a reading of s I(a) FC and slO Fe.
1578 Venter "Hierarchy" in Constitution and Law Seminar Report (1997) 18.
1579 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus Handbook (1999) 153, 154 - 155, 156, 157, 158.
15S0 This term has been used by Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 7, where it is explained that the working draft text of the
Final Constitution is, like the Interim Constitution, still strongly oriented towards equality. Nevertheless, it is
explained, the text is wary of the interaction necessary between the concepts of human dignity and equality:
"Equality transcends mathematical equations: it needs 'flesh and blood' to breathe a spirit conducive to the
~romotion of whut is peculiarly human."
SRI Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 7. There it is explained that equality is also counterbalanced by freedom, "because it
occurs in a dialectical relationship with freedom in key-provisions 0(' the Bill of Rights" and because the
continued
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interpretative aid to constrain one-sidedness in the interpretation of inherently dualistic
provisions - can be quite easily ignored. It is, therefore, advisable that the directives provided by
Chaskalson pl582in the Makwanyane case itself,1583are followed:
"The fact that different rights have different implications for democracy, and in the case of our
Constitution, for 'an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality,' means that there is
no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and necessity. Principles
can be established, but the application of those principles to particular circumstances can only be
done on a case by case basis. This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the
balancing of different interests."
The court, with the use of the term balancing of interests here probably intended a concept
similar to that of Verháltnismáfiigkeit and not really balancing-by-ranking, as is the case with
Giaerabwiigung. This becomes clear when the court explains: 1584
"In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is
limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; the
purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent
of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the
desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in question.
In the process regard must be had to the provisions of section 33(1), and the underlying values of the
Constitution, bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge has said, 'the role of the Court is not to
second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by legislators'."
The situation that could arise in the context of land reform legislation and governmental reform
policy (where constitutionality of the legislation or administrative action will have to be
determined by weighing up the protection of existing property rights against the socio-economic
rights created in support of security of land tenure, as well as the promotion of land restitution
and redistribution), has not yet been considered against the issue of a ranking of rights.
Nevertheless the compromise between liberty and equality in this context has kept the
negotiators and drafters of the Constitution busy until practically the last moments of the drafting
process.P" Surely here the "hierarchy conception" of constitutional values and fundamental
rights will not be of much help in striking a balance between the rights and freedoms affected.
Moreover, the ranking of fundamental rights could encourage a subjective assessment of
constitutional norms, which would amount to legal uncertainty and thus to a denial of the
constitutional state concept itself.1586
3.4.4.3. Implicit adherence to the essential content requirement?
The importance of the essential content requirement lies in the fact that it is a Schranken-
Schranke, to use the German terminology: No matter how urgent the government's objectives
may be, there is a point beyond which the government may not go in limiting the rights
achievement of equality is made a "fundamental goal on one footing with the advancement of (human) freedoms" in
the working draft text of the Final Constitution.
1582 S v Makwanyane 19953 SA 391 (CC) par 104.
1583 Emphasis added.
1584 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 104.
1585 Cf 44 and 46 supra.
1586 Cf203 supra. Also Blaauw-Wolf 1999 SAPRlPL 205.
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enshrined in the Constitution. The essential content requirement achieves this by focussing on
the detrimental effect of a specific restriction of a fundamental right, rather than on the means
and objectives of the restriction.P'"
Tbe requirement that a limitation should not negate the essential content of a right is undoubtedly
controversial. However, in many of the fundamental rights provisions there is a core element that
cannot be limited without destroying the intended social function of the right.1588 Tbe elimination
of the essential content requirement means that the courts will have to devise another method for
ensuring that the fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution arc not undermined by an
unduly deferential limitation test.1589The crucial question is whether the courts are still under the
Final Constitution compelled to concern themselves with the determination of what the
inviolable core of any given fundamental rights is or should be.
The nature oj the right was one of the limitation factors identified in the Makwanyane case,1590
and later incorporated into the limitations clause of the Final Constitution.F" The Explanatory
Memoranda on the Draft Bill of Righlsl592 suggested an "alternative" essential content test,1593
requiring that the limitation should not be incompatible with the nature oj the right. This
emphasises that the interests of society in the restriction of a right are not the only consideration.
The nature of the rigbt itsel f should also be considered. Complete restriction of a right will never
be compatible with the nature of the right.
Thus, the essential content requirement is, under the Final Constitution, built into the
proportionality inquiry.1594 This would mean that, even in the absence of a stipulation like
section 33( 1)(b) IC, the abolition of property as an institution would be in conflict with the
proportionality principle contained in the limitation clauses of both the Interim and Final
Constirution.P" However, this conclusion is based on the assumption that section 36( 1) FC - and
therewith also the provision as to the nature of the right - applies to the constitutional property
clause. The following paragraphs will indicate that this assumption is also well founded, by
15R'Wooiman 1997SAJHR 106-107.
1588Eg, while many of the provisions of s 25 IC, dealing with the rights of detained, arrested and accused persons,
could be limited where such limitation was according to law and was reasonable and necessary in an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality, the denial of the right of habeas corpus contained in s
25( I)(e) IC would destroy the foundation of s 25 IC and s II(I) IC . The case is similar with s 11(2) IC which
prohibits "torture of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional." While certain methods of lawful police
interrogation and imprisonment might cause mental stress amounting to mental and emotional torture, which might
be justified as a lawful limitation, there must surely be a threshold of mental and physical torture beyond the
protection of a limitation clause and which can never be justified.
1589Woolman 1997 SAJHR 107.
15901995 3 SA 391 (CC).
1591Cf 249 supra.
1592Technical Committee of Theme Committee Four Explanatory Memoranda 011 the Draft Bill oj Rights
(09./0./995). online at http://www.constitution.org.za/cgi-bin/vdkw _cgi/xb45ff20b-1 0/Search/x2ccdbc/3#I ILO
[04.02.2000].
1593The so-called compatibility lest based on art 4 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
1594Cf242 supra.
1595Kleyn 1996 SAPR/PL 433.
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analysing the South African courts' attempts to apply the validity requirements for interferences
with property to a specific case.
3.5. The South African judiciary's attempts to distinguish
between deprivation and expropriation
It seems likely that the South African courts will also, as is the case in so many other
jurisdictions, accept the notion of regulatory expropriation.1596 Such an approach could create
numerous difficulties. Chaskalson 1597 has, for instance, warned that the distinction between
deprivation of property and expropriation could result in a situation where the duty of the state to
compensate expropriations could become such a heavy burden that it could impede land reform.
This is especially important if it is accepted that a "grey area" of regulatory expropriation or
"inverse condemnations" exists between the constructions of deprivation and expropriation.
The effectiveness of the courts' approach will depend on the clarity with which they will be able
to construct and define the category of regulatory expropriations and the consequences of such
actions for the parties involved. For this purpose, the interpretation clause1598 and the limitations
clause1599 would be important. The factors that could playa role in delimiting a category of
regulatory expropriations (like (i) the purpose of the regulation, (ii) the history and social
function of the property involved, (iii) the effect of the regulation on society at large, and so on),
could be identified with reference to the values and considerations underlying these
provisions. 1600
3.5.1. Harksen v Lane NO
An attempt at elucidating the distinction between regulation (deprivation) of property and
expropriation has been made by the South African Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane
NO. 1601 The case involved the vesting of the property of the solvent spouse in the Master in
terms of section 21(1)1602 of the Insolvency Act. It was contended that section 21 of the
Insolvency Act was in conflict with the equality guarantee't'" and the property guarantee'r'" of
1596 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 336.
1597 Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 407 - 408, 411; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 134 - 136.
1598 S 35 IC; s 39 Fe.
1599 S 33 IC; s 36 Fe.
1600 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 336.
1601 1997 Il BCLR 1489 (CC).
1602 S 21(1) of the Insolvency Act: "The additional effect of the sequestration of the separate estate of one of two
spouses who are not living apart under a judicial order of separation shall be to vest in the Master, until a trustee has
been appointed, and, upon the appointment of a trustee, to vest in him all the property (including property or the
proceeds thereof which are in the hands of a sheriff or a messenger under a writ of attachment) of the spouse whose
estate has not been sequestrated (hereinafter referred to as the solvent spouse) as if it were property of the
sequestrated estate, and to empower the Master or trustee to deal with such property accordingly, but subject to the
following provisions of this section." The remaining subsections of s 21 of the Insolvency Act provide for the
interests of the solvent spouse to be safeguarded in certain ways. Property of the solvent spouse may be released by
the trustee in certain circumstances.
1603 S 8 le.
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the Interim Constitution. With regard to the property guarantee in particular, the applicant argued
that section 21(1) of the Insolvency Act constituted an expropriation of the solvent spouse's
property witbout any provision for compensation. The court tbus bad to decide, inter alia,
whether section 21 (I) of the insolvency Act amounted to an expropriation in terms of the interim
Constitution, in which case it would not be justifiable, as the legislation did not provide for
compensation.
In deciding tbat this provision did not amount to an expropriation of property, Goldstone J
pointed out tbat the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property, as it was
described in sections 28(2) and 28(3) IC, has long been recognised in South African law.t605 An
analysis of this issue in other jurisdictions also indicates that this question is not peculiar to the
South African context.t606 On the basis of the authority quoted in this context, the court showed
that the main difference between deprivation and expropriation was the fact that the former does
not require that rights in property must be acquired by a public authority Jar a public purpose,
which characterises the infringement in the latter case.t607 A deprivation of rights in property,
which did not include transjer oj ownership, did in other words not amount to an expropriation.
By this reasoning, the Harksen decision has by no means cleared up the dogmatic confusion that
exists with regard to the distinction between deprivation and expropriation of property. The
court's approach has been criticised for being too restrictive and lacking in sophistication.P'"
Fundamental differences exist between the situation in the Harksen case and the decisions
quoted as authority by the court.t609 Moreover, the distinction between deprivation and
expropriation is more complex. With reference to the Interim Constitution, against which section
21 of the Insolvency Act was tested in the Harksen case, the contrast between sections 28(3) and
(2) IC made it apparent that expropriation had to be distinguished from deprivation of property in
that expropriations were subject to additional requirements not applicable to deprivations. The
Interim Constitution thus guaranteed that no deprivation of (rights in) property would be
permitted otherwise than in accordance with a law. In the case of expropriation, further
requirements had to be met: The expropriation had to be Jar a public purpose and against
payment of compensation. Appropriation by the expropriator, being a public authority is not
mentioned as requirement in the Interim Constitution.
16Q.l S 2H IC.
IItOS As authority for this view, the case of Beckenstrater v Sand River irrigation Board 19644 SA 510 (T) 515A-C
is mentioned by the court.
IMló Par 33 (Zimbabwe): Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1982 I SA 490 (ZSC); Davies v Millister of Lands,
Agriculture and Water Development 1997 1 SA 228 (ZSC); Par 34 (India): HD Vora v State of Maharashtra 1984
AIR 866 SC 869.
1(>07 Par 32; 33; 34.
IC,08 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 338.
160Y Cf Van der Walt & Botha 1998 SAPR/PL 21 - 22 for a discussion of the authority.
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This does not necessarily mean that the court was wrong in finding that section 21 of the
Insolvency Act did not constitute an expropriation. However, Van der Walt1610has summarised
the main problem with the Harksen decision well when remarking that
"The essential issue ... is that the purpose of the vesting of property in the master or trustee in terms of
section 21 of the [Insolvency Act] resembles the logic of a forfeiture or a confiscation of property
more closely than it resembles the logic of an expropriation, and consequently the procedural and
evidential purpose and character of these provisions should have enjoyed more attention."
The reasoning of the court in the Harksen case already indicates that section 21 of the Insolvency
Act has a regulatory, rather than an expropriatory character. Goldstone J explained that the
purpose of section 21 of the Insolvency Act was to enable the master or trustee to ensure, for the
sake of creditors of the insolvent estate, that property belonging to the insolvent estate should not
be transferred unlawfully or fraudulently to the solvent spouse's separate estate. It therefore
places the burden of proof of ownership upon the solvent spouse.1611Thus, this section protects
the public interest by ensuring that property of an insolvent estate is available for fair
distribution, and that property is not fraudulently disguised or withheld.
The eminent legal question in the Harksen case should have been whether the temporary and
preventive vesting of the solvent spouse's property could be regarded as a valid regulation
(deprivation) of the rights in that property;1612 and not whether such a temporary vesting
amounted to an expropriation. This question was never considered, due probably to the
applicant's heads of argument, which did not raise this issue in the course of the proceedings.P"
Instead, the applicant chose to build her attack only upon averments that the vesting amounted to
an expropriation. The Harksen case could have been of considerable importance for restructuring
the South African property law order if only the court had been able to investigate the more
complex question whether the vesting of the solvent spouse's property in the master or trustee
was a regulatory measure intended to protect innocent creditors of the insolvent estate and
whether this regulation was reasonable and justifiable in terms of the general limitation
provisions of the Interim Constitution. 1614
3.5.2. Conjunctive reading, interest-balancing and proportionality
In the following paragraphs, an attempt will be made at briefly explaining the influence that
point of departure of an inquiry into the constitutional validity of an interference with property
has on the outcome of the inquiry. The Harksen case, will be used as example. However, instead
of focussing on the question considered by the court in that case (that is, whether section 21 of
the Insolvency Act constituted expropriation of property which should be compensated), the
analysis will tum on the question whether section 21 of the Insolvency Act represents a
justifiable deprivation of property.
1610 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 338 - 339.
1611 Par 35.
1612 CfVan der Walt & Botha 1998 SAPL 17 - 41.
1613 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clauses (1999) 337.
1614339.
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As has been indicated,I61s the disjunctive reading of section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe stands or
falls with the acceptability of the solution this approach provides to the issue of the reversibility
of a decision that a specific interference with property is constitutional justifiable.1616 A
disjunctive reading of section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe either results in the conclusion that the
proportionality principle contained in section 36 Fe is not at all applicable to the constitutional
property clause, or that section 36 Fe provides the parties with another change, in the form of an
additional "third stage" of the inquiry, to contest (or support) the justifiability of a specific
interference with property. Van der Walt1617 argues that these solutions are logically untenable:
"The problem is that the general limitation provisions in section 36 cannot and should not be regarded
as a kind of default, add-on test that complements the specific limitation test in section 25 - the
relationship between the two should be a much more integrated one."
An analysis of the question which should have been raised in the Harksen case (that is to say,
whether section 21 of the Insolvency Act constitutes a justifiable deprivation of property) from a
disjunctive reading of section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe indicates that it would be improbable to
effect a reversal of a decision regarding the (in)validity of an interference with property. It
should not be difficult to recognise that a deprivation of propert that is not in terms of a law of
general application as required by section 25(1) Fe would also not pass the test of section 36(1)
Fe, as the same requirement appears in the latter provision.1618 For present purposes, it is more
interesting to determine how the requirement of non-arbitrariness in section 25( I) Fe can be
distinguished from the proportionality test of section 36( 1) Fe. Both an inquiry into the
compliance with the requirement of non-arbitrariness and an analysis of the proportionality of
the interference with property brought about by section 21 of the Insolvency Act depends on a
process of interest-balancing:
(i) First, the interference brought about by section 21 of the Insolvency Act would comply
with the requirement of non-arbitrariness as set in section 25( I) Fe in that (i) there is a reason
justifiying the interference; (ii) there is a rational connection between the interference and the
purpose, and (iii) there arc certain procedural safeguards in favour of the person whose
proprietary interests had been infringed. In the case of Harksen. there would be a rational
connection between the interference (that is, the temporary attachment of the assets of the
solvent spouse) and the purpose of the interference (the need to establish an inventory of assets
belonging to the insolvent spouse). The reason for the interference establishes the rational
connection between interference and purpose: the need to avoid the situation in whicb tbe claims
of creditors in liquidation proceedings are paralysed because of the indeterminability of the
assets of the insolvent person. Here, the broader public interest (in the sense of the interests of
the creditors and other stakeholders) would seem to overshadow the interests of the individual
(in this case the solvent spouse whose assets are temporarily attached). Moreover, through
certain procedural safeguards (namely, the solvent spouse's opportunity to prove ownership of
1615 Cf the discussions at 65 ct seq, 76 el seq, 187 et seq supra.
1616 Van der Walt 1997 SAPR/PL 326 et seq provides a good overview.
1617326 - 327.
161M Cf218 el seq supra.
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the temporarily attached assets in order to win them back) the interests of the individual enjoy
the most optimal protection that can be afforded to him or her in view of the circumstances of the
case and the importance of the interests of the public at large. In answering the question as to
compliance with the requirement of non-arbitrariness, the interests of the public at large and the
individual seemingly form part of the inquiry. However, it is important to note that an outright
"balancing of interests" is not at the order of the day. Much rather, the interest-balancing that
does take place this early in the inquiry, is a "subconscious" result of a consideration of the
reason for the interference, the rational connection between the interference and its purpose, and
the procedural safeguards that exist.
(ii) On another level, section 21 of the Insolvency Act would also have passed the scrutiny
of the proportionality test (as codified in section 36(I)Fe) upon more-or-Iess the same
considerations as those which indicate compliance with the non-arbitrariness requirement of
section 25( 1) Fe as discussed above. When the "true" proportionality of a specific interference is
brought into play, and section 21 of the Insolvency Act must be found to be reasonable and
justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on human dignity, freedom and equality,
with adherence to the factors listed in section 36(1)(a) to (e) Fe, the balancing process is
apparently more outright, or less "subconscious". As such, it could also be more enticing to
resort to a second-guessing of the wisdom of policy choices made by the legislature. Section 25
Fe, with its specific requirements for the constitutional validity of an interference with property,
therefore gives effect to the proportionality test of section 36 Fe in the context of the
constitutional property guarantee.
Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis above. For one, it should indicate that a
reversal of a finding as to the constitutional validity of an interference with property cannot be
effected by a disjunctive reading of section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe. Instead, it is evident that
there is a relationship of some sorts between section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe, which can never
be ignored. In general, it can be said that a conjunctive reading of the general limitations clause
of section 36 Fe and the specific limitation provisions within section 25 Fe specifies and
confirms the application of the proportionality test in the context of the constitutional property
clause. It also indicates that the point of departure should not be that something "less than
property" is protected from the outset.1619 However, it is submitted that the relationship between
section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe is not static. The mere presence of the interest-balancing
procedure, regardless of whether it takes place consciously or subconsciously, introduces an
element of flexibility in the process of determining the constitutional validity of an interference
with property. This is what the "application of ... principles to particular circumstances ... on a
case by case basis" 1620 is all about.
In short, therefore, an approach to the issue in the Harksen case which would have taken notice
of the need for a balancing of interests on a case to case basis, and which would have combined
this awareness with a conjunctive reading of section 25 Fe and section 36 Fe, would have
1619 Cfthe discussion at 65 et seq, 76 et seq supra.
1620 Chaskalson, P in S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) par 104. Cf also 244 supra.
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4. Limitation through "horizontal" application:
the conflicting rights of private persons
resulted in a finding correcting the argument regarding the arbitrariness of the provision1621 and
coupling the reasoning with the principle of proportionality. This process would also have
illustrated that the balancing of interests can operate on different levels. This could, in particular,
have influenced the manner in which the operation of the property clause on a horizontal level -
in the resolution of the conflicting rights of private persons - could be perceived.
Bills of Rights arc usually regarded as having the primary function of protecting the rights of
individuals against the state, in other words, having vertical operation only. The constitutional
property clauses in Germany and in South Africa are also constructed so as to address the
vertical operation of these guarantees. Legislative and administrative interference with and
regulation of property would be controlled by these provisions. So, too, would expropriation.
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Fundamental rights can, however, also operate horizontally when they affect legal relationships
between individuals. In Germany, this is the so-called Driltwirkung of fundamental rights on
private relations. A distinction is usually drawn between direct and indirect horizontal operation:
Indirect horizontality refers to the influence of the values projected through a bill of rights on
statutory interpretation and the development of the law. This includes the private law, where the
relations between private parties are regulated. Direct horizontality refers to a situation where the
bill of rights would be the immediate and direct source of one individual's right against another.
Indirect horizontal operation of fundamental rights is referred to in German constitutional law as
"mille/bare Drittwirkung'' and direct horizontal operation as "unmittelbare Driltwirkung. "
Both in Germany and in South Africa, the general issues arising from horizontality can rightly be
described as "subtle and ... the subject of considerable debate.,,1622 However, within the general
discussion, the operation of the constitutional property guarantees in the relations between
private parties inter se is generally afforded no more than a cursory reference in legal writing,
not only in Germany, but also in South Africa. In the following paragraphs, an attempt will be
made at providing an overview of the issue of horizontal operation with regard to the
constitutional property guarantee, without addressing the general issues, which gave rise to so
many disputes already.
4.1. German "Drittwirkung" and the property clause
Article I III GG determines that the basic rights in the German constitution "shall bind the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law." Since a similar provision
is not found in respect of private persons, many authors concluded that, in general, the Basic
Law does not explicitly support direct horizontal operation of the basic rights. The wording of
1621 Cf223 ct seq supra.
1622 As per Kcntridge J, /)" Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (5) UCLR 658 (CC); 1996 (3) SA 850
(CC) par41.
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certain provisions may point to a direct operation of the basic rights provisions on private
law,1623but these are exceptional cases. The Federal Constitutional Court1624and most authors
are of the opinion that the fundamental rights in the German Basic Law operate with indirect
horizontality.l'r" This means that basic rights do not solve disputes in the field of private law in
specific cases, but operate as an objective value system, thus "influencing" the relations in
private law. The Federal Constitutional Court refers to the "radiating effect"
(Ausstrahlungswirkung) of the basic rights on private law,1626and remarks: 1627
"The influence of the scale of values of the basic rights affects particularly those provisions of private
law that contain mandatory rules of law and thus form part of the ordre public - in the broad sense of
the term - that is, rules which for reasons of the general welfare also are binding on private legal
relationships and are removed from the domination of private intent. Because of their purpose these
provisions are closely related to the public law they supplement. Consequently, they are substantially
exposed to the influence of constitutional law. In bringing this influence to bear, the courts may
invoke the general clauses which, like Article 826 of the Civil Code, refer to standards outside private
law. "Good morals" is one such standard. In order to determine what is required by social norms such
as these, one has to consider first the ensemble of value concepts that a nation has developed at a
certain point in its intellectual history and laid down in its constitution. That is why the general
clauses have rightly been called the points where basic rights have breached the [domain of] private
law ..."
The "radiating effect" of the basic rights therefore means that, in interpreting concepts such as
"justified," "wrongful," or "contra bonos mores" in the course of private litigation, the German
courts have to take the basic rights into account.1628The basic rights therefore have a "radiating
effect" on the private law through provisions such as paragraph 138 BGB, which provides that
legal acts which are "contrary to public policy" are void.1629The basic rights can, similarly, be
applied to other rules of private law where the meaning is unc1ear.1630Through indirect
horizontal application, the whole body of existing law in German is subject to cautious reform
within its own framework.
1623 Eg art 9 III 2 GG, where the right to form associations "in order to safeguard and improve working and
economic conditions" is guaranteed and where it is provided that agreements restricting or intended to hamper the
exercise of this right shall be null and void; and measures to achieve such an end shall be illegal.
BVerfGE 73, 261269. Cffurther art 20 IV GG and art 38 I GG read with 48 II GG. These provisions are not Basic
Rights in the formal sense, but they are regarded as "quasi-fundamental rights" (grundrechtsg/eiche Rechte) in terms
of art 93 I 4a GG.
1624 BVerfGE 7, 198 (Liith); BVerfGE 30, 173 (Mephisto); BVerfGE 42,143.
1625 Cf eg Von Mtïnch/Kunig Grundgesetz-Kommentar 1(1992) Vorb Art 1-19 mn 31; JarasslPieroth Grundgesetz
fur die Bundesrepub/ik Deutsch/and (1995) 3rd ed Art I mn 22, 24; Hesse Grundziige (1993) 19th ed mn 355
BVerfGE 7, 198203 - 207; BVerfGE 7,230233 et seq; BVerfGE 42, 143 148.
1626 BVerfGE 7,198 (Luth) 207.
1627 Transl by Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 363 - 364.
1628 PierothiSchlink Grundrechte, Staatsrecht //(1994) 51 mn 193.
1629 BVerfGE 73, 261 269. Cffurther eg par 157 BGB, par 242 BGB and par 826 BGB.
1630 BVerfGE 7, 198 206 et seq; BVerfGE 34, 269 280; BVerfGE 54, 117 124. Cf further BVerfGE 89, 214 for an
example of the application of the "general" provisions of par 138 BGB as well as par 242 BGB (which obliges the
debtor to perform in good faith) as a medium through which indirectly to apply art 2 I GG (guaranteeing a person's
private autonomy) to a contract of suretyship. The court struck down the suretyship, in which the surety had
undertaken an exceptionally high risk without obtaining any benefit in the credit supplied, because the bank had
failed to inform the surety about the nature and scope of her obligations, thus violating the principle of contractual
equality.
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In the German context, the importance of the institutional guarantee'S" of property explains the
"radiating effect" of the constitutional guarantee of property best.1632 When legislature
determines the content and limits of property in the course of exercising its capacity in terms of
article 14 I 2 GG, it is compelled to take the institution of property into account. The same is
expected of the adminstration and judiciary in the exercise of their functions.
The principles pertaining to indirect horizontal operation of the property guarantee can be
"translated" into the property context with reference to the protection of landlords and tenants
under the Basic Law. The concept of property in the constitutional context is arguably wide
enough to include personal rights like those created in a contract of lease. Consequently, this
could mean that the constitutional guarantee of property has to be taken into account by
legislature, administration or judiciary with regard to all parties involved in a specific legal
relationship like that of landlord and tenant. For instance, if the rights of the landlord and tenant
of a speci fic apartment come into conflict,1633 the constitutional guarantee of property requires
that the interests of both parties should be carefully balanced. A is the owner of a semi-detached,
double storey house, of which she has leased the top storey to B. However, A is old and ill, and
terminates the contract of lease with B on the basis that she wants her son, C, to live close by in
order to take care of her as she becomes more dependent on help. C lives in the other half of the
semi-detached house. B refuses to acknowledge the termination of the contract of lease, on tbe
basis that it constitutes an unlawful infringement on his right in tcnns of article 14 GG.
The fact that the possessory right of the lessee falls within the protective ambit of article 14
GG,1634 does not lead to the conclusion that article 14 GG is directly applicable to the relation
between lessor and lessee.1635 The function of article 14 GG in the relation between lessor and
lessee is to compel the legislature, courts and administration to takc the interests of both parties
into account and balance them, objectively speaking, in a suitable manner.1636 The function of
the property guarantee in securing tbc freedom of individuals in such a case should work both
ways. It should acknowledge the interest of the lessee in the retention of the apartment as a
method of securing his or her existence, but it should also acknowledge the interest of the
landlord in using the apartment for purposes of advancing his or her self-esteem. These
compcting interests should be balanced in view of the indirect horizontal operation of art 14 GG.
In this regard, the Federal Constitutional Court has made the constitutional justifiability of
termination of the contract of lease dependent on whether the lessor/owner can furnish
acceptable reasons for such a termination of the contract.1637 The court thus accepted that the
1631 Cf 57 ct seq supra.
1632 Wieland "Artikel 14" in Dreier (cd) Kommen/ar I (1996) mn 149.
1633 Example taken from the facts of BVerfGE 89, I 8 et seq.
1634 Cf 160 supra.
1635 BVerfGE 89, I 5. "Sie erhebt ... den Mieterschutz nic/II ZII einer subjektiven Grundrechtsverbtirgung", Cf also
BVerfGE 21, 73 83; I3VerfGE 80,137 150.
1636 BVerfGE 89, I 5. Cfatso OVerfGE 37, 132 140 et seq.
1637 BVerfGE 89, I 10. "Soweit nach einfeehem Reelit die Belange des Vermie/ers darauf ZII priifen sind, ob sie
einen ernsthaften. verniinftigen IIl1dnachvollziehbaren Erlangungswunsch ergeben. kann der Mie/er beanspruchen,
doft das Gericht hiergegen gerichteten Einwanden ill einer Weise nachgeht, die der Bedeutung und Tragweite seines
continued
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reasons for termination of the lease advanced by the lessor/owner in the above-mentioned
example, namely use by a relative in exchange for rendering much-needed health care to the
lessor/owner, would be sufficient justification for termination of the contract of lease.1638
Schwabe1639supports the theory that the courts (as state organs)1640are directly bound by the bill
of rights in civil cases. He argues that article 14 III GG would also be applicable to the case
where one individual is empowered, through statute or codified law, to interfere with the
property right of another or to withdraw such a right. The provisions in the Civil Code dealing
with infringement of property rights in self-defence or due to the creation of a way of necessity
are mentioned as examples.P" More specifically, he relies on the Feldmiihle case1642as an
example of where article 14 III GG with an expanded interpretation should also have found
application. This case involved the reorganisation of a company, by allowing shareholders
owning more than three-fourths of the capital stock of a joint-stock company to convert the
company, in spite of the objection of minority stockholders who were completely excluded from
the decision. The minority stockholder contested the validity of the statute1643that authorised the
conversion,
In deciding the issue, the court reasoned'F" that it is logical that legislature is, in all cases of
determination of the contents and limits of property, compelled to take the "grundlegenden
Wertentscheidungen des GG zugunsten des Privateigentums im herkëmmlichen Sinne,,1645into
account. Furthermore, legislation has to be in accordance with all the constitutional values (in
particular the value of equality and the principles of the constitutional and social welfare state)
and also has to consider the basic right to individual freedom and autonomy.1646 In this case, it
was decided that the legislature acted in the general interest by fostering the creation of larger
business enterprises and that the three-fourths conversion rule was not manifestly out of
proportion to the prejudiced caused by the encroachment on the proprietary interests of minority
shareholders. 1647
The argument of Schwabe is, however, that this (justifiable) legislative interference with
property, and the private law limitation of the owners' rights, create the possibility for further
indirect infringement (or even "expropriation" in a material sense) by individuals (like, in the
Feldmiihle case, the majority of the shareholders). According to this argument, the courts should
apply the requirements of expropriation in terms of article 14 III GG - in particular the
Bestandsinteresses gerecht wird, also Beispielsweise nachpriift, ob der Selbstnutzungswunsch ernsthaft verfolgt
wird ... "
1638 BVerfGE 89, 1.
1639 Schwabe Die sogenannte Drittwirkung (1971) 118 - 139.
1640 In terms of art 1 III GG.
1641 Par 904 BGB; par 917 BGB.
1642 BVerfGE 14,263.
1643 Par 15, Umwandlungsgesetz.
1644278.
1645 Translation: "fundamental value decisions incorporated into the Basic Law, in favour of private ownership in its
ordinary sense".
1646 "Grundrecht auffreie Entfaltung der Persiinlichkeit."
1647277.
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requirement that the expropriation should be in the public interest - to test the justifiability of the
limitation. It is submitted that this reasoning results in a circular argument. Almost every
justifiable legislative interference with the content and limits of property which is "approved" by
the court could have the effect of curtailing the rights of a holder, for the sake of either
expanding the rights of other right holders (like neighbours, in terms of the Civil Code)I648 or of
empowering other individuals (like the public in general, in terms ofa public right of way).
4.2. Horizontality and the property clause in the South African context
In Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another, 1649the majority of the Constitutional Court
held that the bill of rights in the Interim Constitution did not operate directly between relations
on a horizontal level. The Interim Constitution was to be applied between relations on the
vertical level and only indirectly on a horizontal level. However, the arguments of the majority in
favour of indirect horizontal operation1650 could not appease fears concerning the "privatisation"
of apartheid and the socio-economic benefits unjustly gained thereunder.1651 Therefore, some of
the new provisions in the Final Constitution give the bill of rights in general a direct horizontal
effect,1652 within the limits set by these provisions themselves.
Section 8( 1) FC determines that the bill of rights "applies to aI/law and binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary and all other organs of state.,,1653 AI/ law most probably encompasses
common-law disputes between private parties, which indicates direct operation of the bill of
rights. Should it happen that a legal dispute is not covered by subjecting all law to the bill of
rights, then subjecting all judicial actions to constitutional review should fill the gap. 1654
Section 8(3) FC1655should be read as a reminder that rules of common law are subject to direct
constitutional review. This means that, where no express rule of common law exists to cover a
private or public relationship, a rule must be formulated if necessary to give effect to the bill of
rights; and that rules of common law can have their constitutionality tested in terms of the
limitations clause.1656 This interpretation is underscored by section 39(2) FC, which provides:
"When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law and customary law, every
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights."
11H8 Eg par 912 BGB.
1649 Du Plessis and Others I'De Klerk and Another 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (eC).
16~ It was pointed out in Du Plessis v De Klerk, par 103 - 105, with particular reference to the German
jurisprudence, that the "radiating effect" of the indirect horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights on the common law
would adequately address any legitimate fears concerning the privausing of apartheid. Cf also the comments of the
majority on the unsatisfactory jurisprudential features of direct horizontal operation, par 37 - 41, 106 - 112.
1651 Cf Kriegler J, Du Plessis II De Klerk 19965 BCLR 658 (CC) par 120.
1652 Cf Protea Technology Ltd II Wainer 1997 9 BeLR 1225 (W) 1238.
1653 Emphasis added.
1654 Woolman "Application"in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (cds) Constitutional Law (1996) ch 10,57.
1655 Section 8(3) Fe: "When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of
subsection (2), a COurt- (a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or where necessary develop, the
common law to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and (b) may develop rules of the
common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1)."
1650 Woolman "Application"in Chaskalson, Kcntridge, Klaaren ct al (cds) Constitutional Law (1996) ch 10,60.
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This section asserts that there is a core set of values underlying the South African legal system.
Therefore, all law - also the common law - is, in terms of these provisions, subject to direct
constitutional scrutiny. This further also applies to the conduct of juristic persons and natural
persons, where appropriate. Where neither existing statutory law nor existing common law
provides the causes of action or remedies needed in a particular instance to vindicate the new
fundamental rights, the bill of rights directs the courts to create new causes of action and
remedies necessary to protect and promote fundamental rights. 1657
Section 8(2) FC1658 could, however, pose an interpretative problem. This provision could be read
as meaning that a right would apply to a natural person or a juristic person unless the right makes
expressly clear that only certain kinds of relationships are destined for constitutional protection.
This could mean that (certain aspects of) the property clause would preclude application to
private relationships ungoverned by any express rule of law. The property clause contains
provisions that limit the ambit of the guarantee to the relation between the individual and the
state. However, it could also, upon an interpretation of section 8(2) FC read with section 25 FC,
be decided that the latter is excluded from the outset from application to all private relationships,
making it only vertically operational.F" It is submitted that the former possibility is the more
acceptable interpretation of section 8(2) FC. Although it is true that some of the provisions in
section 25 FC can be more easily applied to relations on the vertical level than on the horizonal
level, it is submitted that the right to property also plays a significant role in the relations
between private individuals.
Ackermann.P'" in analysing the impact of the constitutional value of human dignity on the
equality provisions in the Final Constitution, explains that
"[i]n developing the common law generally and in developing it to limit the right to horizontal
equality, it would seem that the courts are in effect being enjoined to conduct a proportionality
analysis and evaluation in the process of balancing what is in essence a clash of rights between
different persons. A clash between, on the one hand, the right to equality and non-discrimination and,
on the other, the rights to freedom (in its various forms), privacy, property (and possibly others), or
combinations of such rights."
In operating on a horizontal level, the right to property can, hypothetically, be invoked in the
following circumstances:
(i) The rules of a sectional title scheme could contain exclusions on the basis of race,
gender, sexual orientation, ethnic or social origin, age, religion, conscience or belief, an so
on.1661 Thus, it might be impossible for a cohabiting couple, or a couple with children, or
someone under a specific age, or a black person, or a homosexual, to buy a unit in a specific
1657 Ch 10,56.
1658 Section 8(2) FC: "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it
is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right."
1659 Woolman "Application" in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 10,58 - 60.
1660 Ackermann "Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity" Unpublished Paper (2000) 22.
1661 CfVan der Merwe, Mohr & Blumberg 2000 Stell LR 167 - 180 for a more extensive discussion of restrictions in
the rules of sectional title schemes and their compatability with the chapter on fundamental rights in the Final
Constitution.
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scheme, because the present owners are prohibited in the rules from selling to certain categories
of persons, or are restricted to sell only to specific categories. 1662In cases like these, the rights
and duties attached to a specific kind of property (sectional title ownership) and freedom of
contract would have to be balanced against the values of human dignity and the right not to be
unfairly discriminated against.I663 The relevant circumstances and impact, if evaluated in
accordance with established jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on vertical equality in
relation to dignity, suggests that, depending on the nature thereof, restrictive conditions in the
rules ought to be declared void and the transfer interdicted.1664
(ii) Q, a widow, rather capriciously, but in her sound and sober senses, makes a will
leaving her entire estate to a friend she has not seen for years and who has no 'financial oeed. Her
children, who had been the beneficiaries in all previous wills of Q, contest the will.1665In this
example one is concerned with a clash between, on the one hand, the capacity to dispose freely
of one's property and freedom of testation and, on the other, the right to equality. Ackermann
remarks: 1666
"A court would have to consider how important the first mentioned rights are and how serious a
limitation of these rights the enforcement of horizontal equality would cause; in particular how serious
the impact on the testator's dignity would be. In considering the position of the complainants, the
impact on their dignity of the testamentary provisions would have to be assessed and, in particular, the
extent to which it can be said to be in [the] public [interest]."
Both the abovementioned examples depend on an application of the constitutional principle of
equality (in its relation to human dignity) to private relations. Mostly, they would also require
judicial interpretation of private law concepts, like freedom of testation, or freedom of contract,
in which case private law is developed by constitutional law jurisprudence. The private law
concept of ownership would, in this regard, be a target of constitutional reform when evaluated
against the constitutional values of human dignity, equality and individual freedom. Through
horizontal operation of the bill of rights, the private law concept of ownership is bound to be
influenced by the spirit, purport and objectives of the constitution, most noticeably that of "social
justice" and "quality of lire," but also that of individual "free potential".1667 This could occur
even though the constitutional protection of property itself is not invoked during the proceedings.
Woolman 16611mentions a further example in the context of horizontal application of socio-
economic rights:
1662 Ackermann "Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity" Unpublished Paper (2000)
23.[n Shelley \I Kraemer 334 US 1 (1948), the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgments of
state courts enforcing a racist restrictive covenant. While the result of the decision is universally applauded, the
reasons for the decision of the Supreme Court have given rise to academic debate. Cf Wechsler 1959 Harv L Rev I;
Henkin 1961 UI/iv Pa L Rev 637; Henkin 1962 UIIiI'Pa L Rev 473; Greenawalt 1978 Colum L Rev 982.
1663 Ackermann "Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity" Unpublished Paper (2000) 23.
1664 Van der Merwe, Mohr & Blumberg 2000 Steil LR 167 - 180.
1665 Ackermann "Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity" Unpublished Paper (2000) 25.
166625,
1667 Cf Preamble, FC.
1668 Woolman "Application"in Chaskalson, Kentridge, Klaaren et al (cds) Constitutional Law (1996) eh 10, 59 refers
to a discussion with Prof Frank Michelman, in the course of which this issue came up.
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(iii) A non-governmental organisation committed to providing adequate, affordable
housing to poor people in South Africa, attempts to lease a large unused piece of land on the
outskirts of a big city from the landowner. The landowner refuses, saying that he would prefer
the land to lie fallow rather than to put it to any particular use, whether profitable or not. The
NGO proceeds with judicial action against the landowner on the basis of the provision for access
to housing in s 26 FC. It is reasoned that this provision, in view of the "spirit, purport and
objects" of the bill of rights operates directly against the landowner and that it trumps the latter's
right in terms of common law to dispose of his property as he wishes. The landowner could, of
course, counter this argument by relying on the protection of the property guarantee, which
would then require direct horizontal application. In such a case, the court would once again have
to consider the importance of these rights weighed against the severity of the limitations thereon,
caused by applying the bill of rights horizontally.
Accepting a hierarchy of rights in this regard would, in my submission, not be appropriate. The
provisions in a bill of rights do not provide an unassailable basis for solving disputes between
"equal" parties. Like in cases where the infringement of constitutionally protected rights by the
state must be tested, it would be inappropriate to introduce weighing and ranking of rights in this
context.1669 Instead, one should endeavour to "harmonise" or "optimise" both (or all of) the
conflicting rights, thereby achieving a relative equilibrium or "practical concordance" as is the
case in German law.167o However, the same results could, in most cases, be achieved by applying
concepts from private law and techniques that have up to now been used to resolve disputes
between "equal" parties. The most appropriate role of the bill of rights in this context would be to
correct possible imbalances in the relation between the parties in an attempt to level their
respective positions, in order to place them on an equal footing in the true sense of the word.
5. Effect of constitutional limitations on the existing property order
In keeping with the basic division between the functions of private and constitutional law, one must
distinguish between legislative limitations on movable and immovable property, on the one hand,
and constitutional limitations on property (whether movable or immovablej'P" on the other hand.
The latter category oflimitations is relatively new in the South-African context, being a result of the
inclusion of the property guarantees in the first two enforceable Bills of Rights in the Interim and
Final Constitutions. However, since the Constitution in the new democratic order ranks higher than
other "ordinary" legislation, these constitutional limitations on property are also of supreme
importance for the whole system of property law in South Africa. On the one hand, the
constitutional provisions determine which ordinary legislative limitations are justifiable in terms of
the property guarantee. On the other hand, the constitutional provisions give rise to a whole new
body of legislation influencing the existing landownership in particular.
1669 Cf 201 supra.
1670 Cf 182 supra. Cf also Rautenbach General Provisions (1995) 79, where both methods of "balancing" are
discussed.
1671 Section 25(4)(b) FC makes provision for the protection of (and limitations on) property of land or otherwise by
expressly stating that for the purposes of section 25 FC , property is not limited to land.
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Divergent methods are used in South Africa and Germany for determining justifiable
constitutional limitations on property. Nevertheless, the effect of limitation in both systems is
quite similar. Fundamental rights are limited individually within the respective provisions
establishing the different basic rights in the German Basic Law. By contrast, both the Interim
Constitution and the Final Constitution of South Africa contain general limitation c1auses.1672
These provisions apply to the same extent to the limitation of all rights included in the South
African bill of rights. However, internal modifying components and specific limitation clauses
included in many of the specific fundamental rights' guarantees of the South African Final
Constitution result in a slight differentiation in the limitation of the various fundamental rights,
according to the unique provisions in which they are framed.
Further; both in private and in constitutional law the scope of property rights are restricted, albeit
on different levels. From a private law perspective, property rights are restricted on a
"horizontal" level by the rights and interests of third parties. From a constitutional perspective,
the scope of a person's property rights is determined by considering limitations in the public
interest; that is, on a vertical level vis-á-vis the state authority. On both these levels restrictions
can cause serious inroads in individual property rights, sometimes to the extent of withdrawing
such rights completely. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the relevance of
limitations in the public interest for private autonomy in property law.
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5.1. Limitations, private autonomy and public interest
The first question to be considered is the extent to which individual interests should yield to public
purpose (that is to say to what extent legislative actions taken for the sake of public benefit can
override individual sovereignty with regard to property). Some of the areas where individual
freedom with regard to property might, under specific circumstances, bave to recede for the public
benefit are: zoning and planning laws, pollution control, nature conservation and the protection of
historic sites. The legislation1673 arising from the commitment in section 25 FC to equitable access
to land, legally protected land tenure, restitution of property and land reform1674 should also be
analysed against the provisions governing the interpretation of public interest (section 25(2)(a) FC
read with section 25(4)(a) FC). Where land is to be expropriated from some individuals in order to
provide land for housing or agricultural purposes to other individuals, the land reform programme
could stand or fall by the interpretation of the public purposes I public interest requirement. Public
purpose or public interest should not be understood to denote that private property could in no
circumstance be expropriated to further housing for the disadvantaged. This would render
effective land reform programmes impossible.
1672 S 33 IC; s 36 FC.
1673 Section 25(9) FC specifically provides for such legislation.
1614 In particular s 25 (5), (6), (7) and (8) FC.
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It is, furthermore, necessary to determine to what extent a public interest / public purpose
qualification must be applied to the deprivation provision in section 25( 1) FC.1675 The
deprivation provision of section 28(2) IC read with section 33 IC covered all legitimate state
interference with private rights in property. Similar provisions are found in section 25(1) FC and
section 36 FC. However, it is not provided that deprivations of property should be in the public
interest or for public purposes. A deprivation of property simply has to comply with the due-
process principle,1676 and it must be authorised by a law that applies generally. It should also be
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality, and
it should arguably not destroy the essence of the right to private property .1677
Van der Walt1678suggests that the public purpose / public interest requirement should be "read
into" section 25(1) FC for purposes of regulation of property in the wide sense. This view is
based on the fact that section 36(1) FC applies to the property clause, and is wide enough to be
regarded as an "extended" public purposes / public interest requirement. If the courts follow this
approach, even more reason exist for comparing the German and South African applications of
the public interest / public purposes requirement.P"
The German Basic Law uses the term "Wohle der Allgemeinheit" to express a requirement similar
to the public interest / public purposes requirement in the South African property clause. The role of
these requirements within the property clauses of Germany and South Africa also correspond to
some extent. It qualifies the limits for expropriation and determines an equitable amount of
compensation. However, in the German context the requirement of "Wohle der Allgemeinheit"
serves two different purposes. In the case of expropriation, it is supposed to limit the number of
expropriations to the minimum, in order to protect individual interests.1680 In the case of
determining the amount of compensation'P" it is meant to protect the public interest as SUCh.1682
This requires that the interpretation of the requirement varies, depending on the function it fulfils in
a specific case.
If this reasoning is applied to the South African context, it would mean that in case of expropriation,
the term public interest / public purposes must be interpreted restrictively, so as to give effect to the
interests of individuals affected by the conduct of the state. An expropriation might be in the public
interest, but might not constitute a public "necessity." Accordingly, expropriation would sometimes
not be justifiable. In the case of compensation, a wider interpretation of the term public interest /
1675 Cf the discussion with reference to the application of the public interest / public purposes requirement in the
context of expropriations at 228 et seq supra.
1676 It is stated, in both the Interim and Final Constitutions that deprivation of property rights can only take place if it
is in accordance with a law of general application. This must be read in conjunction with the administrative justice
clauses of both these Constitutions: s 24 IC, s 33 FC.
1677 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction (1996) 421.
1678 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 137.
1679 Cf 208 et seq supra.
1680 Cf Bëhmer J's minority decision in BVerfGE 56, 249.
1681 And in the case of determining the justifiability of legislative regulation of property, if the approach of Van der
Walt (n 1678 supra) is endorsed for the South African context.
1682 Cf Bëhmer J's minority decision in BVerfGE 56, 249.
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public purposes can be used.1683 If, however, expropriation for the benefit of private individuals
were justifiable, the interpretation of the public interest I public purposes would also have to be
adapted. In such a case, a wider interpretation of public interest / public purposes should also be
followed in the context of expropriation, for the sake of giving effect to the land reform policies.
This approach would tune in with the suggestion above1684 that the importance of constitutionally
protecting and restricting a specific proprietary interest can be measured through a balancing of the
conflicting interests in a specific case against the background of the constitutional and social state
principles. This would enable a consideration of the different interests at stake without resorting to
weighing and ranking of interests, and without forcing a malapplication of the proportionality test
too early in the investigation as to the constitutional validity ofa specific interference with property.
5.2. Limitations and horizontal operation of the Bill of Rights
Jn both Germany and South Africa, two basic categories of limitations arc justifiable on a
vertical level: expropriation and regulation of property. On a horizontal level of limitation,
however, considerable differences exist. In Germany the provisions of the various basic rights
apply only indirectly to all relations between individuals. In South Africa, the bill of rights has
been made directly horizontally applicable in the Final Constitution. Nevertheless, the primary
function of horizontal application, whether applied directly or indirectly, is to create interaction
between the protection of property in private and constitutional law. This enables the judiciary to
correct imbalances that might exist in the relations between those who are perceived to be
"equal" in terms of private law.
Especialy in the context of the constitutional property guarantee, however, direct horizontal
application can be problematic. It raises the issue of how far existing mechanisms in private law
could and should be used to solve problems lying essentially in the private law sphere. The
proliferation of claims based on the right to property could be devastating in view of the
expanded concept of property under the constitution. Moreover, direct application of the
provisions of the bill of rights may result in a situation where well refined private law principles,
developed over a long time and based upon fairness in the private law context, are deviated from
in favour of the vague and general norms of the bill of rights. Considerations of legal certainty
militate against such a result.1685 Of course, in situations where the traditional private law
remedies afford the parties to a dispute no relief, the direct horizontal application of the bill of
rights could fill the gap. Moreover, if the values underlying the constitutional order cannot be
given effect by interpreting or applying ordinary law with due regard to the spirit, purport and
objects of the bill of rights, direct horizontal application becomes necessary.
l(lg) Van del' Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 138.
)68" Cf 247 ct seq supra.
)I,HS De Waal 1995 SA/UR 14.
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5.3. Land reform and restitution as limitation in the public interest
Du Plessisl686 indicates that, in a society like that of South Africa, the limitation of the right to
property under the constitution is imperative:
"To guarantee property in a Constitution which commits a nation to the achievement of equality as
well as the promotion and protection of human dignity, is quite significant. If such guarantee has to
serve the accomplishment of these laudable objectives, it should be seen to include empowerment to
gain access to property as well as to redress inequities, especially the dispossession of large numbers
of people under apartheid. Measures aimed at the restitution of property, therefore, do not constitute
"exceptions to" the guarantee of property, but follow as its natural consequences."
The first steps towards transforming the South African concept of landownership have been taken
through new land-use policies and programmes and innovative legislative reforms.1687 In section
25(4) FC, land reform and equitable access to natural resources are explicitly mentioned as
public purposes for the sake of expropriation in section 25(4) FC. This indicates that land reform
and redistribution are sufficiently important to make regulation and expropriation of property for
those purposes possible, even if existing property relations - and therewith also privileges built
on apartheid - are protected through an individual property guarantee.1688 The drafting history of
the constitutional property clause and the tendency of the courts to prefer a purposive
interpretation of the constitutional provisions suggest that the objectives of land reform,
redistribution and restitution need not even be explicitly mentioned in the constitutional text in
order to interpret them as elements of the public interest / public purposes requirement.
The constitutional dispensation pertaining to property and land rights provide the legal foundation
for a new system of land tenure in South Africa.1689 Simultaneously, the process of land reform,
restitution and redistribution, both in Germany and in South Africa, is a perfect arena in which to
examine the relationship between private and public law, in particular the interaction between
individual and societal interests in the private and public spheres of property law. Of course, the
scope of constitutional property protection and regulation stretches much further than rights related
to land and immovable property. Nevertheless, the interaction of the constitutional protection and
regulation of property by legislation embodying the reform policies is highly significant at this point
in South African legal history. Therefore, the remaining part of this thesis will be devoted to an
analysis of the land reform and restitution programmes in South Africa, compared with those in
Germany after the reunification.
1686 Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 21.
1687 Eg Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991; Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights
Act 112 of 1991; Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991; Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994;
Land Reform Pilot Programme of 1995; Land Affairs General Amendment Act 11 of 1995; Upgrading of Land
Tenure Rights Amendment Act 34 of 1996; Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996; Extension
of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997.
1688 Kleyn 1996 SAPRJPL 417.
1689 Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 34.
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1. Background: incentives for and institutions of reform
[9] Meaning of the constitutional objective of
land reform for the South African property law
With the advent of colonialisation in South Africa, a legislative processl690 was started which
eventually would restrict eighty percent of the South African population to ownership (or quasi-
ownership) of thirteen percent of the country's land.1691 These laws would form the cornerstone
of the apartheid government's policy of absolute racial segregation,1692 and was based mainly on
the hierarchical "primacy" of ownership in terms of private law.1693
The South Africa Act,1694 which paved the way for the formation of the Union of South Africa in
1910, effectively sanctioned all past acquisitions of land by colonialists.F" Further acquisition
was enabled with the promulgation of the Black Land Act of 1913,1696 the first in a long line of
racially motivated land laws. This act provided the statutory basis for territorial segregation by
dividing South Africa into the so-called "black spots" on the one hand and the "non-African"
areas on the other hand.1697 The latter comprised the rest (approximately 87% of the country's
surface area) of the country and black South Africans could not purchase, hire or in any other
way acquire rights to land in these areas.1698 In further developments, the Group Areas Actl699
effected racial fragmentation by assigning land to the so-called white, Indian and coloured race
groups and securing the best agricultural and residential land for the whites. This resulted in
large-scale forced removals, which affected approximately 3,5 million South Africans after
1913. The most extensive removals occurred in 1960 and 1983. Coupled with these policies of
segregation, a double-standard system of land rights was introduced. White people enjoyed
strong and efficient protection against infringement of their ownership of land, because they
were backed up by the highly valued legal institution of property as it was understood in the civil
law oriented private law system. Black people did not receive the same kind of protection of
1690 Cf GUllO Property and Land Reform (1995) 13 - 17 for a discussion of the revolutionary replacement of one
system of dominant proprietary relations (ie the indigenous African non-capitalist properry regime, which was
familiar with concepts like none-property, common property, private properry under slavery and feudalism) by
another system of dominant proprietary relations (ie the colonial dominated capitalist property regime).
1691 Cf eg Bennett "African Land: A History of Dispossession" in Zimmermann & Visser (cds) Southern Cross
(1996) ch 2.
1692 The most prominent of these laws were the Blacks Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 and the two Group Areas
Acts (41 of 1950 and 36 of 1996).
1693 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 261 - 263 points out that the (im)possibility to acquire and exercise land-use rights
was ultimately determined by the (im)possibility of owning land in a certain area.
1694 1909.
16'lS Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 90.
1696 27 of 1913.
1697 Cf maps and illustrations in Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform
(1997) 336 - 337.
1698 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelarnira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 122.
16'19 36 or 1966.
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their land rights, and could mostly have only traditional tribal land rights, or statutory land
"rights" based on "governmental grants" like residential permits or certificates of occupation.
These "black" land rights were not strong enough or even secure enough to weigh up against
"traditional" (white) civil-law land rights,1700not to mention the inability of these rights to serve
as security for bonds or loans.
Although the supremacy of "white" land rights and the deficiencies of "black" land rights under
the apartheid regime primarily resulted from political choices and the inequitable division of
available land related to these policies, the hierarchical conception of property rights in the
system of private law exacerbated the deficiencies of "black" land rights.I701Not surprisingly, the
issue of land rights was espoused in both the Interim and Final Constitutions, as a fundamentally
important factor in the process of redressing the wrongs of the past and ensuring full human and
civil rights for all citizens.1702The inclusion of the objectives of land reform, and redistribution and
restitution of land within the property clause of the Final Constitution in the chapter on fundamental
rights, indicates the desperate need for such reform.
1.1 Problems posed by the existing scheme of landownership law
The diversified and complex land control system with its racial basis necessitated land reform
and the rationalisation of land control measures in South Africa.1703Most of the claims to land of
black South Africans did not enjoy legal recognition under the apartheid-influenced property
law.1704They could not be based on documents such as title deeds or lease agreements, as black
South Africans were denied these rights in "white" areas. Instead, claims were based on certain
principles and values, such as length of occupation, birthright, secure tenure preserved through
due process and contractual obligations. These principles were often closely related to concepts
recognised by the law, but were overreached and restricted by the apartheid land law.1705The
land rights espoused by the law under the apartheid regime were thus based on the relative
strength and security of "white" land rights coupled with the relative weakness and insecurity of
"black" land rights. In this way, the power reiationsl706 implicit in the hierarchy of rights
1700 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 261 - 263.
1701262.
1702 Milton "Ownership" in Zimmermann & Visser Southern Cross (1996) 698.
1703 In effect, fourteen different land control systems existed within South Africa before the introduction of a new
constitutional dispensation. In each of the four provinces the rules on land control varied slightly. The four
"independent" states of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei all had unique sets of rules governing land
control. Moreover, in the six self-governing states different systems of land control were also applied.
1704 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 262 - 263.
1705 Swanson 1992 SAJHR 332. Approximately one third of the persons forcibly removed between 1913 and 1989
were moved off white farms. Several had been there for generations, and believed that their rights to the land were
based on birthright or on traditional patterns of occupation. Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in
Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 124.
1706 For an overview of the different perspectives on property theory, the power relations endorsed by them, and
their application in South Africa at the tum of the zo" century, cfVan der Walt 1995 THRHR 396 - 420.
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endorsed by the private law of property were exploited to ensure the political domination and
legal security entrenching white privilege.1707
Furthermore, the need for a land reform programme was made all the more urgent on account of
poverty (especially in the traditional rural areas), and the lack of suitable land for development
and housing. Demographic factors, like population increase, urbanisation, city sprawling and
increased informal settlements, together with pressure from foreign countries further contributed
to the introduction of a full-scale land reform project. The challenge was to find a manner of
addressing the existing inequalities in the system of land distribution, as well as the structural
inequalities built into the hierarchical, _ .crn of apartheid's land rights.I7OS
1.2. The first attempts at reform
In effect, property law reform in South Africa started off with tbe recognition of the fact that
absoluteness bas never been a characteristic of the ownership concept.I709 fn the eighties and
during the early nineties, the first few insecure steps towards a new property order was taken.
Most of the reforms were, however, directed at the upper land market, in attempts to
accommodate tbe needs of the middle and higher income groups. Van der Walt explains:l7lo
"[P]roperty lawyers have designed and implemented the quite complicated and imaginative system of
property time-sharing in order to provide holiday accommodation for the rich, but were unable to
devise a system of land rights that can provide seeurity of tenure for those who live in rural areas or
informal settlement. Likewise, property lawyers have already made possible the three-dimensional
registration of air space units, but seem to be unable to devise a registration system for unsurveyed
land in the rural areas, which might have provided the occupants of such land with the security of
tenure they need and deserve .... The facade of property law has been developed magnificently. but the
backyard is a dump."
During the latter part of the eighties and the early nineties, after the inevitability of a new
political order was recognised, a few hasty legislative attempts were made at formally
deracialising the existing property law and system of landownership.1711 These steps were aimed
at pragmatically addressing the unjust system of land distribution in South A frica, rather than at
systematically eradicating the injustice ingrained in the system of property law as such.
1.2.1. Reform between 1991 and 1993
The "pre-transitional" reform process was embodied in the White Paper on Land Reform and
corresponding legislation between 1991 and 1993. During these years, the groundwork for the
uni fication of the South A frican land tenure system was completed, on the principles expressed
1707 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 263.
170M 264.
170'1 Cf 133 et seq supra.
1710 Van der Walt "Future" in Van der Walt (cd) Landownership ill South A/rica (1991) 27.
1711 Eg the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991; Conversion of Certain Rights into
Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988; the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991; the Less Formal
Townships Establishment Act 113 of 1991. Most of these were also substantially amended by the General Law
Second Amendment Act 108 of 1993.
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in the White Paper of 1991 that (i) access to land was a basic human right and (ii) free enterprise
and private ownership were the appropriate mechanisms to give effect to this right.17l2
The land control system was deracialised by repealing most of the race-related land measures.
The promulgation of the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act,1713the Upgrading of
Land Tenure Rights Act1714and the Less Formal Township Establishment Actl7lS accompanied
the publication of the White Paper of 1991. This legislation aimed in general at creating speedier
procedures for establishment of informal settlements, improving security of title and addressing
the system of land use by way of a permit system. The purpose of the Abolition of Racially
Based Land Measures Act was mainly to deracialise the land control system. This was done by
repealing various pieces of primary legislation, wholly or partially, on which the policy of spatial
separation of different races within South Africa were based.1716Regulations and proclamations
issued under those acts, however, remained in force until explicitly repealed or abolished. An
example of such subordinate legislation, which was not immediately repealed, is proclamation
R2931717 promulgated under the Black Administration Act.17l8 It made provision for the
establishment of a special kind of township'Ï'" for African citizens in areas of land held by the
"South African Native Trust,,,J720inter alia by creating limited forms of tenure through "deeds of
grant" and "certificates of occupation of a letting unit for residential purposes." These tenure
rights were precarious and could be cancelled by the township "manager" if the holder of the
right ceased, for instance, "to be in the opinion of the manager a fit and proper person to reside in
the township.?'?" The insecure tenure rights established through this proclamation can clearly be
regarded as one of the most visible products of the previous government's policy of apartheid
and racial segregation.
The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act provided for the conversion into ownership of the
(lower ranking) more tenuous land rights granted to black South Africans during the apartheid
era. For example, leasehold, quitrent and deeds of grant could be upgraded to ownership.1722The
1712 Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform (1997) 350.
1713 108 of 1991.
1714112 of 1991.
1715 113 of 1991.
1716 Ie Black Land Act 27 of 1913; Development and Trust Land Act 18 of 1936; Group Areas Act 36 of 1966.
1717 Government Gazette 373, 16 November 1962. Inter alia, chapter I of the proclamation makes provision for the
establishment of the townships. Chapter 2 provides for the demarcation of sites in the townships for various
categories of occupation and regulates their occupation, sale or lease. It makes provision also for the issue of deeds
of grant and certificates of occupation, as well as for their assignment or transfer. Chapter 3 relates to trading sites
and the control of trading in the townships. Chapter 9 establishes special deeds registries in the office of every
"Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner" and for the registration therein of rights granted under the proclamation.
171838 of 1927.
1719 By the (then) Minister of Bantu Administration and Development.
1720 The South African Native Trust (later the South African Development Trust) was established by the Native
Trust and Land Act, 18 of 1936. The short title of the statute and the title of the Minister and the Trust reflect the
names used to refer to Africans at the time the statute was promulgated. Africans were initially referred to in statutes
as "Natives." This term was later changed to "Bantu," and eventually to "Blacks." Even a cursory reading of the
proclamation and the act can leave no doubt as to the distasteful character of the provisions thereof.
1721 Regulation 23(1)(a)(iv) of the Proclamation.
1722 S 2(1)(a), Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act.
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scope of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act was extended by the amendment of the
Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act1723 so as to include other rights in
formalised towns, not mentioned specifically in the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act. The
mechanisms introduced by these acts had a far-reaching influence on the South African system
of land rights, since these rights in land were automatically converted into ownership1724 and
registered at a later stage.172S Although the larger aim of these acts was tbe eradication of
inequalities in the system of land use in South Africa, the effect of the application of this
legislation in specific circumstances nevertheless were sometimes still unjust. In the case of
Mnisi v Chauke,1726 the hidden irony of this system of reform is noticeable. The case involved an
application for the eviction of some family members of Mrs Chauke from a house which
belonged to Mr Mnisi and which was allegedly occupied unlawfully by them. From the history
of the case it appeared that Mrs Chauke obtained a "right of occupation" with respect to the
property1727 by reason of her marriage in community of property with her late husband, who
purchased such a right from the Atteridge Town Council. Upon her husband's death, a certificate
of occupation was issued in her name, as she was his sole intestate heir. After the Conversion of
Certain Rights to Leasehold Act1728 had come into operation, Mrs Chauke was granted leasehold
in respect of the property in terms of this act. Subsequently, the Upgrading of Land Tenure
Rights Act1729 came into operation, whereupon a certificate of ownership with respect to the
property was issued to Mrs Chauke in terms of this act. She then sold and transferred the
property to Mr Mnisi. The rest of the Chauke family objected to the sale of the family residence,
but their objections were overruled and they were evicted from the property, eviction being the
remedy by which a landowner asserts the right of ownership. This outcome indicates that, in
spite of the honourable objectives of the land reform process, the reform measures themselves
could have disastrous results for people who were supposed to benefit from transformation. In
anticipation of a system in which not only the existing inequalities in land distribution, but also
the structural inequalities built into the hierarchical system of South Africa's land rights, are
addressed,l73o one would expect the courts to resort to a more sophisticated and layered system
of interest-balancing in view of the constitutional prerogative of land reform.1731
New methods for the subdivision and transfer of certain land were also invented.1732 The Less
Formal Township Establishment Act provided for procedures to regulate the establishment of
I72l 81 of 1988, as amended by s 24 of the Second General Laws Amendment Act 108 of 1993, by adding "or
ownership" into the title of the net.
1724 112 of 1991. The terms of this act were not of application in the TBVC states (the former "independent
homelands" of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) until 28 September 1998, the date of promulgation of
the Land Affairs General Amendment Act, 61 of 1998 (which inserted section 25A in the Upgrading of Land Tenure
Ri~hts Act and which made the provisions of this act applicable in the whole country).
172 S 2(2)(a), Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act.
l72b Mnisi v Chauke and Others; Chauke v Provincial Secretary. Transvaal, and Others 1994 4 SA 715 (T).
1727 S· d . id ·11 P .uuatc III Atten gcvi e ncar retona.
1728 81 of 1988.
17291120f1991.
mo Van der Walt 1999 Koers 264.
1?lI Cf also 281 infra.
1732 Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform (1997) 354 - 357.
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less formal settlements and townships. The main aim of this Act was to avoid the time-
consuming and expensive procedures usually applied to township establishment (in terms of the
provincial ordinances at the time). The aim was to provide a speedier and more effective type of
informal settlement with the object of eventually upgrading it into a recognised township. The
South African Development Trust!733 was also abolished and the land under its control was
transferred to various functionaries, like the provincial administrations, governments of the (then
still) self-governing territories, and the Department of Regional and Land Affairs.
In 1991 the Commission on Land Allocation was established with the specific purpose of
identifying unallocated and undeveloped state land which was acquired in terms of the repealed
racial legislation and which could be used for agricultural resettlement. The commission could
also identify other rural land, which could be acquired by the state for the purpose of agricultural
resettlement, with the eye to the symbolic redress of approximately three and a half million
victims of forced removals under apartheid.T" Urban claims were, however, excluded from the
commission's brief. This lead to the perception that the commission lacked legitimacy.
Consequently, its powers were expanded in 1993 so as to include jurisdiction over urban land
and to grant the power to make awards in respect of land acquired by the state under apartheid
laws. It also received the authority to make recommendations in relation to land that could be
acquired by the state for allocation for agricultural purposes.V" The commission brought the
need for a restitution process into sharper focus, although not many of the more than 2000 claims
that were received were dealt with. In retrospect, it was more successful with implementing
reforms in the rural areas than in urban areas. The inadequate infrastructure at the commission's
disposal together with the passive and unrepresentative character of the commission itself
explained why better results could not be achieved.1736The commission was eventually replaced
with the permanent Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights. 1737
In further developments, legislation was enacted to prepare the groundwork for the unification of
the South African system of land control and to create new mechanisms for the division and
transfer of certain land. The Joint Administration of Certain Matters Act!738enabled substitution
of many individual departments within South Africa and the (then still) self-governing territories
with a single governmental department. 1739This was further supported by the enactment of the
Regulation of Joint Executive Action Act1740which provided for joint or co-ordinated executive
action by the South African government and the governments of the territories relating to former
1733 The organ established by the Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, with the purpose of administering
the land set aside for occupation by black South Africans under the policy of racial segregation.
1734 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 114.
1735 Act 110 of 1993. S 88B of the amended legislation.
1736 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 115.
1737 Cf 288 infra.
173899 of 1993.
1739 S 3, Joint Administration Act.
1740109 of 1993.
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South African Development Trust land. (These acts were eventually repealed during 1995 by the
Land Affairs General Amendment ACt.)1741
Division and transfer of certain land were regulated by the enactment of the Distribution and
Transfer of Certain State Land Actl742 and the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act.1743
These acts regulated transferrals of land belonging to state organs to specific persons or groups
of persons where transferral coincided with land division; 1744and provided for the designation
and subdivision of state-owned land and privately owned land for resettlement, small-scale
farming, residential, public, community and business purposes.V? The Land Titles Adjustment
Actl746 was another important statute enacted in the pre-transitional period of land reform. It
regulated the allocation or devolution of certain land in respect of which one or more persons
claimed ownership without having registered title deeds. The absence of the necessary
documents could handicap development or utilisation of the property, to the disadvantage of the
parties involved. Therefore, the Minister of Land Affairs was enabled to designate land in cases
where absence of title deeds caused difficulties.
1.2.2. Evaluation
The idea of land restoration encountered severe opposition from the former minority government
when apartheid was dismantled. The government held the view that land restoration was not
feasible because of practical complexity and the potential for conflict. Therefore, reforms in the
period between 1991 and 1993 basically focussed only on removing the formal obstacles in the
way of tbe acquisition of rights in land by black South Africans.1747 Little attention was paid to
addressing the problems of the landless, especially those in rural areas. Thus, these reforms did
not succeed in breaking down the structural and dogmatic priviledge of landowners in terms of
South African common law at all.1748 This explains why the legislative attempts al solving the
land issue in South Africa created probably as many problems as they purported to solve. The
staying in force of subordinate legislation bred confusion; the distribution of land to different
governmental functionaries after the abolishment of the Development Trust reinstated legal
pluralism regarding land control; and land use, town planning and establishment measures were
still complex. In fact, as long as no specific commitment to land restitution and redistribution
was given, the overall objective of land reform would be doomed for failure.
1741II of1995.
17~21190fI993.
174)126 of 1993.
174·1S 3, 5 - 12; Act 119 of 1993.
1745S 5; Act 126 of 1993.
174(,III of 1993.
1747Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwclarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past injustices
(1996) 114.
17/IKVan der Walt 1999 Koers 289.
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1.2.2.1. The continued existence of subordinate (discriminating) legislation
Carey-Millerl749 pinpoints the difficulties arising from the pre-transitional land reform
programme with his remark that
"[t]he anomaly of a process of restitution adopted in advance of the controlling property clause being
settled was an early indication of the ad hoc character of the land-reform process; ... symptomatic of
an approach dictated by compelling circumstances and to that extent, consistent with retaining the
established working infrastructure of property law."
Certain problems related to this ad hoc character of the reforms are illustrated in a recent
decision of the Constitutional Court, DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial
Government and others.l75o Proclamation R293, linked with the Upgrading of Land Tenure
Rights Act, was the subject of controversy. The tenure and registration provisions of
Proclamation R293, read with the Upgrading of Land Rights Act, constituted a cheap and
straightforward mechanism for providing access to land to people in townships. The rights
initially acquired could, in due course, become ownership or at least secure tenure. The case
arose from the enactment of the North West Local Government Laws Amendment Actl751by the
legislature of the North West Province. Section 6 of this act purported to repeal Proclamation
R293 in its entirety. This could have the effect that people whose claims to land were based on
the "deed of grant" of the proclamation, coupled with the Upgrading of Land Rights Act, would
lose any claim they could have had in relation to the relevant land, because the legal basis of
their claim would fall away.
The applicant (DVB Behuising) challenged the constitutional validity of the section 6 of the
North West Local Government Laws Amendment Act,1752contending that the purported repeal
of chapters 1, 2, 3 and 9 of the proclamation was beyond the legislative competence of the North
West province. In the court of first instance,t753 it was held that the purported repeal of these
chapters of the proclamation was unconstitutional. Pursuant to the provisions of section
172(2)(a) FC,1754 the declaration of invalidity was referred to the Constitutional Court for
confirmation.
The Constitutional Court was confronted with the question of whether the legislature of the
North West Province had the competence to repeal the proclamation. It decided that the
1749 Carey-Miller 1999 SALf 750.
1750 CCT 22/99. Online at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/2000/2299.pdf [03.04.2000].
17517 of 1998.
1752 It was averred that the repeal of those chapters made it impossible for persons to whom it had sold houses in a
township established under the proclamation to have their deeds of grant registered by the Registrar of Deeds (the
second respondent in the case). This was alleged to prejudice its business seriously, in particular, because the
purchasers of such houses were not able to secure loans which would normally be offered to them by banks.
1753 DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and Another, Bophuthatswana High Court, Case
No 308/99, 27 May 1999, (per Mogoeng J) as yet unreported.
1754 Section 172(2)(a) FC: "The Supreme Court of Appeal, a High Court or a court of similar status may make an
order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or any conduct of the
President, but an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court."
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legislature of the North West Province did have the competence'{" to repeal all provisions save
for regulations 1 and 3 of chapter 1 and the provisions of chapter 9.1756 These provisions dealt
with the registration of deeds of grant, a matter that is required to be regulated by uniform norms
and standards, and thus falls within the competence of the national legislature.17s7 In the majority
judgement of the court, it was stated:17s8
"What the North West is in effect saying by the repeal of the Proclamation is that in that province
apartheid forms of tenure will no longer be available in future. I should have thought that the
provisions of section 25 of the Constitution and the Upgrading Act are a clear indication tbat apartheid
forms of land tenure that are legally insecure are no longer to be tolerated in our new democratic
dispensation. The repeal of the tenure provisions is consistent with this policy."
The minority judgement contains grave criticism of this approach. It is contendedl759 that the
judgement of the majority of the court would have (he effect that the speedy and accessible form
of registration coupled with the deed of grant tenure is no longer available in the North West.
The minority of the court regards this result as being in conflict with the constitutional scheme in
terms of which land tenure reform and the manner in which it is achieved is a matter reserved for
national government. It is then stated 1760 that
"jurisprudence of the transitional era necessarily involves a measure of contradiction. Fundamental
fairness al times requires that aspects of the old survive immediate obliteration and are kept alive
pending their replacement by appropriate forms of the new .... In the present matter, the meritorious
desire manifested in the majority judgment for a clean sweep of the past in the name of modernisation
and de-racialisation bas an unintended and ironic consequence. It deprives underprivileged
communities from gaining access to a cheap form of land tenure which in terms of national legislation
can be upgraded to freehold. The Constitution requires government to foster access to land. The repeal
of the Proclamation by the North West province, in one sense at least, does the reverse."
The irony inherent in the approach suggested by the minority is perhaps as striking as that
ascribed by them to the majority decision. In employing one of the most apparent pieces of racist
and sexist subordinate legislation of the previous regime, exactly those people who were
previously discriminated against can benefit under the new system. However, the alternative
suggested by the majority, in response to this criticism, is also fraught with difficulties.
Ngcobo J, l761 for the majority of the court, reads into the provisions of the Upgrading of Land
Tenure Act providing for the upgrading of "limited form[s] of ownership" into "full ownership"
the policy that a title which conferred a limited form of ownership was to be phased out. The
implication would be that the cheap, speedy method of obtaining ownership would be available
only to persons holding rights in terms of the old apartheid legislation. The creation of rights in
terms of this legislation would no longer be possible in the North West province. Further,
1m In terms of s 235(8) Ie. By implication, therefore, certain aspects of the legislative competence assigned to the
national legislature can be exercised by the provincial legislatures, anomalous as it may be. Cf in general Schedules
4 and 5 Fe.
1756As amended by Proclamation R9 of 1997.
1757)n terms ofs 126(3)(b) IC.
1758Per Ngcobo: par 69.
1759Per Goldstone, O'Regan and Sachs JJ; par 109 - 110.
1760Par I I O.
1761Par 8 - 9.
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Ngcobo J points to the Less Formal Township Establishment Act1762 and the Development
Facilitation Act1763 as mechanisms that could be used to continue the cheap, speedy method of
acquisition of ownership of land.
Indeed, the Less Formal Township Establishment Act contains an accessible form of land tenure.
It makes provision for the development of less formal settlements and townships. It provides,
among other things, "for shortened procedures for the designation, provision and development of
land, and the establishment of townships [and] for less formal forms of residential settlement"
and it also regulates the use of land by rural communities for communal forms of residential
settlement. In the case of development of less formal settlements, section 3(5)(e) of the Less
Formal Township Establishment Act provides that laws regulating township development and
planning are not applicable. In addition, provision is made in section 9(1) of the Less Formal
Township Establishment Act for the acquisition and registration of ownership in respect of an erf
allocated to a person. In the case of less formal townships, section 19(5)(a) of the Less Formal
Township Establishment Act provides for the exclusion of such laws if their application "will
have an unnecessary dilatory effect on the establishment of the contemplated township or will
otherwise be inappropriate in respect of the establishment of the township." However, not all the
land control measures provided for in terms of Proclamation R293 can be substituted by simply
applying the Development Facilitation Act. Specifically in the case of the Meriteng township, the
establishment of which gave rise to the present case, it is doubtful whether the Less Formal
Township Establishment Act could have been used as a substitute for the procedure of allocating
land rights in terms of proclamation R293 and then "upgrading" them. Similar situations could
also in future arise where the Less Formal Township Establishment Act cannot simply be
employed as a surrogate.
The suggestion is valuable in as far as it indicates a method of retaining the cheap, speedy way of
upgrading lesser rights in land into ownership. Especially the Development Facilitation Act
could be useful in this regard, as it is aimed at overhauling the tedious process of rationalising
and improving (on the provincial level) the content of law inherited by the various provinces.
The Development Facilitation Act addresses the need for legislation describing a common
procedure that could be used nationally, parallel to existing, inherited land development laws and
procedures.V'" The Development Facilitation Act provides a national framework for the
development of land in urban and rural areas for residential purposes, and for the grant of land
tenure rights. It "lay[s] down general principles governing land development throughout the
Republic." It makes provision for the grant of land tenure rights and their registration with the
Registrar of Deeds.1765 It also provides for the upgrading of informal settlements and for the
conversion of "informal or unregistered tenure arrangements" into ownership.V'" However, it
1762113 of 1991.
1763 67 of 1995.
1764 Latsky "Development Facilitation Act" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998) eh 2A, 9.
1765 Chapter VII.
1766 S 63, Development Facilitation Act.
283
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Pari Four: The Challenges of LAnd Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property ill Germany and South Africa
still builds upon legislation created under apartheid, and therefore does not pass the standard that
Ngcobo J sets.
1.2.2.2. Social restructuring
It was said that the White Paper of 1991, together with the legislation implemented pursuant to
it, "changed the face of property relations" in South Africa.1767 However, tbe implementation of
the pre-transitional land reform programme achieved only limited results. It did not focus on the
major socio-legal issues (already recognised by academics during the eighties),1768 which
properly and land rights reform was supposed to address. These issues included redistribution to
achieve class, racial and gender equality, restitution of properly and land rights lost during forced
removals and the policy of racial segregation, the improvement of the unacceptable status of
labour tenants, urban homelessness and the extension of protected property and land rights to the
dispossessed and marginalised. Moreover, local governments were until 1995 dominated by
conservative white elite and private property owners, who were rather cautious of reform.
So, for instance, the administrator of the former province of Transvaal look steps in terms of the
Less Formal Township Establishment Act to resettle the "Zevenfontein squatter community" in a
less formal settlement in the Diepsloot area northwest of Johannesburg. The residents of a
neighbouring upper class (white) residential area thereupon lodged an application for an interdict
preventing settlement of the squatters in Diepsloot, on the basis that it constituted a public
nuisance.1769 One of the arguments raised by the applicant (Diepsloot Residents' and
Landowners' Association), was that the establishment of the less formal settlement would
undermine the value of their property, because of increased air and water pollution, dust and
noise, and a suspected increase in criminality. The case was heard before the Interim
Constitution (and with it the first South African constitutional property guarantee) was enacted.
The argument was raised, however, that it would be impossible for the administrator to fulfil his
obligations in terms of the Less Formal Township Establishment Aet without interfering with the
private property rights of the applicants.
In the decision of the court of first instance, the temporary interdict was granted and the
argument of the applicants concerning the interference with private law rights upheld.177o On the
return day, the application for a final interdict was denied1771 on various grounds. It was held that
an interference with the private property rights of the applicants in this specific case was justified
in terms of the Less Formal Township Establishment ACt.1772 Reference is made to the fact that
1767 Van der Merwe 1990 Steil LR 321 - 335; Roux 1993 SAJHR 539.
17bS Van der Walt 1999 Koers 259 - 294 explains the understructure of the South African system of property law and
the problems it poses for land and property law reform. Cf also Van der Walt "Dancing with Codes" paper still
ul1fllblished (2000).
176 Diepsloot Residents' and Landowners' Association v Administrator. Transvaal 1993 1 SA 577 (T) per De
Villiers J; 19933 SA 49 (T) per McCreath J; 19943 SA 366 (A) per Smalberger JA.
1770 1993 1 SA 577 (T) per De Villiers J, 584C; 585F-G.
1771 1993 3 SA 49 (T) per McCrealh J, 58A et seq.
1772 65F-G.
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the urgent need for resettlement of the Zevenfontein community was not in dispute.1773 On
appeal, this decision was upheld on the reasoning that the Less Formal Township Establishment
Act by implication authorised interference with the common-law. rights of neighbouring
landowners.T" Smalberger J, acknowledges.V"
"I have sympathy for the genuine concerns of the Diepsloot residents and the financial loss they may
suffer as a consequence of the necessary reconstruction of our society. What they conceive, rightly or
wrongly, to be a burden may well have fallen elsewhere."
However, it was found that the administrative authorities did not exercise their powers in a
grossly unreasonable way. The Less Formal Township Establishment Act addressed the urgent
need to provide for the speedy and orderly settlement of homeless persons near the place where
they were or wanted to be, near their work or where employment opportunities existed. In these
circumstances the settlement of persons next door to - or close to - established residential areas
was unavoidable.T"
The decisions of the court of second instance (handed down in December 1992) and the appellate
division (handed down in March 1994) certainly rectified the position. Nevertheless, the decision
of De Villiers J in the court of first instance (handed down in July 1992) indicated the kind of
obstacles in the way of social restructuring early in the pre-transitional period. These included
the long history of judicial conservatism with regard to statutory interpretation.T" which
resulted, in the decision of the court of first instance. The court disregarded the broader context
surrounding the enactment of a statutory provision (except as a last resort in cases where the so-
called ordinary meaning of a provision would be unclear) and focussed on an analysis of the
content of the contested provisions of the act. Such an approach could all too easily be employed
to undermine any legislative initiatives on social restructuring in the context of property.
In general, meaningful social restructuring in the areas of class, race and gender inequalities was
not on the agenda during the pre-transitional land reform period.I778 Reforms in this period
basically focussed on removing the formal obstacles in the way of the acquisition of land rights
by black South Africans; opening up communal tenures to individual ownership and extending
benefits of the dominant property rights regime to those who had the means to gain access to the
market. 1779 Little attention was paid to addressing the problems of the landless, especially those
in rural areas. Further, the dominant property relations were left unscathed by the changes.1780
These reforms were therefore rather ineffective. The main problem was that they still took place
within the existing legal order where ownership prevailed over other subordinated forms of land
control, like leasehold and "communal" or "tribal" land rights. Even in the fast-changing political
177365B_C.
177419943 SA 366 (A) per Smalberger JA, 348H-I.
1775353H-I.
1776349E-G.
1777Roux 1993 SAJHR 543.
1778 Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) 58.
1779Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" III Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
Injustices (1996) 114.
1780Van der Walt 1999 Koers 289.
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order of the beginning of the nineties, the diversification of land rigbts preferred by and
predicted from academic quarters did not get the recognition it deserved from the legislative
organs of the pre-transitional regime.
Two keywords signify the trend for property law reform and land reform during the period
immediately preceding the political changes: privatisation and communalisation. This might
seem like a contradiction in terms, but should be understood against the political goals of tbe
previous out-going government: Tbe chief aim was to protect existing landowners against a
radical property law and land reform. To placate the traditional authorities developed under tbe
Black Administration Actl781 and the Black Authorities Act,1782 and to invest in their likely
coalition in a conservative force against possible future radical property and land rights reform,
the government in the last days of apartheid attempted to entrench the existing powers of these
authorities. Thus conditions were created in which existing traditional leaders could amass
wealth and consolidate their power.1783 The success of these reforms was therefore questionable.
1.3. Constitutional prerogative for the overall land reform programme
One of the clear purposes, and indeed one of the most devastating effects of apartheid policy,
was to deny black South Africans access to land.1784Where access to land was recognised, tenure
was generally precarious. It is not surprising that, with the advent of the new constitutional order,
this deep injustice was acknowledged. The process of property reform gained renewed support in
the Interim and Final Constitutions in that both contain express provisions pertaining to
restitution and redistribution of land and access to land.1785 An important part of the function of
the new constitution is to free land and property distribution patterns from the shackles of
apartheid, and to actively promote the establishment and maintenance of a more just distribution
of property and of greater access to land and security of land tenure. The introduction of the
property guarantee was an attempt to reverse the systematic process of erosion to which most
"black" land rights were subjected during years of apartheid.17R6
The Final Constitution, like the Interim Constitution did before it, plays an active role in land
reform. Section 25(5) to (7) FC provides that:
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.
178130fl927.
1782126 of 1951.
1783Guno Property and Land Reform (1995) 59 - 60 mentions the example of the Lebowa Farmers' Title to Land
Trust, which received illegal transfer of 400 large farms (around 30 percent of the total area of the former Lebowa)
under the Chief Minister Nelson Ramodike, thereby causing complete ineffectiveness of the Upgrading of Land
Tenure Rights Act to address the land needs of peasants.
1784 DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and others CCT 22/99 per Goldstone, O'regan
and Sachs JJ, par 103. Onl inc at http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/2000/2299.pelf [03.04.2000].
1785In the Interim Constirution, the commitment to land reform (or rather, land restitution) is not solely contained in
the Bill of Rights, but in s 121 - 123 IC, that should, however, be read with the property guarantee in s 28 IC. In the
Final Constitution, the land reform provisions are contained within the Bill of Rights itself: s 25(4) - (9) FC.
1786Van der Wall Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 69.
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(6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
restitution of that property or to equitable redress.
These provisions place an obligation on the national legislature to provide redress through
legislative means for the discrimination that happened in the past. Further, legislature is obliged
to transform insecure forms of tenure into legally protected tenure. By contrast, the interim
property clause could, by itself, effectively have blockaded measures for general land
redistribution. However, it had to be interpreted in conformity with the constitution as a whole.
This meant, in particular, that provisions like the equality and affirmative action clauses had to
be taken into account.1787 Further, the detailed provisions of sections 121 - 123 IC1788 left little
doubt that the regulation of property rights and land for purposes of restitution, redistribution and
reform was regarded as being in the public interest and as constituting legitimate restriction of
property rights. Thus, one can safely assume that section 25 FC elaborates in express terms upon
what was implicit in the Interim Constitution.
The part in the Interim Constitution dealing with restitution of land rights had four objectives. (i)
It obliged Parliament to enact legislation for realising the restitution of land rightS.1789 (ii) It
conferred a constitutional right to restitution upon certain categories of dispossessed persons. 1790
(iii) It compelled Parliament to establish a Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights with
competence to investigate the merits of claims, to mediate and settle disputes and to draw up
reports and gather evidence for the adjudication of claims. 1791 (iv) It set the parameters of the
power of the judiciary (the Land Claims Court, in particular) to make orders of restoration and
compensation.F" Section 25 FC is a further manifestation of the constitutional goal of actively
promoting and maintaining a more equitable distribution of property, easier access to land and
security of land tenure. As such, section 25 FC also imposes certain legislative and other duties
upon the government and legislature. Further, the text of the Final Constitution provides
specifically that no legislative provision may impede land reform or equitable access to natural
resources. 1793
1787 S 8(2) IC; 8(3)(a) and (b) IC.
1788 S 121 IC defined the type of legislation to be enacted to effect the requirements of s 8(3) IC. This section also
permitted imposition of conditions, limitations and exclusions which only could have been challenged in court in
terms of s 122 IC. S 122 IC required the establishment of a commission of Restitution of Land Rights to carry out
investigations on the merit of the claims, to mediate and settle disputes arising from such claims and to draw up
reports on unsettled claims to be submitted to court for adjudication. The powers of a court to deal with unsettled
claims were spelled out in s 123 IC. No provision in the Interim Constitution specifically required the establishment
of a special court for land restitution claims. Nevertheless, the Land Claims Court was established in terms of eh III
of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, which was enacted on the basis of s 121 - 123 IC.
1789 S 121(1) Ie. Parliament has heeded this duty with the enactment of Act.
1790 S 121(2) IC.
1791 S 122 re.
1792 S 123 re.
1793 S 25(8) Fe.
287
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Pari Four: The Challenges of LAnd Reform and Restitution for the LAw of Property in Germany and SOIlIJr Africa
The constitutional objectives of land reform, expressed initially in sections 121 to 123 IC, and
imbued with continued importance - albeit in different terms - within section 25 FC, were first
given legislative effect through the enactment of the Restitution of Land Rights Actl794 in 1994.
This act created a Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights, as well as a Land Claims
Court. Thus, a two-tier approach (similar to that in the German Federal Republic after
reunificationj'Ï'" of administrative proceedings followed by judicial intervention was
established, so as to provide a framework within which land claims against the state could be
resolved, where possible through negotiated settlements. Before discussing the land reform
policy under the new constitutional order, the functions of the commission and the court will be
addressed.
1.3.1. Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights
Section 4 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, following section 122 IC, established a
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights. The commission consists of a Chief and Deputy
Land Claims Commissioner appointed by the Minister of Land Affairs, assisted by a number of
regional land comrnissioners'P" with special skills and knowledge in the area of law, land
matters, planning, community development and the history of forced removals. The requirements
for the appointment of the officials are set out in the act.l797 Public servants, drawn from a
representative cross section of the population, and experts appointed on an ad hoc basis complete
the number.1798 The main function of tbe commission was to orchestrate the procedure of land
restitution initiated in the Interim Constitution. Claims had to be lodged on or before 31
December 1998. However, many claims are still not finalised. This necessitates the following
inquiry into the functions and activities of the commission.
1.3.1.1. Functions and activities
In Forjas v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Kwa'Zulu Nalall799 the essential role of the
Commission was seen to be investigative, facilitative and mcdiatory.1800 The functions of the
commission are set out in scetion 6(1) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, which has been
amended on several occasions.P'" It provides for the commission to receive and acknowledge
receipt of all claims for the restitution of rights in land lodged with or transferred to it in terms of
the act. 1802The commission should also investigate the merits of these claims,1803 and mediate
179-1 22 of 1994.
1795 Cf 366 infra. Cf also Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwclarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
"~llStices (1996) 96 n 24:
176 CfCarey-Miller Land Title (2000) 335 for a list of the names of the present commissioners.
1797 S 4(4), Restitution of Land Rights Act. These include that the officials have to be fit to hold the office, they have
to be South African citizens, and they must have skills and knowledge relevant to the work of the Commission or
such legal knowledge or qualifications that the Minister of Land AfTairs deem necessary.
179& S 4, 7,8,9, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1799 1998 2 SA 100 (LCC).
IBOO Pienaar "Land reform" unpublished paper (2000) 36.
1801 Eg Act 63 of 1997; Act 78 or 1996.
1802 S 6( I)(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
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and settlel804 disputes arising from them.180S Further, the commission is supposed to take
reasonable steps to ensure that claimants are assisted in the preparation and submission of
claims.1806 The commission should also upon reasonable request and at regular intervals advise
claimants of the progress of their claims.1807 If settlement is out of the question, the commission
must define those issues that are in dispute between the claimants and other interested parties, in
order to expedite the hearing of claims by the court.1808 It also has to draw up reports on
unsettled claims for submission as evidence to the court and present any other relevant evidence
to the court.1809 Furthermore, the commission has a duty to regularly publicise information about
the ability to claim restitution, and the manner in which claims should be 10dged.l8lO
Section 6(2) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act confers certain powers to the commission. It
may, for instance, monitor and make recommendations concerning the implementation of orders
made by the court.1811 It may also advise the minister regarding the most appropriate form of
alternative relief, if any, for those claimants who do not qualify for the restitution of rights in
land in terms of the act.1812 It is also capable of referring questions of law and interpretation to
the court.1813 The commission may ensure that priority is given to claims which affect a
substantial number of persons, or persons who have suffered substantial losses as a result of
dispossession or persons with particularly pressing needs.1814 It may generally do anything
necessarily connected with or reasonably incidental to the expeditious finalisation of claims.18lS
Section 6(3) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act confers on the regional land claims
commissioner the power to apply to the court for an interdict prohibiting the sale, exchange,
donation, iease, subdivision, rezoning or development of land, which may be the subject of an
order of the court, or in respect of which a person or community is entitled to claim restitution.
The regional commissioner or an interested party must have reason to believe that the sale,
exchange, donation, lease, subdivision, rezoning or development of the land will defeat the
achievement of the objects of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. However, in order to obtain
such an interdict, a claim must already have been lodged in respect of such land1816 and the
1803 S 6(1)(cA), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1804 S 6(1)(d), Restitution of Land Rights Act provides that the commission should, subject to the provisions of
section 14, report to the Court on the terms of settlement in respect of successfully mediated claims.
1805 S 6(1)( cB), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1806 S 6( 1)(b), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1807 S 6(1)( c), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1808 S 6(1)(e), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1809 S 6(1)( eA), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1810 S 6(1 )(f), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1811 S 6(2)(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1812 S 6(2)(b), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1813 S 6(2)(c), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1814 S 6(2)(d), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1815 S 6(2)(e), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1816 S 6(3)(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
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owner of the land must have been notified of such a claim.1817 The court may, in respect to such
an application, grant the interdict or make any other order it deems fit.1818
The commission is, thus, empowered and obliged to assist claimants with preparing and
submitting their claimsl819 and to endeavour to settle land claims by advising claimants to
subject the claim to a process of mediation.182o To aid the commission in the exercise of these
functions, it has the authority to appoint experts (like persons with expertise in dispute
resolution) that could assist it in the phase of administrative adjudication.P" Moreover, the
commission also has wide powers of investigation.1822 It could, for instance, order the production
of government files and help claimants to obtain information that they were unable to find on
their own.1823
1.3.1.2. Interaction with the Land Claims Court
Section 14 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act governs the interaction between the commission
and the Land Claims Court. The commission has the power to refer matters for adjudication to
the Land Claims Court.1824 Claims are referred to the court if: 1825 (i) the parties in dispute agree
in writing that it is not possible to settle the claim by mediation and negotiation; and (ii) the
regional commissioner certifies that it is not feasible to resolve the dispute by mediation and
negotiation; or if (iii) the parties submit an agreement considered appropriate by the regional
commissioner with the request that it is made an order of the court; or if (iv) the regional
commissioner is of the opinion that the claim is ready to be heard by the court. Matters for
adjudication have first to be certified by the Chief Land Claims Commissioner, after having
consulted the parties and upon having reached an agreement that settlement of the claim by
mediation and negotiation was not possible. The parties could, alternatively, agree upon a
manner in which the matter could be finalised, or the Chief Land Claims Commissioner has to be
satisfied that the claim was ready for adjudicatiot1.1826 A claim referred to the court must be
accompanied by a report setting out the details of interested parties and the results of any
investigation into possible, but unsuccessful, mediation. The report must also recommend the
most appropriate way of resolving the dispute. If the referral of the dispute to the court was
delayed for more than nine months, an additional report must be submitted, setting out the
reasons for the delay. The certification and reporting procedures are preconditions for vesting
IKI? S 6(3)(b), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
IKIW S 6(3), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
IKIQ S 6 read with s 14, Restitution of Land Rights Act. Further duties included (i) the provision of publicity of
restitution claims, (ii) giving priority to group claims and claims involving hardship, (iii) defining issues for
adjudication, and (iv) facilitating the implementation of coun orders.
1820 S 13, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1821 S 9, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1822 S 12, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1823 The power of subpoena duces tecum as described in s 12, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1824 S 6 read with 5 14, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
IK2~ S 14, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
182<, S 13 and 14, Restitution 0 r Land Rigbts Act.
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jurisdiction in a specific matter in the court.1827 In short, therefore, the commission operates as
the initial filter and first instance of adjudication. lts chief aim is to solve each land claim in a
non-adversarial manner. Only if this process does not succeed, is the claim referred to the Land
Claims Court for "conventional" adjudication.1828
In both the Macleantown Residents Association casel829 and In Re Elandskloof Verenigingl830 the
relation between the functions of the commission and the court, as set out in section 14 of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act, was at stake. Both cases concerned the referral of specific
settlement agreements to the Land Claims Court. Both these cases were reported before the
amendments to the Restitution of Land Rights Act that ultimately streamlined the referral
procedure.P" which means that many of the comments on 1832 the shortcomings of the statutory
procedure are now obsolete. However, the basic guidelines'F" set out in both these decisions are
presently still useful. In the Elandskloof case it was decided that a settlement was not invalid
merely because the claim which was being settled was in fact open to doubt or the amount paid
1827 S 14(6), Restitution of Land Rights Act. Cases that were referred to the court had furthermore to observe the
administrative procedure of feasibility. This requirement was, however, abolished by the Land Restitution and
Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997. Feasibility addressed the question of whether restoration, acquisition or
designation of land is practically achievable, not whether it is just and equitable. Only the court can pronounce on
the justness or equitableness of restoring rights in land. The procedure entailed that the commission had to request a
certificate from the Minister of Land Affairs in which it was stated - upon advice from the relevant commissioner -
whether or not the restitution would be feasible. In this document it was declared whether it was feasible to restore
the right, or to acquire it, or to designate alternative state-owned land for the purposes of restitution. (S 15( 1), (2)
and (3». When deciding to designate alternative land for restitution, the minister also had to take into account
whether state land would be available in the area where dispossession took place and whether such land would be
suitable to meet the needs of the claimant. S 15(7). Interested parties were given a reasonable opportunity to make
submissions on the question of feasibility. In considering this question, the minister had to take into account (i)
whether the zoning of the land was altered after dispossession in such a way as to make restoration of the relevant
right in the land impracticable, (ii) whether development plans have been approved in respect of the land, as this
would also impede restoration, (iii) whether any other factor would make it unfeasible to restore or acquire the land
and (iv) whether and inherent defect in the land would make it dangerous for human habitation. S 15(5), Restitution
of Land Rights Act. The minister's decision could be reviewed by the Land Claims Court. The requirement
concerning the issue of certificates of feasibility (as contained in section 15 of the Restitution Act) was repealed by
the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997, as this was the cause of considerable delay in
completion of claims. Cf Memorandum on the Objects of the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Bill,
1997. The requirement of a certificate of feasibility placed the Minister of Land Affairs in a position of power in the
determination of the scope and pace of the restitution process. The granting or refusal of a certificate could have
become the real focus of a decision of land claims, thereby leaving the restitution process to the mercy of
bureaucratic red tape. However, skilful use of the feasibility procedure could provide a useful device for managing
the proliferating number of urban claims that threatened to overburden the restitution process. The certificate could,
for instance, be withheld pending the design of an appropriate urban restructuring plan for the area concerned. It
could also encourage cost-effective group awards or compromises. Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in
Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 97.
1828 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 96.
1829 19964 SA 1272 (LCC).
1830 1999 1 SA 176 (LCC).
1831 Cf 311 et seq infra.
1832 Cf In Re Macleantown Residents Association 19964 SA 1271 (LCC) 1285G-1286B.
1833 Eg that if the transfer of state-owned property is involved, particulars of each property, particulars of the person
to whom or community to which it will be transferred and particulars of the relevant state department have to be
included into the agreement.
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for the land was too high or too low.1834 In the case of settlement agreements, the Land Claims
Court does not investigate the validity of the claim or the reasonableness of compensation agreed
on by the parties. However, the court must ensure that the settlement does not prejudice the
rights of persons who were not party to the agreement. The following requirements were listed in
order for settlement agreements to be made orders of the court: 1835 (i) the settlement must be
clear and enforceable; (ii) it must be properly executed; (iii) it must be signed by or on behalf of
all interested parties or their representatives; (iv) it must not be against public policy; and (v) it
must comply with the requirements of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. In the particular case,
the formation of an association1836 was also a condition of the agreement. This aspect can also
be incorporated in the court order. In the course of its decision in the Macleantown case, the
court pointed outlS37 the necessity of examining the legislation under which it is entitled to make
an order upon referral of a settlement agreement, and or determining whether all requirements
imposed by such legislation have been met. The court cited section 14(3) of the Restitution of
Land Rights Act in order to indicate its awareness that it can only convert a settlement agreement
into an order of the court if the competence of such an order is clear in terms of the Restitution of
Land Rights ACt.1838 From these decisions, it seems clear that the court cannot waive compliance
with the requirements of section 14 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. However, the addition
(by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act1839) of the provision that the court
may, on good cause shown, condone noncompliance with the provisions of section 14 of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act, seems to constitute a definite adjustment in the relation between
the Land Claims Court and the commission.1840
Since 199is41 a claim for restitution of a right in land can under certain circumstancesl842 be
made directly to the court. The claimant must obtain leave from the court.1R43 Provision is also
made for the necessary co-ordination between the commission and the court so that the
investigation of a matter is suspended pending the outcome of an application for direct access.
The insertion is intended to make the process of restitution more effective and efficient in terms
of the delivery of results.1844 It thus constitutes a further adjustment in the relation between the
commission and the court for the sake of expediting restitution.
IK34 The case concerned a referral of a settlement agreement to the Court to be made an order of court under
s 14(1)(c) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1835 Gildenhuys Jat 179G.
1836 Under the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996.
1837 19964 SA 1271 (LCC) 1276G.
18J8 127611.
18J9 18 of 1999.
1840 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 358.
ISJI Cfthe Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997, which introduced eh IliA.
18-12 Ie that a s 35 court order has already been made in respect of a right relating to specific land (s 38B( I)(a),
Restitution of Land Rights Act), or that a notice has been published in the Gazette in terms of either s 12(4) or
380(1), Restitution of Land Rights Act, in respect of land and the period specified in the notice has expired
(s 38B( I)(b), Restitution of Land Rights Act).
1843 S 38B( I), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1844 Carey-Miller Land Titte (2000) 391.
292
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
[9]Meaning of the constitutional objective of land reform for the South African property law
1.3.1.3. Influence on the rights of landowners
In the exercise of their powers, the commission and its functionaries could seriously restrict the
rights of owners of land in dispute. For instance, in order to prevent landowners from selling,
destroying or diminishing the value of property, or evicting tenants and occupiers, the regional
land commissioner canl845 direct the Registrar of Deeds for that region to temporarily endorse
the records of title with a reference to the restitution claim. Such endorsement renders it a
criminal offence to obstruct the passage of the claim in an improper manner, to evict claimants
and to remove or destroy improvements upon the land without the written authority of the Chief
Land Claims Commissioner.1846 In order to police the process, the regional commissioner can
also enter the land to prepare an inventory of assets, a list of persons employed or resident on the
land and a report on the agricultural and mining activities on the land.1847
1.3.2. Creation and functions of the Land Claims Court
The Land Claims Court has been established as a court of law, with the specific function of
presiding over the realignment of property rights in South Africa to take account of the history of
racially based dispossession.P" Scollo-Lavizzari'F" ascribes the establishment of a separate
court solely concerned with matters pertaining to land reform and restitution to fears that the
unfortunate experience with land reform in India could be repeated in South Africa. The
reluctance of the Indian judiciary to promote the parliamentary policy of land reform by rigidly
upholding individual property rights in terms of the Indian Constitution resulted in the courts
losing credibility among the members of the Indian society. A similar result in South Africa
could be disastrous.
The Land Claims Court has the same status as the High Court.1850The Court consists of a
President of the Court and five judges.1851 The court, situated in Randburg, has national
jurisdiction,1852 similar to that of a provincial division of the Supreme Court in civil
proceedings 1853as well as all the ancillary powers necessary or reasonably incidental to the
performance of its functions. The latter includes the power to grant interlocutory orders and
interdicts. The procedural rules of the Land Claims Court also resemble those of the High Court,
in so far as the President of the court has not exercised his or her capacity to make rules of
1845 In terms ofs 11(6)(b), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1846 S 11(7), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1847 S 11(8), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1848 Chaskalson 1997 Consultus 31.
1849 Scollo-Lavizzari Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment Research Dissertation, LL M
(1996) 22.
1850 Appeals against decisions of the Land Claims Court have to be directed either to the Constitutional Court or to
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. S 36, 27 and 38, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
185 I S 22(4) - (5), Restitution of Land Rights Act. Provision is also made for the appointment of acting judges in
certain circumstances - s 22(8), Restitution of Land Rights Act. Cf s 23, Restitution of Land Rights Act for an
exrosition of the requirements for the appointment of land claims judges.
185 Cf s 28K, Restitution of Land Rights Act with regard to the scope and execution of process in Court.
1853 S 22(2), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
293
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property /n Germany and Soulh Africa
procedure.P" The court frequently operates as a circuit court in exercising its national
jurisdiction. All hearings of the court are conducted in open court, except if otherwise directed
by the court in special cases.18SS
The Land Claims Court is a product of the Interim Constitution and the Restitution of Land
Rights Act. Section 121 to 123 IC contained the obligation for restitution or provision of
equitable redress to individuals and communities dispossessed of rights in land under racially
discriminatory laws in force in Soutb Africa since 1913. Section 123 IC made provision for the
type of court orders that could be issued with regard to the restitution of land rights, but without
mandating that a special court had to be established for this purpose. In order to achieve this
constitutional purpose of restitution, the Restitution of Land .Rights Act established, among
others, the Land Claims Court. Thus, section 121(6) IC, read with sections 11(5), 14(1), 22,
34( I) and 35 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, conferred jurisdiction on the Land Claims
Court.
1.3.2.1. Jurisdiction of the court
The court deals with the justiciability of claims once the requirements in section 122 IC had been
fulfilled. This meant that the court had jurisdiction over claims only after the Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights, which had to be established in terms of section 122 IC, investigated
the merits of a possible claim, and tried to mediate and settle disputes arising from such a
c1aim.1856 If settlement was not possible,1857 the commission had to draw up a report for
submission as evidence to the court. Any other relevant evidence also had to be presented to the
court.
The jurisdiction of the court was originally limited to claims brought under sections 121 to
123 IC. Since 1996, however, the court's jurisdiction has been extended by the Land Reform
1854 Special rules have been set out in Government Notice 300 of 21 February 1997 and published in Government
Gazelle 17804 of21 February 1997. Arbitrations in terms of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act3 of 1996 are
set out in Government Notice 299 of 21 February 1997. The following features can be mentioned: (i) judges are in
some regards afforded the capacity to playa more active role in the development of cases; (ii) the introduction of a
pre-trial conference to expedite cases and reduce litigation costs; (iii) video-confereneing facilities may be used in
appropriate circumstances; (iv) the forms are written in plain language, making them more comprehensible to
litigants; (v) a standard form in all II official languages accompanies documents served on persons, pointing to the
importance of the documents, and advising persons affected to seek legal aid; (vi) the language used in the rules has
also been modernised and simplified: (vii) procedures have been devised to accommodate the system of
investigation and referral by the Commission of the Restitution of Land Rights and the Director-General of Land
Affairs; (viii) the court may override an agreement between parties which would delay the filing of documents, and
may order parties lo comply with a prescribed time period; (ix) provision is made for the admission of an amicus
curiae in appropriate circumstances; and (x) there are flexible provisions regarding service and service addresses.
1855 S 2gB, Restitution of Land Righis Act.
1856 Cf290 supra.
1857 Claims are referred to the court i f, according to s 14, Restitution of Land Rights Act: (i) the parties in dispute
agree in writing that it is not possible to settle the claim by mediation and negotiation; and (ii) the regional
commissioner certifies that it is not feasible to resolve the dispute by mediation and negotiation; or if (iii) the parties
reach an agreement considered appropriate by the regional commissioner which is submitted with the request to be
made an order of the court; or if (iv) the regional commissioner is of the opinion that the claim is ready to be heard
by the court.
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(Labour Tenants) Act,1858so as to hear and adjudicate all disputes arising out of the provisions of
this act. Jurisdiction of the court has been further extended through the Extension of Security of
Tenure Act1859so as to decide on disputes arising out of the measures introduced by this act to
extend the security of tenure in rural areas. The latter conferred the power to grant eviction
orders on the magistrate's courts, and coupled it with an automatic review function of the Land
Claims Court in terms of section 19(3) of the act until the end of 1999. Therefore, the Land
Claims Court was also, albeit only temporarily, the instance for automatic review of decisions of
the magistrate's courts related to the extension of security of tenure.
The court has the powers to grant restitution of any right in land and to award compensation.P'"
The court's powers are further supplemented by the act, in order to ensure that the restitution
process is consistent with the broader reform programme, and that land is put to its best uses
within the constraints of the prevailing formal and informal tenure arrangements.P'" In terms of
section 33 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, the court has to consider certain factors when
deciding whether or not to award restitution of rights in land, compensation or alternative relief:
33 (Factors to be taken into account by Court)
In considering its decision in any particular matter the Court shall have regard to the following factors:
(a) The desirability of providing for restitution of rights in land to any person or community
dispossessed as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; (b) the desirability of
remedying past violations of human rights; (c) the requirements of equity and justice; (cA) if
restoration of a right in land is claimed, the feasibility of such restoration; (d) the desirability of
avoiding major social disruption; (e) any provision which already exists, in respect of the land in
question in any matter, for that land to be dealt with in a manner which is designed to protect and
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to promote
the achievement of equality and redress the results of past racial discrimination; (eA) the amount of
compensation or any other consideration received in respect of the dispossession, and the
circumstances prevailing at the time of the dispossession; (eB) the history of the dispossession, the
hardship caused, the current use of the land and the history of the acquisition and use of the land; (eC)
in the case of an order for equitable redress in the form of fmancial compensation, changes over time
in the value of money; (f) any other factor which the Court may consider relevant and consistent with
the spirit and objects of the Constitution and in particular the provisions of section 9 of the
Constitution.
The sole function of these rather vague factors is to direct the attention of the court to the fact
that restitution is a legitimate and desirable goal. Thus, the restitution process more closely
approximated a process of peace-making, reconciliation and affirmative action. 1862
The duty of the court in section 33(c) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act to have regard to "the
requirements of equity and justice" in deciding any particular matter, has induced Chaskalson 1863
to refer to this jurisdiction of the court as "equitable jurisdiction." There is no precedent in South
1858 S 29; s 32, Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act.
185962 of 1997, s 17 read with s 20.
1860 These powers are circumscribed by section 123 IC, read with sections 33 to 36 of the Restitution of Land Rights
Act.
1861 Cf293 supra.
1862 Scollo-Lavizzari Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment LL M Research Dissertation
(1996) 25.
1863 Chaskalson 1997 Consultus 32.
295
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property in Germany and South Africa
African land law or property law that could provide the court with guidelines on how this
equitable jurisdiction should be exercised. Ifthe court chooses to draw on the experience of other
countries, the treatment of restitution and reparation issues in the Federal Republic of Germany
might be a helpful guideline.
1.3.2.2. Relevance of the Land Claims Court for property reform in South Africa
The Land Claims Court is an integral part of the mechanism established by the Restitution of
Land Rights Act to deal with the process of restitution. However, its powers stretch further than
the restitution programme. In considering the court's role, it is important to keep the interaction
of the court and commission in mind. The former is in many regards complementary to the
latter.1864
The Land Claims Court constantly considers claims for stability and security by landowners, as
well as claims for restitution and reparation by the dispossessed. As such, it is constantly
confronted with a di fficult challenge: it has to balance the protection of private property rights
against the need for social justice. The Land Claims Court is, therefore, the place where the
conflicting values as embodied in the constitutional property clauses can gain material content.
The treatment of these issues by the court will be discussed in the course of this chapter with
reference to the different elements constituting legislative attempts to reform land law in South
Africa. However, some general effects of the Land Claims Court's powers should be mentioned
at the outset.
(i) The court's power to order restoration includes the power to adjust the nature of the
right previously held by the applicant, and to determine the kind of title under which the right
may be held in future.1865 The original right may therefore be either upgraded or downgraded,
and may even assume a different legal form. The court can also allocate any right connected to
the restored rights, like servitudes or other limited real rights. In view of the fact that the court is
concerned with restoring certain rights to persons dispossessed as a result of the policy of racial
segregation, it seems unlikely that the rights of which restoration is claimed will be further
downgraded. The power of the court to upgrade title is therefore, apparently more important. In
claims for the restoration of rights in terms of quitrent or permission to occupyl866 which were
lost as a result of forced removal or incorporation of land into the bantustans, the court has
jurisdiction not only to restore these rights, but also to upgrade them to freehold without the
racially imposed restrictions.1867 This is an important development, as the legal nature of these
186-1 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 368.
IH6S S 35(4) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
IK66 Held in terms of the regulations in Proclamation R 188 of 18 June 1969. These tenures involved the imposition
of limitations and conditions upon the exercise of the entitlements of the real rights and gave the government
excessive powers in relation to the land. Murphy "The Restitution of Land alter Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle
(eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 130.
1867 In terms of s 35(4) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
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rights have not been sufficiently clarified in the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act1868 which
formed part of the out-going government's land reform programme between 1991 and 1993.
(ii) The court can furthermore use its power in terms of section 35(4) of the Restitution of
Land Rights Act to introduce an equitable and functional division of ownership in respect of
different aspects of the same piece of land. If labour tenancy and informal occupancy on farms
are to be regarded as "rights in land", then the court, in the restoration process, could upgrade
these "rights" into new forms of equitable tenure, providing the beneficiaries with better legal
protection.P'" In making such an order, however, the court must, with the utmost sensitivity,
endeavour to balance commercially related land-use with the social security advantages deriving
from tribal structures and group affiliations.
(iii) The court's power to restore rights in land owned by or falling within the area of
jurisdiction of any national, provincial or local government body, is qualified by section 34 of
the Restitution of Land Rights ACt.1870 The relevant public authority may apply to the court for
an order that the rights in land shall not be restored to the claimant. The court will grant the order
once it is satisfied that it is in the public interest and that the public or a substantial part thereof
will suffer substantial prejudice if the land is restored to the claimant. This provision raises
interesting possibilities. It could, for instance, be invoked by a local authority under pressure
from the owners and residents on land neighbouring the land concerned on the grounds that
restoration may result in a decline in standards or market values.1871 On the other hand, this
provision could also be invoked more progressively by applying it, for example, to help the Cape
Town local authority solve the District Six1872 dilemma. The Land Claims Court recently
found1873 that, although it was true that the object of the Restitution of Land Rights Act was
restitution, it is equally true that the act aims to achieve restitution in a way that is in harmony
with the public interest. In Ex Parte North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure
1868112 of 1991.
1869 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 130. The Land Reform (Labour Tenant) Act, however, also provides for the vesting of ownership in land by
labour tenants (cf 320 et seq infra). Labour tenants can therefore, in terms of the provisions of this act become
owners in own right.
1870 Cf Pienaar "Land Reform" Unpublished paper (2000) 44 et seq; Singh v North Central and South Central
Metropolitan Substructure Councils of the Durban Metropolitan Area 1999 1 All SA 350 (LCC).
1871 Cf the facts in the case of Diepsloot Residents and Landowners Association v Administrator, Transvaal
1993 I SA 566 (T).
1872 This refers to the vacant land in the centre of Cape Town, previously owned by white landlords. The
expropriation and clearance of District Six during the 1960's and 1970's is regarded by many Capetonians of all
creeds and colours as the most brutal and insensitive act of the apartheid government towards their city, as it tore out
a vibrant and colourful community from the heart of Cape Town. Many would like to see the still vacant land
redeveloped and restored, not to the original landlords, but to the tenants who were shunted out to a variety of urban
wastelands on the Cape Flats. PreiBIer Rilekgabe von Landrechten (1998) 95 - 105 provides an extensive analysis of
this issue. Cf http://land.pwv.gov.zallandinfo/editoria.htm [08.06.2000].
1873 Cfthe decision of Singh v North Central & South Central Local Councils 1999 1 All SA 350 (LCC). In this case
another application was brought before the court by participants and other claimants in respect of land in Cato
Manor who were not party to the agreement that was incorporated into the s 34 court order. The applicants claimed
that the respondents were in breach of numerous obligations under the said agreement and claimed, in most
instances, orders of specific performance. The application was dismissed on the facts. It was found that the
principles relating to public interest were not undermined.
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Councils of the Durban Metropolitan Area,1874the Land Claims Court developed the concept of
public interest in this context.1875 The case arose from the purported development of Cato
Manor, an area from which a large group of persons have forcibly been removed during the
times of apartheid. They applied for the section 34 order of exclusion from restitution, and were
opposed by claimants for restoration. During the proceedings, the parties started negotiations and
finally reached an agreement, which they then wanted to incorporate into the court order under
section 34(5)(d) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. The settlement entailed an agreement to
proceed with the development as planned, but subject to the proviso that where restoration was
feasible any respondent who wished to pursue a claim, would be entitled to do so. Respondents
who wished to return to the area without insisting on restoration or for whom restoration was not
a viable option were also able to benefit from the development. The court found that, in tbe
instant case, both development and restoration were in the public interest.1876 Any agreement that
accommodated both, with the consent of all the parties concerned, would henceforth eminently
be in the public interest. A section 34(5) order was consequently granted.1877
2. Legislation shaping the policy of land reform
The endorsement of the restitution and redistribution of land and access to land in the Interim
and Final Constitutions has prompted the new government to initiate further legislative
measures, amend existing legislation and introduce various programmes, strategies and policies.
A two-pronged approach has been adopted: On tbe one hand, the government strives to create an
environment in which these policies can be implemented, and on the other hand it provides direct
financial and other support services.1878 The general function of the land reform, redistribution
and restitution legislation promulgated since 1994, is to officially give effect to the broad
constitutional objectives of land reform,1879 and thus to revive and restore the legal protection
and commercial value of "black" land rights. Most of the legislation is apparently directed at
balancing the competing interests of the landowners, on the one hand, and the landless, on the
other, in the most suitable, rational, feasible and least intrusive manner possible.
187~ 1998 ( I) SA 78 (LCC).
IS'S Cf the discussion of Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 44 ct seq.
1876 At 838-C; E-F.
1877 In Singh and Others v North Central & South Central Local Councils 1999 I All SA 350 (LCC) another
application was brought before the court by participants and other claimants in respect of land in Cato Manor who
were not party to the agreement that was incorporated into the s 34 court order. The applicants claimed that the
respondents were in breach of numerous obligations under the said agreement and claimed, in most instances, orders
of specific performance. The application was dismissed on the facts and did not undermine the principles relating to
public interest as said out in the discussion above.
1878 White Paper (1997) par 2.3.
1879 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 69.
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In the course of 1997, the government published another White Paper,1880in which the policy
pertaining to the land reform programme is set out. According to this document, the
government's policy consists of three separate, but interconnected elements: 1881
(i) The first element, land restitution, aims at redressing the wrongs caused by forced
removals, which took place after 1913. The restitution process is, therefore, limited in scope1882
as well as lifespan.1883 In principle, the Restitution of Land Rights Act,1884which has been
amended in some respects,1885 determine how issues of restitution should be dealt with. The
Land Claims Court and Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights give effect to the
provisions of this act.1886However, the functions of these institutions are not limited to the
restitution programme, but extend to the rest of the broad land reform programme as a whole.
(ii) The second element, land redistribution, aims at providing the disadvantaged and the
poor with access to land for residential and productive purposes. It addresses the needs of the
poorest urban and rural residents, labour tenants, farm workers as well as new entrants to
agriculture. As such, it is a wider project aimed at rectifying some of the inequalities in the
existing land distribution patterns in South Africa. It deals with a wide variety of different
policies, strategies and projects. Legislative measures falling within the purview of land
redistribution'Y" can be found in the Less Formal Township Establishment Act,1888the Provision
of Certain Land and Assistance Act,1889the Development Facilitation Act,1890the Land Reform
(Labour Tenants) Act,1891the Extension of Security of Tenure Act1892and the Housing ACt.1893
The redistribution programme overlaps to some extent with the third element of the overall
reform programme (land tenure reform), as will be indicated in due course.
(iii) The third element, land tenure reform, reviews present land policy, administration and
legislation with the aims of improving the security of tenure of all South Africans and of
1880 Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997). Online at
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/landwp.html[ 16.12.1998].
1881 White Paper (1997) par 2.3. Cf Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform
(1997) 359.
1882 Cf Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 320 - 326.
1883 CfVan der Walt 1999 Koers 270 - 271 n 16.
1884 22 of 1994.
1885 Cf eg Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997. References to the amended texts are
expressly indicated in the course of this chapter.
1886 These bodies were established under the Restitution of Land Rights Act. Cf288 et seq supra.
1887 Academics differ in opinion as to the classification of the legislation according to the three legs of the
government's reform programme. This can be ascribed to the fact that the programmes and the different statutes
sometimes overlap as far as objectives and the means to attain these objectives are concerned. Cf the classifications
of Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275, 282 - 283; Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 404 - 405, 459 - 461; Pienaar "Land
Reform" unpublished paper (2000) Il - 12,29.
1888 112 of 1991.
1889126 of 1993. Renamed from the "Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act 126 of 1993" by the Provision of
Certain Land for Settlement Amendment Act 26 of 1998.
189067 of 1995.
1891 3 of 1996.
189262 of 1997.
1893 107 of 1997.
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accommodating diverse forms of land tenure, including certain kinds of communal tenure. The
probleml894 with many of these "rights" is that they either do not provide sufficient security of
titlel895 or that they are unsuitable for the purpose they are supposed to serve.1896 Land tenure
reform therefore represents that part of the reform process by which the land rights of people
who do have land or access to land are strengthened and secured. Legislative measures falling
within the purview of land tenure reforml897 can be found in the Conversion of Certain Rights
into Leasehold or Ownership Act,1898 the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act,1899 the
Development Facilitation Act,1900 the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act,1901 the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act,1902 the Communal Property Associations Act,1903 the Interim Protection
of Informal Land Rights Actl904 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land ACt.1905
Each of these clements of reform has some consequences for the development of property law in
the South African legal order. Selecting only specific legislative measures for discussion
admittedly does injustice to the process of land and property reform in South Africa. For present
purposes, however, a discussion of some of the legislation as examples of the broader reform
process will have to suffice. For interest's sake, the process of redistribution and tenure reform
will be discussed, albeit only briefly.1906 However, in keeping with the objectives of the present
exposition, the principles and procedures of land restitution is chosen as the main component of
the discussion, because of the parallels with the German reform process introduced after the
reunification in 1990.1907 Nevertheless, it will be indicated in the course of this chapter, that the
different processes of reform in South Africa arc intertwined and their categorisation into
programmes of restitution, (and especially) redistribution and tenure reform, can only be a
superficial aid for understanding the reform process in its entirety. Accordingly, this exterior
categorisation also serves to provide the structure of the following discussion.
1894 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 281 - 282.
189S Because of the way in which they have been acquired or vested or because of the discriminatory laws that
aRplied to them in thc past.
I 9(, Eg because they do not provide access lo financing, or because they feature within a problematic tribal or group
structure that might disadvantage women or other land users.
1897 Cf n 1887 supra.
1898 81 of 1988.
18991120f1991.
I?OO 67 of 1995.
1901 3 of 1996.
190262 of 1997.
190328 of 1996.
IC)().I 31 of 1996.
1905 19 of 1998.
1906 More detailed discussions can be found in Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275 et seq; Carey-Miller Land Title (2000)
398 et seq, 456 et seq; Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) II et seq; and Erasmus Interaction
between Property Rights ami Land Reform doctoral dissertation (1998) 281 et seq, in particular 415 - 421 and 421 -
436.
1'/07 Cf 355 . I·. ct seq In ra.
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2.1. Land restitution (Restitution of Land Rights Act)
The Restitution of Land Rights Act was the practical embodiment of the constitutional
directive'Ï'" that legislation enabling the restitution of land rights should be passed, and was the
first act that was promulgated by the new government during December 1994.1909The Land
Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act,19I0 which came into effect on 21 November
1997, brought the Restitution of Land Rights Act into line with section 25(7) Fe. In the case of
Uitenhage Local Transitional Council v Zenza and OthersI911 it was stated that the mere fact that
provision is specifically made in the constitution 1912for the restitution of land rights, does not
mean that persons can take the law into their own hands and invade property thinking it is their
constitutional right to do so. The Restitution of Land Rights Act is thus the only mechanism to
realise these restitution rights and persons claiming restitution have to follow the correct
procedure, as set out in the act.
The preamble to the Restitution of Land Rights Act confirms the constitutional right to
restitution and the aim of the act to promote and to protect the advancement of persons,
groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to
promote their full and equal enjoyment of rights in land. The act accordingly also
prescribes the procedures to be followed in lodging claims at the Commission on
Restitution of Land Rights'913 and during the mediation and investigation process. It also
established the Land Claims Court,1914which has to consider difficult claims that cannot
be mediated and settled by the commission itself.1915Consequently, the operation of this
act will be discussed and evaluated in the light of the constitutional protection and
regulation of property in South Africa.
2.1.1. Operation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act
The definition of "restitution" should be determined by a cumulative reading of three separate
definitions in section 1 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.1916The event of restitution of a
right in land is defined as the restoring of a right in land or the provision of equitable redress.
Restitution of a right in land means "the return of a right in land or a portion of land dispossessed
after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices." A right in land is
1908S 121 - 123, read with s 28 IC.
1909Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 32. Proclamation R176 in GG 16166 of02.12.1994.
191°630fI997.
191119978 BCLR 115 (ES). This case concerned the invasion of land that was earmarked for the development of a
housing project. The illegal occupants claimed that the invasion ought to be allowed because they formed part of the
category of persons who would benefit from land reform in general and land restitution in particular.
1912S 121 IC and s 25(7) FC.
1913Established in terms ofs 122(1) IC (cf Farjas (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, KwaZulu-Natal
19982 SA 900 (LCC) at 907C) and the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1914The Interim Constitution envisaged claims going to "a court of law," (s 122(1)(c) IC) but the Restitution of Land
Rights Act created a specialised "Land Claims Court".
1915The Land Claims Court has since its implementation also obtained further functions. Cf293 et seq supra.
1916Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 320.
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defined as "any right in land whether registered or unregistered." It can apparently include the
interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a
beneficiary under a trust arrangement and a beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not
less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in question. This understanding of the concept
"restitution" is underscored by the provision in section 25(7) FC thatl917
"[a] person Or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by all Act of Parliament, either to
restitution of that property or to equitable redress."
This provision should be read with section 2 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act,1918which
provides:
Section 2 (Entitlement to restitution):
(I) A person shall be entitled to restitution of a right in land if - (a) he or she is a person or community
[sic] dispossessed of' a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws
or practices or a direct descendant of such a person; and (b) ... (c) the claim for such restitution is
lodged not later than 3 I December )998.
(2) No person shall be entitled to restitution of a right in land if - (a) just and equitable compensation
as contemplated in section 25(3) of the Constitution; or (b) any other consideration which is just and
equitable, calculated at the time of any dispossession of such right, was received in respect of such
dispossession.
In effect, this section sets seven requirements to qualify for restitution, thus also limiting the
number of claims.
(i) The claimant must be a personl919 (or direct dcscendantl920 of such a person) or
community.I921 The term "person" probably extends to natural as well as legal persons, given the
fact that "communities" are included as claimants in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
The acknowledgement the right of a community to claim restitution is an endorsement of
communal tenure systems in traditional and modern customary law. Community claims to
restitution would then much rather be predicated upon the informal tenures underlying the formal
1917 Emphasis added.
191ft Note that the numbering of this section was changed by ACI 18 of 1999.
1919 Read with Annexure A of the commission's rules, it seems as if the term person includes legal persons in the
form of trusts. Roux "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" In Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land
Law (1998) eh 3A, II further submits thai companies (like property-development companies which lost land rights
in terms of the Group Areas Act) would also be entitled lO claim, because any other interpretation would run
contrary to the spirit of the act.
1920 This term is defined as "including the spouse or partner in a customary union of such person whether or not such
customary union has been registered." Registration of customary unions was only compulsory in Natal. In effect,
therefore, most of these customary unions are not registered.
1921 S 121 (2) IC; S 25(7) FC read with s 2() )(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act. The extent to which communities
will exercise their rights to institute claims for restitution against the state, is not certain. It is not generally so that
the victims of forced removals still form cohesive groups or communities. Mostly they have been dispersed over a
wide geographical area, which renders it difficult to identify homogenous groups capable of demanding
consolidated pieces of land. Cf Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelarnira & Werle (cds)
Confronting Past injustices (1996) 123. 11is, however, not required that a community wanting to submil a claim
need to still live together as a group. The community also need 110t have continued occupying land on a communal
basis.
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land distribution system imposed by apartheid. This becomes apparent from the definition of
"community" in the Restitution of Land Rights Act:1922
" '[C]ommunity' means any group of persons whose rights in land are derived from shared rules
determining access to land held in common by such group, and includes part of any such group."
The "shared rules" referred to in the definition could mean that in appropriate circumstances,
mechanisms of land control could be based on status or on a specific understanding of legal
personality. Thus, access to land need not involve the original rights of landowners to exclude
others from the use and enjoyment of the land.I923 As becomes apparent from an analysis of the
nature of claims by communities, claims for restitution on the basis of informal tenure need not
be permitted under all circumstances.F'" The act provides for claims of rival groups within a
single community.P'"
(ii) The claimant must have been dispossessed. Neither the Restitution of Land Rights Act,
nor the provisions of the Interim and Final Constitution contain a definition of "dispossession".
From case law it appears that the claimant need not have been physically dispossessed of the
land. The withdrawal of permission to control land is apparently sufficient. "Dispossession"
apparently also includes "downgraded" in the sense that the person or community was forced, as
a result of racially based legislation, to exchange a stronger right in land for a weaker one.1926 In
Dulabh v Department of Land Affairsl927 it had to be decided whether the claimants would
qualify as applicants under the Restitution of Land Rights Act, seeing that they never lost
physical possession of the property concerned. The transfer of the property under a will to the
heiress, being of the Indian group, was prohibited when the area was proclaimed a white area
under the Group Areas Actl928. The Community Development Board obtained the property at a
reduced price, but the family remained on as tenants. The property was later sold to a white
owner, but the family remained tenants. Subsequent to the abolition of the racially based land
control system, the family bought back the property in 1994 and sent a letter to the commission
setting out a fully motivated claim for compensation. With regard to the issue relating to
dispossession, it was found that the fact that the claimants had leased the property for over 20
years indicated that they were never willing to part with it and were determined retain physical
possession.V" It was found that the prohibition of the transfer of property to the heiress and the
1922 S 1 "community", Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1923 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 123.
1924 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 123.
1925 Cf definition of "community"; s 13(1)(b); s 35(3), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1926 Cf Nehabeleng v Phasha 1998 3 SA 578 (LeC). This case involved the application for an interim interdict
preventing the respondent from making any new allotments of the land concerned, the meaning of "dispossession"
was also considered. Here both parties claimed that they had authority over the land at stake (595G-I). It was found
that the requirement of "dispossession" would be complied with if the applicant could prove that his tribe had
previously exercised exclusive control over the land in question, and that this control was reduced or removed by
governmental action, he would be sucessful (595G-596F).
1927 1997 4 SA 1108 (LeC) par 25 - 31.
192836 of 1966.
192919974 SA 1108 (LeC) 1118F.
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subsequent sale thereof to the Community Development Board constituted a dispossession of her
right in land.1930 Because all the other requirements were fulfilled,1931 the court concluded that a
dispossession had occurred.
(iii) The claimant had to have been deprived of a right in land. This term is defined to
denote:
"any right in land whether registered or unregistered, [including] the interest of a labour tenant and
sharecropper, a customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and
beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in
question"
This definition quite clearly includes "lesser" real rights and personal rights. No numerus clausus
of rights in land is contemplated by the definition. The Land Claims Court has ruled that rights
in Land include the "right to inherit and take transfer of property" 1932and "rights derived from
occupation (in certain circumstances) or from customary law.,t1933 It is thus clear that the
definition of rights in land supports the argument for an extended category of rights, which does
not readi ly comply with the categorisation of rights in private law as either real or personal.1934
In fact, it stretches much further than "real rights" (whether properly registered in terms of the
Deeds Registries Act 1935or "embryonic" in the sense of susceptible of registration, but not duly
registered as such 1936).The express inclusion of "rights" (or claims) of labour tenancy1937 and
sharccropping'Ï'" supports the view that the category of rights in land is not determined on the
basis of the traditional notion of registrable real rights alone. Similarly, the inclusion of
customary law interests in the definition of rights in land indicates that the definition is quite
wide, and that it does not support a categorisation of rights into either real or personal. In fact,
the further incorporation of "beneficial occupation" as a right in land indicates the intention to
bring even forms of possession not otherwise covered and possibly of dubious standing within
the ambit of the restitution policy.1939 This, together with the inclusion of the category of
"beneficiaries under a trust agreement" indicates that the definition of rights in land is in
principle aimed first and foremost at eliminating all possible forms of racial discrimination on
the basis of land segregation by making the category of rights capable of resloration as wide as
possible.
1930 More specifically her right to inherit and take transfer of the property.
1931 She was dispossessed of her right by s 23 of the Group Areas Act, a racially discriminatory law, and
Proclamation 212 of24 July 1968, which delineated the property to fall within a white group area (l120C-D).
1932 Re DuIaM: Re Elf 1687, King William's Town Lee Case no 14/96, par 25 - 31.
1933 Nehabeleng v Phasha 1998 3 SA 578 (LCC) par 27.
1934 Cf Carey-Miller Land Tille (2000) 323.
193547 of 1937.
1936 ef the discussion of Carey-Miller Land Tille (2000) 323.
1937 Cf320 ct seq infra.
1938 The system of shareropping involved black people living on and working parts of while-owned farmland. The
significant feature was thai the landowner provided the seed and the parties shared the crop 011 the basis of an
agreement. This system was abolished by the Black Land Act 27 of 1913, which had the effect of stripping black
African cash tenants and sharecroppers of their land. Carey-Miller Land Tille (2000) 324.
1939 Carey-Miller Land Tille (2000) 324 - 325.
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(iv) Dispossession must have taken place after 19 June 1913.1940This requirement reflects
the view that land restitution in South Africa is not directed at restoring ancestral lands on the
basis of pre-colonial entitlement.V" The moral basis for the South African restitution process is
apparently found in the illegitimate and systematic monopolisation of the country's land surface,
instrumentally consolidated by laws effecting racial segregation after 1913.1942The South
African land restitution policy is, in principle, aimed at correcting these inequities administered
by "internal" colonialism. The reversal of dispossession of land before 1913 is left to a later,
more gradual process of land reform (in the redistribution and tenure reform programmes) and
the economic empowerment of the landless.1943
(v) The dispossession must have had the purpose of furthering the object of a racially
discriminatory law or practice.1944 No definition exists of the term "racially based land
measure." However, reference to sections 121 to 123 IC could be of some help.1945The historical
and statutory context of a contested provision could, furthermore, provide the necessary
interpretative background.Y" especially if it is viewed in relation to the underlying purpose of
the Restitution of Land Rights Act.1947The judgement of Bam, J in Farjas (Pty) Ltd v Regional
Land Claims Commissioner, KwaZulu Natal1948 indicates that deciding whether a particular
expropriation had been effected under or for the purpose of furthering the object of a law which
would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in s 8(2) IC
would require that commissioners delve deeply into complex issues.1949The reason for the
1940S 121(3) IC, read with s 2(1)(a) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1941Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 316 - 317 points out that the White Paper of 1997 expresses the government's
view that the judicial process system of the Restitution of Land Rights Act would be ineffective when applied to
historic land claims. The reasons provided for the argument in the White Paper of 1997 that South Africa's ancestral
land claims would create a number of problems and legal-political complexities that would be impossible to unravel
(par 4.14.2.) are: (i) that most historic claims are justified on the basis of tribal affiliations and that entertaining such
claims would awaken and/or prolong destructive ethnic and racial politics; (ii) that members of ethnically defined
communities have increased in number more than eight times in the 20th century alone and do not form cohesive
groups any more; and (iii) that large parts of South Africa could be subject to overlapping and competing claims
where peices ofland have been occupied in succession by, eg San, Khoi, Xhosa, Mfengu, Trekkers and British.
1942Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 94.
The cut-off date for dispossessions enabling restitution resembles that of the coming into force of the Black Land
Act. A further consideration for not including restitution claims originating in the time before 1913 was found in the
ANC's concern that such claims would be politically divisive. They feared that the Inkatha Freedom Party would use
the land restitution process to stake an ethnic claim to the whole of KwaZulu-Natal.
1943Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 95
n 18.
1944S 25 FC read with s 2(1)(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act. Racially discriminatory laws under which forced
removals were effected include: s 5(1)(b), Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; s 2,3, 13(2),26(5),29(1),33(5)
and 37(3), Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936; s 2, 3(2), 9(1), 16(1)(a), 38(3)(1) and 38(3)(P), Blacks
(Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945; "enabling provisions," National States Constitutions Act 21 of 1971;
Borders of Particular States Extension Act 2 of 1980; s 27bis, Black Laws Amendment Act, 42 of 1964; s 41, Group
Areas Act 36 of 1966; s 35, 38, Community Development Acts 3 of 1966 and 41 of 1984). CfRoux "The Restitution
of Land Rights Act" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998) eh 3A, 19.
1945 Minister of Land Affairs v Slamdien LCC 107/98 of 26 November 1998, par 21.
1946Par 27.
1947Par 28 - 29. The preamble of the Restitution of Land Rights Act might play an important role in such an inquiry.
194819982 SA 900 (LCC).
1949937D.
305
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property ill Germany and South Africa
complexity was explained with reference to the South African societal structure under
apartheid: 1950
"One of the reasons why this issue will frequently be a vexed and hotly contested one is precisely that
South African society was saturated with laws which directly and indirectly discriminated against
persons along the lines enumerated in s 8(2) [IC]. There was scarcely any aspect of life and activity
that was not permeated with racial discrimination.
"Consequently, there was many a law and many an expropriation which at first might appear
innocuous, only to emerge to be serving or promoting racist interests upon closer scrutiny. The
Expropriation Act was particularly vulnerable to abuse since there was no obligation on expropriators
to state the specific purpose for which the expropriation was being made ... "
Although some statutory provisions effecting forced removals were quite obviously racially
discriminatory; certain apparently "race-neutral" provisions could have similar effects.1951
Unlawful dispossessions, although not strictly speaking effected "as a result or' racially
discriminatory law, can also come under the purview of this requiremenl.1952 Furthermore, not
only the actions of governmental organs can give rise to restitution. The inclusion of the term
"discriminatory practice" implies that so-called "private-law evictions", that is, evictions carried
out by private persons within a prevailing climate of racially based evictions, could also give rise
to an entitlement to claim restitution.1953 Accordingly, Bam J found that even though not each
and every expropriation was invariably tinged with an element of racial discrimination, the
appropriate approach in cases of dispossession by expropriation should be that 1954
"only when it is patently clear that there is no racial discrimination that a Regional Land Claims
Commissioner would be entitled to reject a claim."
The Land Claims Court thus tends to interpret the requirement that dispossession had to occur in
terms of a racially discriminatory law or practice generously,1955 but seemingly attempts to relate
the interpretation to practices with land in particular. The case of Minister of Land Affairs v
Slamdienl956 concerned land bought and registered in 1955, after which the area in which the
land was situated was declared a "coloured group area" in terms of the Group Areas Act. The
state purchased the land in 1970 and established a primary school on il. The applicant sought a
declaratory order to the effect that the respondents were not dispossessed of a right in land as a
result of past discriminatory laws or practice.1957 It was decided, on applying a purposive
306
1950937E_G.
1951S 22, Slums Act 6 of 1959; s 15(5)(a), Community Development Act 3 of 1966; s 6F, Prevention of Illegal
Squalling Act 52 of 1951.
1952Roux "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" In Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998)
eh 3A, 19.
1953Cf, for instance, the situation of the San-community in the orthem Cape. Approximately 12 800 hectares of
land close to Kimberly (Platfontein) were handed over to them in 1999 (Daily Mail & Guardian, 20 May 1999). In
1998, a deal was made with thc San community living in the area formerly known as the Kalahari Gemsbok
National Park, enabling them to jointly own and manage a large part of this nature reserve (Daily Mail & Guardian,
23 December 1998). Online at http://www.mg.co.za/mglnews.html[21.05.19991-
19541998 2 SA 900 (LeC) 938B.
1955Cf Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 332, relying on the decision of Fatjas (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims
Commissioner, KwaZ"I,,-NCttaI1998 2 SA 900 (LCC).
1956LCC 107/9801'26 November 1998.
1951The issue was determined (at par II) with regard to three questions: (a) was the Group Areas Act a racially
discriminator}' law as referred to ill section 2( I)(a) and defined in section I of the Restitution Act, (b) was the
continued
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approach 1958to interpretation of this requirement, that the Group Areas Act was plainly the type
of law which was contemplated in section 2(1)(a) of the Restitution of Land Rights ACt.1959It
was, however, further decided that this finding as such did not constitute grounds for restitution.
The dispossession itself also has to fall within the ambit of the Restitution Act. It was
concluded 1960that, in this case, the discriminatory component of the practice was not directed at
the exercise of land rights, either directly or indirectly. The discrimination was directed at the
school's prospective pupils who would have to be educated separately from other race groups.
This type of racially discriminatory practice was, according to the decision, not contemplated in
section 2(1)(a) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. Moreover, it was found, dispossession in
this case was not "a result" of the Group Areas ACt.1961This indicatates that the existence of a
causal link between dispossession and racial discrimination is an important factor to be taken
into account when interpreting this requirement.
(vi) Dispossession must have taken place without payment of just and equitable
compensation. 1962This means that persons dispossessed of rights under the Expropriation Act1963
and corresponding legislation would in principle be excluded from claiming restitution.
However, if just and equitable compensation were not paid, a claim would be possible, provided
that all other requirements are met. Just and equitable compensation in this context is determined
by taking into account the factors listed in section 25(3)(a) to (e) Fe, or circumstances that
prevailed at the time of the dispossession.V'" Such circumstances might include the availability
of alternative land, which could have been bought with the compensation received, and the
suitability of any land, which might have been awarded in lieu of compensation. 1965There are
thus two bases upon which a bar against restitution might be established if the claimant had
already received a fair quid pro quO.1966 If just and equitable compensation was not paid at the
time of dispossession, the amount that was actually paid for compensation may be set off by the
court against an award of restitution in kind or restitution in money.
(vii) The claim for restitution had to be lodged on or before 31 December 1998. The Land
Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act,1967extended the cut-off date for the lodgement of
claims from 1 May 1995. Especially in the face of massive adult illiteracy in rural areas where
no or only limited access to the public media by potential claimants exists, the three-years period
building of the coloured school a racially discriminatory practice and (c) was the dispossession of the property as a
result of the law referred to in (a) or practice referred to in (b)?
1958 Dodson J explained (at par 12 - 13) that the purposive approach should be applied, as the statutory measure
originated directly from the bill of rights and was designed to give content to one of the rights included in the bill.
1959 Cf also Re Macleantown Residents Association 1995 4 SA 1272 (LCC) at 1277, where the Group Areas Act is
declared to "clearly [offend] the provisions of section 8(2) [IC]."
1960 Par 33.
1961 Par 41.
1962 S 2, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1963 Act 63 of 1975.
1964 S 2(2), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1965 Roux "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" In Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998)
eh 3A, 22.
1966 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 333.
196763 of 1997.
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for lodging claims can be regarded as fair.1968The deadline is subject to possible limitation on
the basis of a special mechanism, which allows all the claims in respect of a particular area of
land to be dealt with together as a matter of effective application of resource. 1969In Re Former
Highlands Residents1970 the question whether a number of claimants who did not submit their
claims timeously, could be allowed to piggy-back on claims lodged timely in respect of land in
the same township.'?" The late claimants inter alia submitted that, because of the constitutional
right to restitution of persons dispossessed of their property as a result of racially discriminatory
laws or practices, a generous rather than a legalistic perspective had to be favoured, which would
allegedly have the effect of allowing their (admittedly late) claims. It was held1972 that a
purposive approach to the Restitution of Land Rights Act made it clear that the act was not
focused simply on restoring the status quo ante, but that it instead limited the benefit of
restitution to persons who had lodged their claims timeously. Accordingly, late claims did not
gain validity just because other people lodged timely claims in respect of the same land.
Accordingly, the intervening claimants were denied a right to restitution.
2.1.1.1. Administrative proceedings
The restitution process is in essence administrative rather than adjudicatory. This means that
claims reach the Land Claims Court only in circumstances where the Commission for the
Restitution of Land Rights have done everything within its powers to resolve the claim, and was
not successful. The powers of the commission and its relation to the Land Claims Court have
been discussed above.1973 This section concentrates only on the procedure for lodgement of
claims.
A claim for restitution was lodged by completing and filing the prescribed forms at the office of
the Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights.1974The claim had to include a description of
the land in qucstion,1975 the nature of the right being claimed,'?" and the claimant's needs and
attitude towards receiving alternative land or compensation. The basis of the claim also
determined the kind of documents and certificates that could accompany the claim.1977In case of
1968 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwclamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
Injustices (1996) 120.
1969 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 332, relying on s 12(4), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1970 2000 I SA 489 (LCC).
1971 The claimants or their forebears were the owners of properties in the" ighlands township. They alleged that in
the mid-1960s they or their forebears had been dispossessed of certain properties as a result of racially
discriminatory laws or practices. With the exception of three intervening claimants, they had all lodged claims for
restitution in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act before the cut-off date of 31 December 1998.
1972 Par II.
1973 Cf 288 ct seq supra.
1974 SlO, Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1975 S IO( I), Restitution of Land Rights Act. This will require details of the history of the title to the land. other
interests in the land, the market value and the value of investments in the land and the present use to which the
property is being pul.
1976 This requires details such as the relationship between the dispossessed person and the claimant, the history of
dispossession, the hardship caused and the interests of the dispossessed, the amount of any compensation received,
and the claimant's needs and altitude towards receiving alternative land as compensation.
1977 Cf Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 240 - 341.
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a community claim, the basis of the applicant's representation and an appropriate resolution or
document supporting the right to represent the community had to be provided.1978 If the
appropriate regional land commissioner was satisfied that the claim met the entry requirements
and that it was not frivolous or vexatious,1979 the claim was made public for the benefit of
persons who may have had interests in the claim.1980Otherwise, the commissioner had to advise
the claimant why the claim has not been approved.V"
The Restitution of Land Rights Act set certain "acceptance criteria" which should be met in order
to enable the regional land claims commissioner with jurisdiction over a specific claim to publish
notice of it in the Gazette.1982 These include the seven "qualifying criteria,,1983plus two1984
additional requirements: (i) the claim has to be lodged in the prescribed manner;1985and (ii) the
claim should not be frivolous or vexatious.1986 In the Farjas case,1987it was remarked that the
acceptance criteria for the restitution process involved, on the one hand, matters in respect of
which the commissioners could exercise no independent discretion, and on the other hand,
discretionary criteria which could involve complexities and needed to be approached with great
caution. On the basis of this distinction, the acceptance criteria can be either classified as
"substantive" or "formal".
The decision in the Farjas case was primarily concerned with the basis upon which a regional
commissioner's discretion should be exercised. As such, the decision provides important
guidelines as to the substantive acceptance criteria. The case concerned a review of the regional
land claims commissioner's dismissal of a claim for restitution as being frivolous or vexatious.
Upon review of the commissioner's decision, Dodson J emphasised that section 24 IC elevated
the right to administrative justice to the status of a constitutional right and thereby widened the
High Court's common law powers of review relating to an administrative action
considerably.Y" It was also indicated that the inquiry called for under section 11(3) of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act involved two aspects: 1989(i) reference to the legislation under
1978 S 10(3), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1979 Farjas and Another v The Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Kwazulu-Natal1998 2 SA 900 (LCC).
1980 S 11(1), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1981 S 11(4), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1982 S 11(1), Restitution of Land Rights Act. However, in the case of Farjas and Another v The Regional Land
Claims Commissioner, Kwazulu-Natal (923F) it was indicated that the standard of proof is not as onerous as the
Commission might have perceived it to be, and that the applicants are merely expected to show that they have an
arguable case.
1983 Cf301 supra.
1984 A third requirement, that no order had been made by the court in terms of section 35 of the Restitution of Land
Rights Act in respect of the land in question, was deleted by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act
18 of 1999.
1985 S 1I(l)(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act. This entails compliance with the requirements of the prescribed
claim form in Annexure A. Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 342.
1986 S 1I(l)(c) and (3), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
1987 Farjas (Pty) Ltd v Land Claims Commissioner, KwaZulu-Natal1998 2 SA 900 (LCC) at 937A-B.
1988 910F-G, 912H - 913A.
1989 It should be noted that the Restitution of Land Rights Act was amended and that no distinction between two
different aspects of the inquiry is made since the amendment by Act 63 of 1997. Nevertheless, the new unitary
requirement that the dispossession must be "a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices" still admits the
form of dispossession involved in the Farjas case. Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 344.
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which dispossession had been effected and (ii) the issue whether dispossession had been effected
for the purpose of furthering the object of a law which today would be inconsistent with the
equality clause. It was then found that the commissioner in this instance omitted the first aspect
and failed to refer to the relevant legislation.l"" It was further indicated that the commissioner
erred in her finding as to the basis of the legislation upon which dispossession occurred.I991 It
was also found that the dismissal of the claim as being frivolous or vexatious was based on the
commissioner's finding that just and equitable compensation had been paid when dispossession
had occurred. This was not what was required of her: unless she had been convinced that the
applicants had indisputably received just and equitable compensation as contemplated in s
121(4) IC and that their pursuit oftbe claim was an intentional abuse of the land claims process,
she ought to have accepted the claims.1992 Moreover, because the applicant was not invited even
to show why the compensation was not just and equitable, there was also a general failure to
comply with the audi et alteram partem rule.1993 The applicant should also have been furnished
with reasons for the dismissal and ought to have been given the opportunity to respond and
amplify the claim. The commission was accordingly ordered to reconsider the applicant's claim
under section II (I) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
As far as the "frivolous or vexatious" nature of claims is concerned, the court found that a claim
or legal proceeding would meet this description if it is pursued where there is plainly no prospect
of success and the motive of the claimant or plaintiff is to harass the defendant.'?" Thus, if it
emerged from the documents submitted with the claim or otherwise available to the respondent
that the applicants had indisputably received just and equitable compensation as contemplated in
section 121(4) IC and that their pursuit of the claim was an intentional abuse of the land claims
process, and this view was not altered by the hearing afforded to them, the commissioner would
have been entitled to dismiss the claim for being frivolous or vexatious. This requirement was
presumably introduced in order to provide the commission with the opportunity to dismiss
claims which are mainfestly without substance or merit summarily, and to avoid the waste of
resources involved in the preliminary processing or a claim which is manifestly lacking in any
merit or substancc.1995
In the Forjas case, the court identified the lodging of the claim in the prescribed manner and the
required date of 19 June 1913 as a limit to determine whether dispossessions qualify for
restitution, as purely mechanical considerations involving no independent discretion.1996 These
would, therefore, constitute the formal acceptance criteria. The requirement that the claim has lO
1990 1998 2 SA 900 (LCC) 9201 - 921E, 924F - 9258.
1991 She found that the land in question had been expropriated under the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 and failed to
consider the fact that the land was in fact expropriated under s 21(1)(a) of the Housing Development Act (House of
Delegates) 4 of 1987, a provision that arguably would not survive scrutiny under s 8(2) IC. Thus, even had she
conducted the first leg of the enquiry required by s 121(2)(b) IC, the commissioner had been completely mistaken as
to the law under which it had been effected (921 F-G, 922G).
19929261 - 927E.
1<)<)) 926G-I.
1994 9278-C.
1'195 C '11 .arey-Mi er Laud Title (2000) 346.
1996 1998 2 SA 900 (LeC) 936 - 937.
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be lodged in the prescribed manner indicates the significance of the fact that the restitution
process is by nature rather administrative than litigious or adjudicatory.V" It is also directly
connected to the effectiveness of the restitution process. The requirement that the dispossession
must have occurred after 19 June 1913 is a matter of factual evidence.
In contrast to the deadline for lodging, no definite time limit is set for the settlement of claims.
This might be detrimental to owners whose land is subject to restitution claims, as the mere
threat of a restitution claim could sterilise property for years.1998 Decades of wrongdoing,
however, cannot be undone overnight. Besides, the administrative side of the process is
expedited by the requirement'Ï" that the commissioner should provide reasons why a specific
claim has not been referred to the Land Claims Court if more than nine months have passed since
it has been lodged. The appeal procedure has also been simplified by the provision that either the
Constitutional Court or the Appellate Division has direct appeal jurisdiction for any claims from
the Land Claims Court. An element of balancing public and individual interests are, therefore,
also present in the procedure pertaining to land restitution.
2.1.1.2. Judicial proceedings
Claims are justiciable by the Land Claims Court only once they have been dealt with by the
commission. Matters may be referred to the Land Claims Court only ifoOO(i) the parties to a
dispute arising from a claim have agreed, in writing, that settlement by mediation and
negotiation is not possible,2oo1 (ii) the regional land claims commissioner has certified that it is
not feasible to resolve any dispute arising from the claim by mediation and negotiation,2oo2 or
(iii) the regional land claims commissioner is of the opinion that the claim is ready for hearing by
the court.2003Parties may be represented by either an attorney or advocate, and where the Chief
Land Claims Commissioner considers it necessary, legal representation may be arranged for
parties unable to afford their own.2004
If the parties could come to an agreement, the regional land claims commissioner should provide
a written validation, certifying that the agreement ought not to be referred to the court.200S
1997 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 347.
1998 Cf also, in the German context, 366 infra.
1999 S 14(7) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2000 Certified confirmation by the Chief Land Claims Commissioner is necessary in all cases. Moreover, any claim
referred to the court must be accompanied by a document incorporating the results of the commission's
investigations into the merits of the claim, a report on the failure of any party to accede to mediation, a list of the
parties with interest in the claim, and the commission's recommendations as to the most appropriate manner in
which the claim can be resoved. S 14(2), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2001 S 14(1)(a), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2002 S 14(1)(b), Restitution of Land Rights Act. Feasibility in this context is not connected to the now repealed
general requirement of a feasibility certificate.
2003 S 14(1)(d), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2004 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 127.
2005 S 14(3), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
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However, referral of an agreement is still possible2006 in terms of section Il of the Restitution of
Land Rights Act if (i) the regional land claims commissioner is of the opinion that a question of
law arising out of the agreement needs to be resolved; (ii) there is doubt as to whether or not all
parties who have an interest in the claim are parties to the agreement; (iii) there is doubt as to the
validity of the agreement or any part of it; (iv) there is doubt as to the feasibility of the
implementation of the agreement; (v) the agreement is not just and equitable in respect of any
party; (vi) the agreement is contrary to the provisions of the Restitution of Land Rights Act; (vii)
the authority of any signatory is in doubt; (viii) the agreement is vague and contradictory; (ix)
the parties to the agreement agree that it is desirable that the agreement be made an order of
court; or (x) the agreement ought to be referred to the court for any other good reason.2OO7
The court must, in terms of section 33 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, consider certain
factors when deciding whether or not to award restitution of rights in land, compensation or
alternative relief. They are: (i) the desirability of providing restitution to people dispossessed
under discriminatory laws; (ii) the desirability of remedying past human rights violations; (iii)
the requirements of equity and justice; (iv) the feasibility of a restoration order; (v) any
affirmative action measure pertaining to the land in question; (v) the desirability of avoiding
major social disruption; (vi) the amount of compensation received in respect of dispossession;
(vii) the history of the dispossession, hardship caused, current use of the land and the history of
the acquisition of the land, (viii) the changes over time in the value of money if an order for
equitable redress is contemplated; and (ix) any other relevant factor consistent with the spirit and
objects of the constitution and the principle of substantive equality.
After having considered the feasibility of a particular order and having determined whether any
compensation has already been awarded to the c1aimant/008 the court may make one of several
possible orders:2oo9
(i) The court may review an administrative act, an interdict or a mandamus or a declaration
of rights upon application by an aggrieved party_2°JO In limited circumstances (for instance,
where the facts are in dispute), the review may be sought through the action procedure.
(ii) The court may order that rights in respect of certain land specified in the application
ought nol to be restored. Such an order might bind the claimants and/or the state.20J J The court
should, accordingly, be satisfied that it is in the public interest that the rights in question should
not be restored to a specific claimant and that the public or any substantial part thereof will suffer
2006 In which case II should be accompanied by a copy of the relevant deed of settlement and a report providing the
background mformation regarding the claim and the settlement, information necessary for the court to establish
whether or not it has jurisdiction, the reasons for the referral of the matter, and any recommendations the regional
land claims commissioners may make as to how the matter should be dealt with. S 14(4), Restitution of Land Rights
Act.
2007 S 14(3A)(i) - (xi), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2008 Cf Pienaar Nuwe Sakeregtelike Ontwikkelings Inaugural address (1997) 9.
200<) In terms of s 123 IC.
2010 Cf eg the Forjas case discussed 308 et seq supra.
2011 Scollo-Lavizzari Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment Research Dissertation, LL M
(1996) 26.
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substantial prejudice unless a barring order is made_2°12Consequently, the state may not confer
such rights in respect of land by way of consent. Instead, the court could, for instance order that
alternative land for restitution be allocated to the claimants, or that compensation be paid to
them. In Ex Parte North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils,
Durban2013 the applicant sough a so-called blocking order in terms of section 34(5)(b) of the
Restitution of Land Rights Act. Potential claimants of restitution opposed it. Finally, a
compromise order was made, based on a negotiated settlement. In the course of the judgement,
however, the meaning of the twin prerequisites of the barring order of section 34(6) of the act
was considered. Influenced by the procedure of balancing private and public interests in the
context of Australian native title, the court concluded that it would be almost axiomatic that
restoration of rights in that specific case would be in the public interest, given the history of
dispossession and the resultant devastation and hardship suffered by the forcibly removed
community.Y'"
(iii) As regards awards to claimants, four possibilities are foreseen: Where the land in
question is owned by the state, the court may order the state to restore the rights in that land to
the claimant.2015Where the land in question is under private ownership, the court may again
order the state to purchase or expropriate the land and restore the relevant right to the claimant.
Likewise, an order can also be made for expropriation or purchase of a part of such land or of
rights in the land_2°16Where restoration of the land in question is not feasible, the court may
order the state, in lieu of restoration of the rights, to grant the claimant appropriate rights in
alternative state-owned land designated by the state to the satisfaction of the court and certified
by the state as feasible.2017The court may also order the state, in lieu of restoration of the right,
to pay the claimant just and equitable compensation upon consideration of all relevant
factors.2018The court may, however, also grant the claimant alternative relief.2019These awards
can also be accompanied by ancillary orders to implement the main court order.
(iv) If monetary compensation is decided upon, the court must determine the amount and
manner of payment.2020 If an amount is not negotiated between the Department of Land Affairs
and the parties involved, this might prove difficult for the court. It is submitted that the standard
applicable to the determination of compensation for expropriation should apply to the
2012S 34(6), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
20131998 (I) SA 78 (LCC).
201486H.
2015S 123(l)(a) IC.
2016S 123(l)(b) IC. Expropriation is, however, a last resort according to the policy of the Department of Land
Affairs. If it is ordered that privately owned land should be acquired for the purpose of restitution of land rights,
attempts will first be made at purchasing the land in question.
2017S 123(3)(a) IC.
2018S 123(3)(b) IC.
2019S 123(3)(c) IC.
2020Although the Land Claims Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine compensation in respect of an
expropriation pursuant to an order made by the Court in terms ofs 35(l)(a), read with s 35(5), of the Restitution of
Land Rights Act after the expropriation has taken place, the court has no jurisdiction to determine the compensation
in respect of such expropriation until the expropriation has actually taken place. In Re Farmerfield Communal
Property Trust 1999 (I) SA 936 (LCC) 942F-G, 942H-I.
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determination of monetary compensation as a substitute for restitution in kind. If the Land
Claims Court orders an expropriation of private land, the requirement stated in section
25(3) FC,2021 that "just and equitable" compensation should be paid, must be observed. This is
determined by considering "all relevant circumstances," but especially including:2022
(a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the
market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition
and beneficial capital (c) improvement of the property; and the purpose of the expropriation.
Expropriation is, however, a last resort according to the policy of the Department of Land
Affairs. If it is ordered that privately owned land should be acquired for the purpose of restitution
of land rights, attempts will first be made at purchasing the land in question.
The court's powers are further supplemented by the Restitution of Land Rights Act, in order to
ensure that the restitution process is consistent with the broader reform programme, and that land
is put to its best uses within the constraints of the existing formal and informal tenure
arrangements. Section 35(2) thus empowers the court to give directions for the implementation
of its order. This can entail (i) ordering that any compensation received must be repaid; (ii)
determining preconditions for restoration; (iii) providing for the manner in which rights are held
under communal tenures; and also (iv) making recommendations to the minister concerning the
priority to be given to some claimants for access to state resources for the sake of development.
314
2.1.2. Evaluation
Whereas restitution might not be explicitly focussed on development of the property law order as
SUCh,2023the restitution policy and its implementation by the legislature and the courts have some
important implications for the development of property law in South Africa. These implications
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.1.2.1. The extent to which existing rights have to accommodate new policies
The central concept, rights in land, was created in section 121(2) IC, but not defined. Instead, it
was left to Parliament to decide what the scope of the land claims process, and therefore also the
content of the term rights in land would be. If only dispossession of real rights "in land" would
qualify for restitution, the number of possible claims would have been significantly less.
Numerous persons forcibly removed under apartheid were not owners in the strict private law
sense, and not even the holders of real rights in land, but possessors, labour tenants,
sharecroppers or lessees.2024 In the case of sharccropping2025 and cash tenancl026 limited real
2021 Section 123(2) IC read with section 28(3) IC contained similar provisions.
2022 S 25(3)(a) - (c) Fe. The corresponding provision in the Interim Constitution (s 123(2) IC) also provided for the
taking Into account of "all relevant factors." including the history of the dispossession, the hardship caused, the use
to which the property is being pul, the history of its acquisition by the owner, the interests of the owner, persons
affected by the expropriation and the dispossessed. Cf236 Clseq supra.
2011 Carey-Miller 1999 SAU 750.
2024 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwclarnira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 123.
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rights could, in appropriate circumstances, be established. Past dispossessions of rights under
apartheid legislation,2027 like quitrent, permission to occupy and commonage would probably
also amount to real rights. The dispossession of these "rights" might also have given rise to
claims for restitution.2028 However, rights in terms of a lease are contractual or personal rights,
which would not qualify for restitution in terms of a strict interpretation of the term rights in
land. The decision of De Jager v Sisana,2029although controversial.Y'" created the impression
that labour tenancy rights were also personal in nature. Finally, possession is not considered to
be a "right" but a factual circumstance, which would possibly also exclude restitution claims
related to previous possession.
The decisions as to whether only the "black spot" removals should be reversed, whether the
grievances of communities who never had more than informal rights to land should also be
addressed, and whether urban claims should be included in the restitution programme, turned out
to be a difficult political nut to crack.2031Eventually, the land claims process was given an
extensive scope.2032Apart from previously held registered real rights also more "informal" rights
in land, like sharecropping and labour tenancy are embraced in the definition of rights in land.
Nevertheless it seems as if the executive interprets the scope of the land claims process more
restrictively. In the White Paper of 1997,2033the Department of Land Affairs stipulated that
certain categories of labour tenants and victims of "betterment" policies would not qualify for
restitution, and should be accommodated within the other elements of the land reform
programme. However, these categories of persons could, if all requirements were complied with,
also have fallen within the ambit of the restitution process. For instance, victims of "betterment
planning" - a policy furthering the objectives of apartheid land law - could have been entitled to
enforce restitution if they could prove that they had a "customary law interest,,2034in the land in
question.2035
With the incorporation of the requirement that a claim should qualify as a "right in land" and
with the exceptionally wide definition attached to this requirement, an effective break with the
categorisation of rights as either "personal" or "real" has been achieved in the context of
restitution. This is an important development as far as the distinction between private and
2025 Van der Merwe 1990 Stell LR 321, 333.
2026 Eg when the rule huur gaat voor koop comes into operation against the lessor's successor in title for the duration
of a valid lease. Cf Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314.
2027 Eg GN R29, R 30, R402, R 404, R 405 of9 March 1988 and GN R293 enacted in terms of Act 38 of 1927.
2028 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 124.
20291930 AD 71.
2030 Cf 320 infra.
2031 Roux "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" In Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998)
eh 3A, 14.
2032 Cf s 1 "right in land", Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2033 Par 4.14.3, online at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/landwp.html[19.05.2000).
2034 Nehabeleng v Phasha 1998 3 SA 578 (LCC) par 27 states that the definition of right in land contemplates
"rights derived from occupation (in certain circumstances) or from customary law."
2035 Roux "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" In Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998)
eh 3A, 14.
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constitutional property is concerned, as the restitution of land rights can operate in both the
public and the private sphere. The programme is based on the constitutional directive for it, but
can influence rigbts of individuals to a similar extent as it can influence the position of the state
with regard to landownership. In other words, the restitution of "rights in land" is an important
example of how the existing private law can be overriden by a constitutional correction of tbe
imbalances (in this case in the distribution of land) that exist in the South African society.
The restitution process focusses on the provision of rights in and access to land, on the basis of
the constitutional prerogative to address racial discrimination under the previous statutory order.
The obvious question is to what extent existing property rights can be maintained in the face of
severe policy changes. The Diepsloot decisions, which were handed down in the pre-transitional
period, already indicated that inroads on existing property rights would be sanctioned in view of
the urgent socio-economic need for housing and access to land, even if it would be to the
economic disadvantage of the holders of existing rights.
The legislative measures implementing land restitution focus extensively on administrative
proceeding in processing and effecting the restoration and restitution of rights. Recourse to the
judiciary for the enforcement of rights is reserved as a last resort. From the review proceedings
before the Land Claims Court,2036 it seems as if existing right holders are to an increasing extent,
in terms of the restitution legislation, left to the mercy of administrative authorities. Tbese
authorities can, in effect, decide when and to which extent existing rights should yield to policies
underlying the administrative decisions. Judging from the ad hoc character of the restitution
process, the powers of the administration to determine the kinds of inroads on private property
that should be tolerated is cause for concern. Such administrative decisions are not necessarily
conducive to legal certainty. Moreover, such decisions could involve a violation of the element
of trust inherent to the constitutional state principle, which would be di fficuIt to monitor.
Nevertheless, the restitution policy is apparently guided by the principles of fairness and justice
and driven by the just demands of claimants who have been dispossessed. lnherent in these
principles of fairness and justice is a consideration of the broader development interests of the
country and the responsible exploitation of limited state resources_2°37 The Restitution of Land
Rights Act leaves room for restitution awards that reflect the difference between land and rights
in land. It also provides for restitution awards that differ depending on whether the claimant is an
individual or a community. It furthermore envisages land rights that suit the social and political
position of individual members of a community, and accordingly provides for restitution awards
that take the potential weaknesses and insecurities of dispossessed land rights into account and
allow a suitable adjustment and strengthening of the rights that arc reslored.2038 Yet, the
316
2036 Eg Forjas (Pty) Ltd & another v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, Kwa'Zulu-Natal LCC 21/96.
2037 While Paper (1997) par 4.10.
203M Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275.
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hierarchy of property rights as it is known in private law is basically left intact, with dominium
of land still being the highest aspiration.2039
2.1.2.2. Objectives and character of restitution process
As has been indicated,2040the goal of the restitution policy is to restore land and to make other
restitution remedies available to people dispossessed by racially discriminatory legislation.i?"
Since the promulgation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, it has become clear that the
restitution programme would take centre stage in the new government's approach to redressing
past injustices. Roux2042summarises the policy considerations inherent in the Act as follows:
"More than any other recent statute, the Restitution of Land Rights Act seems to epitomise the
paradox at the heart of the struggle for social justice in South Africa. At its starkest, the question
posed by the Act is whether a society can ever hope, by dint of a fresh round of law-making, to undo
the effects of past unjust laws."
Restitution must be conducive to the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and development.
The process of restitution is accordingly characterised by the extensive powers granted to the
courts in making awards, coupled with a noticeable reticence as far as the nature or content of
rights that could or should be included in an order for restitution is concerned.
The Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Ace043 broadened the process, so that it is
no longer restricted to land or rights in land.2044Nevertheless, restitution is in principle aimed at
the restoration of land and/or land rights. However, the Land Claims Court is granted wide
powers to make alternative orders, like adjusting the nature of the right previously held by a
possible claimant, or determining the form of title under which the right may be held in
future.2045 Thus, it is ensured that the restitution award addresses the possible insecurity
connected to the specific land or right in land at stake, which could result in a situation where the
restitution award conflicts with other rights, or is paralysed by subsequent eviction.2046Similarly,
the Land Claims Court is also granted the power to take into account and make adequate
2039 S 2, Communal Property Associations Act constitutes a possible exception in that restitutions involving
communities may be structured in terms of the framework of communal property associations rather than in the
form of individual common-law ownership. Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275.
2040 Cf 298 supra.
2041 The original preamble to the Restitution of Land Rights Act reiterates this objective and links the act with the
constitutional prerogative of land reform: "Whereas the Constitution ... provides for the restitution of a right in land
to a person or community dispossessed under or for the purpose of furthering the objects of any racially
discriminatory law; and whereas legislation for this purpose is to be designed to promote the protection and
advancement of persons, groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to
promote their full and equal enjoyment of rights in land ... ".
2042 Roux "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" In Budlender, Latsky & Roux Juta's New Land Law (1998)
eh 3A, 3.
2043 63 of 1997.
2044 The preamble was amended by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997 to make it
clear that the restitution process is not restricted to actual restoration of land, but includes restitution of any property
as well as equitable redress, and that a major purpose of the act is to achieve equality, in accordance with the Final
Constitution. Van der Walt 1999 Koers 272.
2045 S 35(4), Restitution of Land Rights Act.
2046 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 273.
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provision for traditional or tribal land rights when making an order to a community, in order to
ensure that all members of tbe community receive equal access to the land awarded and that the
land is held in a manner appropriate under the circumstances.P"
The restitution process has been criticised by some as not being extensive enough. Indeed,
restitution is, by nature, a process limited in scope and lifespan, although it can influence a wide
variety of situations.2048 This appears from the targets envisaged by the White Paper on Land
Reform, which include: (i) a three year period for the lodgement of claims;2049 (ii) a five year
period for the Commission and Land Claims Court to finalise claims; and (iii) a ten year period
for the implementation of all court orders. The Restitution of Land Rights Act and the
programme of restitution coupled with it cannot by themselves alleviate all the injustice still
inherent in the land control system in South Africa. There are several reasons for this, which are
all connected to the limited scope and timespan of the restitution process:
(i) First, the restitution process does not provide for restoration of land rights lost because
of "external colonialism," that is, the restoration of title on the basis of pre-colonial ancestral
entitlement.2050 Most certainly, the compromise reached concerning the cut-off date for claims
does have harsh consequences for some interest groups not adequately represented at the
negotiations, like the Nama inhabitants of the north-western Cape, who were dispossessed of
their traditional land in 1848, when the boundaries of the Cape Colony were extended to the
Orange River.2os1 Some argue that wholesale nationalisation of land, coupled with a more openly
socialist system of wealth distribution would be the only fair and legitimate response to the
dispossession of the indigenous inhabitants during the era of colonial conquest.20S2 However,
arguments like these lose sight of the diversification of land rights over the past 400 years in
South Africa, and the massive demographic shifts involved in a restitution of rights held during
the earlier phases of colonialisation.2os3 It is submitted that a simplistic focus on an absolutist
approach to ownership, which is inherent in these arguments, would not solve South Africa's
land question. Moreover, the claim that settlers confiscated all South A frica's land from the
indigenous people during the l7'h century is not quite accurate. Whereas much land was indeed
taken by illegitimate means, especially in the north and east of the country, the establishment of
the early settlements and the circumstances in which land was transferred are more complex and
even more controversial than this argument proposes. The nature and effect of original and
derivative claims to title can mostly not be determined on the basis of legal and moral
2~7 S 35, Restinnion of Land Rights Act.
2~~ The process of restitution includes, but is not limited to land and "rights in land". The latter concept is
understood as being fairly extensive. Cf 30 I et seq supra.
204~ The three year period for lodgement of claims had to be calculated initially from I May 1995. The period for the
lodgement of claims was, however, extended to the 31 December 1998 by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws
Amendment Act 63 of 1997.
2050 Ie aboriginal title, as applied in Australia, ew Zealand and North America.
20~1 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past injustices (1996) 94.
2052 Cf, eg policy of the Pan-Africanist Congress.
2051 cr Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Wcrle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 121; Van der Merwe 1989 TSAR 663, 672 ; Bennett 1993 SA.!II!? 463 - 465.
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judgement. International law also recognises certain historical arguments that support the claim
that some land was indeed terra nullius/derelicta at the time of settlement.2054
(ii) Second, in spite of the gender inequality persisting in the present system of land
distribution in South Africa, women also do not gain considerable benefit from the restitution
programme. In traditional tribal societies in particular, women were often not capable of holding
any rights relating to land. Consequently, they cannot claim restitution, as no legal basis for the
claim would exist.
(iii) Third, in order to limit restitution claims to a workable number, claims based
exclusively on need were omitted from the land restitution process. These claims are to be
addressed in the broader land reform programme,2055 that is, in the course of tenure reform and
redistribution of land. It should also, where necessary, be linked to initiatives of establishing
gender equality in the South African society. This point is important in determining the nature of
the constitutional protection and regulation of land rights. Restitution seems to be based rather on
historical circumstance than on social statistics.
The land restitution process can clearly not be described as a comprehensive attempt to undo all
the injustices occasioned by apartheid land law. The White Paper of 1997 itself indicates three
distinct categories of unfair dispossessions which are not covered by the restitution programme:
(i) victims of dispossession prior to 1913 ;2056(ii) labour tenants;2057 and (iii) inhabitants of the
former Bantustans who were dispossessed under "betterment" policies.2058 The Restitution of
Land Rights Act itself is mainly concerned with keeping the possibilities of restitution of rights
dispossessed within a limited scope and timespan as open as possible. This is proven by the
broad distinction drawn between three categories of prejudice suffered through dispossession in
the White Paper of 1997.2059
Restitution of proprietary interests like business goodwill and lost profits, as well as non-
proprietary claims founded upon pain and suffering, will not be possible. Attempts at undoing
the injustices of the past by providing restitution can, furthermore, only be successful as far as
the state's fiscal limits allow. These constraints mean that the gesture of restitution is bound to be
more of a politically symbolic gesture than efficient reform promoting development. This
contributes to the pressing need for a restitution framework designed to satisfy at least some of
2054 Cf Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 121; Van der Merwe 1989 TSAR 663, 672; Bennett 1993 SAJHR 463 - 465.
2055 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
Injustices (1996) 116.
2056 White Paper (1997) par 4.14.3.
2057 White Paper (1997) par 4.14.3. The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 is designed to address the
needs of this group.
2058 White Paper (1997) par 4.14.3. Their needs should be addressed through tenure security programmes, land
administration reform and land redistribution support programmes.
2059 In some circumstances, dispossession lead to landlessness. Prejudice has also been suffered through inadequate
compensation for the value of the property. Dispossession has also lead to hardship that cannot be measured in
financial or material terms. White Paper (1997) par 4.14.1.
319
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property ill Germany and South Africa
the demands social justice while, simultaneously minimising new grievances.206O Carey-
Miller2061 points out that the history and circumstances of South Africa mean that comprehensive
land reform is essential in any meaningful transition to a just society. At the same time, however,
there appears to be a certain concern that a package of too radical reform proposals would not
serve the general interest. The market economy is apparently potentially sensitive to nature and
extent of this kind of refonn.2062 For the moment, the conclusion must be that actual
transformation of land and property law and the creation of new land rights are envisaged to take
place mainly by means of tenure reform or redistTibution_2063
2.2. Land redistribution
Whereas restitution involves restoring the control of some persons over land, which was
withdrawn during the apartheid era, and tenure reform involves the strengthening of rights of
those who have access to land, the redistribution effort is aimed mostly at those who did not have
land before, and still do not have sufficient access to land.2064 The purpose of land redistribution
is therefore to provide land for the rural and urban landless and at the same time improve their
standards of living, and the redistribution programme is intended to assist the urban and rural
poor, like farm workers, labour tenants and emergent falmers.2065 In this way, some of the
inequalities in current land distribution patterns can be addressed.2066 As such, this programme
gives priority to the marginalised and to women in need through projects that can be
implemented quickly and effectively. Land traditionally used for agriculture is, in particular,
affected by this element of the activities of the Department of Land Affairs,2°67 although the
redistribution programme also involves legislation dealing with residential land and housing.2068
The scope of this programme is in principle much wider than the restitution programme, and it
involves a wide variety of different policies, strategies and projects, which need to be viable and
20M Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 96.
2061 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 318.
2062 The White Paper of 1997 (box 4.7.) points out that restitution of land must be effected while maintaining public
confidence in the land market.
20M Cf the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, which provides that a restitution award to a community
shall be made in terms of the tenure reform programme. Cf also 334 infra.
2064 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275.
201lS Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) Il.
20M Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275.
20(,7 The most important initiatives are the Land Reform Pilot Project and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3
of 1996. The Pilot Project was announced by the Minister of Land Affairs on 28.02.1995 as part of a Presidential
Lead Programme envisaged by the White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme. It was meant
to "kick start" the land redistribution process in rural areas and involved the identification of areas in each province
where existing land users could be assited in acquiring additional land, as well as financial and technical assitance,
to help them achieve meaningful and sustainable land usc. Six pilot land reform districts were identified, ie the
Northern province (the so-called "White Finger," near Pietersburg); Eastern Cape (Queenstown); Free State (parts of
Bloemfontein, Dewetsdorp, Thaba'Nchu, Botshabelo, Exelsior en parts of Brandfort); Gauteng (the Rust and De
Winter areas); Northern Cape (the North-Eastern area); KwaZulu Natal (Weenen-Estcourt); and the Western Cape
(Southern area). Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) Il; Van der Walt 1999 Koers 279.
2068 In this regard, cf the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 112 of 1991, the Provision of Certain Land for
Settlement Act 126 of 1993, the Development Facilitation Act67 of 1995 and the Housing Act 107 of 1997.
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sustainable. In fact, this process is mainly embodied in state policies (on national, provincial and
local level) regarding the allocation of funds for development of land and building of houses or
for housing subsidies, and in laws that promote wider access to land and housing, in pursuance
of the redistribution imperative embodied in section 25(5) FC. Therefore, redistribution is not a
mere legal mechanism, but rather a more complex programme involving the promotion and
provision of state aid and assistance - in the form of finance and infrastructure - for the
acquisition of land by persons prejudiced by the unfair system of the old regime.2069
Although the redistributive land reform programme is supposed to be based on willing-buyer,
willing-seller arrangements'F" in the course of providing land to the landless, it also provides for
the acquisition of land rights by tenants. In this regard, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants)
Ace071 is of particular importance. However, there are several other legislative measures that are
equally significant to the effectivity of this programme_2°72 The Provision of Land and
Assistance Act2073provides for the designation of certain land and regulates the subdivision of
this land and the settlement of persons on such land. In principle, the act is aimed at bringing
common-law ownership within the reach of a wider part of the general public.2074 The
Development Facilitation Ace075 has a multi-faceted agenda and is, inter alia, aimed at
facilitating, simplifying and expediting the delivery of housing to the rural and urban pOOr.2076
The Housing Aceo77 is meant to provide for the facilitation of a sustainable housing development
process and applies to the provision of housing on national, provincial and local government
levels_2°78The Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act2079introduces new procedures on the
basis of which available land in certain areas can be transferred for the benefit of residents in
substitution for the land-holding system of the old Rural Areas Act. 2080
On the whole, the redistribution programme will probably involve the most far-reaching
innovations in South African property law, simply because of its scope and because of the
wrongs it intends to address. In general, the redistribution policies and laws function within the
common law conceptual and institutional structures already known in the times of apartheid. The
constraints of racial discrimination have simply been removed and access to land and housing
has been extended to people and communities who were previously excluded from it.
Nevertheless, the policies of land redistribution involve a response to the demand that the
2069 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 398.
2070 White Paper (1997) par 4.3.
2071 Act 3 of 1996.
2072 Cf Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 405 - 455 and Van der Walt 1999 Koers 275 - 281 for more detailed
discussions.
2073 126 of 1993, renamed by the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Amendment Act 26 of 1998.
2074 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 405 - 411 and Van der Walt 1999 Koers 276 - 277.
2075 67 of 1995.
2076 Cf in particular eh IV. Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 411 - 449 and Van der Walt 1999 Koers 277 - 278;
Latsky "The Development Facilitation Act" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux New Land Law eh 2A comments
extensively on the provisions of this act. Cf also 344 et seq infra.
2077 107 of 1997.
2078 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 278 - 279.
2079 94 of 1998.
2080 (House of Representatives) 9 of 1987. Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 449 - 445.
321
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.z
2.2.1. The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act: an example
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property in Germany and South Africa
maldistribution of land, brought about by centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid
government, must be restored. As such, it would contain excellent material from which examples
of the influence of the constitutional concept property on existing land law could be drawn.
However, it has been pointed out alreadlo81 that for purposes of the present legal-comparative
inquiry, the redistribution and tenure reform aspects of the South African land reform
programme will have to take the back seat.
In an attempt to select an example from the legislative arsenal of the redistribution programme
that would indicate the extent to which reliance on existing law is intertwined with the
legislature's need to be innovative, the most obvious choice should be the Land Reform (Labour
Tenants) ACt.2082Another option would be the Extension of Security of Tenure Act.2083The
former relates to a more restricted category of disadvantaged people, namely labour tenants,
whereas the latter concerns all persons occupying land of which they are not the registered
owners. In both instances, the measures are aimed at providing protection against unfair eviction
and the acquisition of rights in land, and are thus both aimed at redistribution as well as tenure
reform.
In view of the fact that the system of labour tenancy resulted from racially discriminatory
legislation and led to exploitation of individuals and denial of access to land, the promulgation of
the Labour Tenants Act was seen as imperative to broaden access to land on the one hand and to
provide adequate protection against recurrence of the wrongs induced by this system. The
acquisition of land or rights in land by labour tenants result in the redistribution of existing land
and thereby broadening the access to land.2084Since the present discussion is aimed at indicating
the tension between existing rights and newly created rights within the context of the
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its influence on structures of property in
private law, the rcstributory objectives of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act will enjoy
precedence in the following paragraphs. In a subsequent discussion of the government's tenure
reform and other legislative measures,2085 the protection of unfair eviction provided by the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act will then be considered.
1081 298 supra.
20M2 3 of 1996. Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 525 indicates that labour tenancy reforms are primarily about the
enhancement of an existing form of tenure and hence should be categorised as tenure reform legislation. Van der
Walt 1999 Koers 279 views the Labour Tenants Act as partially redistributory and partially tenure reform in its
orientation. Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 12 indicates that the promulgation of the act was seen
as imperative to broaden access to land on the one hand and to provide adequate protection against this kind of
discrimination being repeated in the future. The acquisition of land or rights in land by labour tenants hence result in
the redistribution of existing land and thereby broadening the access to land.
20K3 62 of 1997.
20K4 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 12.
20KS 332 et seq infra.
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2.2.1.1. Labour tenancy under apartheid
Labour tenancy is a contractual arrangement between an agricultural landlord and a tenant in
terms of which the tenant is obliged to provide labour in exchange for the right to occupy and
use a part of the farm for his or her own agricultural or residential purposes.2086 This practice is
found mainly in the north of KwaZulu-Natal and in the Mpumalanga, where there are between
30 000 and 40 000 labour tenants at present.2087 Labour tenants in South Africa have occupied
land for generations, usually with the expectation that the tenancy would endure irrespective of
the changes in the ownership of the land. Traditionally the rights of the tenants would devolve
automatically on death to their descendants.ê''"
The labour tenancy system is a direct result of the Black Land Act of 1913. Prior to that act
many black South Africans, deprived of ownership by earlier conquests, occupied land as
tenants, lessees, or sharecroppers. The Black Land Act of 1913 prohibited these arrangements.
To continue farming, the only alternative for those affected was to become labour tenants. The
nature of this right to labour tenancy was, at the outset, not clear. In De Jager v Sisana,2089 it was
held that labour tenancy could best be described as an innominate contract from which the tenant
gains no real rights in land. Consequently, compliance with the rules of labour tenancy rested
upon custom. Moreover, the system resulted in unfair discrimination and disadvantage in that
labour tenants were denied access to land.209o Between 1966 and 1980, the labour tenancy
system was progressively outlawed with the aim of reducing all black South Africans in so-
called white rural areas to the status of temporary wage labourers. More than one million people
were evicted under this scheme.2091
2.2.1.2. Objectives and operation of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act
Under the Labour Tenants Act, persons qualifying as "labour tenants" enjoy much better
protection than during the era before its enactment. Considerations of equity emerging from the
new constitutional order gave rise to the recognition of more secure tenure rights for labour
tenants.2092 The objectives of the Labour Tenants Act are twofold: On the one hand, the act
provides for the protection of the existing rights of labour tenants. On the other hand, it makes
provision for the acquisition of land for existing labour tenants by granting them the opportunity
2086 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
Injustices (1996) 117 n 22.
2087 Haythorn & Hutchinson "Labour Tenants and the Law" in Murray & O'Regan No Place to Rest (1990) 194.
2088 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
Injustices (1996) 124.
20891930 AD 71.
2090 Cfpreamble of Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act.
2091 Haythorn & Hutchinson "Labour Tenants and the Law" in Murray & O'Regan No Place to Rest (1990) 195 -
198; Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 117 n 22.
2092 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices
(1996) 124.
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to obtain a settlement or land access grant of RI 5 000 per household,2093 to enable them to
become landowners in own right. The present discussion is primarily concerned with this second
aspect, although mention will also be made of the first aim of the act.
2.2.1.2.1. Qualifying criteria for labour tenant protection
In order to enjoy the benefits of the Labour Tenants Act, a "labour tenant" has to comply with
the requirements set out in the act. These are found in the definition of "labour tenant.,,2094In
Moshela v Sanco,J·095 it was confirmed that "labour tenant" is not a dictionary term, but a
technical one. Accordingly, the facts have to be speci fied in order to support the allegation of
labour tenancy. ln general, a labour tenant can be described as a person (usually black), who
lives on a (usually white-owned) farm, and who exchanges labour for the right to use cropping or
grazing land on farm land of the owner.2096For purposes of the Labour Tenants Act, a labour
tenant is someone2097
(a) who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm;
(b) who has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land on the farm, referred to in
paragraph (a), or another farm of the owner, and in consideration of such right provides or has
provided labour to the owner or lessee; and
(c) whose parent or grandparent resided or resides on a farm or had the use of cropping or grazing
land on such farm or another farm of the owner, and in considcrauon of such right provided or
provides labour to the owner or lessee of such other farm,
including a person who has been appointed a successor to a labour tenant in accordance with the
provisions of section 3(4) and (5), but excluding a farm worker.
In theory, this definition sets three requirements which should be complied with in order to
qualify [or the benefits of the redistribution programme: (i) the person must have had a right to
reside on the [arm, (ii) the person must have bad cropping or grazing rights in consideration of
which labour must have been provided, and (iii) the person's parent or grandparent (who also
resided on a [arm) had the previously mentioned rights and provided labour. In effect, however,
the final part of the definition constitutes a fourth requirement: the person trying to establish
labour tenancy must also be able to prove that he or she is not a farm worker. Therefore, labour
tenancy is often contrasted with the contractual rights and duties of a Jarmworker.2098 A
[armworker is employed on the farm in terms of a contract of employment, which entails that in
return for the labour, provided to the owner or lessee of the farm, payment shall be
predominantly in cash or in natura (a share in the proceeds), and not predominantly in the right
to occupy and use land. A [armworker is furthermore obliged to perform his or her services
2093 White Paper (1997) par 4.10. Cf Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform
(1997) 359.
209~ SI, Labour Tenants Act.
209S 1999 1 SA 614 (T).
2096 Cf Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 525 - 526.
2097 According to s I read with s 3(4) and 3(5), Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act.
209R Cf Mahlangu v De Jager 2000 3 SA 145 par II - 57.
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personally_2099When compliance with the requirements in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the
definition, can be proved, a person shall be presumed not to be a farm worker, unless the
contrary is proved.2100In this regard, the court must take into account the combined effect and
substance of all agreements between the person who avers labour tenancy and the owner or
lessee of the land concerned."?'
The reference in paragraph (b) to the provision of labour includes labour provided personally by
a person who claims labour tenancy, or by way of a nominee. This would also include cases
where applicants have never provided labour personally, but always through nominees_2102
Although an agreement of some sort in which labour tenancy is embodied usually exists, a
labour tenant contract is not essential to the issue oflabour tenancy.2103
As far as paragraph (c) is concerned, the interpretation of the word "farm" initially was
uncertain. The issue was apparently whether a person trying to establish labour tenancy and his
or her parent or grandparent all had to have rights relating to the same farm. In Zulu v Van
Rensburl104 Dodson J contended that if the farm referred to in paragraph (c) had to be the same
farm as that referred to in paragraph (a), the legislature would have expressly mentioned it, as
was the case in paragraph (b). Itwas also emphasised that if the approach were followed that the
"same farm" was intended, a person whose predecessors had over generations consistently been
labour tenants, but had been forced by eviction to move from farm to farm, would inevitably be
excluded from protection. This could not have been the intention of the legislature, keeping in
mind the redistributive objectives of the act. In another case, Mlifi v Klingenberg,210S it was
argued that paragraph (c) required the plaintiff to show that his parents or grandparents had
resided and worked on a farm owned by the same owner or his successors or predecessors in
title_2106Meer J found that the nexus is between the labour tenant and the land and not between
the land owner and labour tenant (or generations of labour tenants) and confirmed the Zulu case
on this matter.2l07
The statutory definition of labour tenancy has also on a larger scale led to interpretative
differences, and consequently different judgements. The vexing issue is apparently whether
paragraphs (a) (b) and (c) of the definition should be interpreted disjunctively or
2099 Cf s 1 (Definitions) of the act. The difference between farmworker and labour tenant has been discussed in the
case of Mahlangu v De Jager 1996 3 SA 235 (LCC). Cf also Ngcobo and others v Salimba CC [1999] JOL 4728 (A)
online at http://www.butterw0l1hs.co.zaljol/special/99004728.html[31.05.1999].
2100 S 2(5) was inserted by the Land Restitution and Reform Amendment Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997 in order
to relieve the heavy burden on persons claiming to be labour tenants.
2101 S 2(6) of the Labour Tenants Act.
2102 Mlifi v Klingenberg 19992 SA 647 (LCC) 6841.
2103 In Mokwena v Marie Appel Beleggings (LCC) 89/98 of 30.09.1998 the argument that the existence of labour
agreement was imperative for proving labour tenancy was rejected.
2104 19964 SA 1236 (LCC) at 1257H-1258A.
2105 19992 SA 647 (LCC).
2106 Reference was also made to the unreported case of Salimba v Ngcobo (NPD) 340/96 of 4.11.1997 (cf n 2099
supra) in which a nexus between the same owner and his successors or predecessors in title and generations of
labour tenants was suggested, but was rejected by the Court.
2107 19964 SA 1236 (LCC) 690A. Meer J remarks that the legislature could not have intended such an "absurd and
unfair result" (690F).
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conjunctivcly.i''" Some decisions require compliance with paragraphs (a) and (b) or (a) and (c)
are required, but does not require compliance with all three paragraphs.2109 Other decisions seem
to place exceptional interpretative value on the connecter "and" between the paragraphs, and
apply it in such a manner that compliance with all three paragraphs of the definition is
required_2110 The most probable explanation of the reason behind the different approaches is the
obscure wording of paragraph (c), which is an open invitation to varied interpretations.i'!' If a
disjunctive approach is followed, the burden of proof is eased, and more prospective claimants
would be able to meet the requirements of the definition. If "cumulative compliance'v!" with the
requirements is necessary, the application of the act would be more restricted. The Zulu case and
the Mahlangu case required cumulative compliance with all three requiremcnts.t'{' The Klapper
case departed from this approach, but without giving reasons. Galgut J merely mentioned that the
rigid approach followed in the latter case would substantively stultify the objectives of the
Labour Tenants ACt.2114The Tselentis case provides a valuable overview of case law concerning
the matter of interpretation and attaches a broad interpretation to the definition of labour tenancy
within the context and goal of the act.2IlS Meskin J concluded in this decision that persons have
to comply either with paragraphs (a) and (b) or with (a) and (c). It is also said that paragraph (c)
intends to provide for additional means of establishing labour tenancy.
Although paragraphs (a) and (b) are normally met by applicants resulting in paragraph (c) being
problematic, the opposite happened in Ngcobo v Van RellsbUli116 where applicants (the son and
daughter of a deceased labour tenant) applied for an interdict preventing their ejectment from the
premises they occupied. The daughter cared for her father and lived with him, but she never
provided labour to the landowner. The son left the farm at a very early age and returned only
after his father's death. Hence, neither of the respondents complied with paragraph (b) of the
definition, but both complied with paragraph (c) in view of the terms of contract between their
father and the respondent and his predecessors in title. It was argued that the daughter's presence
on the farm was unlawful and consequently not in accordance with the requirements of the act.
However, the court found that lawfulness of occupation was of no consequence under the
circumsranccs.i!'? The more important question was whether the statutory requirements for
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210& Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 13.
2109 Ic Klopper v Mkhize 1998 1 SA 406 (N) and Tselentis Mining (Pry) LId v Mdlalose 1998 I SA 41l (N). For a
detailed analysis, cf Pienaar 1998 Steil LR 311 - 325.
2110 le Mahlangu v De Jager 1996 3 SA 235 (LeC) and Zulu v Van Rensburg 1996 4 SA 1236 (Lee), Moshela v
Sancor 1999 1 SA 614 (T) and Mokwena v Marie Appel Beleggings (LeC) 89/98 of 30.09.1998. Cf Pienaar 1997
TSAR 538 - 548 for a detailed analysis. Most recently, the ruling in Ngobo v Vall Rensburg and Others 19992 SA
525 (Lee) supported the (normal) conjunctive approach.
2111 Galgut J in Klopper \' Mki:e 1998 1 SA 406 ( ) 408H; Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 13.
2112 This phrased was used by Gildenhuys J in Mahlangu v De Jager 19963 SA 235 (LeC) 241 F.
2113 Both decisions handed down by Dodson J.
2114 1998 1 SA 406 (N) 40811.
1115 In the Tselentis case other definitions such as "family member" and "associate" are also discussed. ef also
Makhombothi v Klingenberg 1999 I SA 127 (T) with regard to the interpretation of "associate."
2116 1999 2 SA 525 (LeC).
2117 This aspect was con finned in Mkwanazi v Bivane Bosbou. Msimango v De Villiers: Ngema v Van der Walt;
Mdletshe v Nxumalo 1999 1 All SA 59 (Lee) 771 B. Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 14 n 42
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qualification as "labour tenant" were met, seeing that she only complied with the requirements of
paragraphs (a) and (c). This basically called for a decision in favour of either the disjunctive or
the conjunctive approach. If the disjunctive approach would be followed, the daughter would
succeed with the application. If the conjunctive approach would be followed, the non-
compliance with paragraph (b) of the definition would disqualify her. In the judgment it was
recognised that the word "and" can have both a conjunctive and a disjunctive meaning and that
interpretation had to be based on the statute in its entirety, with constant consideration of the
objectives of the act. Eventually, the decision was in favour of a conjunctive approach and
against the applicant. The mere fact that the word "and" had been inserted before paragraph (c)
apparently made it clear that the paragraph cannot be read on its own. Hence, the conjunctive
approach as first set out in the cases of Mahlangu and Zulu enjoys stronger support.
2.2.1.2.2. Access to land
The redistributory character of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act is apparent from Chapter
III of the act, which provides for the acquisition of ownership or rights in land by the labour
tenant. Persons qualifying as "labour tenants" in terms of the statutory definition2118may apply
for an award of land or land rights and for financial assistance.i!" In applications concerning
land allocation, tenants can apply for the specific parcel of land being occupied by the tenant or
for land that was occupied by the tenant or predecessors for a period of five years prior to the
commencement of the Act and of which they were illegally deprived.2120 They can also apply
for rights in land elsewhere on the farm or in the vicinity, which have been proposed by the
landowner. Servitudes of water, way or any other servitude reasonably necessary or reasonably
consistent with the rights previously enjoyed by the labour tenant may also be awarded.2121
The claim must be lodged with the Director-General of Land Affairs, after which notice is given
to the landowner,2122 who is entitled to dispute whether the applicant is indeed a labour
tenant.2123If the status of the applicant is not disputed, he or she is presumed to be a labour
tenant, unless proof to the contrary is produced_2124If the applicant's status is disputed, either
party is entitled to institute judicial proceedings in order to determine the issue. Once the issue
concerning the status of the applicant has been resolved, the owner may submit proposals to the
director-general for alternative, equitable ways of dealing with the claim instead of allowing the
acquisition of a right in the affected land.2125The applicant is also informed of these proposals,
and can reject any proposal if he or she wants to persist with the original claim. If the matter
points out that the term "reside" is not limited to lawful residence. In cases where the contractual basis for residence
had been terminated, such residence would still fall within the ambit of the Labour Tenants Act.
2118 Cf 324 supra.
2119 S 16, Labour Tenants Act. Advances and subsidies are made available under s 26 of the Labour Tenants Act.
2120 S 16(1)(a) and (b), Labour Tenants Act.
2121 S 16(1)(c) and (d), Labour Tenants Act.
2122 S 17(l)(a), Labour Tenants Act.
2123 S 17(4), Labour Tenants Act. The landowner has a month's time within which to dispute the applicant's status.
2124 S 17(5), Labour Tenants Act.
2125 S 18, Labour Tenants Act.
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cannot be resolved, the claimant may institute court proceedings for an order or apply to court
for appropriate relief.2126
The application for the acquisition of ownership or other rights will thus be submitted to the
court if the owner refrained from initiating settlement proposals; if such a proposal was offered,
but rejected by the applicant; and in cases where parties have reached an agreement, but the
agreement was not certified to be reasonable or equitable.i!" If necessary, the issue will be
referred to arbitration in which case tbe arbitrator has extensive powers in order to assist he
parties in reaching an agrcement.i" In the process of determining the nature of the order to be
made by the court, various factors will be taken into account:2129 (i) the desirability of assisting
labour tenants to establish themselves on farms on a viable and sustainable basis; (ii) the
achievement of the objectives of the Act; (iii) the requirements of equity and justice; (iv) the
willingness of the owner of affected land and the applicant to make contributions towards the
settlement of the application; and, where relevant, (v) the report of an arbitrator.
If the Land Claims Court decides that the labour tenant is eligible to obtain ownership, the owner
and the labour tenant should try to reach agreement on the price to be paid. The act gives detailed
prescriptions on the arbitration procedure to be applied in aiding the parties to come to an
agreemen1.2I3o In terms of the land reform programme of the Department of Land Affairs, a
"settlement/land acquisition grant" may be obtained to subsidise the purchase price of the land
allocated to the labour tenant.2131If the labour tenant fails to make payment within three calendar
months of reception of a notice claiming payment, the owner can lodge an application to bave
the court order granting ownership to the labour tenant nullified.2132
In exceptional circumstances expropriation will be resorted to. The owner of the land is entitled
to just and equitable compensation, as set out in section 25(3) FC, which will be determined by
the court or, if necessary, by an arbitrator.2133 If the land in question is encumbered by a
registered mortgage bond or is subject to a deed of sale, compensation will be paid only on terms
agreed to by the owner and the mortgagee or buyer2134or, in the absence of such an agreement,
only after a court order containing directions with regard to the payment of compensation has
been issued_2135 As is the case with land restitution issues, provision is also made for
mediation.i'"
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2126 S 17(4), Labour Tenants Act.
2127 S 17(7), Labour Tenants Act.
2128 S 20 and 22, Labour Tenants Act.
2129 S 22(5), Labour Tenants Act.
mo S 18 to 22, Labour Tenants Act.
2131 White Paper (1997) par 4.5.9 and 4.7.
2132 S 24, Labour Tenants Act.
2133 S 23, Labour Tenants Act.
2134 S 25( I), Labour Tenants Act.
2135 S 25(2), Labour Tenants Act.
2136 Cfin general s 36, Labour Tenants Act.
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2.2.1.2.3. Protection of labour tenants and rights of landowners
Presently, labour tenants for the first time enjoy a statutory right to occupation and use of the
land, which can only be terminated in accordance with the provision of the Act.2137 They are also
protected against arbitrary eviction, in that eviction should take place in accordance with
prescribed procedures and in the circumstances prescribed by the act.2138 Extensive rights of
reinstatement are granted to labour tenants who had to vacate the land or who were evicted
between 2 June 1995 and the commencement of the act on 22 March 1996_2139 Similarly, the act
has strict provisions controlling the relocation of labour tenants in the case where the owner of
the land requires it for agricultural purposes or development for the public benefit.2140
The rights of the landowner are, however, also protected: First, the successor proposed by the
labour tenant should be acceptable to the owner. The owner is therefore entitled to refuse a
proposed successor on reasonable grounds.i'?' Second, the owner can apply for eviction if he or
she can prove that such an eviction is just and reasonable. One such instance is where the labour
tenant (in spite of a one-month's written notice) acted contrary to their agreement by refusing to
work for the owner. Alternatively it could be shown that a material breach of the relationship
between the parties, which was practically impossible to remedy, has occurred.2142
The owner can under certain circumstances approach the court in urgent proceedings for the
eviction of the labour tenant. If there were a real and imminent danger of substantial injury to the
owner or damage to his or her property if the labour tenant is not removed from the farm,
eviction would, for instance, be possible. Furthermore, no other effective remedy should be
available to the owner or lessee and the likely harm to the owner or lessee in case of an order not
being granted, should be disproportionately higher than the likely harm to the labour tenant
against whom the order is sought.2143 Under appropriate circumstances, the owner can also be
entitled to just compensation where his or her rights are affected by the act, if it would amount to
an expropriation.t''"
2137 The Labour Tenants Act mentions four possible circumstances under which the right of use and occupation is
terminated: (i) in case of waiver, s 3(2)(a); (ii) death, s 3(2)(b); (iii) eviction in accordance with the act, s 3(2)(c); or
(iv) acquiring of ownership or compensation, s 3(2)(d). Eviction may only take place according to the provisions of
the act.
2138 S 5 - 15, Labour Tenants Act. In some instances, eviction is not at all possible. Cf s 9(1), Labour Tenants Act.
2139 S 12, Labour Tenants Act.
2140 S 8(1), Labour Tenants Act. This section further stipulates the circumstances under which a court could grant an
order for relocation (s 8(2), Labour Tenants Act); provides for the payment of compensation to the labour tenants to
forestall unfair prejudice (s 8(3) and (4), Labour Tenants Act); determines the circumstances under which a labour
tenant can claim reinstatement of his or her right to occupy and use the land (s 8(5), Labour Tenants Act) and in this
regard grants the court a wide discretion in making any order deemed to be just and equitable (s 8(6), Labour
Tenants Act).
2141 S 3(5), 4(1) and (2), Labour Tenants Act.
2142 S 6 and 7, Labour Tenants Act.
2143 SIS, Labour Tenants Act.
2144 S 23 read with s 2(1) and s 38(1)(b)(ii), Labour Tenants Act.
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2.2.2. Evaluation
In determining the influence of the government's redistribution policy on the development of
land law as such, and in examining the influence of these developments on the existing concept
of ownership in private law, a brief overview of the effects of redistribution in general is
necessary. This will be provided in the following paragraphs. The effects of the Land Reform
(Labour Tenants) Act as an example of the redistribution policy will be evaluated in more detail.
2.2.2.1. The effects of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act in particular
In practice, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act has brought long-needed relief to a large
community of people disadvantaged by the existing land control system in South Africa. The
Labour Tenants Act does not perpetuate the original form of labour tenancy with its numerous
shortcomings.i'" Instead, the institution of labour tenancy is revised, and a general phasing out
of the institution and its replacement by common law ownership is envisaged.
For the person who has not applied for the acquisition of land or other rights in land, the basic
elements of labour tenancy remain the same: the provision of labour and services in exchange for
utilisation of land. Even in cases where no application was made for the acquisition of rights in
land, the labour tenant has definite security of tenure in that eviction can only take place in
accordance with the Labour Tenants Act.
The labour tenant, who has successfully applied for the acquisition of land or rights, does not fit
the traditional mode of labour tenancy since one of the essential elements, namely exchange of
labour for the use of the land, has lapsed_2146 A successful applicant for the acquisition of land
rights is technically no longer a labour tenant, but an independent landowner. Of course, such a
person is free to provide labour and services, but this will have nothing to do with the institution
of labour tenancy. In fact, the implementation of the Labour Tenants Act introduced a totally
new dispensation with regard to the provision of labour and serviccs.i"?
A point in favour of the act is its strongly negotiation-oriented nature, which means that conflict
is regulated rather than gcnerated.i!" In terms of the act, the rights of labour tenants, on the one
hand, and owners, on the other, must constantly be balanced. Jn Van del' Wall v Lange2149 the
owners of the land in question applied for an order prohibiting the occupiers from keeping more
than ten head of cattle each, while the labour tenants had applied for the acquisition of rights in
land under section 16 of the Labour Tenants ACt.2150 The occupiers averred that they had
permission to graze more cattle and that a curtailment of that right would amount to eviction in
terms of the act. The applicants based their argument on the principle that rights are never
2145 The practice of labour tenancy before the commencement of the Labour Tenants Act was equated with slavery.
Cf the detailed discussion of Pienaar 1998 Steil LR 311 - 325.
2146 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 21.
214721.
2148 Pienaar 1997 TSAR 143.
214919991 SA 189(LCC).
2150 People cannot be evicted as long as section 16 applications are pending.
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absolute and above limitation, and indicated that they would suffer irreparable harm if an
appropriate interim measure was not enforced. In its decision, the court included the restriction
of grazing rights within the meaning of "eviction" for purposes of the act.2151The pending
section-16-application prohibited an eviction of the labour tenants. The court nevertheless also
established that it had the necessary jurisdiction to restrict the use of land by labour tenants by
way of interim measures. Since "damage" was interpreted to include pecuniary IOSS2152over and
above mere physical damage, it was found that the applicants would indeed suffer damage from
an overgrazing by the cattle of the respondents. Moreover, the only remedy available to the court
was an application to the court. The court thus granted interim relief, in spite of the pending
application for the acquisition of land rights. This constituted a restriction on the rights of the
labour tenants.
In the final analysis, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act is an example oflegislation dealing
with forms of possession circumscribed in a particular way.2153It enhances the security of tenure
of persons qualifying as "labour tenants" and established a specifically controlled right to
acquisition of property. As such, it reflects the process of transformation of the existing law
pertaining to private ownership. Although the act is in the first place aimed at redressing past
injustices with which labour tenants had to deal, and is therefore orientated to establishing social
justice, existing owners are protected in several ways. On the one hand, strict procedures are
prescribed to deal with the infringement of existing rights of owners, and provision is made for
compensation in case of inevitable infringement. On the other hand, the Land Claims Court tends
to follow a.strict.approach.in interpreting the requirements of the act.2154
2.2.2.2. Redistribution in general
Because of the nature and purpose of the redistribution programme, most of the legislation
comprised by it is aimed at increasing the speedy and cheap delivery of land and access to land,
both in the residential and the agricultural sectors. Here the primary concern is the alteration of
the unequal distribution of land and of means to gain access to land still prevalent in the South
African society. This is done mainly by way of state intervention in the market process.2155
Within the context of the redistribution programme, the intention is to make provision for a
variety of flexible land rights. In reality, most of the redistribution initiatives are aimed at
enabling the beneficiaries in terms of the redistribution process to become owners in own right.
The traditional hierarchy in which common law ownership forms the pinnacle of all rights in
property is thus by and large upheld. Van der Walt2156indicates that even the initatives that
mention a variety of rights explicitly, like the Housing Act, tend to create frameworks that either
leave the question of a possible diversification of rights open, or openly priviledge "full"
215119991 SA 189 (LCC) 197G-H.
2152200C_E.
2153Carey-Miller 1999 SALJ752.
2154Pienaar 1997 TSAR 135; Mahlangu v De Jager 19963 SA 235 (LCC).
2155Van der Walt 1999 Koers 281.
2156Van der Walt 1999 Koers 281.
331
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Relarm and Restitutionfor the Law of Property in Germanyand Sou/IrAfrica
ownership as it is known in private law. Even the procedures of the Labour Tenants Act tend to
fall back on an understanding of rights in the traditional classification, in which private law
ownership remains supreme.
The redistribution programme should be understood within the context of the three-tiered land
reform process as such. The success of this process depends to a large extent on the possible
colaboration between the different aspects of land reform. Seeing that the overall aim of the land
reform process is to establish a more equitable system of land control and to make land control
more accessible to all members of society, the separate aspects of land reform must, to a large
extent, be intertwined. That explains why certain legislative measures arc on the one hand unique
to a specific aspect of land reform, but on the other hand also leave room for supple boundaries
between these different aspccts.2157 It also explains why some parliamentary acts serve two or
more of the individual programmes simultaneously. For example, although the Restitution of
Land Rights Act is unique to thc restitution programme, but the Labour Tenants Act and the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act are relevant to both the redistribution and the tenure reform
programmes.
2.3. Land tenure reform
One of the most troublesome legacies of apartheid land law is its diversified land tenure system,
in which forms of land control vary from race group to race group and from region to region,
depending on the applicable legislation.2158 In general, land rights for blacks, both in urban and
in rural areas, were cast in legal forms that rendered them permanently insecure, weak, and open
to the manipulation that characterised the forced removals and evictions of the apartheid era.
Black holders and occupiers of land lived under the continuous threat that the precarious
"priviledge" which characterised their relation with the land could be retracted at the whim and
fancy of the controlling officials.2159
Against this background, tenure reform was intended to restore at least some security and
permanence to land rights, to formalise the land rights of those whose occupation or use of land
justified it, and to establish land rights for those who needed it. Therefore, tenure reform is also
defined as a process whereby insecure or unsuitable forms of existing land tenure are legally
transformed to provide better or more suitable rightS.2160 This can concern the security of the
landholding as such, or the possibility of procuring loans with the land right as security, or any
aspect of the tenure under which the land right is held or exercised. In view of these policies and
21S7 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) II.
21S8 Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform (1997) 364.
21S~ Van der Walt 1999 Koers 281 - 282; Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 28 - 29.
2160 ('I'White Paper (1997) vi. viii, 9 and 10. The constitutional provision controlling land tenure reform is s 25(5)
Fe. Legislation incorporating land tenure reform policies include: the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of
1991, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, read with the Land Restitution and Reform Laws
Amendment Act 63 of 1997. the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996, the Interim Protection of
Informal Land Rights Aet 31 of 1996, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, and the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
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objectives of the tenure reform programme, it is understandable the the process of tenure reform
is particularly complex, and its implementation is rendered all the more difficult by the intention
to introduce new systems of land tenure, land rights and forms of ownership. In this regard, the
Department of Land Affairs have set targets2161amongst which are (i) the movement away from
a permits-based system to a rights-oriented system; (ii) the development of a unitary, non-racial
system of land rights for all South Africans; (iii) the suitable accommodation of individuals in
tenure systems according to their circumstances and preferences; (iv) the consist adherence to the
constitutional commitment to basic human rights and equality; (v) the adoption of a rights-based
approach to deliver security of tenure; and (vi) the upgrading of the land registration system to
facilitate new tenure systems.
Several legislative measures, like the Communal Properties Associations Act,2162Upgrading of
Tenure Rights Act,2163the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act,2164and in some
regards also the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, contribute to the realisation of these
objectives. The implications of this policy for the existing law pertaining to private ownership
will be analysed in the following paragraphs. As the scope of this policy is exceptionally wide,
the following analysis concentrates only on examples taken from the Interim Protection of
Informal Land Rights Act, the Communal Property Associations Act and the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act, and by no means purport to present an extensive analysis of the
government's tenure reform programme. It merely indicates the degree to which the different
legs of the South African land reform programme are intertwined.
2.3.1. Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act is specifically aimed at protecting insecure
tenure rights (for example unregistered communal tenure), held by a large number of South
Africans (especially in areas previously part of the national states, the self-governing territories
and land of the South African Development Trust) which exist de facto, but are still not legally
recognised. In terms of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act a number of
specifically defined "lesser" rights enjoys protection (on an interim basis, pending permanent
reform measures) against the otherwise dominant rights of the title holder. In principle, the
various "informal" rights protected pertain to the holding of state-owned land. However, where
the protection of "beneficial occupation" is at stake, not only state-owned land is involved.
"Beneficial occupation" is defined in terms of this act as "the occupation of land by a person, as
if he or she is the owner, without force, openly and without the permission of the registered
owner. ,,2165This kind of occupation then constitutes an "informal" land right if it has endured for
a continued period of not less than 5 years prior to 31 December 1997. The definition of
2161 White Paper (1997) par 4.16.
216228 of 1996.
2163 112 of 1991.
2164 62 of 1997.
2165 S 1, Interim Protection of Land Rights Act.
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beneficial occupation in this act suggests a relation to prescription nee vi, nee clam, nee precario.
It in effect provides for the protection of a non-precarious interest, which would otherwise be no
more than an unprotected potential to mature into a right on the basis of acquisitive prescription
after a period of thirty years.
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act thus reflects a departure from the previous
position under the South African common law in terms of which the strong power of vindication
of a title holder is regarded as a natural consequence of the supremacy of his or her ownership
over other rights and against third parties. The absolute powers enforce the right to ownership
are thereby watered down.
2.3.2. Communal Properties Associations Act
The Communal Property Associations Act aims at providing a framework for the registration of
a new form of juristic person to acquire, hold or control property on behalf of and for the benefit
of disadvantaged communities. Although innovatory, this act docs not represent a radical move
away from the existing property law. With its commitment to ensure non-discrimination, equity
and democracy in the management of communal property,2166 it is significant for future
developments, though. It provides for the holding of movable and immovable property for the
benefit of a community group, constituted as a new kind of juristic person, in a way similar to
the establishment of the body corporate in terms of the Sectional Titles Act.2161 However, the
body corporate in terms of the Sectional Titles Act does not have ownership or rights of tenure,
and is therefore not comparable to the juristic person created in terms of the Communal Property
Associations Act.
2.3.3. Extension of Security of Tenure Act
The preamble to the Extension of Security of Tenure Act2168 states that many South Africans
presently do not have security of tenure of their homes and land and are consequently vulnerable
to unfair eviction. It also acknowledges that these evictions have led and will continue to lead to
great hardship, conflict and social instability. It thus shows the desirability of promoting the
achievement of long-term security of tenure for occupiers of land and the extension of rights of
occupiers through legislative measures. However, the rights, duties and legitimate interests of
owners also need to be taken into consideration.U'"
2166 Preamble, Interim Protection of Land Rights Act.
2167 Ac! 95 of 1986. Cf Carey-Miller 1999 SAU 758.
216862 of 1997.
2169 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 21.
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2.3.3.1. Objectives and application
The objective of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act is to provide security of tenure for farm
labourers that do not benefit from the protection of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Ace!70
because they do not qualify as labour tenants. As such, the act focusses on "occupiers" of land,
and applies to rural areas, nation wide?!7! Like the Labour Tenants Act, the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act is aimed at preventing unfair evictions and creating alternative ways of
acquiring independent land rights. For purposes of illustrating the land tenure reform objectives
of the overall land reform programme, focus will be placed on the first aspect in the following
discussion.
2.3.3.1.1. Definition of "occupier"
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act defines "occupier" to denote (i) a person residing on
land which belongs to another person, and who has or had on 4 February 1997 or thereafter had
consent or another right in law to do so; or (ii) a person who resides on land belonging to another
who works for himself or herself and does not employ an outside person.2172 Labour tenants,
persons using or intending to use the land mainly for industrial, mining, commercial or
commercial farming purposes, and persons whose income exceeds R5000 per month are
explicitly excluded form the protection of the act.2!73 Persons claiming to be occupiers for
purposes of the act, have to set out the facts upon which they rely. In Ntuli v Smi?!74 it was
found to be insufficient for such persons merely to repeat the wording of the statutory
requirements in their affidavits.
With regard to the consent requirement in the definition of "occupier" for purposes of the act,
section 3(4) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act provides that a person who has
continuously and openly resided on land for a period of one year shall (for purposes of civil
21703 of 1996.
2171 S 2, Extension of Security of Tenure Act. The provisions of the act do not apply in a township established,
approved, proclaimed or otherwise recognised in terms of any law. The act is, however, applicable to land within a
township (of any kind) that has been designated for agricultural purposes and any land within a township which has
been established, approved, proclaimed or otherwise recognised after 4 February 1997 (the date on which the bill
was first published) only if the person concerned was an occupier immediately prior to the establishment, approval,
proclamation or recognition (s 2(1), Extension of Security of Tenure Act). This would give some protection to
persons residing on land in towns used for agricultural purposes and the land is then rezoned, for whatever reason,
resulting in the land not falling within the general ambit of s 2, Extension of Security of Tenure Act, as a whole,
except with regard to the particular occupiers. This specific group would still have protection from eviction.
However, because the land has been rezoned, occupiers that take occupation after the rezoning would not fall under
the scope of the act and cannot benefit from the protective measures. The act therefore in essence applies to rural
areas only and not to urban areas. In Karabo v Kok 19984 SA 1014 (LCC) 1019B it was found that the section does
not relate to agricultural land only. In this case the property was in fact used for industrial purposes in that a quarry
and brick work were operated from the farm. The conclusive considerations were apparently the rural, farming
nature of the land. Cf Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 22; Carey Miller Land Title (2000) 493 -
495.
2172 Members of the family excluded.
2173 S 1(1)(x)(c), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2174 19992 SA 540 (LCC) 549C-D.
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proceedings in term of the act) be presumed to have consent unless the contrary is proved. In this
context, the treatment of the issue of tacit permission in Rademeyer v Western. Districts
COUl1ci/2175 is important. This case involved an application for an interdict prohibiting the
council from allowing certain occupants of land belonging to the council to erect housing
structures thereupon, and ordering the removal of the occupants. The occupants initially
occupied the land without the pennission of the council. The applicants accordingly argued that
the provisions of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act did not apply,2176as the occupants did
not fall within the ambit of "occupiers" in terms of this act. However, on the facts it was clear
that the council had become aware of the occupants' presence before the commencement of the
act and had done nothing to disturb their occupancy.2177 It was consequently found that the act
applied to the situation and that the strict requirements relating to eviction had not been adhered
to.
2.3.3.1.2. Long-term security of tenure
Chapter ITof the Extension of Security of Tenure Act deals with the measures to facilitate long-
term security of tenure for occupiers. Jn view of the importance of these measures for
establishing security of tenure, this part of the act is too generally formulated and contains too
little information concerning specific options open to claimants of long-term security of
tenure_2178Nevertheless, two methods of achieving long-term security can be identified: by way
of either on-site or off-site development.ê!" Off-site development takes place where occupants
of land are provided with an independent tenure right on land owned by someone other than the
owner of land on which they resided immediately prior to the development. The act envisages a
balancing-of-interests process, in that applications accommodating the interests of both occupiers
and landowners, and which are cost-effective, are given precedence.2180 If the development is not
on the farm itself and occupiers have indicated a preference towards on-site development,
satisfactory reasons must be given why an on-farm development is not feasible.2ls1
If expropriation of land is necessary to enable developments in accordance with the Extension
Act, the Minister of Land Affairs is called upon to exercise his or her powers in terms of section
26( I) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, which roughly resembles those powers
conferred by the Expropriation Act.2182However, all expropriations for these purposes have to be
2175 19983 SA 1011 (SECLD).
2176 Non-application of the act would expedite the eviction of the occupants who were causing a nuisance to the land
owners in the vicinity.
2177 At IOI6F-G, IOI7C.
217M Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 23.
2179 S 4(1), Extension or Security of Ten ure Act.
mo S 4(2), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
WIl S 4(2)(c), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
21R2 63 of 1975.
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preceded by a hearing2183and compensation has to be paid with due regard to the section 25(3)
FC and sections 12(3) to (5) of the Expropriation ACt.2184
2.3.3.1.3. Protection against eviction
Chapter IV of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act deals with the termination of occupant's
rights and evictions. The primary aim of the act being the provision of security of tenure, rights
vested under the act may only be terminated in accordance with the act.2185Circumstances are
accordingly prescribed in terms of which occupants of land can be evicted legally.2186
Applications for evictions or for the restoration of residence and use of land can either be made
in the Magistrate's Court for the area concerned or in the Land Claims Court.2187If all parties
agree, an application can also be made to the Provindal High Court.2188 Since relationships
between especially farm workers and landowners can be very volatile at times, the provision for
mediation proceedings in section 21 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act can be quite
2183 S 26(2), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2184 S 26(3), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2185 In cases of legal eviction, proper alternative housing must be provided. Illegal removals will be punishable.
Section 15, Extension of Security of Tenure Act provides for an alternative eviction procedure in cases of urgency.
The order made in terms of this section resembles that order available in identical circumstances in terms of labour
tenancy legislation. In Conradie v Fortuin (LCC) 19R198, the order for eviction was set aside due to the fact that the
applicant did not give the occupier notice of the intended eviction and also because the occupant was not present
when the final proceedings were held under s 15 of the act. Even though it was an urgent application, it could not be
granted in the absence of the person affected by it.
2186 Eg where a worker is dismissed in terms of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 or when the lessees refuse to
~ay their rent.
187 S 17(1), Extension of Security of Tenure Act. The Land Claims Court has national jurisdiction and has all the
ancillary powers necessary or reasonably incidental to the performance of its functions, including the power to
decide on any constitutional matter in relation to the act, to grant interlocutory orders, declaratory orders and
interdicts and to review acts, omissions or decisions of functionaries under the act. Cf 293 et seq and 311 et seq
supra. The Land Claims Court has an automatic review function with regard to orders made by Magistrate's Courts
until 31 December 1999. The number of reported cases immediately after the commencement of the act indicates
that the provisions of the act with regard to eviction are generally not adhered to by the Magistrate's Courts. Pienaar
"Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 24.
2188 S 19(2), Extension of Security of Tenure Act. The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to granting an
interdict relating to occupiers under the Extension Act was the issue in Khumalo v Potgieter 1999 (1) All SA 10 (N).
The proceedings involved an application for an interdict to restrain the respondent/landowner from ejecting the
applicant. A point in limine was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application, since it ought
to have been lodged in the Land Claims Court. Nicholson J investigated the relevance of the Extension of Security
of Tenure Act to the facts and found that, the provisions of the act applied, in spite of certain conflicting factual
statements in the papers. The landowner was accused of threatening and intimidation, and interference with the
applicant's occupation and use of the land. This was par exellenee the sort of conduct for which legislature reserved
the relief of the Land Claims Court under section 19( 1)(b )(i) of the act. Prior to the commencement of the Extension
of Security of Tenure Act, such an interdict would have been granted by the High Court. Hence, the question was
whether the jurisdiction of the High Court in these matters had been ousted by the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act (16F). The decision attempts to indicate the specialised function of the Land Claims Court (16G-17E). The
conclusion was reached that the Land Claims Court had the power to grant interdicts and that the legislature had
sought to cater for situations which may arise for ancillary and incidental powers. It was therefore necessary to
consider the aims and object of the Extension Act to determine whether an interdict to prevent the threats fell within
the jurisdiction of the Land Claims Court (19H). The point in limine succeeded. Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished
paper (2000) 24.
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helpfu1.2189 Provision has also been made for the establishment of a special tribunal2190
authorised to grant eviction orders and to exclude persons from lodging applications in terms of
the act if such a person had unlawfully obtained consent to reside on the land in question.i!"
In the provisions made for evictions, a distinction is made between persons who were
"occupiers" on 4 February 19972192 and persons who became "occupiers" after this date_2193
Section 11(3) of the Security of Tenure Act lists specific factors that have to be considered in
determining whether an eviction order would be just and equitable in cases where "occupation"
in terms of the act commenced after 4 February 1997:2194 (i) the period that the occupier had
resided on the land; (ii) the fairness of the terms of any agreement between the parties; (iii) the
availability of suitable alternative accommodation to the occupier; (iv) the reason for the
proposed eviction; and (v) the interests of the landowner or person in charge, the occupier and
the remaining occupiers.
Irrespective of the date of occupation, the right of residency may generally be terminated on any
legal ground,2195 including: (i) breach of section 6(3) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act,
which relates to the prohibitions on occupiers;2196 (ii) breach of a material and fair term of any
agreement reached by the occupier and the landowner, if the landowner has kept his or her part
of the agrecmcnt.i!" (iii) such a fundamental breach of the relationship between the occupant
and the landowner that it is not practically possible to remedy it;2198(iv) voluntary resignation of
an occupier who was simultaneously an employee of the landowner and whose right of residence
arose solely from the employment,2199 in circumstances not amounting to a constructive
dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act.22oO Since the commencement of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act, numerous cases have been reported relating to the requirements for
eviction orders.2201
2189 Under s 21, Extension of Security of Tenure Act, any person may request the director-general to appoint
someone to facilitate meetings and to attempt mediation. If the parties refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, a person may be appointed as arbitrator from the panel established under s 31(I) of the
Labour Tenant Act.
2190 Appointed in terms of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996.
2191 S 19(2A) inserted by s 27 of Act 61 of 1998.
2192 S lO, Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2193 S II, Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2194 According to the decision of Albertyn v Bhekaphezulu 19992 SA 538 (LCC), these provisions are peremptory.
2195 S 8(1), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2196 Eg intentionally causing harm or damage.
2197 S 10(1)(b), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2198 S 10( I )(c), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2199 S IO(I )(d), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2200 66 of 1995.
2201 Most of the reported cases resulted from the automatic review of orders granted by the Magistrate's Courts.
Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 25. Cf Lategan v Koopman 1998 3 SA 457 (LCC), Rademeyer v
Westem Dis/ric/ COI/I/ci/1998 3 SA lOll (SECLD), Karabo v Kok 19984 SA 1014, Albertyn v Bhekaphezulu 1999
2 SA 538 (LCC), COl/radie v Fortuin (LCC) 19R198, Springs v Occupants of the Farm Kwa- Thema 19984 All SA
ISS (LCC), Uitkyk Farm Esta/es v Visser (LCC) 60/98, Kanhym v Mashiloane (LCe) 17R198 and Serole v Pienaar
(LCC) 9/99.
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In Lategan v Koopman2202 and in Karabo v KoIC203 it was emphasised that the objectives of the
act relating to security of title can only be achieved when there is compliance with all the
requirements for eviction orders. Despite the legal requirements concerning the grounds for
eviction, the applicant also has to satisfy the court that the eviction is fair. When an application
for an eviction order is lodged, various factors are taken into account, inter alia (i) the fairness of
any agreement or provision in any law on which the owner or person in charge relies; (ii) the
conduct of the parties giving rise to the termination; (iii) the interests of the parties and (iv) the
fairness of the procedure followed by the owner or person in charge_2204
If the court orders eviction, a just and equitable date on which the vacation of the premises has to
take place, as well as a date on which the eviction order will be carried out if not adhered to,
have to be determined by the court.2205When determining these dates, the court has to consider
all relevant factors, the main thrust of the process being to find a fair solution in the balancing of
the interests of the parties.2206An eviction order can coincide with orders regarding the payment
of compensation for structures and buildings erected by the occupier, as well as compensation
for improvements or crops planted by the occupier.2207 Eviction orders can also be made
conditional on the payment of any outstanding wages.2208In cases where occupiers are evicted
due to no fault or choice of the occupier, for example as a result of a retrenchment exercise by
the owner, the provision of suitable accommodation by the land owner may be ordered_2209
Like in the case of labour tenants, the possibility of eviction has certain limits. The right of
residence of occupiers who have resided on the land for ten years or longer and who have
reached the age of 60 may normally not be terminated, unless a breach as contemplated in
section 10(1)(a) to (c) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act was committed. In short, there
must be a legal ground for eviction, and an occupier may not be evicted merely on the ground of,
for instance, old age.22lO
220219983 SA 457 (Lee) 461e-D.
2203 19984 SA 1014 (Lee) 1019B.
2204 S 8(1), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2205 S 12(1), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2206 S 12(2), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2207 S 13(l)(a), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2208 S 13 (1)(b), Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2209 Alternative accommodation is accommodation that is safe and no less favourable than previous accommodation
and suitable, having regard to the reasonable needs of occupiers, their joint earning abilities and the need to live
close enough to employment opportunities or other economic activities.
2210 This was common practice prior to the enactment of legislation. Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper
(2000) 23.
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2.3.3.2. Protection, rights and duties of occupiers and owners
Chapter III of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act sets out the rights and duties of owners
and occupiers respectively. Here the social nature2211 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act
becomes clear.
The occupier first and foremost is entitled to security of tenure. Furthermore, he or she has the
right to reside on the land and utilise it, in a manner, which takes the interests of the owner or
person in charge into account. A list of special rights and privileges are also set out in section
6(2) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act. These include the rights to receive postal and
other communication, and to enjoy family life. An occupier is prohibited from intentionally and
unlawfully causing harm to other persons or to cause material damage to property. The right to
occupation is in some instances extended beyond the lifetime of the occupant concerned. Section
8(5) of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act provides that the right of residence of the
occupier's spouse or dependant may only be terminated on written notice of twelve calendar
months, unless such a spouse or dependant has committed a breach contemplated in section
IO(1) of the act.2212 In the latter instance, the court has a discretion to grant an eviction order on
shorter notice if the landowner will be unfairly prejudiced. The rights of owners are likewise set
out in section 7 of the Act and include for example the right to have an animal belonging to or
under the care of an occupier impounded if there was no reaction to a notice to remove the
animal. However, the landowner has to heed the provisions of the Extension of Security of
Tenure Act in enforcing his or her rights. In this regard, it is of particular importance that the
occupier may not be prejudiced in the past, present or anticipated exercise of a right conferred by
section 7 0 f the act. 2213
A person who has been evicted contrary to the provisions of the Extension of Security of Tenure
Act may apply for reinstatement under section 14(3) of the act. A reinstatement order may be
issued on such terms as the court deems fit. Such an order may include provisions regarding the
repair, reconstruction or replacement of any building or structure and the payment of
compensation. In Karabo v Ko!(2214 reinstatement of occupiers was particularly problematic,
because the case also involved a dispute about the validity of the termination of the employment
of the labourers, an aspect which was being dealt within under the provisions of the Labour
Relations Act. The court found that the termination of the employment had not taken effect for
2211 The social nature of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act is also
illustrated by the treatment of costs orders espoused by this legislation. This entails that the Land Claims Court will
refrain from making cost orders, provided that litigation is reasonably justified and properly conducted. Cf Pienaar
"Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 27. Cf also Ntuli v Smit 19992 SA 540 (LCC) 550G-1. In that case the
attorney could not take full instructions from the applicants and had accordingly been unable to present their case
properly. It was found that litigation was not reasonably justified or properly conducted with the result that a costs
order was allowed, In Manana v Johallnes 1999 1 SA 181 (LeC) 1831 - 184C the attorneys were ordered to show
cause why they should not pay the costs de bonis propriis. In thai case the conduct of the legal representatives was
below the expected quality.
2212 All the rights of occupiers bind successors in title. S 24, Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2213 Du Plessis, Olivier & Pienaar 1997 SAPRlPL 541.
221~ 19984 SA 1014 (LCC).
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purposes of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act, because the dispute was still pending.22l5 It
was clear that the Magistrate's Court should never have granted the eviction order. Nevertheless,
reinstatement was problematic, because the hostel were the applicants previously resided was at
that point already occupied by the new labourers hired by the landowner. The respondents
accordingly alleged that the restoration of residence would lead to renewed violence_2216The
court the ordered that the applicants should be placed in a position to reside elsewhere in an
available hostel. Thus, reinstatement did not mean restoration of the exact status quo ante.
Section 5 of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act contains a catalogue of general rights for
owners, persons in charge of the property and occupiers. These rights mirror those contained in
the constitutional bill of rights, and include the right to human dignity, freedom and security of
person, privacy, freedom of belief, and expression of opinion, freedom of association and
freedom of movement. In view of the preference for contextual interpretation, this section holds
interesting possibilities for further studies of the development of land law in view of the
constitutional provisions regarding the protection and regulation of property. This is also
illustrated by the existing case law.
Serole v Pienaar,2217 for instance, entailed an inquiry into the question whether occupiers of land
are allowed to bury their dead on that land. It was argued before the Land Claims Court that it
was an important African custom for deceased family members to be buried close to the place
where the surviving family members reside. The court nevertheless found that the rights set out
in the Extension of Security of Tenure Act were all of a temporary nature and that the right to
burial did not form part of it. Accordingly, it was found that graves would only be allowed if an
agreement to that effect was reached between the occupier and the landowner.
The implementation of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act surely limits the exercise of a
landowner's property rights considerably by creating basic human rights for occupiers of rural
land and preventing unfair eviction. Hence it contributes to creating a (previously non-existent)
culture of rights, especially in rural areas.22l8 Nevertheless, it should be approached cautiously,
keeping in mind the interests of all parties involved.
2.3.4. Evaluation
On the whole, the redistribution policies and laws function within the common law conceptual
and institutional structures. An attempt is made, however, to free access to land and housing
from the shackles of apartheid and to extend it to people and communities previously excluded
from it. Hence, the redistribution programme addresses the demand for restoring the balance in
land law. The claims here are more general, relating to an imbalance in land holdings, and here
the reconciliatory aspect of the land reform process is probably not as prevalent as the demands
2215 I020E, I022B.
2216 I023C-I.
2217 (LCC) 9/99. The Magistrate's Court granted a temporary order refusing burial on the land. The Land Claims
Court refused to hear the case on a procedural ground, but went ahead and dealt with the burial issue.
2218 Pienaar 1998 SAPRlPL 423 - 437 provides an extensive evaluation of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
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on the government to deliver on promises made to the landless and homeless. The purpose is not
to restore land rights or to grant or improve access to land, but rather to transform the law in
order to improve the security of tenure and the value of previously disregarded and unprotected
land rights.2219
In the context of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act in particular, this means that a working
relationship between landowners and the local government is paramount if the act is to be
successfully applied. This holds true particularly with regard to off-site development. In view of
the fact that the Act is generally not applicable to urban land, there is a risk involved that
landowners would opt for new workers to settle in towns, thereby avoiding the impact of the Act.
This could again lead to overcrowding and ever even longer waiting lists, exacerbating the huge
backlog with regard to the provision of housing.2220
To some extent, the Communal Property Associations Act and the Interim Protection of Informal
Land Rights Act manifest a tendency in South African legislation towards diversification of the
ownership concept. In recognition of the fact that individual security is of the essence in the
ownership concept, these statutes expand the categories of tenure holders that can claim
ownership-like protection.2221 Simultaneously, it adds new dimensions to the entitlements
inherent in ownership, in that it circumvents the recourse to aspects of common law by providing
for the community factor on the basis of rights to and control over the property-acquiring and
property-holding entity of a communal property association_2222
2.4. Developments pertaining to land administration and regulation
Other pieces of legislation, not exactly falling within any single specific subcategory of the
tripartite programme of land reform in South Africa, could also influence the development of
property law. The issue of land tax2223 and the initiatives of the Development Facilitation Act
within the broader framework of the Reconstruction and Development policy of the government
are only mentioned here. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act2224 will be discussed briefly.
2.4.1. Land tax
Another innovation linked to land reform and relevant to the question of the limitation of the
entitlements inherent in ownership, is the appointment of a subcommittee of the Tax
Commission to investigate the possible introduction of a land tax. The functions of the
commission include investigating the rationale for and the nature of land tax, its economic
2219 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 288.
mo Pienaar & Mu lier 1999 3 Stell LR 370 - 396.
2221 Cfalso Van der Wall 1999 Koers 288.
2222 Carey-Miller 1999SAI-1758.
2223 I am grateful to Mr Pieter Oosthuizen for discussing some of the intracacics of this subject with me.
2224 19 or 1998.
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effects, the revenue raising potential thereof and the possibility of utilising funds for future land
reform programmes and redistributional practices.
In South Africa land is a capital asset, and therefore the only taxation is in the form of transfer
duties to be paid at sale and taxation raised on proof that land in a particular instance is not held
as a capital asset, but as a source of income (like in the case of speculation with land).2225In the
Third Interim Report of the Katz Commission.r " however, the sub-committee investigating the
land-tax issue stated that there was no reason in principle why a rural land tax should not be
seriously considered, primarily as a source of revenue for rural local authorities. The committee
further recommended that such a tax should be levied at a local government level. It did not
recommend the introduction of a national land tax on agricultural land.
Further proposals published during September 1996 aimed at including all land (that is to say
privately owned land, state-owned land, tribal land and land used for any purpose within the
jurisdiction of the local councils) be included in the tax base, with tax levied on the improved
market value of the land. It was also suggested that the land tax should be levied on the owner
and/or occupier to a maximum of 2% per annum for all jurisdictions. These principles have been
translated into the South African Revenue Service's "Guide to Capital Gains Tax,'t2227which is
presently being put into legislation.
Recently, the Draft Property Rates BiU2228 has been published, and is presently open for public
comment. It proposes that municipal authorities be granted the capacity to levy rates on property
within a specific municipal area. Municipalities are given wide capacities to decide upon the
categories of property against which such rates could be levied, by taking into account the use
and status of the property and the area in which it is situated.2229The property capable of being
categorised as such by the municipal authorities range from residential property, commercial
property through to a variety of farm land.223oIt is suggested that the rated be levied on the
improved value of the property as determined from time to time by the municipal authorities,2231
for which specific provisions are prescribed_2232The Bill also provides for the recovery of rates
so levied,2233and for the keeping of a register by the municipal authority portraying the different
rates on property.2234Provision is further made for appeal against a valuation of the property and
the consequent assignment of a specific rate.
In the opinion of the Department of Land Affairs, the introduction of a land tax system might
lead to a reduction in land speculation, which would in tum expedite the availability of land for
2225 Municipal rates and taxes are also levied on (in particular rural) immovable property.
2226 Commission of Enquiry into Certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa - Third interim Report
published in November 1995.
2227 SARS Guide to Capital Gains Tax 23 February 2000.
2228 Cf http://www.polity.org.za/govdocslbills/2000/property .pdf [06.09.2000].
2229 Clause 3, Draft Property Rates Bill.
2230 Clause 4, Draft Property Rates Bill.
2231 Clauses 5 et seq, Draft Property Rates Bill.
2232 Cl 21 .auses et seq, clauses 32 et seq, Draft Property Rates Bill.
2233 Clauses 15 et seq, Draft Property Bill.
2234 Clause 12, Draft Property Bill.
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land reform purposes.2235 The question whether land tax would be constitutional in the South
African context, has not yet been considered by the constitutional court. When confronted with
this problem, the court would probably again have to weigh up the interests of individual owners
against those of the South African society at large, but also the interests of tbe various "local"
communities in particular. It is submitted that the bill in its present form does not portray a fair
balance between the interests of society (or, for that matter, the various local communities) and
the interests of the individual. The municipal authorities are granted almost unlimited capacity to
determine the amount of rates to be levied, as well as the capacity to discriminate against certain
groups of owners on the basis of the status, situation and use of the property, by levying higher
(or lower) rates.
2.4.2. Reconstruction and development: Development Facilitation Act
In the broader context of the reconstruction and development policy of the government, the
Development and Facilitation Act2236 plays an important role in projects relating to land reform.
lts primary thrust is to transform land law in its entirety on a uniform basis. It adopts an approach
of extensive development, encompassing rural and urban areas, land tenure matters, general
planning and conservation standards, financial measures and a new planning and developmental
infrastructure.2237
The act covers the following matters:2238 In the first place, it deals with the general principles
relating to all land development2239 and land development objectivcs.F'" In the second place, it
provides for the establishment of a new infrastructure consisting of the Development and
Planning Cornmissionv"! and the Development Tribunals and Appeal Tribunals.2242. Finally, the
act deals with the land development procedures, sometimes excluding2243 and sometimes
including, small-scale fanning2244 and land tenure matters.2245 The provisions relating to general
principles and objectives are important from the perspective of limitations on ownership. It
contains conservation measures2246 as well as an additional commitment to the fundamental
rights set out in the Constitution_2247
ms Paragraph 3.4: Department of Land Affairs White Paper 011 South African Land Policy (1997). Online at
hllp://www.polity.org.za!govdocslwhite_papcrs/landwp.htrnl [16.12.1998]; Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land
Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform (1997) 366 - 367.
223667 of 1995.
2237 Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform (1997) 368.
223M ef368.
2239 Ch 1s 2 - 4.
2210 eh IV s 27 - 29.
224lehlls5_14.
2242 eh 111s 15 - 26.
2W eh Vs 30 - 47.
22014 Ch Vs 30 - 47; eh VI s 4R - 60.
2W eh VII s 61 - 66.
2246 S 3(c)(viii).
2247 S 3 (g)(iv).
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At another level, the act also influences the existing ownership concept, in that it provides for a
new form of title, so-called "initial ownership,,,2248thereby introducing land tenure developed in
stages. By this mechanism, full ownership is acquired in a number of steps_2249"Initial
ownership" can be registered in a deeds registry,225o enabling the holder thereof to use and
occupy the land as if he or she were the registered owner in terms of the normal system of
registration. The "initial" owner therefore has almost2251all the entitlements usually afforded to
the owner.2252 The "initial" owner can encumber the land by mortgage or servitude, and
significantly, can sell his right of "initial ownership" to an outsider. At a later stage, when al the
requirements for the registration of the land are met, "initial ownership" is converted into full
ownership,2253 without the payment of transfer or stamp duties. In other words, automatic
conversion to ownership occurs when certain prescribed conditions2254are met.
The Deeds Registries Act2255defines immovable property as including "a registered right of
initial ownership contemplated in section 62 of the Development Facilitation Act." Prima facie,
initial ownership is therefore a real right, due to the fact that it is eligible for registration in the
deeds register. Initial ownership is, however, a new kind of limited real right in that it amounts to
a diminution of the parent right of ownership and is enforceable against the whole world.2256
However, unlike other real rights,2257a registrar of deeds can cancel initial ownership.2258 This
indicates that initial ownership is not an ultimate reversionary right, because ownership can in
principle only be terminated by the owner himself or herself (or a state authority in accordance
with the provisions of the constitutional property guarantee).
Through this innovation, security of land tenure is guaranteed at a much earlier stage in the
process of acquiring rights in land, thus diminishing the holding and selling costs thereof.2259
This indicates that although the land reform policy of the government is, in the first instance,
dedicated to establish social justice with regard to landownership through the principles of
equality and fairness, it also places a premium on security of tenure inherent in the ownership of
2248 S 62.
2249 Latsky "Development Facilitation Act" in Budlender, Latsky & Roux Jula's New Land Law (1998) eh 2A, 73.
2250 S 61(7) read with s 62, Development Facilitation Act.
2251 The right of disposal over the object is restricted until conversion into ownership has taken place, except in the
contexts of the administration of a deceased estate, sale in execution, insolvency or liquidation, "or where some
other event occurs requiring the transfer of such initial ownership". Cf s 62(6), Development Facilitation Act.
2252 S 62(4), Development Facilitation Act, provides that, upon the making of the prescribed entries by the registrar
of deeds, a transfer of initial ownership vests in the holder the following rights: the right to occupy and use the erf as
owner; the right to acquire ownership of the erf under the Act; the right to encumber the initial ownership by means
of a mortgage or a personal servitude (but not the right otherwise to encumber or deal with the initial ownership);
and the right to sell the right of initial ownership.
2253 S 62(7), Development Facilitation Act.
2254 S 38, Development Facilitation Act.
2255 S 102 of Act 47 of 1937.
2256 Carey-Miller 1999 SALJ754.
2257 All other real rights except mortgage bonds need to be cancelled by a court order. Cf s 6, Deeds Registries Act
47 of 1937.
2258 On concurrence of the owner of the parent entity of land, the holder of the right of initial ownership and parties
with mortgage or personal servitude interests. Cf s 62(5)(b), Development Facilitation Act.
2259 Van der Merwe & Pienaar "Land Reform" in Jackson and Wilde (eds) Reform (1997) 370.
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land. On a theoretical level, the introduction of initial ownership constitutes such a far-reaching
deviation of the "traditional" private law definition of ownership, that the scope and content of
private law ownership will have to be redefined.
The act also attaches another meaning to the concept of "beneficial occupation." It defines a
"beneficial occupier" as "any person who has been in peaceful and undisturbed occupation of
such land for a continuous period of not less than five years.,,2260 Precarious occupation is not
excluded. The main intention here is to legally recognise the factual eireurnstance of established
peaceful occupation in the context of land reform. A tribunal, in approving land development
under the Development Facilitation Act is empowered to impose a condition of establishment
regarding the manner in which the interests of any "beneficial occupier" will be provided for in
the upgrading of an existing settlement.2261
2.4.3. Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act
Illegal land occupation is a national concern, but seems to be especially prevalent in the Western
Cape.2262 The slow pace, at which affordable housing is made available to those needing it and
the insufficient provision of alternative land for settlement, most probably exacerbate the
invasion of land.2263 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act2264 of 1951 criminalised, inter alia,
invasion of land without a lawful reason and the occupation of it without permission_2265. The act
furthermore made provision for the removal of informal settlers and the demolition of their
buildings and structures. 2266 In the light of the provisions for housing and property in the
Interim and Final Constitutions, the repeal of the Act was inevitable. In its stead, the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act2267was promulgated in 1998. The
long title of this act indicates that its purpose is, on the one hand, to provide for the prohibition of
illegal eviction and, on the other hand, to provide procedures for the eviction of unlawful
occupiers.2268
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act describes an unlawful occupant as a person who occupies
land without the express or tacit consent of the person in charge,2269 or without any other right in
zzso S I, Development Facilitation Act.
2261 Carey-Miller 1999SAU757.
2262 In 1999, the estimated number of shacks in the metropolis alone was 72000. Cf Brummer "Kaap Kreun onder
Plakkery" Die Burger (04.08.1999) I.
226) Reitz "Iluisagterstand meer as in 1994" Die Burger (10.09.1999) 10.
2264 52 of 1951.
w,s S I(I )(a), Prevention of Illegal Squalling Act. Erecting a building without the necessary approval (S 3A( I)(a)(i),
Prevention of Illegal Squalling Act), and permitting anyone to occupy such a building or structure and receiving or
solicittng payment for facilitating squalling (also referred to as "squatter farming" s 4{ I), Prevention of 1I1egal
Squalling Act), was also prohibited.
2266 S 3, Prevention ofIllegal Squalling Act.
2267 19 of 1998.
2268 Cf the discussion of Carey-M iller Land Title (2000) 516 Cl seq on the rclationsh ip between the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction ACI and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act.
2269 S I(x), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act, defines "Person in charge" as any person who has or at the relevant
time had legal authority to give permission to a person to enter or reside upon the land in question.
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law to occupy.2270There is no provision in the Act that criminalises the illegal occupation ofland
as such. However, the eviction of occupiers from land other than on the authority of an order of a
competent court constitutes an offence.2271Hence, this act has very little in common with the
preceding legislation on squatting.2272
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act covers both evictions by private individuals2273 as well as
eviction at instance of a state organ.2274An urgent procedure for eviction is available to both
private parties and state organs,2275should the circumstances require it. The act also provides for
mediation, irrespective of whether the landowner is an organ of state or a private party.2276This
constitutes a clear departure from the intolerant approach followed in earlier legislation.2277
As far as eviction at the instance of a private party is concerned, the proceedings may be
instituted as soon as it comes to the attention of the owner or person in charge of the property
that persons are occupying the land unlawfully. The court must serve2278a written and effective
notice of proceedings upon the unlawful occupier or occupiers and the municipality that has
jurisdiction at least fourteen days before the contemplated hearing.2279If the court is satisfied that
the prescribed manner is for specific reasons not acceptable,2280 the court can determine the
manner in which service should be effected. The notice must contain:2281 (i) a statement that
proceedings are being instituted in terms of section 4( 1) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act
for an eviction order against the unlawful occupier; (ii) the date and time at which the court will
consider the matter; (iii) the reasons for the proposed eviction and (iv) an indication of the
unlawful occupier's entitlements to appear before the court, defend the case and where
applicable, apply for legal aid. In Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba
2270 S I(xi), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act. Persons who qualify as occupiers for purposes of the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act and persons whose rights to land would normally be protected by the Interim Protection of
Informal Land Rights Act are excluded form the definition of "unlawful occupier".
2271 S 8, Prevention ofIllegal Eviction Act. Persons are on conviction liable to a fine, or imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both.
2272 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 49.
2273 S 4, Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2274 S 6, Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2275 S 5, Prevention ofIllegal Eviction Act.
2276 S 7.
2277 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 51.
2278 Normally the manner and procedure for the serving and filing of notices would be as set out in the rules of the
Magistrate's Court. Service of process takes place when the process is formally delivered to an opposing litigant, in
accordance with the rules of the court. Rule 9 of the Magistrate's Court provides for the following methods of
service: (i) personal service, (ii) service upon an agent, (iii) service at the residence or place of business of the
defendant, (iv) service at the defendant's place of employment, (v) service at the defendant's domicilium citandi,
(vi) service upon a body corporate, (vii) service by registered post, (viii) service upon state organs and state
officials, (ix) service by affixing a copy upon the defendant's door, (x) service upon a partnership, (xi) service upon
curators, executors or guardians, (xii) service upon clubs and societies, and (xiii) service in terms of an order of
court. Paterson Eckard's Principles (1996) 96 - 103; Erasmus & Barrow Hooggeregshof en Landdroshowe (1992)
88 - 91. Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 49.
2279 S 4(2), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2280 The very nature of land invasion and the informal settlement of people on land can make the service of notices
on unlawful occupiers in practice extremely problematic.
2281 S 4(5), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
347
Part Four. The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Property in Germony and South Africa
and Olheri282 the meaning of the requirement that the notice should be written and effective was
considered. A rule nisi was obtained for the eviction of 542 families unlawfully occupying the
property of the applicant. However, the eviction order was sought under section 4 of the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act, which provides for written and effective notice of at least 14
days prior to the hearing. No such notice was given. Accordingly an application for setting aside
the rule nisi followed. The Court confirmed, with reference to the right to housing,2283 tbat
eviction orders may only be granted after all relevant circumstances had been considered. It held
that the purpose of the notice was to protect occupants by warning them that their occupation
was threatened, informing them of their rights and remedies in terms of the provisions of the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.2284 It would therefore not be sufficient to merely have the
notice in writing, because the effectiveness of the notice is as important as its form. In tbat
particular case, the larger part of the community consisted of Xhosa-speaking, illiterate people.
Effectiveness in that case would have meant that the written notice would have bad to be
accompanied by a Xhosa translation and that the contents thereof should have been broadcast, in
Xhosa, by a megaphone throughout the community at times when many of the residents would
be there.2285
The court can grant the eviction order after having taken into account all tbe relevant
considerations. The order will set a just and equitable date on which vacation must take place
and a date on which the eviction order is to be carried out if vacation had not occurred.2286 The
equitable date referred to is to be determined after all relevant factors have been taken into
account, inter alia the period of occupation. An eviction order can coincide with an order
regarding the demolition and removal. However, any such order is subject to conditions deemed
reasonable by the court. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act compels the court to distinguish
between unlawful occupiers who have occupied land for less than six months and those who
have been in occupation of the land for more than six months in granting eviction orders. In both
cases, the court will grant an eviction order if it is just and equitable to do so after considering all
relevant circumstances.V" but with regard to occupiers who have been on the land for longer
than six months, it should additionally be considered whether land has been made available or
can reasonably be made available by a municipality or other organ of state or another landowner
for the relocation of the unlawful occupiers.2288 This aspect will be a consideration in all of these
cases, except where the land is sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a mortgage. It must be
stressed that the availability of alternative land is not a prerequisite for the issue of an eviction
m2 2000 2 SA 67 (C).
2183 More specifically s 26(3) FC.
228420002 SA 67 (C) 740-F.
118S 75F-G. Apart from the problems ensuing form the notice above, the nile nisi was discharged due to the
following considerations: (a) the proceedings were initiated by obtaining a mie nisi in stead of issuing and serving a
notice of motion, (b) the hearing took place without notice to the respondents, (c) the normal time periods were
bypassed by the applicant and (d) only a copy of the court order, rather than a full copy or the founding papers, was
served on each or the respondents (770-E).
2281> S 4(8), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2287 Eg the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.
228M S 4(7), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
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order, but that it is rather one of the factors that can be taken into account. Thus, it will not
necessarily form part of all eviction proceedings. It is only relevant in cases where the land was
occupied longer than six months.
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act provides for the initiation of eviction proceedings by a
state organ directly or indirectly. If the eviction is to take place at the direct instance of an organ
of state,2289such an order will be granted if just and. equitable and after the court has considered
all the relevant circumstances.F'" This includes questions like whether the occupant is in
occupation of land or has erected a structure without the necessary consent or whether it is in the
public interest to grant such an order.2291The interests and safety of those occupying the land, as
well as the interests of the general public need to be considered. Furthermore, the circumstances
under which occupation took place and structures were erected, the period of occupation and the
availability of suitable alternative accommodation or land can also influence the outcome of the
court order. In contrast to the case where private parties apply for eviction, the court will
normally consider the availability of alternative land or accommodation regardless of the period
of occupation.F" Notice of the proceedings must be given not less than 14 days before they take
place.2293
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act further provides that an organ of state can initiate eviction
proceedings indirectly, by giving an owner or person in charge notice to institute eviction
proceedings. This is usually relevant within the context of local authorities' responsibility to
enforce town planning and spatial measures_2294In such cases, the court can order the private
party to bear the costs of these proceedings, upon request by the state organ responsible for
instigating the eviction order.2295If the relevant owners do not react within the stipulated period
in the notice, the proceedings will nevertheless continue, on the authority of the organ of
state_2296
Both individuals and state organs can make use of the urgent proceedings pending the outcome
of proceedings for a final order. Such an order will be granted if the court is satisfied (i) that
there is real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to any person or property if the
unlawful occupier is not evicted; (ii) that the likely hardship to the owner if an order is not
granted in relation to the likely suffering of the unlawful occupier against whom the order is
sought if an order of eviction is granted; and (iii) that there is no other effective remedy
available. As in the case of an ordinary order, the hearing has to be preceded by a notice. This
must be in writing and must effectively indicate the owner's intention to obtain an eviction order,
2289 An organ of state may institute eviction proceedings with regard to land situated in its area of jurisdiction.
2290 CfCarey-Miller Land Title (2000) 522 - 523.
2291 S 6( 1), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2292 Where individuals apply for eviction orders, this aspect is only relevant if occupation had been longer than six
months.
2293 S 4(2) and 5(2) as opposed to s 6(4).
2294 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 51.
2295 S 6(5), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2296 Carey-Miller Land Title (2000) 522.
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but no time period is set out in this section.2297 The content of the notice is identical to that of a
normal eviction notice.2298
Upon reading the provision of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act, it seems as if the intention
is not lO create any new land rights. It simply provides fair procedures for tbe eviction of
unlawful occupants.2299 However, illegal land invasion and informal settlement are still major
concerns. The fact that a court order may entrench the position of unlawful occupiers of land is
problematic. The question whether the unlawful occupation of the land becomes lawful upon an
order of court against eviction, and the issue of the status of the occupiers of land pursuant to
such an order, will in future have to be clarified. Obviously, the Full impact of the Prevention of
Illegal Eviction Act has not been completely realised in practice.
Also in the case of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act, the main purpose of the legislation
seems to be the protection of both occupiers and landowners. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v
Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Otheri300 the underlying philosophy of this act and
the unique circumstances and background which led to the drafting of it, were highlighted.2301
Horn AJ emphasised that a legalistic approach to this kind of social welfare legislation was not
appropriate. The legislation is inevitably linked to social and economic factors and fairness,
morality and social values must influence it.2302 In matters like these, the conflicting interests of
the landowners and the homeless are always present. It is the duty of the court to balance these
interests and to come to a decision that is "just and equitable" in the relevant circumstances.
3. Evaluation
The actual transformation of property law and landownership is presently curtailed by financial
difficulties and the lack of a generally accepted theoretical framework. The recently introduced
legislative reforms must be accommodated within the current socio-political function and practise of
landownership to establish an acceptable legal theoretical framework.
The land reform model currently advocated by the government promotes the individual self-
esteem and interest as one of the primary incentives to efficient and optimal use.2303 However,
the three-fold division of the South African land reform programme does not reflect a specific
2297 S 5(2), Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act.
2298 Pienaar "Land Reform" unpublished paper (2000) 51.
2299 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 288.
2300 2000 2 SA 1074 (SECLO). This case concerned land earmarked for housing development under carefully
structured housing policies, but which was occupied illegally as a result of a well-organised, deliberate and
premeditated act on the part of the occupants. The duty of the loeal authority to provide housing and shelter and the
role that the Aet had to play to regulate evictions in an orderly fashion, were underlined. The court pointed out the
intolerability of allowing a small number of individuals to frustrate large-scale housing projects and henceforth
granted the eviction order, pending the availability of suitable alternative land or accommodation.
2301 1079!\ - I aSOf.
2302 1081G.
2303 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting PaSI
Injustices (1996) 1 16.
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dogmatic structure.2304 Instead, it represents the ad hoc nature of the process and its possible
results. Consequently, substantive legal change would be a matter of chance.
The reform process has, up to now, been focussed on according land rights by using existing
procedures or by modifying existing procedures of acquisitions. As such, the land reform
programme's most striking contribution to the transformation of property law is the expansion of
a broad range of possessory "rights" at the expense of ownership.2305 Fundamental
transformation of the law of landownership is embodied in the introduction of the concepts of
"initial ownership" and "beneficial occupation." However, these developments still take place
within a framework resembling that of "traditional" common law, that is, a framework in which
full ownership (of land, in these cases) is seen as the highest ideal. Within this framework, new
mechanisms of access to land can be seen as exceptions to the old, established rules of private
law.
Initial ownership, for instance, challenges the traditional South African common law concept of
ownership in that it questions the element of absolute enforceability usually associated with
private property. Initial ownership hovers somewhere between "proper" ownership and a limited
real right, as it encompasses the power to enforce the rights "against the whole world", but does
not comprise the power of alienation. Alternatively, it can also be argued that it constitutes no
inroad on the traditional common law understanding of ownership, because it can be seen as
ownership "in name and anticipation'Y'" and already contains the essential elements of full
ownership.
In the context of the constitutional property guarantee, the application of the principles of
proportionality to a specific case will determine whether the legislation intentionally or
accidentally resulting in an adaptation of the private law principles of property law will pass
muster. The constitutionality of the legislation promoting the objectives of the broader land
reform process and denying rights and entitlements existing under private law of property will
most probably be supported by the affirmative action clauses, the broader context and the solemn
language of the preamble which tip the scales in favour of the homeless and landless.2307
3.1. Land reform and public purpose
The property law order under a system characterised by the predominance of private law in
determining the principles and rules pertaining to property underwent a radical change when the
new constitutional order induced a reconsideration of priorities in the context of land reform. The
crux of the land reform programme concerns the introduction of measures to give effect to
constitutionally declared policy commitments. Thus, land reform legislation embodies a critical
2304 Carey-Miller 1999 SALJ749.
2305 Cf eg Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act; Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act; Extension of
Security of Tenure Act; Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act.
2306 Carey-Miller 1999 SALJ755.
2307 Murphy "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past
Injustices (1996) 119.
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statement of policies agreed upon in the course of drafting the Final Constitution. This of
necessity entails an abandonment of existing laws and measures of control that represented a
different policy orientation in the past.2308
The term public purposes will play a prominent role in determining the constitutionality of
aspects related to the land reform programme. An absolutist interpretation of this term would
result in a prohibition of expropriation of one individual for the sake of restoring ownership to
another. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the principles of restitution and
reconstruction, which are central to the constitution.2309 Already in terms of the Interim
Constitution, the use lo which property is being pul as a factor relevant to the determination of
compensation on expropriation suggested that expropriation of under-utilised property for the
purposes of transferring it to new owners was anticipated.23lo It appears that the distinction
between situations where the specific aim of expropriation is to benefit a private party, and
others where the private party is benefited as an ancillary result of the expropriation that was
intended to fulfil a public policy, remains important. The ultimate purpose of the expropriation,
as opposed to the mechanism of expropriation, is the determining factor?311
Public purpose has obviously not been interpreted literally as public use in South Africa. It is
understood in a broad sense. Instead of facilitating direct public use and access to the property,
public purpose rather requires that the expropriation generate some particular advantage for the
public in general. It includes expropriations whereby the entire population or a local community
is affected and not only matters pertaining to the state or govemment.2312 Therefore land
redistribution programmes have been regarded as falling within the purview of the public
purpose definition, even if private property is occasionally transferred from one private party to
another.2313
3.2. Land reform and the concept of property
The "traditional" property law division between ownership and other "possessory rights" or
"rights in property" was dictated by the assumption that the all-pervading power of ownership,
represented by seventeenth-century Roman-Dutch law, should not be open to challenge.r'!" The
all-pervading power of ownership was perhaps best indicated by the prominence and scope of a
landowner's powers of vindication. Exactly this power has been curtailed extensively as a result
of the advancement of the so-called lesser rights through the process of reform. Yet, the idea that
"full" ownership is supreme to other rights, still seems to be at the order of the day?315 In more
2308 Carey-Miller 1999 SALf 751.
2309 .Cf cg s 8, 121, 122, 123 and the Preamble and Postscript, IC.
2JIOChaskaison 1994SAJI//? 137.
2JII Eisenberg 1995 SAJ/ IR 221.
2312 While Rocks Farm (Ply) Ltd \I Minister of Community Development 1984 3 SA 785 (N) 7931.
nu Eisenberg 1995 SAJ/ IR 221.
2314 Carey-Miller 1999 SALf 751.
2m Van der Walt 1999 Koers 289 - 290.
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recent land reform legislation, however, it seems as if there is a stronger tendency to break away
from the existing structure.
Instances of the reinforcement of lesser rights are found in the Land Reform (Labour Tenants)
Act and the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act. In the Land Reform (Labour
Tenants) Act, the formerly insecure tenure of labour tenants were granted better legal protection,
and where a controlled right to acquisition of land was granted to persons who qualified for it in
terms of the act. In terms of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act a specifically
defined number of lesser rights enjoys protection (on an interim basis, pending permanent reform
measures) against the otherwise dominant rights of the titleholder.
The concept rights in land could in future have a substantial influence on the concept of
property, not only in the context of constitutional property protection, but also in the context of
private-law enforcement of rights. The inclusion of beneficial occupation (for a period of 10
years prior to dispossession) as a right in land worthy of restitution in terms of the Restitution of
Land Rights Act points, for instance, to some of the objective and subjective components which
comprise informal land rights: occupation (usually of a specific period)2316plus the intention to
benefit from the land to the exclusion of others. Beneficial occupation itself is not defined in the
Restitution of Land Rights Act. Under the Development Facilitation Act,2317it is apparently
understood to mean peaceful and undisturbed occupation of land for a continuous period of not
less than five years. The Interim Protection ofInformal Land Rights Act2318defines it as
lithe occupation of land by a person, as if he or she is the owner, without force, openly and without the
permission of the registered owner."
Carey-Miller+'" shows that the concept of beneficial occupation has distinct roles in separate
legislative contexts. In the context of restitution, it functions as a control mechanism to
determine the beneficiaries of the restitution programme. In the context of protection of informal
land rights, this concept serves to secure an otherwise very insecure form of possession. In the
context of land reform, "beneficial occupation" is a condition of establishment in providing how
the interests of parties will be upgraded in existing settlements. From these definitions it seems
as if beneficial occupation is a concept similar to "statutory prescriptive title," which enjoys
protection from infringement by third parties.
4. Land law reform and the constitution in comparison
The chief purpose of the constitutional provisions on land reform in general is to redress the
imbalance of existing patterns of ownership by promoting the development of a new property
order, where rights in land are diversified and based upon considerations of fairness. This speaks
2316 Whereas the Restitution of Land Rights Act requires a period of 10 years for beneficial occupation, the
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 set a minimum of 5 years as requirement.
2317 S I defines the term "beneficial occupier".
2318S I,Act31 of1996.
2319 Carey-Miller 1999 SAU755 et seq.
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against an elevation the courts elevating real rights above other interests, since such an approach
would do nothing but confirm the existing unjust patterns of title.
The following chapter aims at providing a comparative balance to that part of the South African
land reform programme involved in restitution. It indicates the extent to which the balancing of
interests inherent to a system of constitutional protection of Germany (and arguably also South
Africa) pervades the law-making process in cases where land law reform is necessary.
Simultaneously, it provides examples of how certain issues with regard to compensation and
restitution have been resolved.
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1. Background to the property questions raised by reunification
After World War II, it was assumed that the division of Germany, which was effected by the
Allied forces, was only of a temporary nature_2320Instead, the relationship between the three
Western powers2321on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other, deteriorated with the
commencement of the Cold War, and German unification seemed to be out of the question. In
the East German occupation zone a socialistic constitution was enacted in 1949, replaced in
1968, and extensively revised again in 1974 to remove all references to a possible reunification
of Germany. In the West, the Basic Law, which was intended to be a temporary constitution,
came into force in 1949 and remained so until reunification in 1990.2322In fact, it still forms the
basis of the German state.
German reunification eventually took place in 1990, with the "accession" of the German
Democratic Republic to the Federal German Republic. Due to the different political and social
models that have developed during the forty years of separation, many obstructions impeded
reunification, among them also the issue of how the property order in Germany would be
influenced by attaching two such different socio-political and legal systems to eachother. In
particular, the treatment of the property order of the former German Democratic Republic would
place new, unexpected demands on the courts, legislature and administration of the new
reunified Federal German Republic. This contributed to the development of the concept of
constitutional protection and regulation of property in German law. This chapter provides an
overview of the legislative innovations to the property order brought about by reunification, as
well as the treatment thereof by the judiciary.
1.1 Property order in the German Democratic Republic before reunification
After the war, but before the establishment of the German Democratic Republic, the eastern part
of Germany was under the rule of the Soviet occupation regime. During this period (between
1945 and 1949), a series of expropriations were effected under the so-called Bodenreform
programme, in order to lay the foundation for a socialist society. The ostensible legal basis for
this large-scaled property reform programme was the Treaty of Potsdam, concluded by the four
Allied Powers in July 1945, although the true purpose of this treaty was rather the elimination of
militarism and national-socialism in Germany_2323Almost all large businesses were expropriated.
The land seized formed about one-third of the entire Soviet zone.2324
2320 Robbers Introduction (1998) 41.
2321 Britain, France and the USA.
2322 Cf 34 et seq supra.
2323 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 13.
2324 Southern 1993 ICLQ 691.
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Large industrial enterprises and all estates larger than 100 hectares (for instance, the estates of
the aristocratic land barons called the Junkers) were confiscated/32s the latter on the basis that
owners of such vast landholdings were automatically regarded as "enemies of the People" _2326
Many thousands of holdings under 100 hectares were confiscated too with the objective of large-
scale social restructuring. All in all, this comprised around 3,3 million hectares_2327 Some 60% of
the confiscated land was distributed to poor fanners who did not pose any political threat to the
governrnent.2328 The rest was reorganised for purposes of societal use or municipal
administration, or developed into state research and educational institutions_2329
Orders that all land registers relating to land confiscated in the time of Soviet occupation bad to
be destroyed, were apparently not obeyed.233o Crossings-out, erasures, obliteration or gummed
paper were, nevertheless, used to remove evidence of former owncrship.P" Thus, the land
registers as such were left intact, but the process of tracing the original owners after reunification
and during the restitution process was complicated. The new holders received "title" to the land
attributed to them by the Soviet occupation regime in so far as that they were allowed to use it
and that the land could be bequeathed to a descendant, but the holders did not have the capacity
to alienate, divide or mortgage it. Further, the holders were obliged to deliver a specific share of
their harvests to the govemment.2332
Extensive expropriations of property by the state for public purposes2333 took place after the
establishment of the German Democratic Republic in 1949 and during its forty year existence.
Virtually all industrial and agricultural property, like land, buildings, installations, machinery,
raw materials, industrial products, copyright and patents, were converted into Volkseigentum
(People's Property).2334 In most cases extremely low compensation was awarded. The agrarian
land distributed to individual fanners during the period between 1945 and 1949 was reorganised
into agricultural co-operatives.2J35 Many of the small and middle-sized businesses remained - at
least partly - in the hands of private owners until 1972 when practically all private businesses
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2325 No compensation was paid. Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 16.
2326 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 125; Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 7 - 12.
2327 Southern 1993 ICLQ 691.
2J28 This property was referred to as Neubauereigentum, Bodenreformeigentum or Siedlungseigentum. Cf Pries
Neubaucrncigenrum (1993) I - 2; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 256.
2329 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 19 - 24.
mo Most of the old land registers were collected and stored in Castle Barby, and forgotten for decades. With the
reunification, they were rediscovered by anxious former landowners wanting restitution of their property. The arson
attack on the archive at Castle Barby in 1993 caused considerable damage, and seriously dislocated the restitution
process. Southern 1993 ICLQ 692.
ml Pries Neubauemeigentum (1993) 18.
zm 26 - 34; 36 - 40.
m3 This included expropriation of land for the building of cities and development of infrastructure; for industrial
settlements, energy management and for military purposes. Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelarnira
& Werle (cds) Confrontlng Past Injustices (1996) 100.
21J4 Quint The imperfect Union (1997) 124.
2l.l5 The so-called Landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften (LPGen). Cf Pries Neubauerneigentum
(1993)41 -45.
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were placed under government ownership. The thousands of state-owned enterprises were also
regarded as People's Property_2336
Land and property had a consciously diversified, subordinated and artificially reduced status in
the socialist socio-economic system.2337In Socialist law, a premium was placed on "control"
rather than "ownership. ,,2338The following types of "control" could be identified:
(i) Socialist Property consisted of Peoples Property,2339 Co-Operative Socialist
Property,2340 and Property of Civic Associationsiï" It is difficult to determine exactly where
ownership of People's Property lay. It was owned by everybody and nobody. The ownership
entitlements were exercised by the socially owned firms of the state, which means that it was
indeed not the People, but rather the State, that could be regarded as the legal subject of People's
Property.2342 Co-Operative Socialist Property belonged to the industrial and agricultural co-
operatives. They could use and control the property in the interests of their enterprise. Property
of Civic Associations constituted the belongings of mass organisations and parties.
(ii) Personal Property2343included objects for personal use, like furniture, books and so on,
aimed at satisfying the material and cultural needs of citizens. It was not intended to be used as
source of income. Land and buildings could also qualify as personal property. This property
could be alienated, used and exploited at will of the owner.2344
(iii) Property of Labourers'i'" comprised property connected to certain kinds of
professions, like that of craftsmen, labourers and small-scale farmers.2346
Where immovable property was concerned, the existing land registers were closed and a new
land register opened,2347designating the land as People's Property, and indicating the authority or
2336 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 146.
2337 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 83; Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 119;
Kimminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefi der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 53.
2338 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 45 - 65 indicates, for instance, that the members of the agricultural co-
operatives had specific rights and duties with regard to the land, but that the co-operative itself had extensive rights
of use over this land against the members. A member had, upon entry into the co-operative, to submit an inventory
of the land and related property under his or her control, and had to hand it over to the co-operative. In return, the
member was entitled to a just proportion of the land under control of the co-operative, for control by the member
himself or herself. This also included the right to determine a successor upon death of the member. The member
further had the right to terminate his membership, but only once the Members' Assembly agreed to it. He or she
would also lose the means of production. The co-operative had the right to claim handing over of all fruits from the
land, to use the land for agricultural purposes, and to erect buildings upon it. It could exploit the mineral resources
of the land, and could exercise the rights of an owner, without that it was necessary for the controller to be joined to
any action pertaining to the property.
2339 Volkseigentum.
2340 Genossenschaftlich-sozialistisches Eigentum.
2341 Eigentum gesellschaftlicher Organisationen der Burger.
2342 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 120 - 121.
2343 Persënliches Eigentum.
2344 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 122 - 123.
2345 Eigentum der Handwerker und Gewerbetreibenden.
2346 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 123.
234722.
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enterprise holding the property. Agriculture and industry were organised into different
"enterprises" (Kombinate) and each enterprise controlled a number of "socially owned firms"
(Volkseigener Betrieb / VEB). Moreover, state and party organisations acquired extensive land
holdings.2348
The application of the rules of economic criminal law led to the gradual defacto expropriation of
the middle class. It provided [or total expropriation of industrial and other property on even
minor offences against provisions on, for example, the delivery of goods.2349 In addition,
property could be seized by the state [rom the owners if permissible rental under the law of the
German Democratic Republic were insufficient to maintain the property_2350
The small sphere of private property left was held under a comprehensive system of government
administration. The institution of long leasehold (Uberiassungsvertrag) was introduced and the
number of titles thus created proliferated between 1952 and 1976. Tbe occupiers had the same
entitlements as owners, but were not registered as such in the land register.2351 In some instances,
property - especially houses or other residences - remained in private ownership and could still
be alienated. Both the 1949 and 1968/1974 constitutions of the German Democratic Republic
protected private property to some extent and even seemed to contemplate at least a low rate of
compensation for expropriation.2352
The socialist property order in the German Democratic Republic at the time of reunification,
together with the haphazard system of land registration, created serious obstacles for the
development of a just property law regime in the reunified Germany. The property issues were
amongst the most controversial to be solved.
1.2. Problems posed for the property order due to reunification
At the start of negotiations for reunification, there were many unsettled property questions. This
resulted [rom the different ideologies which formed the basis of property law in the eastern and
western parts of Germany, and the discriminatory way in which the German Democratic
Republic treated the property of people who fled its territory, who left with its pennission and
who were domiciled outside its later territory (including the Soviet sector of Berlin) before the
2348 Southern 1993 ICLQ 692.
2349 Pieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 82.
2350 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 129.
2351 Southern 1993 ICLQ 692.
2352 In the 1949 Constitution (art 22, 23, 27) property was protected subject to "the social duties in favour of the
community." Expropriation was allowed "only for the good of the community on the basis of a statute," and required
compensation, "as long as the law does not determine otherwise." In the 1968/1974 Constitution (art 11, 16),
"personal property" was guaranteed, but in a much narrower sense than what is usually understood to be personal
property in the "western" sense of the word: it referred in principle only to "property in consumer goods purchased
from income from work." It was also stipulated that "the lise of property may not contradict the interests of the
community." Expropriation could be undertaken "in return for appropriate compensation."
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end of World War II in Europe.2353The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of these
problems.
1.2.1. The "Bodenreform" and its implications
The Soviet occupation regime's Bodenreform - the land or agrarian reform programme of 1945 to
1949 - caused dogmatic difficulties after the reunification.2354 It was primarily aimed at the
punishment of fascism by dividing agricultural areas more "justly" and thus indirectly improving
the use of land.2355It therefore did not qualify as confiscated foreign assets, and the purpose of
the confiscation was neither reparation, nor debilitation of the German national economy.
Consequently it did not fall into any of the categories of confiscation qualifying for
compensation set earlier2356by the Federal Constitutional Court.2357 It was also speculated
whether the Bodenreform could have been an unconstitutional infringement in terms of article 3
III GG, which provides protection against discrimination on the basis of class or social origin_2358
1.2.2. "Wiedergutmachung" in the Federal Republic and its implications
A further problem was to what extent the reparation arrangements of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the Allied powers influenced the measures undertaken in the former East zone and
also in the German Democratic Republic. Refugees who left Germany between 1933 and 1945
were forced to sell their immovable property and could only take a restricted amount of currency
out of the country. The persecuted that did not flee, only rarely survived the large-scale massacre
of so-called state enemies. In any event, their land often ended up in the hands of party
organisations or members, without any systematic alterations to the land register.2359
The Wiedergutmachung programme in the German Federal Republic was aimed at providing
some kind of reparation for the victims of national socialism. The Federal Court of Justice
declared on one occasion that the reparation arrangements in the Federal Republic of Germany
were compatible with article 14 GG.2360No comprehensive rehabilitation was ever envisaged in
the German Democratic Republic for the victims of national socialism,2361 and in particular no
restitution of property which had been lost as a consequence of persecution in the period between
1933 and 1945.2362After reunification it was, however, not clear how the forcible dispossession
23538 May 1945.
2354 BVerfGE 1991 NJW 1597.
2355 Kirnminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefi der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 81; Pries Neubauerneigentum
(1993) 13.
2356 In 1976 in BVerfGE 41,126.
2357 Leisner 1991 NJW 1569 et seq provides a discussion of the reasons forwarded by the Federal Constitutional
Court for not granting compensation.
2358 Kirnminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefi der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 72.
2359 Southern 1993 ICLQ 691.
2360 BGHZ 52, 371381.
2361 Tappert Die Wiedergutmachung von Staatsunrecht der SBZ / DDR (1995) 19 - 71 gives a detailed analysis of the
attempts at Wiedergutmachung that were undertaken.
2362 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 99.
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or confiscation of property, situated in what would later become the German Democratic
Republic, could be brought into line with the Basic Law.2363 The victims2364 or their relatives
demanded the necessary relief from the two German govemments.236S
1.2.3. Expropriation policy in German Democratic Republic
In 1949, the Soviet occupation zone became the German Democratic Republic. Expropriation
legislation was enacted and on this basis countless expropriations and other infringements of
property rights, in particular with regard to land, apartment ownership and means of production,
took place. The main purpose of these expropriations was to give effect to a socialist conception
of ownership,2366 and to transform individual ownership to so-called Volkseigentum.r'" A
di fficult problem, which resulted from this, was whether the expropriation legislation of the
former German Democratic Republic would continue to apply after reunification had taken
place.
This crucial question in this regard was whether the requirement of article 14 III 2 GG was
applicable to expropriatory legislation of the former German Democratic Republic. This
provision states that expropriation could only take place if compensation was provided for and if
the type and extent of such compensation was expressly stipulated by legislation. The
confiscation and expropriations in the German Democratic Republic were undertaken in terms of
regulations applying to all inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic, citizens of the
German Federal Republic as well as foreigners. They were thus not necessarily arbitrary, and not
necessarily aimed at putting a particular group or person at a disadvantage, even if the
compensation amounts offered (if any) were very low. Instead, they could be regarded as part of
the socialist system of the German Democratic Republic. The only exception to the rule in article
14 IT1 2 GG pertains to expropriatory legislation enacted before the coming into force of
article 14 GG. It therefore had to be determined whether the German Democratic Republic's
expropriation legislation would be subject to article 14 III 2 GG, or whether this article was not
applicable because of the rule against retrospectivity.P"
The confiscation of property in East Germany that qualified for compcnsatiorr=? confronted the
legislative authorities with the question about the manner in which the amount of compensation
should be determined. In discussions on this topic, the social function of property as it is
described in article 14 GG played an important role.237o Under the Defence Act2371 of the
mj Kimminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Pro=ep der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 80.
2364 Who were mostly Jews who survived the holocaust, or their descendants, but also included relatives of the
conspirators of20 July (the day on which a failed assassination attempt on Hitler took place).
231>5 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 82.
23106 Ficbcrg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwclamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past II/jl/Slices (1996) 82.
2167 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) COl/fronting Past Injustices (1996) 99.
23M Kimminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefi der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 79.
2369 Mostly those taking place after 1949.
2370 Kimminich Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefl der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 83.
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German Democratic Republic, property was for instance expropriated (with payment of normal
GDR compensation) for building the Berlin Wall and clearing the surrounding territory. Most of
the "Wall Property" ran through the centre of Berlin, and became extremely valuable after
reunification. The administration in Bonn was particularly adamant on retaining this property, at
essentially no cost, for governmental purposes or lucrative resale. This created an uproar among
many interested parties, some even calling it a retroactive endorsement of the Berlin Wall by the
legal system of the former western part of the Federal Republic of Germany.2372
1.2.4. Administration of emigrants' and refugees' property and its implications
Between 1945 and 1990, but especially before 1961, about 3,5 million people fled the German
Democratic Republic.2373At first, no special legal regulation governed the immovable property
abandoned by these refugees. In 1952, however, the property of all people who fled the German
Democratic Republic since the end of the war, was confiscated.Y'" Regulations pertaining to
obligatory state regulation were also imposed against the property of all property holders living
outside the German Democratic Republic since the end of the war. This legislation was repealed
in 1953, but without undoing the retrospective confiscation of property abandoned before 1952.
Movement from East to West was severely constrained after the Berlin Wall was erected in
1961. Citizens of the German Democratic Republic could, however, still apply for official
permission to leave. In spite of the legal protection offered to emigrants, permission to leave was
in effect only granted once these "emigrants" had been forced to alienate their land to the state or
third parties, often at very low prices.2375
From this time onwards, until the opening of the inner-German borders in 1989, property
abandoned by refugees was not confiscated, but placed under the obligatory administration of the
state, which was in fact nothing less than de facto expropriation.v " The obligatory
administration of the state effectively removed all the rights and commercial opportunities
usually associated with ownership. Although still registered as owners in the title deeds of land,
they were no longer responsible for the administration of their own property, they had no control
over it and received no information about its use and condition. Proceeds did not befall the
owners, but were regarded as People's Property or as state resources. The state used this property
for a variety of purposes, for instance for the construction of industries or for state housing
schemes. Land belonging to the state was let to tenants from as early as 1954. State administered
property were also often used for this purpose. Tenants received the right to use state property,
2371 1961
2372 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 134.
2373 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 80.
2374 Verordnung zur Sicherung von Vermogenswerten 17 July 1952 (GDR Law Gazette 615)
2375 A decree from the Ministry of the Interior permitting emigrants to have the property administered was never put
into effect or made public. Emigrants regarded themselves as having no choice but to alienate their property to the
state.
2376 Regulation no 2 (Anordnung iiber die Behandlung des Vermogens von Personen. die die Deutsche
Demokratische Republik nach dem JO. Junie 1953 verlassen) GDR Law Gazette I, 664.
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free of charge and without any time limit. Property under obligatory state administration could
be sold to its users subject to specific conditions. Even after this regulation had been repealed,2377
the obligatory administration of property continued. This system gave rise to several problems
after reunification:
Ci)In practice these regulations created two separate groups of refugees with different legal
rights, although their positions were practically identical. The one group was de lure and defacto
completely dispossessed, whereas the other group still retained title, but was economically
dispossessed and "expropriated" for all practical purposes_2378This situation made the decision as
to the form of rehabilitation controversial: confiscated or similar assets, could be returned to the
original owners, state control could be removed,2379 or the expropriated owners could be
financially rccompcnscd.P'" The former option eventually turned out to be more equitable in
view of the anomalous categorisation of refugees' property. Restitution was the only possible
way in which both categories of "refugee property" could receive equal and equitable treatment.
Compensation would have had the unacceptable result that victims of the obligatory state
administration system would not have been regarded as having lost their property in the first
place. The compensation option would then either have had to be restricted to cases of loss of
ownership through expropriation or alienation, or would have had to provide in the Unification
Treaty for formal expropriation of hitherto state-administered property. The consequence of the
latter would be a sanctioning of the discriminatory confiscation that was effected economically
by the German Democratic Republic, by the Unification Treaty_238IThis could have had a
disruptive effect on the restoration of German unity. Thereby a step would have been taken in the
unification process that not even the German Democratic Republic's authorities wanted to take.
(ii) This system also caused serious disagreement between the so-called East- and West-
Germans. On the one hand, former owners who previously ned to the West regarded the
reunification negotiations as their chance of having their property returned. They regarded any
interests of third parties that vested in the property after confiscation or the commencement of
obligatory administration by the government of the former Gelman Democratic Republic as
unworthy of protection. They argued that these parties almost always knew that the property
belonged to refugees, and thus were accomplices of the corrupt state. On the other hand, fear and
insecurity prevailed within the German Democratic Republic itself, among landowners, but also
among the larger contingent of land tenants: In fact, not many citizens of the German
Democratic Republic were landowners. Most were tenants, often of property (which was
abandoned by refugees) under the obligatory state administration system.2382This property was
2377 II November 1989.
2378 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwclarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 81.
2379 This option was preferred by the Federal Republic of Germany, as the expropriation of refugees' property had
never been recognised by its government.
2380 This option was preferred by the German Democratic Republic and its inhabitants.
2381 Pieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwclarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past IIIjustices (1996) 84 - 85.
m2 Quint The Imperfect UIlion (1997) 132.
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mostly not maintained properly by the state and the tenants themselves often financed
fundamental repairs and maintenance, to keep the land and dwellings in habitable conditions.
Tenants in the German Democratic Republic were subsidised by the state and enjoyed the strong
protection of the socialist rent legislation. However, their situation became precarious with
reunification and property reform pending. They faced possible eviction from their long-term
homes by the original owners who had no real interest in these dwelling places any more.
Besides, practically no provision was made for remuneration, regardless of the extent of their
expenditure for maintenance of the property over years of residence_2383The problems of
landowners in the German Democratic Republic were also manifold. The assets acquired by
them - mostly with great personal effort and under harsh economic, social and legal conditions -
were all of a sudden to be placed at the disposal of the previous owners. The security of title that
landowners in the eastern part of Germany enjoyed under the legal system of the German
Democratic Republic vanished. Economic and social re-evaluation of land and property in a new
market-oriented economy loomed. A satisfactory solution for all parties concerned could only
include compromises. This involved substantial inroads in the respective interests of the parties
concerned.2384
1.2.5. Business property
The large-scaled expropriation of businesses under Soviet occupation rule and in the later
German Democratic Republic led to more problems at reunification. It was uncertain how these
enterprises should be treated. In the last days of the German Democratic Republic, a trust agency
(Treuhand) was created by the transitional government for the administration of these
businesses. Provision was made to convert state-owned businesses into stock companies or
private companies.2385
2. Legislative arrangements
The framework within which certain property, expropriated or confiscated in the German
Democratic Republic was to be returned to its original owners was first set out in the Joint
Declaration in regard to the Regulation of Unresolved Property Questions.2386 The Joint
Declaration formed the political and legal basis for the regulation of property in a new, reunified
Germany. lts aim was to return expropriated property in the German Democratic Republic to its
original owners or their heirs,2387 although several pragmatic considerations restricted this
general intention of restitution. Although the Joint Declaration was a political document, it was
2383 133.
2384 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira &Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 83.
2385 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 146.
2386 Gemeinsame Erkliirung zur Regelung ofJener Vermëgensfragen, 15 June 1990, BGBl1990 111273.
2387 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 256.
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incorporated2388 into the Unification Treaty,2389 and thus obtained binding legal force for the
contracting parties.239o It therefore forms part of the foundations of modern German property
law_2391
2.1. Giving legislative effect to the revision of the property order
For the purpose of clarifying the general provisions of the Joint Declaration, the Unification
Treaty also provided for more detailed measures regulating property issues: (i) The Law on the
Regulation of Unsolved Property Questions (the "Property Act,,)2392 regulated the circumstances
under which the principle of natural restitution would apply. (ii) The Act on Special Investments
in the German Democratic Republic (the "Investment Act,,)2393 and its successors (the
"Jnvestment Acceleration Act,,2394 and the "Investment Priority Act,,)2395 provided additional
conditions to regulate the principle of natural restitution.
2.1.1. Restitution before compensation
The policy of natural restitution (Ruckgabe vor Entschiidigung) is laid down and simultaneously
limited in articles 41 (I) and (2) of the Unification Treaty.2396 The chief mechanism for giving
this principle practical implication, was the "Property Act." Section I is the key provision.
Subsections (I) to (7) enumerate the various categories of property which could be subject of
restitution claims, while subsection (8) excludes restitution in a further number of categories. An
amendment to the Property Act in 19922397makes express provision for interpretation di fficulties
arising from the Property Act in connection with descendants of former owners or right holders
that might qualify for restitution.2398
Restitution before compensation did not mean that rehabilitation in the economic sphere would
necessarily be guided by present market values. It merely established the precedence of
rehabilitation in kind over rehabilitation in money.2399 However, this principle does reneet an
almost absolutist conception of property with the right of recovery extending to 1949 and even
ms Incorporated into the Unification Treaty as Exhibit lIl, the agreement covered seized businesses and real estate -
nearly all the industrial and landed property in the German Democratic Republic.
2389 An 41 (I) of Ver/rag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland lind der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
liber die Herstel/ling der Einheit Deutschlands - Einigungsvertrag - 31 August 1990, BGB1 1990 11 889.
2390 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Pas/ Injustices (1996) 83.
2391 Dickmann Das System der Ritckerstattungstatbestánde (1992) 43 - 55.
2392 Geset= zur Regelung von offener Vermogensfragen, BGBI 1990 11 1159.
2393 Gesetz iiber besondere lnvestitionen in der Deiusehen Demokratischen Republik, BGBI 1990, 11 1157.
2394 Geset: zur Beseitigung von Hemnissen bei der Privatisierung von Unternehmen und zur Fordening von
lnvestitionen, 8GBI 1991 1766
2)95 Gesetz Ober den Vorrang fiir Investitionen bei Riickiibertragungsanspriichen nach dent Bermogensgesetz -
lnvestitionsvorranggesetz - BGBI 1992 1 1268
2396 Dickmann Das System der Riickerstauungstatbestande (1992) 66 - 74.
2397 Cf 2. Vermëgensrechtsánderungsgesetz (BGBI I 1992 1257) incorporated in art 233 EG 13GB.
2)')~ Cf in general Forsterling Recht der oflen en Vermogensfragen (1993) mn 225 et seq.
2399 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Properry Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Pas/Injustices (1996) 84 - 85.
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earlier; thus, over a period of more than fifty years. Even though descendants had no personal
relation to the property, they were still able to pursue the claims for restitution_2400
A profound ideological gulf lay between the supporters and opponents of restitution.2401
Supporters of this policy regarded restitution as a moral and pragmatic necessity, because respect
for and protection of property is a prerequisite for creation of wealth. Opponents of this policy
saw in this process the making of an economic and administrative disaster, which produced
greater injustice than that it intended to relieve_2402By the end of 1994, however, about half of all
the restitution claims had been processed and most of the claims for return or privatisation of
businesses have been completed. The claims to restitution of land and buildings were more time-
consuming.
2.1.1.1. Restitution of land
The principal object of the Property Act was the restitution of land seized by the German
Democratic Republic state without adequate compensation. The main categories for which
restitution could be claimed were: (i) property that was converted into People's Property after the
establishment of the German Democratic Republic on 7 October 1949,2403(ii) property acquired
mala fide by third parties after this date; and (iii) property lost between 30 January 1933 and 8
May 1945 as a result of religious, political or racial persecution.2404 The Joint Declaration also
stated that property under obligatory state administration, namely property placed under state
administration in consequence of forced emigration, renunciation, and flight to West Germany
and non-consensual sale or property appropriated by the state,2405would be restored to the
original owners.Y'"
The Property Act initially provided that expenses for fundamental repairs and maintenance to
keep the land and dwellings in habitable conditions could be reclaimed by the tenants. This
provision was, however, subsequently deleted_2407
2.1.1.2. Restitution of business property
The property settlement in the Unification Treaty also addressed the fate of thousands of
business enterprises in the German Democratic Republic. After it had been accepted that the
former German Democratic Republic would adopt the legal and economic principles conforming
2400 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 128 - 129.
2401 Du Sold Restitution var Entschiidigung (1993) discusses in detail the arguments against and in favour of this
policy.
2402 Southern 1993 ICLQ 696 - 697.
2403 Cf art 41 (1), Unification Treaty.
2404 Property Act s 1(6); Claims of restitution involving victims of National-Socialism would take precedence over
claims of later holder of the same property who may have been subject to expropriation. Property Act s 3(2).
2405 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 161 - 164; Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 256.
2406 Attachment III par 2, Unification Treaty; s 1(4), 11 - 15 Property Act. The original owner could, however,
choose compensation in stead of restitution.
2407 Cfs 19, 1990 version of Property Act.
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with those of the Federal Republic, including the principle of private property in land and means
of production, the Treuhand Act2408 was promulgated to assist in the privatisation of People's
Property.
It was decided that the general policy of restitution would also apply to business property
expropriated by the German Democratic Government. Yet, some legal, technical and economic
problems related to business property necessitated a specialised treatment of restitution. In
contrast with land, business property is a rather fluid entity. It would make little sense to return a
firm that might have the same name but otherwise bore no resemblance to the expropriated
enterprise.2409 Thus, under the Property Act, a business enterprise could only be returned to its
prior owner if the enterprise remained comparable with the business at the time of expropriation,
taking into account intervening changes in technology and general economic development.i""
The original owner could, however, in many cases also choose compensation instead of return of
the enterprisc.i"!'
If the business was comparable, and therefore capable of being returned to the original owner,
adjustments had to be made for substantial changes in the value of the business in the intervening
period. The Property Act contains complicated rules for measuring substantial increases or
decreases in value and regulating the problems of joint owners and stockholders caused by
intervening mergers and splitting of businesses. Those business concerns that were not
comparable, and could consequently not be returned to the original owners, as well as the
business enterprises that were founded by the state and therefore had no prior owners, posed a
serious administrative problem.2412 The task of determining the destiny of these concerns fell to
the Treuhand. It was decided that the concerns would mostly be sold to private owners.
However, due to lack of governmental participation and the currency union established after
unification, many of the Treuhand-coocetos were unable to pay their debts, and the Treuhand
administration itself was incapable of handling this problem effectively. Consequently, the
Treuhand had to bear the brunt for the decline of the economic conditions and the escalation of
unemployment rates in the east of Germany.2413 The Treuhand ceased its activities in 1994, and a
number of smaller agencies continued the necessary administrative duties.
2.1.1.3. Procedure for claiming restitution
Restitution claims usually had to be registered at one of the 221 local Open Property Offices in
Germany. These local Property Offices are subject to one of six superior (provincial) Property
NilS Gesetz zur Privatisierung lind Reorganisation des volksetgenen Vermogens (Treuhandgesetz), 17 June 1990,
GBI DDR I 11033,300; art 25 Unification Treaty.
2409 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 146.
2410 S 6(1) - (4), Property Act; cf auachrnent III, s 7, Unification Treaty.
2411 S 6(7), Property Act.
2412 Quint The imperfect Union (1997) 147.
2413 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 148 - 151 gives a detailed explanation of the factors contributing to the fall of
the Treuhand institution.
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Offices.2414Restitution claims had to be registered in the local Property Office of the district
where the claimant (or the deceased in the case of a claim by the descendants) last lived, but
could also be directed to the office in the district where the property in question was situated.
The victims of persecution under national-socialism and foreign residents had to register their
claims at the Federal Ministry of Justice in Bonn. Applications by corporate bodies and
businesses had to be made to one of the six provincial property offices. Once a restitution claim
had been lodged, the person with the power of disposition over the property - usually the
Treuhand or another state or local authority - could not sell, lease or rent the land,2415unless an
investment priority decision or investment certificate had been granted. In such cases, the right to
restitution was overridden_2416
The deadline for lodging restitution claims (Ruckubertragungsanspriiche) was set at 31
December 1992. Property not claimed by that date would belong to the person with de facto
power of disposal over it;2417Over 1,2 million applications were lodged, the majority concerning
landownership and affecting over one-third of the land area of the former German Democratic
Republic.
After a restitution claim had been registered, the relevant property office had to establish what
exactly was being claimed in each case. Claims were often unsubstantiated, vague, contradictory
or conflicting. In favoured areas, like the suburbs of Berlin and central areas of cities, two or
more claims, seeking recovery of the same piece of land to different "prior" owners, were
sometimes even encountered.P" Itwas up to the federal, provincial and local property offices to
trace the original owners of such property with proper title to it. Once a claim had been
sufficiently clarified, the office would make a provisional decision (Vorbescheid), either to reject
or uphold the claim, or find that the applicant is only entitled to compensation, and not
restitution.2419Appeals against such a decision have to be directed to the superior Property Office
in a specific territory, where they will be decided by a committee established especially for this
purpose.2420
If the claim for restitution was endorsed, an application could be brought to the local Land
Registry for the entry of the correct particulars of the proprietor. Such an application would be
successful, if no investment certificate was sought or granted in respect of the property. In case
of a successful entry, the property is charged with a levy for the purpose of subsidising the
compensation fund. The rights and duties of parties who had contracted in good faith are
2414 Scollo-Lavizzari Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment Research Dissertation, LL M
(1996) 45.
2415 S 3(3)1 and 15(2), Property Act.
2416 Scollo-Lavizzari Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment Research Dissertation, LL M
(1996) 45 - 50; Southern 1993 ICLQ 695.
2417 Gesetz zur Ánderung des Vermogensgesetzes und anderer Vorschriften (2. Vermëgensrechtsënderungsgesetz) 14
July 1992; 1992 BGBI 1257
2418 Southern 1993 ICLQ 696.
2419 Scollo-Lavizzari Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment Research Dissertation, LL M
(1996) 50 et seq.
242046 et seq.
367
Pari Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for the Law of Properly in Germany and South Africa
returned with the property to the original owner. The original owner would then step into the
position of the party with whom bona fide third parries have concluded agreements pertaining to
the property. In many instances the original owners had to take over the roles of contracting
parties, with all the rights and duties arising form the contractual relationships.i?'
If a claim is rejected by the property office in the provisional decision, an appeal could be lodged
first at the provincial and subsequently at the federal property office. After exhausting internal
appeals, the applicant could appeal to the Administrative Court.2422Only a limited number of the
numerous restitution claims resulted in court proceedings. Most reached only the administrative
pre-trial phase of the process. Eventually about 9000 cases were heard by the administrative
courts. Several must still be decided.2423
2.1.2. Exclusion of restitution
The revision of property law was not intended to remedy the disastrous consequences of a 40-
year-old socialist economic and property policy. Rather, it was regarded as a form of
rehabilitation, covering only cases of political disadvantage or discrimination.2424 Complete
revision of property measures applicable in the fourty years of German Democratic Republic rule
was therefore never on the cards. For instance, the Joint Declaration regarded the expropriations
"for the public interest,,2425effected during socialist rule in the German Democratic Republic as
valid. They were consequently not subject to review and could not be reopened for restitution
c1aims_2426
Under the principle of restitution before compensation, it had to be decided how the interests of
third parties to affected property could be treated. Extensive inroads in the principle of restitution
were required to maintain the social viability of the compromised reached on the property
question in the course of reunification.2427 The Joint Declaration consequently contained some
exceptions to the policy of restitution which were incorporated into the Property Act. Restitution
was excluded in the following instances: (i) where property was confiscated in the period from 8
May 1945 to 6 October 1949, prior to the establishment of the German Democratic Republic;
and (ii) where property was acquired by an individual, church or charitable organisation between
7 October 1949 and 18 October 1989 in a bona fide transaction. ln some instances, restitution
was also excluded on the ground that the use of the property had changed after expropriation, for
2421 Pieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelarnira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 85.
2422 Southern 1993/CLQ 695.
2423 Fiebcrg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past injustices (1996) 88.
2<124 Pries Neubaucrneigentum (1993) 160; Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and
Central Issues in the Property Question" in Rwelarnira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 84.
2·125 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past injustices (1996) 100.
2'126 For a discussion, cf Du Sold Restitution vor Entschëdigung (1993); FOrstcriing Recht der offenen
Vermogens/ragen (1993); Diekmann Das System del' Ruckerstauungstatbestiinde (1992).
2427 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwclamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 85.
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example through the erection or alteration of buildings, or through communalising industrial or
social use.
2.1.2.1. "Bodenreform" property
The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic refused to undo the expropriations
undertaken in terms of the Soviet Occupation Regime's Bodenreform of the period between 1945
and 1949. Business concerns expropriated before 1949 by the Soviet occupation regime would
also not be returned to their former owners. The Bodenreform property distributed amongst
individual farmers therefore became the property of those farmers after reunification, upon a
reading of the Bodenreform Act (enacted in the last days of the German Democratic Republic)
together with article 233 II 1 of the Act on Introductory Provisions to the Civil Code.2428
Furthermore, the agricultural co-operatives were to be dissolved in order to create more
competitive agricultural and industrial structures_2429
Because of the vast amount of property involved, restitution of the property expropriated in the
Soviet occupation period would have caused a major social obstacle for reunification. It would
have involved about one third of the agricultural property in the former German Democratic
Republic, and would have left thousands of farming families landless and homeless.243o The
Soviet Union would not have signed the final peace treaty without this concession on the part of
the Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany_2431Former owners of land in eastern Germany
challenged the Treaty's exemption clause on the ground that it violated their right to property
secured by article 14 III GG, their right to equality under article 3 I GG, and the rule oflaw_2432
A compromise was eventually included in the Compensation and Equalisation Payments Act.2433
Instead of settlement payments, original owners could choose to purchase a portion of the land at
a favourable price. However, the act determined that the proportion of land subject to a
favourable purchase price depended on the extent of the land previously owned. The larger the
original property was, the smaller the piece that could be favourably repurchased would be.
Besides, any individual leasing the property at that moment would have a prior right of
repurchase. In enacting this legislation, the interests of modern society in accessibility of
landownership for a larger part of the population ostensibly enjoyed precedence over
considerations of the individual autonomy of previous owners in the likes of the land barons of
the pre-war era. This legislation met with oppositions from both sides, the original owners
complaining about an alleged disregard of the Junker system of landownership, and the present
possessors pointing out that the agricultural co-operatives in the eastern parts of Germany would
be greatly disadvantaged if the land wer put up for sale to the former owners.
2428 EGBGB (Einfuhrungsgesetz zum Burgerliches Gesetzbuch).
2429 Cf Gesetz iiber die strukturelle Anpassung der Landwirtschaft an die soziale und ëkologiesche Marktwirtschaft
in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Landwirtschaftsanpassungsgesetz / LAnpG) 19 June 1990 GBI I 642.
2430 CfQuint The Imperfect Union (1997) 128.
2431 Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 151.
2432 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 256.
2433 1994.
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The legislation was eventually adapted. Former land barons, farmers from the east and west of
Germany, as well as the agricultural co-operatives in the east could repurchase the property at
favourable prices. However, purchasers who did not intend to use the land for agricultural
purposes, could only repurchase half of what they would otherwise have been entitled to
purchase.2434
2.1.2.2. Bona fide transactions
Bona fide acquisitions of private property were in principle excluded from the ambit of claims
for restitution.2435 In such cases, a socially acceptable exchange had to be effected_2436The
original owners were therefore entitled to compensation at a rate less than market value,2437or
they could receive land of comparable value. The recognition of rights obtained in good faith
was considered the foundation necessary for a solution that was to be both just and socially
practicable. The interpretation of the term bona fide acquisition (gufglaiibiger Erwerb) would
determine exactly how much land would remain in the hands of former citizens of the German
Democratic Republic.2438
Good faith acquisitions entailed the acquisition of property consistent with the prevailing law or
administrative practice of the German Democratic Republic. The acquirer should not have been
aware of any inconsistency, the transaction should not have been influenced by corruption or
exploitation of a personal position of power, and should not have been the result of coercion or
deception. Moreover, the reasonableness of the purchase price would serve as evidence of
whether the property was acquired through corruption, coercion or deception_2439 However, it
was not easy to determine bona fides in all cases. For instance, it was questionable whether
purchase of land abandoned - or forcibly sold - by refugees could be regarded as having been
obtained in good faith. Mere knowledge of the fact that the object purchased was part of the
property of a refugee, however, eventually did not hinder an acquisition in good faith_244o
The situation was more problematic where the property had become the object of real rights of
use as they existed in the legal system of the German Democratic Republic.2441 The original
owner's interest in restitution had to be balanced against the interests of such right holders in
retaining their rights of use. From a social viability viewpoint, this balancing of interests could
only fall in favour of the current right holders. They had obtained the rights in good faith, under
the relevant legal position of the German Democratic Republic at the time.
2434 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 142 - 143.
ws S 4(2), Property Act.
2436 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 131.
2437 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 100.
2438 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 132.
2439 131.
2440 Ficbcrg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 85.
2441 This right of use was unlimited in time, free of charge, and could be inherited.
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In cases where land was obtained during the collapse of the German Democratic Republic -
within sight of the new economic and social order and the obvious changes that would
accompany it - the problem was even more critical. At first, an acquisition in good faith under
these circumstances was excluded and the former owners could always recover their property.
Legislature2442 regarded the interests of the original owners as taking precedence over those of
current owners, if the property was acquired at a time when the changes in the German
Democratic Republic could be anticipated_2443The exception applies to acquisitions of property
from autumn 1989 until the time of reunification. However, because of the fierce political debate
resulting from this point, the rule had been adjusted considerably in favour of later right holders.
2.1.2.3. Restitution impossible
If restitution of property was impossible, impractical or inequitable "in the nature of the
matter,,,2444the principle of restitution before compensation did not apply. Anticipated here were
cases defined in the Joint Declaration (i) in favour of society in general and the administration;
(ii) to secure the position attained by the German Democratic Republic in the field of public
housing construction and settlement; and (iii) to ensure the survival of business undertakings.T"
In some instances property had merged with other property so completely'Ï" that separation of
the different parts was not possible any more. In case of restitution being impossible, the original
owners were entitled to receive compensation to the extent that compensation had not already
been paid under German Democratic Republic law to one of its own citizens_2447
2.1.3. Special arrangement for "wall property"
Although property surrounding the infamous Berlin Wall (the "wall property" or
"Mauergrundstilcke'') was expropriated around 1961 against the payment of compensation by the
German Democratic Republic, thereby strictly disqualifying it from further compensation or
restitution, the public pressure for restitution was so strong that particular provision was made
for restitution of the "wall property" to its original owners. In 1996 it was enacted that the "wall
property" would be returned to its former owners, upon payment of one-fourth of its current
market value. The owners of property retained by the government, or sold by it "in the public
interest" could receive compensation equal to 75 percent of its present market value. The original
2442 Gesetz zur Regelung ofJener Vermëgensfragen 23 September J990 Bundesgesetzblatt II 889, JJ 59;
bundesgesetzblatt 1994 I 3610.
2443 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 131 - 132 reports that in the last days before the opening of the Berlin Wall,
high party functionaries of the SED purchased villas in East Berlin and elsewhere for what was said to be, by all
calculations, bargain prices. The exclusion of "good faith" acquisitions after 18 October 1989 (Honecker's
capitulation) was apparently intended to invalidate these purchases. However, this regulation endangered the
purchases of ordinary citizens for whom it was easier under the legislation of the transitional period under Modrow
to purchase the dwellings they had ocupied and maintained for years.
2444 Cf Joint Declaration; Property Act s 4(1).
2445 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 86.
2446 Eg in the development of sites for large apartment buildings or as part of a business enterprise.
2447 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 130.
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owners of "wall property" were nevertheless not satisfied, and threatened with a Federal
Constitutional Court action.2448
The restitution principle was further limited by the priority given to investment.2449 This
limitation sought to strike the necessary balance between maintaining the sovereignty of
individual ownership of the former owners and the need to attract investment, create
employment opportunities and reduce subsidies in the eastern part of Germany.2450
The provisions of the Investment Priority Act245t when read with the Property Act2452 provided
for alienation of the land to certain kinds of prospective investors, despite any restitution claims
already lodged. The "special investment purposes" provided for in the act included: (i) the
safeguarding or creation of jobs, in particular through the establishment or preservation of
industrial or service-providing enterprises; (ii) the creation of new housing space or the repair of
housing space which was not habitable or in danger of being lost; or the building or repair of
one- or two-family houses; and (iii) the creation of infrastructure necessary for (or imperative
because of) investment. The former owner's right of restitution was overridden and converted
into a right to compensation, if an investor obtained the approval for a proposal which satisfies a
"special investment purpose. ,,2453
The Property Act introduced a priority procedure for obtaining business property for investment
purposes.2454 A similar provision was contained in the Investment Act for other immovable
property, like land and buildings_2455 The original procedure for investment claims, the
Investment Act and the provisions of the Property Act related to the priority of investment have,
however, been revised several times,2456 due to the conflicting interests, the time pressure under
which the initial provisions had to be formulated and the lack of experience with regard to the
2448 134.
24-19 Cfart 41(2), Unification Treaty.
2450 Southern 1993 ICLQ 604.
2451 Gesetz iiber besondere Investitionen in der Deutsche Demokratischen Republik 23 September 1990
Bundcsgcsctzblatt II 889, 1157. Now Gesetz iiber dell Vorrang VOII lnvestitionen bei Riickiibertragungsanspruchen
nach dem Vermëgensgeset: 14 July 1992 (Bundesgesctzblart I 1257, 1268); Berichtigung des zweiten
Verm6gensrechtsiilldel1l1lgsgeset=es (Bundesgesetzblan 1993 I 1811)
2452 Art l.
2453 Southern 1993 ICLQ 694.
201S4 S 3(6) - (8).
2455 S I.
2456 Cf s 3a, Gesetz zur Beseitigung VOII Hemmuissen bei der Privatisierung VOII Unternelunen und zur Forderung
\'011 lnvestitionen, (Investment Acceleration Act), 22 March 1991. BGBI I 1991 766. The various procedures were
combined in s 2 of the Investment Priority Act of 14 July 1992. This Act also introduced the new procedure of the
"investment priority certificate," to be granted by the municipality in which the land in question was situated, were
the person with power of disposition over the land a private individual. In other cases, the certificate was to be
issued by the body with power of disposal over the land. The certi ficatc annulled the right to reconveyance,
transforming it into a right to compensation. All reconveyance claims finally had to be registered by 31 December
1992. As soon as the Property Office was informed of the investment priority application, the restitution process is
suspended for a maximum of three months. Southern 1993lCLQ 694.
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unification of property law, as well as the large variety of property regulations in the German
Democratic Republic.2457During 1991, statutory amendments were also made to the existing
legislation in order to accelerate privatisation. This applied to both land and business property.
The 1991 amendments pertaining to investments, for instance, also extended the special rules on
investment to expropriated enterprises_2458Accordingly, a former owner expropriated of a
business concern could be excluded from restitution by a purchaser with an investment plan. The
former owner would then receive the purchase price or other compensation.V" All this reduced
the status of the original owner in the administrative process and his or her legal protection
against investors.246oHowever, the economic disadvantages were minor, as the original owner is
entitled to claim payment of the selling price or at the least the current market value of the
property.2461
2.1.5. Compensation as alternative to restitution
As an alternative to restitution,2462the original owners could in many cases choose compensation
instead of return of the land or business enterprise.2463If the claim for restitution was endorsed
by the property office or one of the bodies of appeal, the applicant had to decide whether he or
she preferred restitution or compensation. If the applicant preferred compensation, or could only
claim compensation, an application for payment of it had to be made to the local valuation
office.2464
Compensation would constitute only 30 to 50 percent of the current market value of the property
under discussion. Payments of over DM 100000 were to be reduced on a sliding scale:2465
compensation was based on 1.3 times the 1935 rateable value of the property, up to a maximum
figure of DM 250 000. Payment of compensation was to begin on 1 January 1996, depending on
the available funds. A minimal compensation would also be paid to those who lost property
between 8 May 1945 and 6 October 1949, even though these cases were excluded from
restitution.
In overview, the compensation alternatives to restitution can be summarised as follows:
(i) Generally, compensation for land seized during the time of Soviet occupation was not
envisaged, as the rehabilitation programme did not cover such confiscation. However, for some
of the Junker expropriations, certain "equalisation measures" in the form of compensation for
2457 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 87.
2458 S 3a(I)(2), Property Act (1991 version); s l , Investment Preference Act.
2459 S 18, Investment Preference Act.
2460 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 129.
2461 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 86.
2462 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany (1997) 256.
2463 S 6(7), Property Act.
2464 Southern 1993 ICLQ 695.
2465694.
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less-than-market-value were envisaged.2466 Legislation providing for a more extensive right of
compensation was enacted during 1994.2467This followed the public row that arose because of
the initial decision neither to return the Bodenreform property to its original owners, nor to pay
compensation. Accordingly, fixed property was compensated up to a maximum of ten percent of
its present market value. This provision has since been criticised for not living up to the
standards of the German equality guarantee, as it ostensibly pointed to a discrepancy of ninety
percent between monetary reimbursement and restitution in kind.2468
(ii) In case of expropriations "for the public interest,,2469effected during the forty years of
socialist rule in the German Democratic Republic, less-than-market-value compensation could be
claimed, provided that no compensation were paid previously in terms of other compensatory
measures, regardless of how unfair such amounts were.2470 Thus, claims for increasing the
compensation already paid by the German Democratic Republic were not allowed.2471
(iii) Bonafide acquisitions of private property were in principle excluded from the ambit of
claims for restitution.2472 At first, neither the Unification Treaty, nor the Property Act provided
for compensation of former owners who could not obtain restitution of their property due to it
having been acquired by a bona fide third person. In later legislation it was provided that
compensation would be payable in such cases, but at a rate lower than market value.2473
(iv) Where restitution was impossible, the original owners were entitled to receive
compensation to the extent that compensation had not already been paid under German
Democratic Republic law to one of its own citizens_2474In other words, a second compensation
could not be claimed as equalisation for the low compensation rates existing in the German
Democratic Republic.
(v) An exception to the compensation and restitution regulations was made for former
owners of property that was expropriated for purposes of building the Berlin Wall. These owners
had received compensation before, and were strictly speaking disqualified from receiving further
compensation or restitution. Nevertheless, the public pressure was so strong that former owners
of property retained by the government, or sold by it "in the public interest" could receive
compensation equal to 75 percent of its present market value.2475
2~66 Joint Declaration par I; Property Act s I(8)(a).
2467 Gesetz iiber die Entschiidigung I/ach dem Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermiigensfragen und iiber staatliche
IIusgleichsleistungen fitr Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher oder besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage 27
September 1994 (Bundcsgcsctzblau I 2624).
2~68 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 87.
2469 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Pas/II/jl/slices (1996) 100.
2<170 Ficbcrg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Pas/ Injustices (1996) 84.
'471 J. DI· 3- omt ec aranon par a.
147'- S 4(2), Property Act.
2473 Visser & Roux "Giving back the Country" in Rwelamira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 100.
2474 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 130.
2475 134. Cf also 371 supra.
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(vi) In case of an investor obtaining the approval for a proposal which satisfies a special
investment purpose,2476 the former owner's right of restitution was overridden and converted into
a right to compensation. In such a case, the former owner could claim payment of the current
market value of the property.2477
(vii) In 1992, amendments were made to legislation governing the return of business
property. This entailed the identification of specific territories where the principle of restitution
was not applicable. In those areas, restitution of business property was excluded altogether, and
claimants were only able to claim compensation_2478
2.2. Restitution and the Basic Law
In order to avoid constitutional challenges to the decision not to include expropriations in the
period of Soviet occupation in the restitution programme, the Basic Law was also amended by
the Unification Treaty_2479A provision was added to the Basic Law to the effect that the Treaty
and related regulations would remain permanent to the extent that they provide that incursions on
property in eastern Germany are not to be undone.248oThis would make the non-return of land
expropriated between 1945 and 1949 permanent, provided that it was in accordance with the
basic principles of the German constitutional order.2481
3. The treatment of the restitution / compensation questions by the courts
The ambiguities and insufficiently negotiated compromises incorporated in the Joint Declaration
and its related statues, will probably ensure decades of litigation on the property questions that
arose from the German reunification. According to estimates, the restitution issue in Germany
will take another 30 years to resolve_2482More than one million claims have been filed for the
return of property in the east of Germany, and in many areas the understaffed claims offices have
been hopelessly clogged.2483This claims process will probably be rendered even more difficult
by the likely problems of proof that will arise in individual cases. The following paragraphs
briefly survey the way in which restitution of property situated in the former German Democratic
Republic is treated by the German courts.
2476 Southern 1993 ICLQ 694.
2477 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelarnira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 86.
2478 S 18, Investment Preference Act.
2479 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 136.
2480 Art 4(5), Unification Treaty; art 143 III GG.
2481 Cf 86 et seq supra.
2482 Southern 1993 ICLQ 697.
2483 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) lSI.
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Tbe development in case law, particularly the judgements of the superior courts had a significant
effect on the work of the state offices in the sphere of property law. The Federal Administrative
Court has handed down some important decisions on the Property Act, thus resolving some of
the interpretation problems experienced.
Several attempts were made to obtain property outside the confines of the revised and reunified
property law. One specific problem is that the decision to exclude specific expropriations from
the restitution programme were in certain cases perceived to be unjust. Particularly where the
initial aim behind the expropriation had not been realised and could no longer be realised due to
the changes that have taken place, or where the earlier goal disappeared completely during
German reunification, the exclusions from restitution were challenged. This would include
property expropriated in Berlin in order for the Wall to be built. These attempts mostly failed
before the Federal Administrative Court.2484
3.2. Federal Constitutional Court
Many of the property related cases to reach the Federal Constitutional Court in the 1990s
involved procedural irregularities.2485 For example, the court granted the former owner of
property expropriated by the German Democratic Republic an injunction, restraining the present
owner from building upon that property, because the court of first instance failed to grant tbe
former ow ncr a hearing on the validity of the claim, thus violati ng article 103 GG. 2486
On policy issues the court continually sustained the political considerations embodied in various
laws and treaties. For instance, the political decision not to allow restitution of property
expropriated during the time of Soviet occupation from 1945 to 1949, met with considerable
resistance and eventually was challenged before the Federal Constitutional Court. Several
arguments were put forward to support the allegations that the practice of excluding the
expropriations during the time of Soviet occupation from restitution were unconstitutional:
(i) It was argued that the expropriations were ab initio void on several grounds. They
violated the Weimar Constitution's property guarantees, which were, arguably, effective until
1949. Alternatively, they violated the rules of international law, such as the Hague
Convention,2487 in terms of which the occupying powers were bound to respect the laws in force
in the occupied country, and which prohibited expropriation. A further possible ground for the
invalidity of the expropriations was tbat they allegedly violated the principles of natural law
binding on all nations.2488
2484 Ficberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwclarnira & Werle (cds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 84.
2485 Kommers Constitutional Jurisprudence of Germany ( 1997) 256.
2486 BVerfGE 84, 286.
2487 1907.
2488 Q' Tt fi .urnt fie III/per eel UIllOII (1997) 135.
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(ii) A second series of arguments maintained that, even if the expropriations were not
illegal at that time, the social welfare state principle imposed a positive duty on the present
government to make those past actions undone. When applying the social welfare state principle
in an extraordinarily conservative manner so as to recreate a previously existing status quo,
rather than to affirm present economic and social equality, it could be sustained that the state had
to alleviate the misfortune that part of the community affected by the expropriations.Y" In
earlier cases, similar obligations were placed on the government of the Federal Republic of
Germany to alleviate certain forms of prejudice incurred during the war and period of
occupation.249o
(iii) Further, the validity of the added article 143 GG was challenged on the basis that it
eroded the "core" values of articles 1 to 20.2491
(iv) It was also argued that exclusion of the expropriations between 1945 and 1949 from
the restitution programme would violate the guarantee of equality contained in article 3 I GG. It
would make the restitution process applicable only to certain groups of deprived owners, namely
those who lost their property in terms of the Nazi-expropriations and the expropriations of the
German Democratic Republic. The government would ostensibly create substantial inequality by
granting redress to some groups and denying it to others.2492
The Federal Constitutional Court, however, in 1990 unanimously upheld the provision of the
Unification Treaty stating that the 1945 to 1949 expropriations could not be undone,2493 thus
affirming the validity of the exemption clauses. Faced with the Soviet Union's non-negotiable
stance against any rollback of properties expropriated during the occupation, the court accepted
the government's argument that the exemption was a compromise necessary to achieve the higher
constitutional goal of reunification.P''" The court thus concluded that the legislature had not
exceeded its authority in giving constitutional endorsement to the decision not to return the
expropriated property. 2495
The view that the expropriations were illegal at the time when they were undertaken was
rejected. Under Soviet occupation law, the expropriations were according to the court clearly
legal. At the time neither the Basic Law nor the law of the German Democratic Republic applied
to the territory where the expropriations were undertaken. This reasoning also by implication
rejects the arguments of illegality on the basis of the Weimar Constitution or natural law_2496
With regard to the international law, the court noted that Germany was not responsible for the
expropriation between 1945 and 1949, since the affected property was subject to a legal system
2489 136.
2490 BVerfGE 27, 253 283; BVerfGE 41,153 154.
2491 BVerfGE 84, 90121.
2492 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 136.
2493 BVerfGE 84, 90.
2494 127 - 128.
2495 The court sustained the validity of article 143 over the objection that it amounted to an unconstitutional
amendment to the Basic Law. 117 - 121.
2496 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 137.
377
Part Four: The Challenges of Land Reform and Restitution for lire Law of Property in Germany and SOIlIIr Africa
other than that of the Federal Republic of Germany. In any event, the Basic Law did not become
enforceable until after the property had been taken.2497
The court took a positivistic stance and argued that the question of whether someone has a
specific legal interest could only be answered in light of a specific legal order. In this case, the
Soviet occupation regime's expropriations deprived the original owners of any legal interest in
the property_2498Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the Basic Law requires affirmative
governmental action in favour of the original owners. The social welfare state principle might
even, according to the court, require that the legislature effect an equalisation of burdens to some
extent: not necessarily return of the property, but some degree of compensation to the former
owners.
The core of the court's ruling, on the basis of the equality guarantee, also supported this point.
The final effect of the decision was that excluding the Soviet occupation regime's expropriations
from the restitution programme did not violate the principle of equality. However, the equality
principle also necessitated some kind of compensation to the original owners, albeit not at
market value. Lesser compensation was regarded as reasonable in light of the government's other
obligations incurred upon unification, such as the cost of economic renewal in tbe former
German Democratic Republic.2499
It is debatable whether the mediating technique employed by the court in this case, in choosing
no clear winners or losers but rather seeking to create a political compromise, resulted in an
acceptable balancing of the interests on both sides of the former inner-German border.250o It has
also been contended that the court's ruling is based on the false assumption that the Soviet Union
would not have agreed to reunification of Germany if the Bodenreform would have been treated
differently.2501 In addition, disputes about the equitable amount of compensation to be paid to the
original owners were complicated by the budget deficit of the state. After a few unsuccessful
initial attempts/502 legislation providing for compensation of owners whose property was
expropriated during the Soviet occupation of East Germany was eventually enacted during
2~9713VerfGE84, 90122 - 125.
2498 122 - 125.
2499 130 - 131.
2SOO Cf Quint The imperfect Union (1997) 139 for a summary of the polemical discussion that resulted from this
decision.
HOI Pries Neubauerneigentum (1993) 154.
2S02 The first proposed statute of 1992 envisaged settlement payments that would not burden the federal treasury.
According to this, original owners would be entitled to 1,3 times the worth of the property in 1935. A special tax
was also to be imposed on original owners who received a return of expropriated property under the Unification
Treaty. The tax, equalling one third of the actual value of the returned property, would be used to help finance
compensation under the statute. This proposal was withdrawn in the face of severe attacks on it by some interest
groups. A second proposal (in 1993) significantly increased the amounts offered as compensation, and omitted the
planned taxation of property restitution. But compensation would not be paid in the form of immediate cash. That
would have burdened the treasury too much. Instead, promissory notes payable after the year 2004 would have been
issued, and a bonus would be paid if the property were to be used for investment in the east of Germany. This
proposal also met with fierce opposition because it did not foresee compensation of the original owners in the form
of real property of the state. Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 142.
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1994.2503However, this still did not satisfy the some of the parties involved, as the legislation
could not solve the practical ninety percent discrepancy between monetary reimbursement and
restitution in kind.2504It is questionable whether this provision lives up to the standards of the
German equality guarantee as set out in the decision.
In 1993, the court reaffirmed its view that former owners of land expropriated between 1945 and
1949 as part of an agrarian reform program would not have a right to return of their property. 2505
In addition, the court summarily dismissed a claim by a German citizen that the German-Polish
Frontier Treaty of 1990 violated his right to property, noting that Germans could no longer claim
expropriated or abandoned property they once owned within the present boundaries of
Poland.2506Finally, in rejecting motions for injunctions that would have undermined the general
willingness to invest in the former German Democratic Republic, the court demonstrated
considerable sensitivity to the plight of eastern Germany's economy, by refusing to stop the sale
of a former owner's property to a third party for deveiopment2507 and refusing to bar the
Treuhand2508 from implementing a contract by which it had sold property for investment
purposes_2509In the latter case, the applicant's main claim in respect of the property had to be
decided before it could be determined whether the original owner would be entitled to restoration
of title.
4. Influence on the reunification's property issues
on the property order in Germany
Section 3(3) 1 and 15(2) of the Property Act provide that the owner of the land is not entitled to
sell, transfer or rent it if restitution claims have been registered against it. As such, these
provisions paralyse commercial traffic with the property, and constitute a serious curtailment of
the interests of the present landowners. Because the restitution process effectively prohibited
circulation of affected property, an orderly property market could not develop straight away. The
prices of freely disposable pieces of land were, moreover, driven to unrealistic heights. Besides,
investment in the east of Germany was hindered by the fact that investors could not be certain
that the property they wanted to developed belonged to them. Banks refused finance, because of
the inability to register mortgages over property subject to a restitution dispute.251o This
uncertainty affected small investors and entrepreneurs in particular. Larger businesses had, after
2503 Gesetz iiber die Entschiidigung nach dem Gesetz zur Regelung ofJener Vermëgensfragen und iiber staatliche
Ausgleichsleistungen for Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher ader besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage 27
September 1994 (BGBI I 2624).
2504 Fieberg "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the Property Question"
in Rwelamira & Werle (eds) Confronting Past Injustices (1996) 87.
2505 Property Confiscation IIcase, Chamber decision of IS April 1993 (1 BvR 1885/92) NJW (1993) 366
2506 German-Polish Frontier Treaty case, Chamber decision of 5 June 1992, EuGZ 19 (1992)
2507 BVerfDE 85, 130
2508 The agency charged with privatising state-owned property in the old German Democratic Republic and
clarifying questions of ownership.
2509 Chamber decision of21 April1993 (1 BvR 1422/92)
2510 Southern 1993 ICLQ 696.
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all, the capacity to fend for themselves, without state protection. This could also lead to
unbalanced economic development.
The social dislocation caused by the property provistons In the Unification Treaty and
consequent legislation brought about, could well have created a permanent division between east
and west. Quint2511explains the position in the following terms:
"In certain towns in the outskirts of Berlin, for example, more than half of the dwellings are being
claimed by former owners or the heirs of former owners, leading to the prospect of homelessness
(virtually unknown in the old GOR) and even, apparently, suicides of house-holders fearing eviction.
Often, the claimants are people from the west who do not want to live on the property, but intend to
sell it, as real-estate prices in Berlin and its suburbs have increased enormously since unification.
Here, as in most other aspects of the property rules, the structure of the Unification Treaty has the
effect of pitting east against west in a very clearly perceptible manner."
The market strategies reflected in the action of the Treuhand represent a massive extension of
western structures and western personnel to the business enterprises of the east. The surviving
concerns were mainly purchased by business people from the west of Germany, as citizens of the
former German Democratic Republic rarely had the resources to purchase old concerns or
establish new enterprises. Moreover, from the time of the currency union onwards, many eastern
enterprises have gone out of business or have been closed by the Treuhand. With them, many
social structures, like day care centres for children and vacation resorts disappeared. Even where
the enterprises - with help from the west - survived, practically no attempts were made to
preserve the social structures.2512
The restitution policy also resulted in the extension of western control over the eastern part of
Germany. Apart from the few exceptions to this rule, with regard to bona fide acquisition and
investment, this policy have resulted in displacements of large communities, especially in areas
which became politically or financially important after reunification, like the suburbs around
Berlin. Instead of maintaining the existing residential structures, the western landowners
preferred to lease or sell their property to those who could pay market prices, mostly also people
from the west.2513This also deepened the division between rich owners of assets in the western
part of Germany and asset-poor wage earners and unemployed in the eastern part.2514
Agricultural property in the cast of Germany also raised complex problems. After the ruling of
the Federal Constitutional Court with regard to the non-restitution of the lands expropriated by
the Soviet occupation regime, the agricultural structures of the cast - large farming co-operatives
- will probably continue to exist as an alternative to the smaller family farms which are more
usual in the western parts ofGermany.2515
In general, the strong property principles of conservative ideology prevalent in the west of
Germany before reunification, together with the large-scale extension of capitalist values to the
2511 Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 133.
2512 152.
zsu Du Sold Restitution vor Entschiidigung (1993) 159 et seq.
2514 Southern 1993 ICLQ 696.
251S Quint The Imperfect Union (1997) 152.
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eastern part of Germany, have significantly contributed to the creation of these problems. These
principles prevailed in the decision to prefer restitution to compensation.P'" In years to come,
the reorganisation of the German property order after reunification will significantly influence
the issue of whether a strongly individual property concept is compatible with the social market
economy under the Basic Law.
5. The significance of the German experience
with land reform for South Africa
From the treatment of the post-reunification land reform, and more specifically the issue of
restitution in Germany, it becomes apparent that the success of such a process of reform depends
on the importance attached to the social welfare and individual functions of property. In South
Africa it could be problematic to find a balance between these different functions of property
within the legal order, due to the extensive scope that the land reform programme would have to
take in order to effect a socially just system of land control and distribution.
After the re-unification in Germany, approximately one fifth of the entire population was
involved in claims pertaining to land situated in the former German Democratic Republic. In
South Africa, the claims of four-fifths of the entire population to land have to be satisfied. With
the financial means available, this is practically impossible_2517This also, at least partially,
explains why only one percent of the estimated thirty percent of land that had to be distributed
between 1994 and 2000 has, in fact, been so distributed. Other factors further complicate the
process of reform. The system of land redistribution, restitution and tenure reform has turned out
to be more complex than was expected at the outset. The proliferating number of reform statutes,
which are not always interpreted uniformly, slow processes=" and lack of co-ordination within
the Department of Land Affairs2519 all ostensibly contribute to the frustration of the
constitutional objectives pertaining to land reform.
2516 Du Sold Restitution vor Entschiidigung (1993) 159 et seq.
2517 An estimated 25 million hectares (almost 30%) of South Africa's agricultural land are supposed to be
redistributed. This will cost billions of Rands. In 2000, the budget for redistribution was set at R424 million. The
budget for restitution of land, which is set at R150 million for 2000 and can be doubled within the next two years,
seems more realistic in view of the objectives of this leg of the reform programme. Cf Van Zyl (Finansies en
Tegniek, 5-05-2000) 10 - 12.
2518 By December 1998, only 40 of the more than 63 000 claims had been finalised. Cf Van Zyl (Finansies en
Tegniek, 5-05-2000) 10 - 12.
2519 Van Zyl (Finansies en Tegniek, 5-05-2000) 10 - 12 provides a brief account of the quick succession of key
players within the structure of the Department of Land Affairs within the first four years of the reform project. The
previous Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, mr Derek Hanekom discharged the Chief Commissioner of Land
Affairs (mr Joe Seremane) in 1998, before leaving the department himself later that year. In the mean time adv
Geoff Budlender, the former Director General of Land Affairs, also left office. Dr Peter Mayende has recently been
appointed in this position. The new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs, ms Thoko Didiza, has introduced new
policy guidelines for land distribution.
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[11] Property in private law and its constitutional
protection and regulation: some considerations
1. General remarks
Under the surface of the property order espoused by section 28 IC and section 25 FC, the
unfortunate history of ownership and property rights in South Africa and the present disparities of
wealth in the society meet to create the need for reform. Private property is one of the socio-legal
institutions inherited from - and thoroughly influenced by the inherent injustice of - the old South
African order. South Africa's constitution is the embodiment of a new social, political and legal
order. The main virtue of the constitution is its potential to correct the injustices integrated in the
law and society inherited from the old order. In the case of private property, the challenge to the
new constitutional order is to eliminate the injustice of the apartheid era (so deeply ingrained in
the South African system of property law) without crippling the institution of private property as
such. This is no easy task, especially because property, and especially land, is a limited resource
(in South Africa, like in the rest of the world) and the need for it is greater than tbe supply of it
can be. The acute need for legislative programmes of reconstruction and reparation will inevitably
disturb existing property relations in South Africa.252o Emotions are running high, especially
where the principles of private property meet policies of land tenure reform, restitution and
redistribution. Because these issues are highly emotional, they are also prone to political abuse,
as the example of our neighbouring country Zimbabwe shows.252I
The present investigation set out to determine to what extent constitutional development of the
private law of property could result in a property law order serving the socio-economic and
political goals of economic growth and ernpowennent of the individual and development of
individual self-esteem. As such, this dissertation is an attempt at reconciling the existing (and
until recently predominant) private law concept of ownership and the property rights sustained
by the new constitutional order. Attempts at restitution and redistribution in South Africa and
Germany were used as speci ric examples of the manner in which the existing law of property in
both these legal systems could be developed through legislative and judicial initiative.
This final chapter summarises the conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding inquiry. It
attempts to distinguish the function of property in private and constitutional law. Then it
provides a discussion of the significance of a new property order for the economic growth of
mo Chaskalson & Lewis "Property" in Chaskalson, Kcniridge, Klaaren el al (eds) Constitutional Law (1996)
eh 31,21.
2521 The Zimbabwean crisis has pushed the South African land reform programmes into the public eye. The South
African situation parallels that of Zimbabwe only to a limited extent, In Zimbabwe, corrupt politicians had abused
the land reform question in attempts 10 retain political power. Most politicians in South Africa still refrain from
using this line of argument to gain political support. However, the slow pace al which land reform, redistribution
and restitution is taking place could be used to ignite emotions similar to those experienced by the landless in
Zimbabwe. Cf Fillansies & Tegniek (05.05.2000) 10- 12 for different viewpoints on this issue.
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South Africa and for the empowerment and development of the self-esteem of all South
Africans. Furthermore, it also attempts to provide some guidelines for the development of a new
property order in South Africa.
2. The distinction between property in private and constitutional law
Part of the confusion surrounding the study of property and land law is its proper place in the
overall structure of the law. The classification of property and land law as belonging either to
public law or private law is, for instance, one issue that causes general confusion. Property takes
a central place in the study of constitutional and human rights law, public and private
international law, delict, criminal law, contract, commercial law, tax law, planning and
environmental law, mining and minerals law and family law. The scope and limits of property
law and aspects of property in the law can, therefore, be confusing. One of the questions that
could be posed in this regard is to what extent the distinction between private law and constitutional
law will remain intact.
2.1. Property and ownership
In the wake of the new South African land reform policies and practises, the demise of "traditional"
property law2522 (or rather private law property) inevitably raises profound theoretical questions. It
has been indicated that the definition of property and ownership is not the exclusive domain of
private law. In fact, property means something different from ownership, and the constitutional
property concept is much wider than the private law concept of ownership. Even though not
explicitly defined in either the German or South African constitutions, the term property in the
constitutional context usually designates a concept broader than the concept thing (res) of private
law. It includes not only ownership as it is known in private law, but also several other
patrimonial and incorporeal rights, regarded as "lesser" rights in private law, and which mostly
do not even qualify as limited real rights.
The varying definitions of property in private law and constitutional law underscores the
dichotomy between individual security and freedom reflected by the institution of property, on
the one hand, and the obligatory social welfare function of property on the other. This raises the
question of how the predominantly liberalist principles of property in the private law can be
adapted to the values of social democracy underlying the new constitutional order.2523 The
introduction of a wider property concept in the constitutional context would obviously bring
about some changes to the property law order. However, the private law concept of ownership
and the meaning of property in the constitutional context remain poles apart.
2522 Ie the law of property cast in the mould prepared by the most important Roman-Dutch authors, and
supplemented by the perspectives of the Pandeetist interpreters. The foundations for this approach were laid in Van
der Merwe Sakereg (1979) and (1989).
2523 Van der Merwe 1998 TSAR 10.
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2.2. Function of constitutional law and private law with regard to property
This polarisation of property in private and constitutional law is connected to the different
functions of private law and constitutional law in general: private law regulates (inter alia) the
acquisition, protection and transfer of private property and constitutional law regulates the liberty
and equality of citizens. From a private law perspective, property rights are restricted on a
"horizontal" level by the rights and interests of third parties. From a constitutional perspective,
the scope of a person's property rights is determined by considering limitations in the public
interest; that is, on a vertical level vis-a-vis the state authority. The private law concept of
ownership influences the constitutional concept of property insofar as it provides a point of
departure for an investigation about the scope of protection under the constitution, but the
constitutional properly concept will necessarily be a protective shield to a broader variety of
interests.
The reason for limiting the protection of property in private law to corporeals only lies in the fact
that other kinds of proprietary relations are protected and regulated elsewhere in private law or in
public law. Contractual rights fall under the law of contract, statutory rights are regulated and
protected by the statutes creating them, rights arising from the social security benefits granted by
different state organs fall within the ambit of administrative law, labour law and the like.
However, all these rights - as far as they relate to the patrimony of individuals - are
constitutionally protected by the property clause: against arbitrary state authority in the first
instance, but also against an "unjust" balance of power between individuals inter se, which
should be eradicated on the initiative of the state. In case of an imminent danger to the common
good, or in times of social change, the constitutional provisions will, therefore, be used to correct
the effect of private law principles on the patrimonial interests of individuals.
From an analysis of the range and intensity of the constitutional property guarantee, the
significance of a constitutional right to property becomes clear. The right to property has a
distinct individual or personal function, because it is the means through which the individual can
secure his or her material existence, and assert his or her independence and freedom. Further, the
right to property has a distinct social function. For society, private property is a prerequisite for
promoting private initiative under the conditions of a deccntralised economy. It is, however, also
in the interest of society at large that the state exercises its power of control against dangers and
disadvantages arising from private, autonomous use of property and allocation of thingS.2524
These di fferent functions of the constitutional property guarantee are in a sense antagonistic.
When the function of property as a safeguard for individual freedom is emphasised, the
constitutional guarantee of individual ownership tends to be expanded. When the social welfare
function is emphasised, the legislature is allowed to restrict the individual owner's powers of
1524 Badura "Eigcntum" in Benda, Maihofcr & Vogel (eds) Handbuch (1994) 329: "Aber auch den staattichen
Auftrag der Sozialbinduug und Mach/kontrolle gegeniiber den Gefahren und Nachtellen einer privatautonomen
Eigentumsnutzung und Giiteraltokation. ti Kirnminich "Property Rights" in Starck (cd) Rights. Institutions and
Impact of International L{lW (1987) 79.
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disposal over the property_2525The German example illustrates that the constitutional protection
and regulation of property serves as a guarantee of personal freedom within a social dimension.
The fact that the legislature may limit property rights only to that extent, in which the public
weal could be served best, restricts the power of the state and compels it to respect private
property.2526 Whereas certain kinds of property interests are protected or guaranteed by the
property clause, not every single property entitlement will be protected or guaranteed in a
specific situation. Property is therefore not protected in the sense that existing property interests
are guaranteed absolutely against any interference or invasion not authorised or consented to by
the owner.2527
The constitutional protection of property is, therefore, different from the private-law protection
of property. The main purpose is not to guarantee and insulate the status quo and the existing
position of the individual property holder against any interference. The purpose of the
constitutional property guarantee is to establish and maintain a balance between the individual's
existing position and the public interest, which often means that the individual's interest has to be
subjected to controls, regulations, restrictions, levies and other measures that advance or protect
the public interest, often without compensation_2528In the constitutional framework, an owner
might be free to act with his or her own property, but only within the limits set by the interests of
the public.2529
Because property is not a legal institution exclusively dealt with in private law,253o the
imbalances that might occur through an emphasis of private autonomy and individual freedom in
the private law of property as it stands at present, will have to be corrected through the horizontal
application of constitutional values. The application of the constitutional values of equality and
human dignity on a horizontal level (that is, to private relations) might, for instance, influence an
owner's capacity to restrict resale thereof.2531 Similarly, it might also influence an owner's
capacity to dispose of property inter vivos or upon his or her death. An even more severe
restriction of powers can be effected by the enforcement of socio-economic rights on a
horizontal level. Changes in the area of customary property law can also be expected,2532 in
particular where upholding existing proprietary relations will result in discrimination on the basis
of sex, marital status, and the like.
Private property ownership does not have the same prominent position in constitutional law as it
has in private law. Instead, the nature of the constitutional guarantee of property and the land
reform prerogative attach importance to individual security in the sphere of land tenure,
2525 Schuppert "The Right to Property" in Karpen (ed) Constitution of Germany (1988) 108.
2526 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 414.
2527 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 68.
252868.
2529 Pienaar Nuwe Sakeregtelike Ontwikkelings Inaugural address (1997) 6 - 7.
2530 Contra Gutto Property and Land Reform (1995) xiv.
2531 Cf 264 et seq supra.
2532 Kleyn 1996 SAPRlPL 423.
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regardless of what the nature of rights emanating from it might be in private law. Moreover, a
wide range of proprietary interests is protected.
Long before the introduction of the constitutional property clause in South Africa, Van der
Merwe2533 has explained that the place of property law in the South African legal system
stretches far beyond that of private law. The law of things probably most closely resembles the
place of property in the Roman-Dutch oriented private law structure of the South African legal
system. However, even in this sphere of the law far-reaching public law (restrictive and/or
developing) adjustments continuously influenced the understanding of property concept in terms
of private law. The most obvious example of such adjustments remains legislation aimed at
establishing the apartheid government's ideal of a "racially segregated" society by allocating
specific land for specific races on a discriminatory basis. The legitimacy the existing private law
of property was, consequently, also rightly challenged, because of its succeptibility to influences
from the apartheid government's legislature, whose enactments were clearly not always for the
weal of the general South African public.
In spite of the questionable legitimacy of the existing property order in private law, one should
not exclude the possibility that the private law of property could still play an important role in
developing the property law under the new constitution in South Africa. However, the continued
significance of private property law under the new constitution is closely connected to the
question of how successful the new constitutional order will be in fulfilling its self-assigned
objectives of healing the divisions of the past, establishing a society based on democratic values,
social justice and fundamental human rights, improving the quality of li fe of all citizens and
freeing the potential of every individua1.2534
3. Property, economic growth and empowerment
The state has to foster the ideals of governance through legality, the promotion and protection of
fundamental rights and the constitutional and social state principles. This is important for the
formulation and implementation of policies on social and economic development. ft can be done
either through legislative regulation, or through providing the necessary infrastructure, or both.
In this regard, the German and South African systems are comparable, although by no means
similar. Ownership of land can, for instance, be a stabilising clement in society. However, this
stabilising role can also be undertaken by the state; for instance, through the provision of social
security, licences and permits. The extent to which the state assumes responsibility for providing in
2m Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 6 - 7 explains his statement that the law of things farms part of private law and
not of public law by pointing immediately to the difference between these two spheres of the law: "[Die sakeregj
reël die verhouding tussen individuele regsubjekte .... eli nie soos die publiekreg die verhouding tussen die owerheid
ell 'II onderdaan nie." The role that public law plays in the formation legal structures within the law of things is
expressly acknowledged: "Dit beteken egter nie dal die sakereg heeltemal onafhanklik vail publiekregtelike
beperkings wat die uitoefening eli illhoud vall saaklike regte beperk, bestudeer kali word nie. Aangesien sodanige
beperkings il/ die moderne tyd al hoe II/eer toeneem, moet die sakereg wel deeglik daarvan kennis neem. "
2Sj4 Cf Preamble, FC.
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the socio-economic needs of individuals, influences the importance attached to private ownership in
a given society.
Social and economic development implies the increase and the effective and equitable
distribution of wealth within a society so as to enhance material, cultural, intellectual and
spiritual well being. For proprietary relations in South Africa, this means that the constitutional
property clause should be aimed at enhancing the individual's ability to participate in important
societal changes, while simultaneously upholding the individual's ability to determine his or her
own economic destiny. However, the success of a venture like this will be determined by the
ability of the courts and legislature to resolve the inherent conflict between individual autonomy
and equality (or freedom and social duty) in the property clause.
South Africa has one of the worst records in the world in terms of income equality and social
indicators like health, education, safe water and fertility_2535The inclusion of socio-economic
rights in the bill of rights represents a strong commitment to overcome this legacy and to put the
principle of the social state into motion.2536However, at present the indications of the state's
ability to deliver on the promises of providing social security, ensuring social justice and raising
living standards, are rather disappointing. One could, therefore, assume that individuals will have
to fend for themselves at least until the economic tide has taken a tum for the better in South
Africa. This would be reason enough to support an interpretation of the constitutional property
clause that would also provide individuals the autonomy to determine their own econorruc
destiny to a large extent, along with the responsibility to partake in social change.
3.1. A framework for legal reform: liberalism and social democracy
In the previous chapters, an attempt was made to indicate that the constitutional protection and
regulation of private property in South Africa is a tool for protecting individual freedom and
security as well as initiating social change. The judicial task of balancing the protection of
ownership of individuals against the need for regulation and expropriation of property rights for the
common good is enormous. An overzealous protection of property rights will do injustice to the
broader objectives of national unity and reconciliation espoused in recent legislation; a fanatical
focus on the restributive character of the property clauses might lose sight of the importance of
maintaining individual security in the context of property law.
The practical consequences of a failure to find the balance would be devastating. South Africans
need look no further than the neighbouring country of Zimbabwe to get an idea of what could
happen if the urgent need for socio-economic upliftment is left smouldering for too long and then
abused for political ends. Even though the constitutional order and land reform process in
2535 CfPienaar & Muller 1999 Stell LR 373.
2536 In this sense, the South African constitution goes even further than the German Basic Law, by extensive
coverage of socio-economic rights in the chapter on fundamental rights. In Germany the Sozialstaatsprinzip is the
constitutional anchor for the socio-economic rights, which by far does not enjoy the same constitutional coverage as
in South Africa and are mostly not explicitly mentioned in the Basic Law as such. In Germany the socio-economic
rights are effected on the level of ordinary legislation.
389
Part Five: Conclusion
Zimbabwe differs from that of South Africa, it still illustrates the dismal consequences of a
complete disregard of individual freedom and autonomy of landowners and disrespect for the
courts' attempts to keep the rule of law intact.
No property guarantee can survive the maintenance and absolute insulation of an unjust and
inequitable system of distribution of property for too long. It is therefore always in the public
interest that at least some reform and some redistributive initiatives be undertaken to preserve the
property system itself.2537 An effective balance between collective and individual interests would
further require a continuation of the compromise reached between the ideologies of
libertarianism and liberationism/egalitarianism in the drafting of the South African constitutions.
This is proved by the German example, where a constant balancing of the values of liberalism
and social democracy takes place. Classical liberalism, on which also the human rights ideology
of libertarianism is based, affords owners and other right bolders a high degree of individual
freedom and autonomy. In terms of social democratic theory, on which
liberationism/egalitarianism is based, stronger regulatory measures - also upon private property -
are in general accepted as permissible. But, if the application of a property order with hybrid
ideological foundations is to be successful, it is important that the state seriously endeavour to
give effect to social justice and to improve the quality of life of its citizens. It is equally
important that properly rights of citizens are respected, by the state administration, legislature
and private persons alike. The role of the courts is to supervise the process of reform. It is,
therefore, also indispensable that the judiciary is independent and perceived as legitimate and
that its decisions are enforceable.
Political and economic equality in the sphere of landownership cannot be effected merely by
importing a short-term policy of redistribution of wealth coupled with a disregard for individual
autonomy. On the long run, it would be in the political and economic interests of the larger South
African society that the institution of property is protected by attaching fundamental importance
to the value of individual freedom. However, protection and regulation of property based on
individual freedom alone will not be able to addressing all social welfare issues prevalent in
modern day South African society successfully.
Here, the German constitutional order is an important example of a system where a working balance
was achieved between an individual interest in property and social responsibility inherent in the
concept of private property. The German example indicates that existing proprietary relations can
sometimes cause inequality in certain individuals' chances of participation in social life. In some
instances the inequality can be so severe that "justice" would require state intervention. A purely
legalistic interpretation of property and ownership is not possible in a legal system in which the
constitutional and social stale principles interact. ln such a system, the demands of equity
influence the approach to property. This means that material needs, historical changes and the
social function of property rights qualify the definition and application of a constitutional
properly guarantee, In the process, a system of "scaled" protection of property in the constitutional
25J7 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Clause (1997) 68 - 69.
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context developed, according to the interest of the society at large in the protection and regulation of
specific interests.2538 For instance, in landlord-tenant relations, the tenant's interest (as expounded
through rent control legislation or other forms of tenant protection) is intimately connected with
personal liberty, while the landlord's interest is usually of a more economic nature. The former
therefore usually enjoys a higher level of protection than the latter.
The German example teaches us that, although personal freedom and private property are two
separate ethical values, they influence each other reciprocally, particularly in modem,
industrialised societies. To be integrated in society, the individual needs a strictly protected
sphere of property, to enable him or her to develop as a person among equals. The right to
private property is a crucial component of the values of freedom and human dignity, which
enables the individual to develop his or her own personality and self-esteem in a responsible way
and to be more than the mere object of an overwhelming state power. In the German context, this
individual freedom and responsibility underlying the constitutional protection of property has
influenced the courts' treatment of rent control legislation, the determination of a fair amount of
compensation in cases of expropriation, and the definition of the scope of entitlements pertaining
to property (like excavations, gardening leases, and exclusion of third parties), to mention but a
few.
The approach developed by the Federal Constitutional Court could be well applied in South
Africa, not only to the abovementioned issues, but also to a broader range of issues, like labour
rights, land reform and property taxation. By interpreting the property guarantee so as to secure
personal liberty for the individual, and tempering this liberty with the duty to participate in the
development and functioning of the community, it might be possible to achieve a working
balance between liberalism and social justice in the context of section 25 FC. The willingness of
the courts to continue the spirit of compromise and reconciliation established during the period
of negotiations preceding the coming into effect of the new constitutional order will determine
whether the attempts at striking such a balance will be successful.
3.2. Property, individuals and the public at large
As far as the constitutional property guarantee is concerned, the basic premise of the South
African Constitution is clear: property can be limited in terms of legal norms which are generally
applicable, and a person can be deprived of ownership if the legal norm is not arbitrary. If
property is completely withdrawn, compensation should be paid. On various levels public
interest shapes the property law in general and the concept of ownership in particular, both in
Germany and in South Africa. In the constitutional context, property regulation and property
protection has to be viewed against the unique function and purpose of the bill of rights. The
inclusion of certain interests in and the exclusion of other interests from the constitutional
protection of property, is usually undertaken by determining whether it would serve or frustrate
2538 Cf the discussion of Alexander "Constitutionalising Property: Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas" in McLean
(ed) Property and the Constitution (1999) 106 et seq.
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the constitutional purpose of establishing and maintaining an equitable balance between private
property interests and the public interest in controlling and regulating the use of property and the
distribution of property. 2539
The development of the law of landownership within the framework of the new constitutional
order in South Africa is regulated by the general constitutional objectives mentioned in the
preamble of the Final Constitution. For South Africa, the significance of the German experience
with property, liberty and social duty lies in tbe balancing of individual autonomy and the public
good pertaining to private property. It indicates that in a democracy supported by constitutional
values like the constitutional and social state, proprietary relations must always be characterised
by an interaction between liberty and social duty.2S4o The Basic Law also establishes that, in the
recurring tension between the property interest of the individual and the needs of the public, the
public interest may in case of conflict take precedence over the legally guaranteed position of the
individual. The Basic Law does not leave the resolution of this conflict to the legislature but
settles the issue in the provisions of article 14 GG.
This framework is important in the South African context where, with the dawning of a new
constitutional order, the legal system will be confronted with the question as to what interests
should enjoy precedence in situations where the interests of individual property owners and the
public in general come into conflict with eacb other. The policy of the Department of Land
Affairs is quite clear with regard to tbe future of South African law of landownership. The
primary focus should be on the protection of both the interests of individual owners and the
society at large. Nevertheless, the inherent dichotomy between individual autonomy and social
responsibility inevitably requires balancing of interests. In such a process, the eradication of past
injustice and continued inequality seems to be a decisive consideration. It is also likely to have
the same importance if a court is required to balance the interests of the individual against those
of the public at large.
The inevitable implication of the constitutional purpose to establish and maintain a just and
equitable balance between individual property interests and the public interest is tbat the
constitutional property clause itself must support a just and equitable distribution of property,
even in absence of explicit land reform provisions like those in section 25 FC. A constitutional
property clause cannot guarantee existing property holdings indefinitely, absolutely or without
qualification, without destroying tbe dynamic nature of property relations. This probably also
indicates the approach that could be followed in examining interference on property in the light
of proportionality.
2S3968.
2540 Kirnrninich Die Eigentumsgarantie fill Prozej3 der Wiedervereinigung (1990) 24.
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4. Property, interference, portionality and balancing of interests
In the course of this exposition,2541 an attempt was made at indicating the importance the
approach chosen in the investigation of interferences with property. The different approaches,
and the arguments supporting and countering them, will not be repeated here. It is necessary,
however, to briefly recapitulate the approach favoured in this exposition.
It is submitted the constitutional property clause in South Africa needs to be approached from the
premise that property itself, and not something "less than property" is protected.2542 This
eliminates the problems that could be experienced at a later stage in the inquiry as to the
constitutional protection and regulation of property and its interaction with the general limitation
clause in the South African bill of rights.2543It is further submitted that the property clause and
the general limitations clause apply cumulatively in an investigation as to the justifiability of a
specific infringement on property_2544
The problems with selecting the appropriate point of departure m an investigation into the
constitutional regulation and protection of property are, submittedly, linked to the structure and
stages of the inquiry to be followed_2545In the South African system, the contraction of the
"threshhold" question and the question as to the existence of an infringement into a single stage
might lead to a disregard of the latter question. Skipping the process of identifying the
infringement (that is, identifying the nature of the action complained of, without attempting to
determine its justifiability), could result in a confusion as to the kind of validity requirements
that would be applicable to determine justifiability at a later stage in the inquiry_2546If more
focus is placed on the nature of the action earlier in the process of determining the ,
constitutionality of that action, it would in many cases not even be necessary to resort to the
proportionality inquiry. For such an approach, the German theory on protection and regulation of
property can provide valuable examples_2547
Proportionality (in the sense of the suitability, necessity and moderation) of an infringement.P'"
it is submitted, should be tested only as a very last step in the investigation, so as to exclude the
probability of the court making decisions on the basis of a ranking of rights. This does not mean,
however, that interest-balancing will practically never take place. The values underlying the
constitution in its entirety, like those of the constitutional state and the social state,2549require
that throughout the whole process the interests of the parties to a dispute as well as the general
2541 Cf eg 57, 65, 76, 115,242,257,268 supra.
254276, 139 supra.
2543 183 supra.
2544 188 supra.
2545 69 supra.
2546 The decision in Harksen (cf 225, 241, 255 supra) is an example of how the issue of whether compensation was
payable could have been avoided if more focus was place on the kind of infringement, before an attempt was made
at determining whether the validity requirements for expropriation of property were complied with.
2547 194, also 69 supra.
2548242 supra.
2549 Ch 6 (81) supra.
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public interest be taken into account. This, however, can be done on a case by case basis, and
need not be based on a preconceived hierarchy of rights.
5. Land law reform and the balancing of interests as example
Within the system of social reform legislation pertaining to land, the system of a continuous
balancing of the individual interest and the interests of society at large seems to be established
already. In the discussion of certain pieces of this land reform legislation above,2550 an attempt
was made at indicating how the legislature considered the interests on both sides of the scale in
drafting the relevant legislation. First and foremost, the interests of the poor and landless are
addressed by reform legislation. However, provision is nearly always made for a certain degree
of protection of existing rights. As such, the body of land reform legislation provides an example
of how individual autonomy can be coupled with the duties of the same individuals towards the
development of society.
Simultaneously, the land reform legislation represents an example of how the interaction
between private law and constitutional law could operate. Tbe private law remedies of owners
are upheld as far as possible, and land and ownership of land are made more readily accessible
for all members of the South African society. This could result in a diversification of land
rights,255I although indications to this effect are still few and far apart. More recent land reform
legislation seems to follow this tendency to a larger extent than the earlier legislative efforts
pertaining to land reform.
What can be deducted from viewing the land reform effort as a whole, however, is the intention
of legislature to correct the imbalances existing in land control relations within the structure of
private law, by adherence to the constitutional mandate of reform. In effect, the constitutional
provisions, either directly or indirectly, can be employed to regulate the effects that private law
protection and regulation of property could have on particular cases. However, the fact that the
application of the constitutional provisions to specific cases vary according to the particular facts
and circumstances, does not justify an ad hoc approach to the interaction of private and
constitutional law in the sphere of property. A reading of the constitutional property clause in
conformity with the rest of the Final Constitution and the adherence to the values underlying tbe
constitutional system would dictate against such an approach.
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The extent to which the private law of property will eventually be influenced by the
constitutional provisions on property remains to be seen. At this point, it can only be estimated
that the degree of interaction will vary according to the nature and content of the specific
property interests at stake. For the time being, these issues need not be pursued into the finest
detail. Submittedly, it is more important to identify a structure within which such an interaction
between the principles of property in private and constitutional law could take place.
mo 298 Cl seq supra.
USI Cf h fI C argument 0 Van der Walt 1999 Koers 289 ct seq.
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6. The way forward?
This exposition indicates that individual security and freedom, which is characteristic of private
law property, remains important amidst the changes effected by the constitution or the reform
legislation to the property law order in general. However, the private law rights and entitlements
of owners need to be viewed against the interest of these people in a society based on equality,
freedom and human dignity. A new constitutional order cannot insulate property from the
influence of these basic values. Because of the different functions of property protection in
private law and constitutional law, an owner's private law rights alone will in any event not
provide much assistance if his or her position is challenged by the general interests of the public.
If property law can be developed according to a set of principles, abstracted from the constitution
itself, in which land reform takes place against a consideration of the constitutional spirit of
reconciliation, unity and compromise, but without discarding the importance of the institution of
private property, many of the problems related to the constitutional protection of property could
be satisfactorily solved. However, the courts' task of abstracting a set of values from the
constitutional property guarantee to regulate the function of property law and to monitor
compliance with these values is by no means easy. The omnipresent dichotomy between social
justice and individual freedom in the realm of property law should not be underestimated. The
treatment of this issue will influence the definition of the constitutional property concept, for
which no extensive guidelines are provided in section 25 FC itself.
Indeed, the South. African constitutional property clause itself is not of much assistance in the
determination of the protective scope of section 25 FC, nor in the weight that the public interest
requirement should have in the process of balancing competing interests. The policy of the state
administrative authorities on reforming the law of landownership is to attempt protecting the
interests of both individual owners and the society at large. The relevant statutory provisions and
policy documents are, however, subject to varying interpretation. It is vital that the judiciary
more clearly defines a process through which more legal certainty can be achieved in the
application of the principle of balancing the competing interests of the individual and society, as
espoused by the constitutional property clause. This approach should, moreover, not apply only
to issues emanating from the reform of the system of landownership, but should also be
assimilated on a broader basis so as to apply to all issues related to property.
In particular, major socio-economic issues have to be tackled in South Africa through the chosen
method of constitutionalism. In this regard, substantive legal change should not be a matter of
chance. In German law, the treatment of the values of individual freedom and social justice
through application of the constitutional principles have resulted in a clear-cut framework within
which the interests of the individual property owner can be weighed against those of the
community at large. This framework is important in the South African context, where, under a
new constitutional order, the legal system will be confronted with the question as to which of
these considerations should enjoy precedence in situations where both are at stake and compete
with each other.
Very real differences exist between the German and South African property law orders and
societies. Nevertheless, the issues arising for constitutional adjudication in terms of the property
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clauses of both these legal systems show considerable similarities. These issues are related to the
balancing of individual autonomy and the public good pertaining to private property. They are to
a large extent still unsolved in South Africa, and were in most instances effectively treated by the
German judiciary. This is where the German experience with property, liberty and social duty
becomes significant. Translating the relevant principles, which have crystallised in German law
through a process of trial and error, into the South African context is a challenge well worth
embracing. In embarking upon such a venture, the present exposition, as a whole, can be no
more than an introduction.
396
Bibliography"
Commentaries, books, articles, papers and dissertations
A
ACKERMANNL "Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity" Bram Fischer
Lecture delivered at Rhodes House, Oxford (26 May 2000). Still Unpublished.
ALEXANDERG "Constitutionalising Property: Two Experiences, Two Dilemmas" in McLEAN J (ed)
Property and the Constitution (1999)
ALLEN T "Commonwealth Constitutions and the Right not to be Deprived of Property" 1993
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (Int & Comp LQ) 523 - 552
ATKINSOND "Insuring the future? The Bill of Rights" in FRIEDMANS & ATKINSOND (eds) South
African Review 7 - The Small Miracle: South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (1994) chapter 5
AVENARIUSH Die Rechtsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2nd ed (1997)
B
BADURA P "Eigentum" in BENDA E, MAIHOFER W & VOGEL H-J (eds) Handbuch des
Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2nd ed (1994) chapter 10
BARRY M (ed) Proceedings of International Conference on Land Tenure in the Developing World
(held at the University of Cape Town in January 1998); online at
http://www.gtz.de/orbodenlcapetown/capetown.htm [13.05.2000]
BAUMANRW "Property Rights in the Canadian Constitutional Context" 1992 South African Journal
on Human Rights (SAJHR) 344 - 361
BAURF & STURNERR Sachenrecht 17th ed (1999)
BEEKHUISJH, LAWSONFR, KNAPP V, ETAL "Structural Variations in Property Law" in LAWSONFH
(chiefed) Property and Trust International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law VI (1975) chapter
2
BELLW Enteignungen in der Landwirtschaft der DDR nach 1949 und deren politische Hintergriinde
(1992) Schriftenreihe des Bundesministers fur Ernëhrung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Heft 413
BENDA, E MAIHOFERW & VOGELH-J (eds) Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland 2nd ed (1994)
BENNETTTW "Redistribution of Land and the Doctrine of Aboriginal Title in South Africa" 1989
1993 South African Journal of Human Rights (SAJHR) 443 - 476
BENNETTTW "African land: a History of Dispossession" in ZIMMERMANNR & VISSER DP (eds)
Southern Cross (1996) chapter 2
BENNETTTW Human Rights & African Customary Law (1995)
BENNUNM & NEWITTM (eds) Negotiating Justice - A New Constitution For South Africa (1995)
BIRKSP "The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership" 1985 Acta
Juridica 1 - 37
...A selection of literature and court decisions published up to September 2000 has been considered in the writing of
this dissertation.
Bibliography
Booo A "Property Ownership and Social Concern" in FERRARl V (ed) Laws and Rights - Proceedings
of the International Congress of Sociology of Law for the Ninth Centenary of the University of
Bologna May 30 - June 3,1988 (1991) 967 - 981
BLAAU L [sic] "The Rechtsstaat Idea Compared with the Rule of Law as a Paradigm for Protecting
Rights" 1990 South African Law Journal (SALJ) 76 - 96
BLAAUW L The Constitutional Tenability oj Group Rights Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation
UNISA (1988)
BLAAUW-WOLF L "The 'Balancing of Interests' with Reference to the Principle of Proportionality and
the Doctrine of Gutcrabwagung - A Comparative Analysis" 1999 SA Publiekreg / Public Law
(SAPRlPL) 178 - 214
BLAAUW-WOLF L & WOLF J "A Comparison between German and South African Limitation
Provisions" 1996 South African Law Journal (SALJ) 267 - 296
BOOYSEN H "South Africa: fn Need ofa Federal Constitution for its Minority Peoples" 1997 Loyola oj
Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal (Loy LA In('1& Camp LJ) 789 - 809
BRYDE B "Artikel 14" in VON MUNCH] & KUNIG P Grundgesetz Kommentar [ 4th ed (1992) 821 -
904
BUB W -R (ed) Festschrift fiir Johannes Biirmann und Hermann Weitnauer (1990)
BUCHWALD D Prinzipien des Rechtsstaats - Zur Kritik der gegenwártigen dogmatik des Staatsrechts
at/hand des allgemeinen Rechtsstaatsprinzips noch dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (1996)
BUDLENDER G "The Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" in BUDLENDER G, LATSKY J &
Roux T JU/a's New Land Law (1998) chapter 1
BUDLE 'DER G "The Right to Equitable Access to Land" 1992 South African Journal all Human
Rights (SAJ/lR) 295 - 304
BUDLENDER G & LATSKY J "Unravelling Rights to Land and Agricultural Activity in Rural Race
Zones" 1990 South African Journal oj Human Rights (SAJH R) 155 - 177
I3UDLENDER G, LATSKY J & Roux T Juta's New Land Law (1998)
C
CACHALIA A, CHEADLE H, DAVIS D ET AL Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution (1994)
CAIGER A "The Protection of Property in South Africa" in BENNUN & NEWITT (eds) Negotiating
Justice - A New Constitution Jar South Africa (1995) chapter 5
CAREy-MILLER DL "A new property?" 1999 South African Law Journal (SALf) 749 - 759
CAREy-MILLER DL "Revision of Priorities in South African Land Law" in BARRY M (ed)
Proceedings oj International Conference on Land Tenure ill the Developing World (held at the
University of Cape Town in January 1998) 49 - 60
CIIASKALSO M "The Land Claims Court" (May 1997) Consultus 31 - 33
CHASKALSON M "Stumbling towards Section 28: Negotiations over the Protection of Property Rights
in the Interim Constitution" 1995 South African Journal on Hunian Rights (SAJHR) 222 - 240
CIIASKALSON M "The Problem with Property: Thoughts on the Constitutional Protection of Property
in the United Stales and the Commonwealth" 1993 South African Journal all Hunian Rights
(SAJHR) 388 - 411
CIIASKALSON M "The Property Clause: Section 28 of the Constitution" 1994 South African Journal on
HI/man Rights (SAJHR) 131 - 139
CIIASKALSON M & LEWIS C "Property" in CHASKALSON M, KENTRIDGE J ET AL (eds) Constitutional
398
Bibliography
Law of South Africa (1996) chapter 31
CHASKALSONM, KENTRIDGEJ, KLAARENK, ETAL"Introduction" in CHASKALSONM, KENTRIDGEJ
ETAL (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996) chapter 1
CHASKALSONM, KENTRIDGEJ, KLAARENK, ETAL(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (1996)
CLAASSENSA "Compensation for Expropriation: The Political and Economic Parameters of Market
Value" 1993 South African Journal of Human Rights (SAJHR) 422 - 427
COHEND & SIMOND (eds) Collected Studies in Roman Law II (1991)
CORDERH & DAVISD "Law and Social Practice: An Introduction" in CORDER(ed) Essays on Law &
Social Practice in South Africa (1988) chapter 1
CORDERH, KAHANOVITZS, MURPHYS, ETALA Charter for Social Justice - A Contribution to the
South African Bill of Rights Debate (1992)
COWENDV New Patterns of Landownership - The Transformation of the Concept of Ownership as
Plena in Re Potestas Unpublished paper, read at the University of the Witwatersrand
(Johannesburg) on 26 April 1984
CRONJÉ DSP Barnard Cronjé & Olivier's The South African Law of Persons and Family Law 2nd ed
(1990)
CURRIE DP The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994)
D
DAUBED "Fashions and Idiosyncracies in the Exposition of the Roman Law of Property" in COHEND
& SIMOND (eds) Collected Studies in Roman Law JJ (1991) 1325 - 1339
DAVELCJ & JORDAANRA Personereg Studentehandboek (1995)
DAVISD, CHASKALSONM & DEWAALJ "Democracy and constitutionalism: the role of constitutional
interpretation" in VANWYK, DUGARDETAL (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism - The New South
African Legal Order (1996) 1 - 130
DAVIS D, CHEADLEH, & HAYSOMN Fundamental Rights in the Constitution - Commentary and
Cases (1997)
DAVISDM "The Case against the Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in a Bill of Rights Excerpt
as Directive Principles" 1992 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 475 - 490
DE VILLIERS B "Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Rights: The Experience of
India" 1992 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 29 - 49
DE VILLIERS B "The Socio-Economic Consequences of Directive Principles of State Policy:
Limitations on Fundamental Rights" 1992 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 188 -
199
DEVILLIERSB (ed) Birth of a Constitution (1994)
DEVOS P "A Bill of Rights as an Instrument for Social and Economic Transformation in a New South
African Constitution: Lessons from India" in BENNUNM & NEWITI M (eds) Negotiating Justice -
A New Constitution For South Africa (1995) chapter 4
DE WAAL J "A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the Interim Bill of
Rights" 1995 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 1 - 29
DEWAAL J, CURRIEI & ERASMUSG The Bill of Rights Handbook 2nd ed (1999); 3rd ed (2000)
DEWET E "Can the Social State Principle in Germany Guide State Action in South Africa in the Field
of Social and Economic Rights?" 1995 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 30 - 49
DE WET E The Constitutional Enforceability of Economic and Social Rights - The Meaning of the
German Constitutional Modelfor South Africa (1996)
399
Bibliography
DEGENHART C Staatsrecht I - Staatszielbestimmungen, Staatsorgane, StaatsJunkrionen 41h ed (1998)
DEVENISH GE A Commentary all the South African Constitution (1998)
DIEKMANN B Das System der Rilckerstattungstatbestiinde nach dem Gesetz zur Regelung offener
Vermogensfragen (1992)
DIOSDI G Ownership in Ancient and Pre-Classical Roman Law (1970)
DLAMINl CR "Landownership and Customary Law Reform" in VAN DER WALT (ed) Land Reform and
the Future oj Landownership ill South Africa (1991) 37 - 44
DOLZER R Property and Environment: The Social Obligation inherent in Ownership - A Study oj the
German Constitutional Setting (1976)
DOMANSKJ A "Landownership and Natural Law" 1989 Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse
Reg (THRI-IR) 433 - 443
Du PLESSIS LM "A Background to Drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in DE VILLIERS (ed)
Birth of a Constitution (1994) 89 - 100
Du PLESSIS LM "Constitutional Construction and the Contradictions of Social Transfromation in
South Africa" 2000 Scriptura 31 - 52
Du PLESSIS LM "The Bill of Rights in the Working Draft of tbe New Constitution: an Evaluation of
Aspects of a Constitutional Text Sui Generis'' 1996 Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell LR) 3 - 24
Du PLESSIS LM "The Evolution of Constitutionalism and the Emergence of a Constitutional
Jurisprudence in South Africa: An Evaluation of the South African Constitutional Court's
Approach to Constitutional Interpretation" 1999 Saskatchewan Law Review 300 - 328
Du PLESSIS LM "The Genesis of the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in South Africa's Transitional
Constitution" 1994 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPRlPL) I-21
Du PLESSIS LM & CORDER HUllderstanding South Africa's Transitional Bill oj Rights (1994)
Du PLESSIS W " 'n Regsteoretiese Ondersoek na die Begrip 'Openbare Belang' " 1987 Tydskrif vir
Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 290 - 298
Du PLESSIS W & OLIVIER N "The Old and the New Property Clause" 1997 (I) 5 Human Rights and
Constitutional Law Journal oj South Africa (HRCLfSA) II- 15
Du PLESSIS W, OUVIER N & PIENAAR JM "Land Reform continues during 1997" 1997 SA Publiekreg
/ Public Law (SAPRlPL) 531 - 550
Du SOLO A Restitution var Entschiidigung: Wiederverinigung zu welch em Preis? Analyse und
Wertung noch rechtlichen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gesichtspunkten (1993)
E
EUKE WF & FINKIN MW (eds) Introduction to German Law (1996)
ECKERT J Sachenrecht (1999)
EISENBERG A "'Public Purpose' and Expropriation: some Comparative Insights and the South African
Bill of Rights" 1995 South African Journal on Hunian Rights (SAJHR) 207 - 221
ERASMUS G "Limitation and Suspension" in VAN WVK J, DUGARD J, ET AL (eds) Rights and
Constitutionalism - The New South African Legal Order (1996) 629 - 663
ERASMUS I-IJ & BARROW OJ Die Wet op die Hooggeregshof 59 van 1959 en die Wet op
Landdroshowe 32 vail 1944 81h ed (1994)
ERASMUS J The Interaction between Property Rights and Land Reform in the New Constitutional
Order ill South Africa Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, UNISA (1998)
ESCHENBACII JOeI' Verfassungsrechtliche Schutz des Eigentums (1996)
400
Bibliography
F
FEENSTRA R "Der Eigentumsbegriff bei Hugo Grotius im Licht eimger mittelalterlicher und
spatscholastischer Quellen" in BEHRENDS 0, DIESSELHORSTM, LANGE WE ET AL (eds) Festschrift
for Franz Wieacker zum 70. Geburtstag (1978) 208 - 234
FIEBERG G "Legislation and Judicial Practice in Germany: Landmarks and Central Issues in the
Property Question" in RWELAMlRA MR & WERLE G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices -
Approaches to Amnesty, Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South Africa and Germany
(1996) 79 - 88
FINER SE, BOGDANORV & RUDDEN B Comparing Constitutions (1995)
FaRSTERLING W Recht der offenen Vermëgensfragen (1993)
FOSTER NG German Legal System and Laws 2nd ed (1996)
FRAENKELE Der Doppelstaat (1974)
FRECKMANNA & WEGERICH T The German Legal System (1999)
FRIEDMAN S & HUMPHRIES R (eds) Federalism and its Foes - Proceedings of the Institute for Multi-
Party Democracy and the Centre for Policy Studies Workshop, "The Politics and Economics of
Federalism: a South African Debate" held at Breadwater Lodge, Cape Town 21 - 23 August 1992
(1993)
FRIEDMAN S & ATKINSON D (eds) South African Review 7 - The Small Miracle: South Africa's
Negotiated Settlement (1994)
FROWEIN JA & PEUKERT W Europiiische Menschenrechtskonvention-Kommentar 2nd ed (1996)
FROWEIN JA Report on German Law concerning the Protection of Property in Relation to Taxation
Unpublished report (25 July 1996)
G
GREENAWALT K "The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles" 1978 Columbia Law Review
(Colum L Rev) 982
GROTE R Die Lehre von den Rechtskreisen und ihre Bedeutung for die Rechtsvergleichung auf dem
Gebiete des ëffentlichen Rechts - Zugleich ein Beitrag zu aufgaben und Methode der ëffentlich-
rechtlichen Rechtsvergleichung Paper Still Unpublished, read at Max Planck Institut fur ausl. Off.
Recht und Vëlkerrecht, Heidelberg on 19 February 1999
GRUPP TM Siidafrikas neue Verfassung - Mit vergleichender Betrachtung aus deutseher und
europdischer Sicht (1999)
GUEST AG (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961)
GUTTO SB Property and Land Reform - Constitutional and Jurisprudential Perspectives (1995)
H
HAYSOM N "Constitutionalism, Majoritatian Democracy and Socio-Economic Rights" 1992 South
African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 451 - 463
HAYTHORN M & HUTCHINSON D "Labour Tenants and the Law" in MURRAY C & O'REGAN K No
Place to Rest (1990) chapter 11
HEGEL GW Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1896) translated by DYDE SW Philosophy of
Right (1996)
HELDRICH A Das Interlokale Privatrecht Deutschlands nach dem Einigungsvertrag - Zivilrechtliche
Vorfragen der Riickpbertragungsanspriiche nach dem Vermiigensgesetz (1992)
HENKIN L "Shelley v Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion" 1962 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review (Univ Pa L Rev) 473
401
Bibliography
HENKIN L "Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy" 1961 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review (Univ Pa L Rev) 637
HESSE K Grundziige des Verfassungsrechts 19th ed (1993)
HOFT E Offentlichrechtliche Eigentumsbeschriinkungen im rëmischen Bauwesen Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation (1952)
HONORÉ AM "Ownership" in GUEST A (cd) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (1961) chapter 5
HUMPHRIES R, RAPOO T & FRIEDMAN S "The Shape of the Country - Negotiating Regional
Government" in FRIEDMAN S & ATKINSON D (eds) South African Review 7 - The Small Miracle:
South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (1994) chapter 6
IpSEN HP "Enteignung und Sozialisicrung" in VON HIPPEL, IPSEN, VOIGT ET AL Verhandlungen der
Tagung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Gouingen am 18. und 19. Oktober 195/ (1952)
74 - 177
ISENSEE J & KIRCIII-IOF P Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland VI (1989)
J
JARASS HD / PIEROTII B Grundgesetz fur die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1995) 3rd cd
JEFFRESS DA "Resolving Rival Claims on East German Property Upon German Unification" 1991
Yale Law Joumal (Yale LJ) 527 - 549
JUNG Y Das deutsche und das koreanische Enteignungsinstitut - Insbesondere die Enteignung
zugunsten privater Unternehmen nach dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland sowie
"ach der Verfassung der Republik Korea (1990) Rechtswissenschaftliche Forschung und
Entwicklung Band 274
K
KA MOUMBE F "Socio-Economic Rights: Van Biljon versus Soobramoney" 1998 SA Publiekreg /
Public Law (SAPR/PL) 460 - 470
KASER M Eigenrum und Besitz im alteren rëmischen Recht (1943)
KENTRIDGE J & SPITZ D "Interpretation" in CHASKALSON M, KENTRIDGE J ET AL (eds) Constitutional
Law of South Africa (1996) chapter II
KIMMINICH 0 "Artikel 14" in VON MANGOLDT H/ KLEIN F Bonner Kommentor (1992)
KIMMfNlCH 0 "Eigcnturn und Freiheit" in ABELEIN M & KIMMINICII 0 (eds) Studien zum Staats- und
Volkerrecht - Festschrift for Hermann Raschhofer zum 70. Geburtstag am 26. Juli 1975
(1977) J05 - 121
KIMMfNlCH 0 "Property Rights" in STARCK C (ed) Rights, Institutions and Impact of International
Law according to the Basic Law (1987) 75 - 91
KIMMfNlCl1 0 Die Eigentumsgarantie im Prozefi der Wiedervereinigung - Zur Bestandskraft der
agrarischen Bodenrechtsordnung der DDR (1990)
KIMMINICII 0 Eigenturn Enteignung Entschádigung - Eine Kommentierung des Art /4 GG (1976)
KLEYN D "The Constitutional Protection of Property: a Comparison between the German and the
South African Approach" 1996 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPRlPL) 402 - 445
KLEYN D, BORAINI:. /\ & Du PLESSIS W Silberberg & Schoeman's Law of Property 3rd ed (1992)
KOMMERS DP Tire Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 2nd cd (1997)
KOrz H "The Role of the Judge in the Court-room: The Common Law and Civil Law Compared"
1987 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 35 - 43
402
Bibliography
KROEZE I Between Conceptualism and Constitutionalism: Private-law and Constitutional
Perspectives on Property Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, UNISA (1997)
KROEZE I Between Conceptualism and Constitutionalism: The South African Property Concept
Unpublished paper (1997)
KROEZEIJ "The Impact of the Bill of Rights on Property Law" 1994 SA Publiekreg / Public Law
(SAPRlPL) 322 - 331
KUNIG P "German Constitutional Law and the Environment" 1983 Adelaide Law Review
(Adel LR) 318 - 332.
KUNIGP "Staatsorganisationsrechtliche Grundentscheidungen des Grundgesetzes" 1990 Jura (Special
edition for first semester in East and West) 49 - 60
KUNIGP "The Principle of Social Justice" in KARPEN(ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany - Essays on the Basic Rights and Principles of the Basic Law with a Translation of the
Basic Law (1988) 187 - 204
L
LATSKYJ "The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995" in BUDLENDERG, LATSKYJ & Roux T
Juta's New Land Law (1998)
LAWSONFH (chief ed) Property and Trust International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law VI
(1975)
LEISNERW "Das Bodenreform-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts: Kriegsfolge- und Eigentums-
entscheidung" 1991 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 1569 - 1575
LEISNERW "Eigenturn" in ISENSEEJ & KIRCHHOFP Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland VI (1989) 1023 - 1097
LEISNERW "Eigentumswende? Liegt der Grundwasser-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
ein neues Eigentumsverstëndnis zugrunde?" 1983 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (DVB) 61 - 67
LEISNERW Eigentum - Schriften zu Eigentumsgrundrecht und Wirtschaftsverfassung 1970 - 1996
(1996)
LERCHE P "Grundrechtlicher Schutzbereich, Grundrechtspragung und Grundrechtseingriff" in
ISENSEEJ & KIRCHHOFP (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland V
(1989) 739 - 773
LETSOALOEM Land Reform in South Africa - A Black Perspective (1987)
LEWISC "The Modem Concept of Ownership of Land" 1985 Acta Juridica 241 - 266
LEWISC "The Right to Private Property in a New Political Dispensation in South Africa" 1992 South
African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 389 - 430
LIMPENSH Funktion & Grenzen der Inhaltsbestimmung des Eigentums im Sinne von Art. 14 Absatz 1
Satz 2 des Grundgesetzes Doctoral Dissertation University of'Këln (1973)
M
MALHERBEEFJ "Die Sertifisering van die 1996 Grondwet" 1997 Tydskrifvir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg
(TSAR) 356 - 370
MARCUST "Land Reform - Considering National, Class and Gender Issues" 1990 South African
Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 178 - 194
MAURERH Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (Grtindrisse des Rechts) u" ed (1997)
McLEAN J (ed) Property and the Constitution (1999)
MEIER-HAYOZ A "Vom Wesen des Eigentums" in KELLER M (ed) Revolution der Technik
Evolutionen des Rechts - Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag von Karl Oftinger (1969)
403
Bibliography
MEYER-ASICH J Der Schutzzweck der Eigentumsgarantie (1980)
MICIIELMAN F " Property as a Constitutional Right" 1981 Washington & Lee Law Review 1097
MILTON JR "Ownership" in ZIMMERMANN R & VISSER OP (eds) Southern Cross - Civil Law and
Common Law in South Africa (1996) chapter 20
MOELLENDORF 0 "Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-Economic
Rights Claims" 1998 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 327 - 333
MOHNHAUPT H "Zur Geschichte des Rechtsstaats in Deutschland: Begriff und Funktion eines
schwierigen Verfassungsprinzips" 1993/94 Acta Facultatis Politico-Juridicae Universitatis
Scientlorum Budapestiensis de Rolando Eotvos Nominatae 39 - 60
MOLLER K "Sachenrecht" 4th ed (1997)
MUNZER SR A Theory of Property (1990)
MUREINIK E "Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution" 1992 South
African Journal all Human Rights (SAJHR) 464 - 474
MURPHY J "Insulating Land Reform from Constitutional Impugnment: An Indian case study" 1992
South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 362 - 388
MURPHY J "Interpreting the Property Clause in the Constitution Act of 1993" 1995 SA Publiekreg /
Public Law (SAPR/PL) 107 - 130
MURPHY J "Property Rights and Judicial Restraint: a Reply to Chaskalson" 1994 South African
Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 385 - 398
MURPIIY J "The Ambiguous Nature of Property Rights" 1993 Journal for Juridical Science (JJS)
35 - 66
MURPHY J "The Restitution of Land after Apartheid: Constitutional and Legislative Framework" in
RWELAMIRA RW & WERLE G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices - Approaches to Amnesty,
Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South Africa and Germany (1996) 113 - 132
MURRAY C & O'REGAN K No Place to Rest (1990) chapter Il
MUI3GNUG R "Verfassungsrechtlicher und gesetlicher Schutz vor konfiskatorischen Steuem" 1991
Juristen Zeitung (JZ) 993 - 999
o
OLZEN 0 "Die geschichtliche Entwicklung des zivilrechtlichen Eigentumsbegriffs" 1984 Juristische
Schulung (JuS) 328 - 336
OSSENBOHL F "Economic and Occupational Rights" in KIRCHHOF P & KOMMERS D (eds) Germany
and its Basic Law (1993) 251 - 282
P
PAPIER HJ "Artikel 14" in MAUNZ T & DORIG G Grundgesetz Kommentor (1994) chapter 14
PAPIER HJ Recht der ëffentlichen Sac/len 3rd ed (1998)
PIENAAR G "Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse Eiendomsbegrip in Pcrspektief" 1986 Tydskrifvir
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 295 - 308
PIENAAR G "Huurarbeiders - Baas of Klaas?" 1997 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR)
131 - 144
PIENAAR .1M "Farm Workers: Extending Security of Tenure in Terms of Recent Legislation" 1998 SA
Publiekreg / Public: Law (SAPRlPL) 423 - 437
Pienaar JM "Labour Tenancy: Recent Developments in Case Law" 1998 Stellenbosch Law Review
(Steil LR) 3 I I - 325
404
Bibliography
PIENAARJM "Land Reform" chapter of textbook in progress, still unpublished (2000)
Pienaar JM "Land Reform, Labour Tenants and the applications of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants)
Act" 1997 Tydskrifvir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 538 - 548
PIENAAR JM "Nuwe Sakeregtelike Ontwikkelings op die Gebied van Grondhervorming" Inaugural
Address University of Stellenbosch (1997)
PIENAAR JM & MULLERA "The Impact of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 on Homelessness and Unlawful Occupation within the Present
Statutory Framework" 1999 Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell LR) 370 - 396
PIEROTH B & SCHLINKB Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II 14th ed (1998)
PIEROTHB & SCHLINKB Grundrechte - Staatsrecht II th ed (1991)
PREIGLERS Die Rilekgabe von Landrechten in Siidafrika (1998)
PRETORIUSJL Die Begrip Openbare Belang en die Burgervryheidsbeperking Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation UOFS (1986)
PRIESS Das Neubauerneigentum in der ehemaligen DDR (1993)
Q
QUINT PE The Imperfect Union - Constitutional Structures of German Unification (1997)
R
RAUTENBACH1M General Provisions of the South African Bill of Rights (1995)
REICHCA "The New Property" 1964 Yale Law Journal (Yale U) 733 - 787
RICHTER 1& SCHUPPERTGF Casebook Verfassungsrecht 3rd ed (1996)
RITTSTIEG H Eigentum als Verfassungsproblem - zu Geschichte und Gegenwart des Biirgerlichen
Verfassungsstaates (1975)
ROBBERSG An Introduction to German Law (1998)
ROBERTSONM "Land and Human Rights in South Africa: (A reply to Marcus and Skweyiya)" 1992
South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 215 - 227
ROTH H "§ 905" and "§ 906" in STAUDINGERJ Kommentar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit
Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht §§ 903 - 924) BEITZKEG (ed)
13th revised edition (1996)
Roux T "Balancing competing Property Interests" 1993 South African Journal on Human Rights
(SAJHR) 539 - 548
Roux T "The Restitution of Land Rights Act" in BUDLENDERG, LATSKYJ & Roux T Juta's New
Land Law (1998) original service; (1998) service 1
RWELAMlRA MR & WERLE G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices - Approaches to Amnesty,
Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South Africa and Germany (1996)
RYCROFTAJ "The Protection of Socio-Economic Rights" in CORDER(ed) Essays on Law & Social
Practice in South Africa (1988) chapter 10
S
SACHSA "Constitutional Developments in South Africa" 1996 New York Journal of International Law
and Politics (NYU J Int'l L & P) 695 - 709
SACHSA Advancing Human Rights in South Africa (1992)
SALTERMG "Hegel and the Social Dynamics of Property Law" in HARRIs (ed) Property Problems
from Genes to Pension Funds (1997) chapter 19
SCHNAUDERF "Die Relativitat der Sondemutzungsrechte" BUB W-R (ed) Festschrift for Johannes
405
Bibliography
Bormann und Hermann Weitnauer (1990) 567
SCHOCH F "Die Haftung aus enteignungsgleichem und enteignendem Eingriff" 1990 Juristische
Ausbildung (Jura) 140 - 150
SCHULTE H Zur Dogmatik des Arl.14 GG Paper read at the Juristische Studiengesellschaft: Karlsruhe
on 6 February 1979
SClIULTZ F Classical Ron-Ian Law (1951; reprinted in 1992) 334 - 380
SCIIUPPERT GF "The Right to Property" in KARPEN U (ed) The Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany (1988) 107 - I19
SCIIWABE J Die sogenannte Drittwirkung der Grundrechte (1971)
SCOLLO-LA VIllARI CE Restitution of Land Rights in an Administrative Law Environment - The
German and South African Prodedures Compared LL M Research Dissertation, UCT (1996)
SEIFERT K-H & HOMIG D Grundgesetz Taschenkommentar 5lh ed (1995)
SEILER HH "§ 903" and "§ 904" in STAUDINGER J Kommentar zum Burgertichen Gesetzbuch mit
Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengeseizen (Drittes Buch Sachenrecht §§ 903 - 924) BEITZKE G (ed)
13th revised edition (1996)
SEILER HH "Vorbemerkungen zu §§ 903 ff" in STAUDINGER J Kommentar zum Burgertichen
Gesetzbuch mil Einfiihrungsgesetz lind Nebengesetzen (Driftes Buch Sachenrecht §§ 903 - 924)
BEITlKE G (ed) 13th revised edition (1996)
SIIAP1RO FR "The Most-Cited Law Review Articles" 1985 California Law Review 1540 - 1554
SKWEYIYA Z "Towards a Solution to the Land Question in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Problems and
Models" 1990 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 195 - 214
SOBOTA K Das Prinzip Rechtsstaat - Verfassungs- lind verwaltungsrechtliche Aspekte (1997)
SONTIS JM "Strukturelle Betrachtungen zurn Eigenturnsbegriff" 1973 Fes/schrift Lorenz 981
SOUTIIERN M "Restitution or Compensation: The Land Question in East Germany" 1993 ICLQ
(International and Comparative Law Quarterly) 690 - 697
STAUDINGER J Kommenlar zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch mil Einfiihrungsgesetz und Nebengeseizen
(Drif/es Buch Sachenrecht §§ 903 - 924) BElTZKE G (ed) 13th revised edition (1996)
STERN K "A Society based on the Rule of Law and Social Justice: Constitutional Model of the Federal
Republic of Germany" 1981 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 241 - 250
SWANSON E "A Land Claims Court for South Africa: Report on work in Progress" 1992 South African
Journal Oil Human Rights (SAJHR) 332 - 343
T
TAPPERT W Die Wiedergutmachung VOII Staatsunrecht der SBZ / DDR durch die Bundesrepublik
Deutschland nach del' Wiedervereinigung (1995)
TIlORMANN M Abstufungen in del' Sozialbindung des Eigentums - Zur Bestimmung von Inhal1111Id
Schranken des Eigentunis noch Art. /4 Absatz I Satz 2 GG im Spannungsfeld von
Eigentumsfreiheit und Gemeinwohl (1996)
U
UNDERKUFFLER LS "On Property: an Essay" 1990 Yale Law Journal (Yale LJ) 127 - 148
V
VAN DER MERWE CG LA WSA Things XXVII 3 - 195
VAN DER MERWE CG "Die Wet op Deeltitels in die Lig van ons Gemeenregtelike Saak- en
Eiendomsbegrip" 1974 Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 113 - 132
406
Bibliography
VANDERMERWECG & PIENAARJ "Land Reform in South Africa" in JACKSONP ANDWILDE DC
(eds) the Reform of Property Law (1997) chapter 18
VANDERMERWECG Sakereg 2nd ed (1989)
VANDERMERWECG, MOHRP & BLUMBERGM "The Bill of Rights and the Rules of Sectional Title
Schemes: a Comparative Perspective" 2000 Stellenbosch Law Review / Regstydskrif (Stell LR)
155 - 181
VANDERMERWED "Land Tenure in South Africa: a Brief History and some Reform Proposals" 1989
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 663
VAN DER MERWE D "Land Tenure in South Africa: Changing the face of Property Law" 1990
Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell LR) 321 - 335
VANDERMERWED "The Roman-Dutch Law: From Virtual Reality to Constitutional Resource" 1998
Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 1 - 19
VANDERVYVERJD "Expropriation, Rights, Entitlements and Surface Support of Land" 1988 South
African Law Journal (SALJ) 1 - 16
VANDERVYVERJD "The Doctrine of Private-Law Rights" in STRAUSSSA (ed) Huldigingsbundel vir
WA Joubert (1988) 201 - 246
VANDERWALT AJ " 'Double' Property Guarantees: a Structural and Comparative Analysis" 1998
South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 560 - 586
VANDERWALTAJ "Bartolus se Omskrywing van Dominium en die Interpretasies daarvan sedert die
Vyftiende Eeu" 1986 Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 305 - 321
VANDERWALT AJ "Comparative Notes on the Constitutional Protection of Property Rights" 1993
Recht & Kritiek 263 - 297
VAN DER WALT AJ "Gedagtes oor die Herkoms en Ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse
Eiendomsbegrip" 1988 De Jure 16 - 35; 306 - 325
VAN DER WALT AJ "Introduction" in VAN DER WALT AJ (ed) Land Reform and the Future of
Landownership in South Africa (1991) 1 - 8
VAN DER WALT AJ "Marginal Notes on Powerful(l) Legends: Critical Perspectives on Property
Theory" 1995 Tydskrifvir die Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 396 - 420
VANDERWALTAJ "Notes on the Interpretation of the Property Clause in the New Constitution" 1994
Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 181 - 203
VAN DER WALT AJ "Ownership and Personal Freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid's
Theory of Ownership" 1993 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 569 -
589
VANDERWALT AJ "Property Rights and Hierarchies of Power: a Critical Evaluation of Land-Reform
Policy in South Africa" 1999 Koers 259 - 294
VAN DERWALT AJ "Property Rights, Land Rights, and Environmental Rights" in VAN WYK D,
DUGARDJ, ETAL (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism - The New South African Legal Order (1996)
VANDERWALT AJ "Rights and Reforms in Property Theory - A Review of Property Theories and
Debates in Recent Literature: Part III" 1995 Tydskrifvir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 493 - 526
VANDERWALT AJ "Roman Law, Fundamental Rights, and Land Reform in Southern Africa" 1998
Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 400 - 422
VANDERWALT AJ "Subject and Society in Property Theory - a Review of Property Theories and
Debates in Recent Literature: Part II" 1995 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 322 - 345
VAN DERWALT AJ "The Fragmentation of Land Rights" 1992 South African Journal on Human
407
Bibliography
Rights (SAJ/IR) 431 - 450
VAN DER WALT AJ "The Future of Common Law Landownership" in VAN DER WALT AJ (ed) Land
ReJorm and the Future oj Landownership in South Africa (1991) 21 - 36
VAN DER WALT AJ "The Impact of the Bill of Rights on Property Law" 1993 SA Publiekreg / Public
Law (SAPRlPL) 296 - 319
VA DER W ALT AJ "The Limits of Constitutional Property" 1997 SA Publiekreg / Public Law
(SAPRlPL) 275 - 330
VAN DER WALT AJ "Towards a Theory of Rights in Property: Exploratory Observations on the
Paradigm of Post-Apartheid Property Law" 1995 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPRlPL) 298 - 345
VAN DER W ALT AJ "Towards the Development of Post-Apartheid Land Law: An Exploratory Survey"
1990 De lure I - 45.
V AN DER WALT AJ "Tradition on Trial: a Critical Analysis of the Civil-Law Tradition in South
African Property Law" 1995 South African Journal 011 Human Rights (SAJHR) 169 - 206
VAN DER WALT AJ "Unity and Pluralism in Property Theory - a Review of Property Theories and
Debates in Recent Literature: Part 1" 1995 Tydskrifvir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (TSAR) 15 - 42
VAN DER W ALT AJ & BOTHA H "Coming to Grips with the New Constitutional Order: Critical
Comments on Harksen v Lane NO" 1998 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPRlPL) 17 - 41.
VAN DER W ALT AJ & PIE AAR GJ Introduction [0 the Law oj Property (1996)
V AN DER W ALT AJ & PIE AAR GJ Introduction to the Law oj Property 2nd ed (1997)
VAN DER WALT AJ Constitutional Property Clauses - A Comparative Analysis (1999)
VAN DER W ALT AJ Die Ontwikkeling van Houerskap Doctoral Dissertation Potchefstroom University
for Christian Higher Education (1985)
VAN DER WALT AJ The Constitutional Property Clause - A Comparative Analysis oj Section 25 of the
South African Constitution of /996 (1997)
VAN MAANEN G "Ownership as a Constitutional Right in South Africa - Articles 14 & IS of the
Grundgcsctz: the German Experience" 1993 Recht & Kritiek 74 - 95
VAN WYK D " 'n Paar opmerkings en vrae oor die nuwe Grondwet" 1997 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse
Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 377 - 394
VENTER F "A Ilierarchy of Constitutional Values" in Constitution and Law (Seminar Report of the
papers delivered at the Colloquium of the Faculty of Law of the Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir
Christelike Hoër Onderwys on 31 October 1997) 17 - 19
VENTER F "Aspects of the South African Constitution of 1996: An African Democratic and Social
Federal Rechtsstaat?" 1997 Zeitschrifi for auslandisches ëffentliches Recht und Volketrecht
(Za6RV) 51 - 82
VENTER F, VAN DER WALT CF , VAN DER WALT, ET AL Regsnavorsing Metode en Publikasie (1990)
VISSER D & Roux T "Giving back the Country: South Africa's Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994
in Context" in RWELAMIRA RW & WERLE G (eds) Confronting Past Injustices - Approaches to
Amnesty, Punishment, Reparation and Restitution in South Africa and Germany (1996) 89 - III
VISSER DP "The 'Absoluteness' of Ownership: the South African Common Law in Perspective" 1985
Acta Juridlca 39 - 52
VON BRONNECK A "Die Eigentumsordnung im Nationalsozialismus" 1979 Kritische Justiz lSI - 172
VON BRONNECK A Die Eigentunisgarantie des Grundgesetzes (1984)
VON DOEMMING K, FOSSLEIN R & MATZ W "Entstehungsgeschichtc der Artikel des Grundgesetzes"
1951 (1) Jahrbuch des 6jJentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart (Nelle Fassung) 144 - 154
408
Bibliography
VON HEINEGGWH & HALTERNUR "Keine Angst vor Art. 14 GG!" 1993 Juristische Schulung -
Zeitschrift fiir Studium undAusbildung(JuS) 121-126; 213 - 217
VONMANGOLDTH / KLEINF Bonner Kommentar (1992)
VONMDNCHI / KUNIGP Grundgesetz-Kommentar I (1992) 4th ed. Artikel 1 - 19
W
WATIS RL "Is the New Constitution Federal or Unitary?" in DE VILLIERS B (ed) Birth of a
Constitution (1994) 75 - 88
WEBERW "Das Eigenturn und seine Garantie in der Krise" in PAWLOWSKIH-M & WIEACKERF (eds)
Festschrift fiir Karl Michaelis zum 70. Geburtstag am 21 Dezember 1970 (1972) 316 - 336
WECHSLERH "Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" 1959 Harvard Law Review (Harv L
Rev) 1
WENDTR "Art. 14 [Eigenturn, Erbrecht und Enteignung]" in SACHSM (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar
(1996) 482 - 528.
WENDTR Eigentum und Gesetzgebung (1985)
WESTERMANNHP BGB-Sachenrecht 9th ed (1994)
WIECHERSM "Grondslae van die Moderne Rechtsstaat / Foundations of the Modem Rechtsstaat"
1998 Tydskrifvir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 624 - 634
WIELANDJ "Artikel 14 [Eigentum Erbrecht, Enteignung]" in DREIERH (ed) Grundgesetz Kommentar
1(1996)
WIELINGHJ Sachenrecht 2nd ed (1994); 3rd ed (1997)
WOOLMANS "Application" in CHASKALSONM, KENTRIDGE J ET AL (eds) Constitutional Law of
South Africa (1996) chapter 11
WOOLMANS "Limitation" in CHASKALSONM, KENTRIDGEJ ETAL (eds) Constitutional Law of South
Africa (1996) chapter 12
WOOLMANS "Out of Order? Out of Balance? The Limitation Clause of the Final Constitution" 1997
SAJHR 102 - 134
Z
ZACHERHF "Was kënnen wir liber das Sozialstaatsprinzip wissen?" in STODTERR & THIEMEW (eds)
Hamburg, Deutschland, Europa - Beitrage zum deutschen und europiiischen Verfassungs-,
Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftsrecht - Festschrift for Hans Peter Ipsen zum siebzigsten Geburtstag
(1977) 207 - 267
ZIMMERMANNR & VISSER 0 "Introduction: South African Law as a Mixed Legal System" in
ZIMMERMANNR & VISSER0 (eds) Southern Cross - Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa
(1996) 1 - 30
Newspaper articles
DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN (1998-12-23): "Bushmen get a stake in game park" online at
http://www.mg.co.za [21.05.1999]
DAILYMAIL & GUARDIAN(1999-05-20): "New farm, but not home for former guerrilla trackers"
online at http://www.mg.co.za [21.05.1999]
DIEBURGER(04-08-1999) 1: Brummer "Kaap kreun onder plakkery"
DIE BURGER(10-09-1999) 10: Reitz "Huisagterstand meer as in 1994"
FINANSIESEN TEGNIEK(2000-05-05) 10 - 12: Van Zyl "Grond - So lyk SA hervorming" / "Wat
409
Bibliography
Zimbabwe vir die rand inhou" / "Maak plan of ly honger" / "SA is nie Zimbabwe nie" / "So lyk die
wette nou"
SUNDAY INDEPENDENT(1997-10-19) II: "The law created apartheid, but apartheid didn't quite
destroy the law" Edited version of the submission of Mohamed, Chaskalson, Corbett, Van Heerden,
and Langa to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Digest of cases
South Africa"
Administrator Natal v Sibiya 1992 4 SA 532 (A)
Administrator Transvaal v J van Streepen (Kempton Park) (Pry) Ltd 19904 SA 644 (A)
African Farms and Townships Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1961 3 SA 392 (C)
Albertyn v Bhekaphezulu 1999 2 SA 538 (LCC); 6R199
Beckenstratcr v Sand River Irrigation Board 19644 SA 510 (T)
Cape Killarney Property Investments (Ply) Ltd v Mabamba and Others 2000 2 SA 67 (C).
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (Second Certification case) 1997 2
SA 97 (CC); 1997 1 BCLR (CC); http://www.constitution.org.za/cert.html[06.08.1999]
Chetty v Naidoo 19743 SA 13 (A)
Conradie v Fortuin (LCC) 19R198 not yet reported
Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 (3) SA 936
(CC)
De Jager v Sisana 1930 AD 71
De Lange v Smuts 1998 3 SA 785 (CC); 1998 7 BCLR 779 (CC)
Diepsloot Residents' and Landowners' Association v Administrator Transvaal 1993 I SA 577 (T); 1993 3
SA 49 (T); 1994 3 SA 366 (A)
Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC); 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC)
Dulabh v Department of Land Affairs 19974 SA 1108 (LCC) also reported as Re Dulabh: Re Erf 1687,
King William's Town 1997 All SA 635 (LCC)
Durban City Council v SA Board Mills Ltd 1961 3 SA 392 (C)
DVB Behuising (Pty) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and Another Bophuthatswana High Court
Case No 308/99 (27 May 1999) as yet unreported
DVB Behuising (Pry) Ltd v North West Provincial Government and others CCT 22/99;
http://www.law.wits.ac.zaljudgements/2000/2299. pd f [2000.04.03]
Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie en Andere 1988 2 SA 627 (T)
.. Where cases have been reported in more than one publication, references to the different reports are provided and
separated by a semi-colon. References in the footnotes are, however, limited to one per decision. In general, the
decisions handed down by the Land Claims Court and the Constitutional Court are also available online at
http://wv.rw.law.wits.ac.za [09.10.2000). Those decisions that have not yet been reported in either the South African
Law Reports or the Buttcrworths Constitutional Law Reports at the time of completion of this dissertation, are
quoted by means of their case numbers, and where possible an online reference.
410
Bibliography
Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155
Ex Parte North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils of the Durban
Metropolitan Area 1998 1 SA 78 (LCC).
Farjas (Pty) Ltd v Regional Land Claims Commissioner, KwaZulu-Natal1998 2 SA 900 (LCC)
Ferreira v Levin and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powel NO and Others 1996 1 BCLR 1 (CC); 1996
1 SA 984 (CC); http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/ferreira.html [09.06.1999]
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 19973 SA 786 (CC); 19977 BCLR 851 (CC)
Fourie v Minister van Lande en 'n Ander 19704 SA 165 (0)
Gien v Gien 19792 SA 1113 (T)
Harksen v Lane NO 1997 Il BCLR 1489 (CC); 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC)
Holomisa v Argus Newspapers Ltd 19962 SA 588 (W); 19966 BCLR 836 (W)
Jeeva v Receiver of Revenue 19952 SA 433 (SE)
Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314
Kanhym v Mashiloane (LCC) 17R198 not yet reported
Karabo v Kok 19984 SA 1014 (LCC).
Kerksay Investments (Pty) Ltd v Randburg Town Council 1997 1 SA 511 (T)
Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 4 SA 218 (W); 1995 2 BCLR 89 (W)
Khumalo and others v Potgieter and others 1999 1 All SA 10 (N)
Klopper v Mkhize 1998 1 SA 406 (N)
Lategan v Koopman 1998 3 SA 457 (LCC)
Mahlangu v De Jager 19963 SA 235 (LCC)
Mahlangu v De Jager 20003 SA 145 (LCC)
Makhombothi v Klingenberg 1999 1 SA 127 (T)
Manana v Johannes 1999 1 SA 181 (LCC)
Minister of Land Affairs v Slamdien (LCC) 107/98 not yet reported
Minister of the Interior v Loekhat 1961 2 SA 587 (A)
Mkwanazi v Bivane Bosbou, Msimango v De Villiers; Ngema v Van der Walt; Mdletshe v Nxumalo
1999 1 All SA 59 (LCC)
Mlifi v Klingenberg 1999 2 SA 647 (LCC)
Mnisi v Chauke and Others; Chauke v Provincial Secretary, Transvaal, and Others 19944 SA 715 (T)
Mokwena v Marie Appel Beleggings (LCC) 89/98
Moshela v Sancor 1999 1 SA 614 (T)
Nehabeleng v Phasha 1998 3 SA 578 (LCC)
New National Party of South Africa v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1999 (3)
SA 191 (CC); 19995 BCLR 489 (CC)
Ngcobo and others v Salimba CC 1999 2 SA 1057 (SCA); [1999] JOL 4728 (A);
http://www.butterworths.co.za/jol/special/99004728.html [31.05.1999]
Ngobo v Van Rensburg and Others 19992 SA 525 (LCC
Nortje v AG Cape 1995 (2) SA 460 (C); 1995 2 BCLR 236
Ntuli v Smit 1999 2 SA 540 (LCC).
411
Bibliography
Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 19952 SA 148 (C); 19952 BCLR 198 (C)
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 2 SA 1074
(SECLD).
Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); 1998 3 BCLR 257
Protea Technology Ltd v Wainer 19979 BCLR 1225 (W) 1238
Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 19943 SA 625 (E); 1995 I BCLR 75 (E)
Rademeyer v Western Districts Council 19983 SA 10II (SECLD).
Re Dulabh: Re Erf 1687 King William's Town LCC 14/96; later reported as Dulabh and Another v
Department of Land Affairs 19974 SAII08 (LCC)
Re Elandskloof Vereniging 1999 I SA 176 (LCC)
Re Farmerfield Communal Property Trust 1999 (I) SA 936 (LCC)
Re Former Highlands Residents 2000 I SA 489 (LCC)
Re Macleantown Residents Association 19964 SA 1272 (LCC)
Rondebosch Municipal Council v Trustees of the Western Province Agricultural Society 1911 AD 271
S v Bhulwana 1995 I SA 509 (C); 1996 I SA 388 (CC)
S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 19974 SA 1176 (CC); 1997 10 BCLR 1345 (CC)
S v Majuvu 19944 SA 26 (Ck); 1994 2 BCLR 56 (Ck)
S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC); 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC)
S v Mhlungu 1995 3 SA 867 (CC); 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC)
S v Zuma 1995 2 SA 642 (CC); 1995 4 BCLR 40 I (CC)
Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 19982 SA 38 (CC); 1997 12 BCLR 1675 (CC)
Sandton Town Council v Erf 89 Sandown Extension 2 (Pty) Ltd 1988 3 SA 122 (A)
Serole v Pienaar (LCC) 9/99
Singh v North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils of the Durban Metropolitan
Area 1999 I All SA 350 (LCC)
Slabbert v Minister van Lande 1963 3 SA 620 (T)
Soobramoney v Minister of Hcalth KwaZulu-Natal 1998 I SA 765 (CC), 1997 BCLR 1696 (CC)
Springs v Occupants of the Farm Kwa-Therria (1998) 4 All SA 155 (LCC)
Tselentis Mining (Pty) Ltd v Mdlalose 1998 I SA 411 (N)
Uitenhage Local Transitional Council v Zenza and Others 1997 8 BCLR 115 (ES)
Uitkyk Farm Estates v Visser (LCC) 60/98
Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 19974 SA 441 (C); 1997 6 BCLR 789 (C)
Van der Walt v Lange 1999 I SA 189 (LCC)
White Rocks Farm (Ply) Ltd & Another v Minister of Community Development 19843 SA 785 (N)
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd v Whitehead (Women's Legal Centre Trust Intervening) 2000 3 SA 529 (LAC)
Zulu v Van Rensburg 19964 SA 1236 (LCC)
412
Bibliography
Germany
Federal Constitutional Court
BVerfGE 1 14
BVerfGE 1 264 (Schomsteinfeger)
BVerfGE 1 97
BVerfGE 3377
BVerfGE 358
BVerfGE 47 (Investitionshilfe)
BVerfGE 585
BVerfGE 6 32
BVerfGE 6 389
BVerfGE 7 129
BVerfGE 7 198 (Luth)
BVerfGE 8 71
BVerfGE 8 210
BVerfGE 8 277
BVerfGE 9 137
BVerfGE Il 64
BVerfGE 28, 119
BVerfGE Il 105
BVerfGE 12205
BVerfGE 13 225
BVerfGE 13 248
BVerfGE 14263 (Feldmuhle)
BVerfGE 14 288
BVerfGE 16 147
BVerfGE 16 194
BVerfGE 16286
BVerfGE 1694
BVerfGE 17 108
BVerfGE 17306
BVerfGE 18 121
BVerfGE 18, 132
BVerfGE 18315
BVerfGE 18 392
BVerfGE 19206
BVerfGE 19 342
BVerfGE 20 351 (Tolwut)
BVerfGE 20 45
BVerfGE 21 150
BVerfGE 21 73
BVerfGE 22 180
BVerfGE 23 127
BVerfGE 23 288
BVerfGE 24 367 (Deichordnung)
BVerfGE 25 112 (Niedersachsische
Deichgesetz)
BVerfGE 25371
BVerfGE 27 253
BVerfGE 27 344
BVerfGE 28 119
BVerfGE 30 292
BVerfGE 30 173 (Mephisto)
BVerfGE 31 229
BVerfGE 31 239
BVerfGE 31275
BVerfGE 32 111
BVerfGE 34 165
BVerfGE 34 210
BVerfGE 35 263
BVerfGE 3585
BVerfGE 36 281
BVerfGE 37 132 (Wohnraumktindigung)
BVerfGE 38 175
BVerfGE 38 348
BVerfGE 40 121
BVerfGE 40 65
BVerfGE 41 126
BVerfGE 41 153
BVerfGE 41 29
BVerfGE 41 65
BVerfGE 42 143
BVerfGE 42263 (Contergan)
413
BVerfGE 45 142
BVcrfGE 45297 (Hamburger U-Bahn-Bau)
BVerfGE 45 376
BVerfGE 47 268
BVerfGE 49382
BVerfGE 50 290 (Mitbestimmung)
BVerfGE 50 57
BVcrfGE 51 liS
BVerfGE 51 150
BVerfGE 51 193 (Schlol3berg)
BVerfGE 52 I (Kleingarten)
BVerfGE 53 257
BVerfGE 53366
BVerfGE 56 249 (Durkheirner Gondelbahn)
BVerfGE 58 137 (Pflichtexernplar)
BVcrfGE 58 300 (Nal3auskiesung)
BVerfGE 58 81
BVerfGE 59 275
BVerfGE 61 82
BVerfGE 62 169
BVerfGE 62 320
BVerfGE 66 234
BVerfGE 66 248 (Hochspannungslcitung)
BVerfGE 68 193
BVerfGE 68361
BVerfGE 69 272
BVerfGE 70 191
BVerfGE 70 278
BVerfGE 72 175
BVerfGE 72 278
BYerfGE 72 66
BVerfGE 72 9
BYerfGE 73 261
BYerfGE 74 12
BYerfGE 74 129
BYerfGE 74 203
BYerfGE 74 264 (Boxberg)
BYerfGE 76 220
BVerfGE 77 84
BYerfGE 78 205
BYerfGE 78 58
BYerfGE 79 I
BYerfGE 79 174
BYerfGE 79 29
BYerfGE80137
BYerfGE8112
BVerfGE 82 159 190
BVcrfGE 83201 (Vorkaufsrecht)
BVerfGE 84 286
BVerfGE 8490
BYcrfGE 85 130
BYerfGE 87 114
BVerfGE 89 I (Besitzrecht des Mieters)
BVerfGE 91 294 (Fortgeltung der
M ietepreisbindung)
BVerfGE 1991 NJW 1597
BYerfG 1976 NJW 101 (Vermëgcnsstcucr)
BYerfG 1988 KTS 564 - 565 (3 K)
Decisionof21 Apri11993(1 BvR 1422/92)
Decision of 3 April 1990 (1 BvR 269/90, I BvR
270/90)
Decision of7 July 1985, 1985 DVB/1015
Decision of 5 June 1992, 1992 Europtiische
Grundrecht Zeitung 19
Decision of 16 July 1985 - (I BvL 5/80), 1985
881537-1540
Decision of 18 October 1993 [ BvR 1335/91
1994 NJ25
Decision of 15 April 1993 (I BvR 1885/92)
1993 NJIV 366
Bibliography
BGHZ 6 270 (1952 NJW 972)
BGHZ 6 276
BGHZ 23 157
BGHZ 23235
Federal Court of Justice
414
Bibliography
BGHZ 2330
BGHZ 30 241
BGHZ 30 338
BGHZ 30 338
BGHZ 37 44
BGHZ 39198
BGHZ 44, 288.
BGHZ 45 83 (Knackebrot)
BGHZ4865
BGHZ 52 371
BGHZ 55261
BGHZ 62 96
BGHZ 72 211
BGHZ 73 146
BGHZ 77179
BGHZ 80111
BGHZ 9017
BGHZ904
BGHZ9120
BGHZ 92 34
BGHZ 97 369
BGH 1975 NJW 1017
BGH 1976 NJW 1313
BGH 1980 NJW 387
BGH 1986 NVwZ 76
BGH 1990 NJW 898
BGH 1994 NJW 188
Federal Administrative Court
BVerwGE 3335
BVerwGE 32 135
BVerwGE 38 209
BVerwGE 4 57
BVerwGE 5 143
BVerwGE 62 224
BVerwG 1990 DVBI 585
Other
BayVfGH l3 141 (b)
BSG 1987 NJW 463
RGZ 109319
RGZ 111320
RGZ 129 146
Other Jurisdictions
City ofOwnensboro v McCormack 581 SW 2d 3 (Ky 1979)
Davies v Minister of Lands Agriculture and Water Development 1997 1 SA 228 (ZSC)
Flemming v Nestor 363 US 603 (1960)
Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 254 (1970)
Handyside decision 1977 EuGRZ 38
HD Vora v State of Maharashtra 1984 AIR 866 SC 869
Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1982 1 SA 490 (ZSC)
Holland v Scott 1882 EDC 307
Karesh v City Council 247 SE 2d 342
Marckx decision 1979 EuGRZ 454
415
Bibliography
Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub-intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565
Poletown Neighbourhood City Council v City of Detroit 304 NW 2d 455
R v Oakes 1986 19 CRR 308; 1986 1 SCR 103; 198626 DLR 41h 200 SCC; 1987 LRC (Const) 477
Shelley v Kraemer 334 US 1 (1948)
Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347
State of Bihar v Kamcshwar Singh AIR (1952) SC 252
Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1980) 2 EHRR 245
416
Bibliography
Digest of statutes and policy documents
South Africa
Constitutions
(Interim) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 200 of 1993
(Final) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
Legislation
Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991; 110 of 1993
Abuse of Dependence-producing Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971
Advertising on Roads and Ribbon Development Act 21 of 1940
Agricultural Pests Act 36 of 1983
Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991
Animals Protection Act 71 of 1962
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965
Arms and Ammunition Act 75 of 1969
Atmospheric Pollution Prevention Act 45 of 1965
Black Administration Act 38 of 1927
Black Authorities Act 126 of 1951
Black Land Act 27 of 1913
Black Laws Amendment Act 42 of 1964
Black Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936
Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945
Borders of Particular States Extension Act 2 of 1980
Broadcasting Act 73 of 1976
Communal Properties Associations Act 28 of 1996
Community Development Act 3 of 1966
Companies Act 61 of 1973
Conservation of Agricultural Resources Act 43 of 1983
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Amendment Act 2 of 1994
Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act 81 of 1988
Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995
Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936
Distribution and Transfer of Certain State Land Act 119 of 1993
Electricity Act 40 of 1958
Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989
417
Bibliography
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975
Expropriation Amendment Act 31 of 1958
Expropriation of Lands and Arbitration Clauses Proclamation 5 of 1902 (Transvaal)
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
General Law Second Amendment Act 108 of 1993
Group Areas Act 36 of 1966; 41 of 1950; 77 of 1957
Health Act 63 of 1977
Housing Act 107 of 1997
Housing Development Act (I louse of Delegates) 4 of 1987
Indecent or Obscene Photographic Matter Act 37 of 1967
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996
Joint Administration of Certain Matters Act 99 of 1993
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
Land Affairs General Amendment Act II of 1995
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 18 of 1999; 63 of 1997; 78 of 1996
Land Titles Adjustment Act I II of 1993
Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (Cape)
Less Formal Township Establishment Act 112 of 1991; 113 of 1991
Local Government Ordinance 17 of 1939 (T)
Minerals Act 50 of 1991
Municipal Act 45 of 1882
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977
National States Constitutions Act 2) of 1971
Physical Planning Act 125 of 1991
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951
Property Time-Sharing Control Act 75 of 1983
Provision of Certain Land and Assistance Act 126 of 1993 (now: Provision of Certain Land for
Settlement Act 126 of 1993)
Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Amendment Act 26 of 1998
Public Service Act 1994 (Transkei)
Publications Act 42 of 1974
Regulation of Joint Executive Action Act 109 of 1993
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994
Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989
Rural Areas Act (House of Representatives) 9 of 1987
Second General Laws Amendment Act 108 of 1993
Share Block Control Act 59 of 1980
418
Bibliography
Slums Act 6 of 1959; 76 of 1979
South Africa Act 1909
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 of 1996
Transformation of Certain Rural Areas Act 94 of 1998
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Amendment Act 34 of 1996
Government Notices R29, R 30, R402, R 404, R 405 of9 March 1988 and R293
Proclamation R176 of02 December 1994
Proclamation R188 of 18 June 1969
Proclamation R293 of 16 November 1962
Proclamation R9 of 1997
Town Planning and Township Ordinance 15 of 1986 (Transvaal)
Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949 (Natal)
Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969 (OFS)
Transvaal Roads Ordinance 22 of 1957
Political and governmental policy documents and papers
ANC: "A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa." Appendix A vol 21 1989 Columbia Human Rights
Law Review 235 - 239
ANC: "African Claims in Africa" 1943 online at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/keydocs.html
[12.03.2000]
ANC: "Freedom Charter" 1955 online at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/keydocs.html
[12.03.2000]
ANC: "Ready to Govern: ANC Policy Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" online at
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/readyto.html [13.02.2000]
Department of Land Affairs White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) online at
http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white _papers/landwp.html [16.12.1998]
Draft Property Rates Bill, online at http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/bills/2000/property.pdf
[06.09.2000]
Memorandum on the Objects of the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Bill 1997
NP "Proposals on a Charter of Fundamental Rights" (2 February 1993)
Panel of Constitutional Experts' Memorandum (Re: panel memo on "special limitations'Z''qualifiers"
and general limitation) of20-02-1996, online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/exmemo/cp320026.html[ 19.01.2000]
South African Law Commission Working Paper 25 Project 58 Group and Human Rights (1989)
South African Revenue Service (SARS): Guide to Capital Gains Tax 23 February 2000
Technical Committee/Theme Committee Four Explanatory Memoranda on the Draft Bill of Rights
(09.10.1995) "Overview of Method of Work" online at
http://www.constitution.org.za/cgi-bin/vdkw _cgi/xb45ff20b-l 0/Search/x2ccdbc/3#HLO
419
Bibliography
[04.02.2000]
Germany'
Basic Law
Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 23 May 1949, BGBI I
Statutes and Treaties
Anordnung abel' die Behandlung des Vermogens von Personen die die Deutsche Demokratische
Republik nach dent 10 Junie 1953 ver/assen 10 June 1953, GBI DDR I 664
Atomgesetz 31 October 1975 as amended on 15 July 1984, BGBI I 1565
Baugesetzbuch 8 December 1986, BGBI 12253.
Berichtigung des zweiten Vemiëgensrechtsánderungsgesetzes 1993, BGBI [ 1811
Bundesfernstrafiengesetz 19.April [994, BGBll 85
Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz 14 May 1990, BGBI I 880
Bundesnaturschutzgeset; 29 December 1976, BGBI I 889
Bundeswaldgesetz 2 May 1975, BGBll 1037
Bundeswasserstraflengesetz 23 August 1990, BGBI 818
Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 18 August 1896, RGBI 195/ BGBI [J[ 400
Energiewirtschafisgesetz 24 April 1998, BGBI r 730
Flurbereinigungsgesetz 16 March 1976, BGBI [ 546
Gemeinsame Erklárung zur Regelung offener Vermëgensfragen 15 June 1990, BGBI II 1273
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz 27 January 1877, RGBII 41 19 May 1975, BGBI 111300
Gesetz iiber besondere Investitionen in del' Deutsche Demokratischen Republik 23 September 1990,
BGBI If 889, 1157
Gesetz iiber das Wohuuugseigentum und das Dauerwohnrecht 15 March 1951, BGBI I 175 / Il
January 1993, BGBI 150
Gesetz Ober den Vorrang jur Investitionen bei Riickiibertragungsanspriichen nach dem
Vermëgensgesetz (Investitionsvorranggesetz) 14 July 1992, BGBI r 1257, 12G8
Gesetz uber den Widerruf von Einburgerungen und die Aberkennung der deutschen
Staatsangehërigkeit 14 July 1933, RGBI 1480
Gesel: iiber die Entschiidigung nach dem Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermogensfragen und Liber
staatliche Ausgleichsleistungen fiir Enteignungen auf besatzungsrechtlicher oder
besatzungshoheitlicher Grundlage 27 September 1994, BGBI [ 2624
Gesel: iiber die strukturelle Anpassung der Landwinschaft an die soziale und okologische
Marktwinschaft in del' Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Landwirtschaflsanpassungsgeselz) [9
June 1990, GBI I 642
• The German legislation quoted is based on the law as it stands on I June 2000, unless the contrary appears
from the context in which il is used in the text.
420
Bibliography
Gesetz Ober MaJ3nahmen zur Verbesserung der Agrarstruktur und zur Sicherung land- und
forstwirtschaflicher Betriebe 28 July 1961, BGBI I 1091/8 December 1986, BGBI I 2191
Gesetz zur Ánderung des Vermogensgesetzes und
(2. Vermogensrechtsánderungsgesetz) 14 July 1992, BGBl 1257
Gesetz zur Anpassung der Rechtspflege im Beitrittsgebiet 30 June 1992, BGBI I S 1147
anderer Vorschriften
Gesetz zur Beseitigung von Hemmnissen bei der Privatisierung von Unternehmen und zur Fërderung
von Investitionen (Investment Acceleration Act) 22 March 1991, BGBI I 766
Gesetz zur Ordnung deichrechtlicher Verhiiltnisse der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg,29 April
1964, GVBl I 79
Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Vermogens (Treuhandgesetz) 17 June
1990, GBI DDR I 33 300
Gesetz zur Regelung offener Vermëgensfragen (Open Property Questions Act / Property Act) 23
September 1990, BGBI II 1159/2 December 1994, BGBI I 3610
Grundbuchordnung 26 May 1994, BGBI I 1114
Grundstiicksverkehrsgesetz 28 July 1961, BGBI I 1091, 1652,2000.
Hamburger Denkmalschutzgesetz, 3 December 1973, GVBI 466
Landesenteignungsgesetz von Baden- Wiirttemberg 6 April 1982, GBI Ba-Wil 97
Landesenteignungsgesetz von Rheinland-Pfalz 1966 GVBl 103/27 June 1974, GVBl290
Luftverkehrgesetz 14 January 1981, BGBI I 61
Pachtkreditgesetz 5 August 1951, BGBI I 494 / 8 November 1985, BGBl I 2065
Telegraphenwegegesetz 24 April 1991, BGBI I 1053
Umwandlungsgesetz 28 October 1994, BGBI I 3210/1995 BGB1428.
Verordnung des Reichspriisidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat 28 February 1933, RGBI I 83
Verordnung zur Sicherung von Vermogenswerten 17 July 1952, GBI DDR 615)
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik iiber
die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands (Einigungsvertrag / Unification Treaty) 31 August 1990,
BGBI 1990 II 889
Wasserhaushaltsgesetz 1 March 1960 (amended version of 16 October 1976), 23 September 1986,
BGBI I 1529
Zwangsversteigerungsgesetz 24 March 1897, RGBI 97 / 20 May 1898, RGBI 713 / BGBI. IIIIFNA 310
-314
Other
Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982
Constitution of India 1950
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950
421
